1st Masurian Lakes WI

  • Thread starter Deleted member 1487
  • Start date

Deleted member 1487

http://www.firstworldwar.com/maps/easternfront.htm

http://www.firstworldwar.com/maps/graphics/maps_21_east_prussia1914_7.jpg

http://www.firstworldwar.com/battles/masurian1.htm
On September 10 the German flank attack on the Russian 1st army south of the main line near Konigsberg had broken through the Russian defenses and the Russian supply lines laid open. Hindenburg then made a grave mistake and turned his troops north toward Goldap instead of making toward Wierzbalowo by way of moving south of the forest of Rominten. This allowed the Russians to escape back into Lithuania instead of suffering a similar fate to that of the 2nd army at Tannenberg.

Though it probably wouldn't have been completely destroyed, the Russian 1st army could have lost several corps including the difficult-to-replace artillery. Supposing Hindenburg had taken the risk and won big, destroying 2 Russian armies in as many weeks, what would happen next?

OTL the Russians were able to regroup and stop the Germans on the Nieman river while Hindenburg wasted his troops by trying to force said river. Meanwhile the Russians were slaughtering the AHs in Galicia. So would Hindenburg try to invade Lithuania to go after the Russian 10th army, recently formed near Osowiec, or would he try to help the AHs?
 
He probably should have gone to Galicia, satisfied with his victory. As I recall, the lakes continued much further beyond his line of advance, and would've remained a troubling obstacle. I think the entire Masurian Lakes region was a bad front for both sides with regard to offense.
 
http://www.firstworldwar.com/maps/easternfront.htm

http://www.firstworldwar.com/maps/graphics/maps_21_east_prussia1914_7.jpg

http://www.firstworldwar.com/battles/masurian1.htm
On September 10 the German flank attack on the Russian 1st army south of the main line near Konigsberg had broken through the Russian defenses and the Russian supply lines laid open. Hindenburg then made a grave mistake and turned his troops north toward Goldap instead of making toward Wierzbalowo by way of moving south of the forest of Rominten. This allowed the Russians to escape back into Lithuania instead of suffering a similar fate to that of the 2nd army at Tannenberg.

Though it probably wouldn't have been completely destroyed, the Russian 1st army could have lost several corps including the difficult-to-replace artillery. Supposing Hindenburg had taken the risk and won big, destroying 2 Russian armies in as many weeks, what would happen next?

OTL the Russians were able to regroup and stop the Germans on the Nieman river while Hindenburg wasted his troops by trying to force said river. Meanwhile the Russians were slaughtering the AHs in Galicia. So would Hindenburg try to invade Lithuania to go after the Russian 10th army, recently formed near Osowiec, or would he try to help the AHs?

He would very probably split Eighth Army into Eighth Army and Ninth Army and try to do both. Interestingly the Germans had a lot of trouble with the minor fort at Osowiec in both 1914 and 1915.

There is two interesting personality aspects to this. One is that Hindenburg's prestige is enhanced still more so his ascendancy over Falkenhayn may be moved forward. The other is that once again the hero of the battle is the commander of I Army Corps, von Francois. The Dynamic Duo viewed him with ambivalence and distrust. Would he finally get the credit he deserved.
 
http://www.firstworldwar.com/maps/easternfront.htm

http://www.firstworldwar.com/maps/graphics/maps_21_east_prussia1914_7.jpg

http://www.firstworldwar.com/battles/masurian1.htm
On September 10 the German flank attack on the Russian 1st army south of the main line near Konigsberg had broken through the Russian defenses and the Russian supply lines laid open. Hindenburg then made a grave mistake and turned his troops north toward Goldap instead of making toward Wierzbalowo by way of moving south of the forest of Rominten. This allowed the Russians to escape back into Lithuania instead of suffering a similar fate to that of the 2nd army at Tannenberg.

Though it probably wouldn't have been completely destroyed, the Russian 1st army could have lost several corps including the difficult-to-replace artillery. Supposing Hindenburg had taken the risk and won big, destroying 2 Russian armies in as many weeks, what would happen next?

OTL the Russians were able to regroup and stop the Germans on the Nieman river while Hindenburg wasted his troops by trying to force said river. Meanwhile the Russians were slaughtering the AHs in Galicia. So would Hindenburg try to invade Lithuania to go after the Russian 10th army, recently formed near Osowiec, or would he try to help the AHs?

I'm a bit dubious of the 8th army encircling and destroying Rennekempf in that scenario... the 8th army was damn exhausted and would have a difficult time (as they did going the other direction) on a forced march like that. Also Rennekempf's troops where much fresher and where no longer suffering from starvation ... I think your scenario would result in a head to head meatgrinder (perhaps compelling Rennekempf to retreat, but costing the Germans casualties that where difficult to spare)
 

Deleted member 1487

I'm a bit dubious of the 8th army encircling and destroying Rennekempf in that scenario... the 8th army was damn exhausted and would have a difficult time (as they did going the other direction) on a forced march like that. Also Rennekempf's troops where much fresher and where no longer suffering from starvation ... I think your scenario would result in a head to head meatgrinder (perhaps compelling Rennekempf to retreat, but costing the Germans casualties that where difficult to spare)

I didn't say, or at least intend to say, that Rennenkampf would be destroyed. He would suffer more losses than OTL, but would still escape with some forces, probably more proportionally than Samsonov. He also had large forces at Kovno, mainly reservists that were not brought along for lack of equipment/training, who would still be able to form some sort of force to fight.
 
I posted a thread on this very subject sometime back. Generally the consensus emerged that while the Russians get banged up a bit more another Tannenburg is highly unlikely as at Tannenburg the Russian commander on hearing that he had been encircled became despondent and did nothing to redress the situation.

Link
 

Deleted member 1487

I posted a thread on this very subject sometime back. Generally the consensus emerged that while the Russians get banged up a bit more another Tannenburg is highly unlikely as at Tannenburg the Russian commander on hearing that he had been encircled became despondent and did nothing to redress the situation.

Link

Too bad I didn't see it at the time, I would have commented. It seems though that Tom_B covered the subject nicely, however there appears to be a new wrinkle:
http://www.1911encyclopedia.org/Battles_In_Masuria
"The battle opened generally on Sept. 7. On that day and the two following days the frontal attack of the Germans made only slow progress, the Guard Res. Corps approaching Allenburg, the I. Res. Gerdanen, and the XX. Angerburg. One div. of the last named, originally kept back as army reserve to add weight to the decisive attack, had to be returned to the corps to enable it to progress in the Mauer See region. Farther to the S., the XVII. Corps, utilizing the gate of Lotzen, sought to debouch on Kruglanken, but the Russians, having intended to attack Lotzen, were in strength here, and the advance of this part of the German enveloping wing was arrested. Army headquarters now possessed no reserve, and to open the way for the XVII. Corps there was no alternative but to swing the greater part of the I. Corps sharply northward instead of northeastward. Thus delay was imposed on the striking wing of the attack; and when, on the night of Sept. 9-10, Rennenkampf decided to take down his line from right to left and retired eastward on Wirballen, Suwalki and Augustowo, it was already unlikely that the Germans would be able to place any important forces across the enemy's lines of retreat in time."

So it would appear that the turn north instead of northeast, while imposing a significant delay on the German advance, was necessary to allow enough space for XVII corps to advance, seeing as it was hemmed in at Loetzen. Perhaps this PoD is not a workable as I thought.

http://www.tannenberg1914.de/4_1masur/3_angr.htm
From a German perspective, so you'll have to use google translate.

Edit: further reading of Hew Strachan, who only offers analysis rather than in depth coverage, suggests that Ludendorff's fixation pre-battle on simply forcing the Russian out of Prussia instead of envelopment cost them the opportunity to really encircle their foe. Fears in the 8th army over the Russian 10th cutting off the southern pincer were a major hold on the operation and it was only Francois's independent actions that even opened up the possibility of envelopment from the south. Ludendorff, again according to Strachan, only realized the opportunity on September 11th after Rennenkampf had already ordered a retreat back to Lithuania.

Reading through Max Hoffmann's "War of Lost Opportunities", it seems the operations officer of the 8th army did not consider this to be one of those lost opportunities. He claims that with the forces at hand an envelopment was impossible. Intelligence indicated the Russians had many more forces that they did not use (he mentions a Grodno reserve of several divisions, which would have operated against Francois's I corps), which of course affected planning.
 
Last edited by a moderator:
Top