The major POD with this would have to be Saddam's initial planning; anything from the actual invasion onwards would have negligible butterflies and still end in a serious curbstomping. He tried to fight it like Iran-Iraq II, but months of entrenching can only do so much if you have zilch air superiority. The thing to remember here is that Saddam was gambling that no one would actually step in once he took control of Kuwait; all he really wanted was nullification of his war debts with Iran, some quick cash from the Kuwaiti coffers and a firmer grip on oil output and price control to help refill his own depleted treasury. Once the pressure from the UN began to step up to get him out, he began playing for time with delaying tactics such as solving the issue through an Arabs only summit, or offering to pull out only once the Palestinian question was settled. He always figured he'd have enough time to intimidate his neighbors while he resettled enough Kuwaiti's to skew their demographics in favor of his "19th Province" plan.
I like the idea of him just expanding the operation to simply include Kuwait as part of a larger sweep into Saudi Arabia. It'd serve as a spoiler to U.S. defensive plans and limit Coalition responses for the immediate future to an amphibious assault or a more limited buildup in Bahrain or Qatar. Certainly not the lengthy, overwhelming buildup Coalition forces were able to do OTL. There's certainly pontential for some bloodier engagements if we increase the operations area by that magnitude, and it opens up a whole slew of possible strategic responses.
The downside to this is that the logistics buildup needed for an operation of this scale would be easily spotted on the border by both U.S. and Soviet satellites, possibly throwing a kink into things. We wouldn't have pre-emptive U.S. naval airstrikes ('03, yes. '90, hell no.) to disrupt the columns, but it could help speed along U.S.-Saudi negotiations to get military assistance into the country.