1989: A Space Timeline

I: STS-27
This timeline can also be found on Sufficient Velocity.

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STS-27



Commander Howard “Skip” Johnson was the first to speak up. “We’re in deep shit.”

The rest of the crew of Space Shuttle Atlantis were in agreement. On the second day of mission STS-27, December 3rd 1988, an unusual request was made from Mission Control. Despite being the largest, most capable spacecraft ever built, the Space Shuttle was extraordinary delicate. A piece of debris from the booster rockets had hit the orbiter on ascent, and inspection was required. Mission specialist William Mueller positioned the robotic Canadarm’s television camera below the right wing of the craft. It was the worst case scenario. Hundreds of tiles were damaged, and any one of them could have exposed the vulnerable aluminum belly of the craft. Johnson turned on his microphone. “Houston, we are seeing a whole lot of damage on the right wing, in the chine area and back on the right wing in the tiles, sending secure TV of the damage.”

With the classified Department of Defense cargo they were carrying, an unencrypted television signal was deemed too dangerous. Each frame of the slow scan television signal was sent through a sophisticated encoder and relayed down to Houston. What followed was a few tense moments of silence.

Mueller was about to turn around and ask for a second opinion when CAPCOM¹ responded. "We've looked at the images and Mechanical² says it's not a problem. The damage isn't that severe."

Mueller was the first to object. “There must be an issue with your images, Houston, we’re seeing massive damage along the right wing in particular.”

"Houston, Will is right. We're seeing a lot of damage." Johnson had been there since the start of the program, and never had there been such damage predicted, let alone seen.

“Skip, we’ve looked it over and we’ve determined that it's not any worse than what we've seen on other flights.” A very long silence passed. Confusion, anger, and a small amount of fear was thick in the cabin. But, ultimately, they was little that could be done. There was no possibility of a rescue mission, nor could the tiles, each precision machined and applied by hand to the Shuttle in a multi-million dollar facility, be replaced on a space walk.

“Well, all right Houston, we trust your analysis, continuing with the mission.” Skip released his mike and leaned back into his flight seat. The rest seemed pleased by the answer, but he’d only made the call to avoid an argument. Maybe they were keeping it bottled up too.

Department of Defense work proved to be a needed distraction. Nestled within the stomach of the Shuttle was a National Reconnaissance Office satellite, some kind of telescope. Johnson wasn’t exactly sure what it was, but the mission specialists on the middeck spent the rest of the day preparing the payload for release. A control thruster failed soon after it was launched, but the repair spacewalk was finished quicker than estimated. The rest of the mission was devoted to some flight experiments, all classified of course. The NRO was pleased with the results, and the mission was declared a success.

Before Skip knew it, December 5th had come and gone. It was time for sleep, and after that, reentry.

Sleep was difficult, as it always is in zero-g. With no gravity to keep one to the sleeping bag, it felt like trying to sleep while paragliding. The stress of the circumstances didn't help. Johnson woke up early on December 6th, not entirely rested. He was surprised to find Mueller already awake, looking nearly paralyzed Johnson unbuckled his restraints and floated over to the mission specialist’s sleeping bag. Whispering, he asked, “What is it Will, you’re as stiff as a rod!”

Mueller’s voice was calm, but cautious. “It’s well, the reentry, commander. I’ve been anxious this last day about it. I mean, they say it’s all right, but, is it?” He started to raise his voice past a whisper. “We’ve never had a strike like this before. Could it be--”

Johnson cut him off. Hearing someone else feel just as concerned about the situation released all the stress he’d built up. He glided to the porthole and beckoned Mueller. “No reason to die all tensed up.” They were passing over the US at night. A hundred million streetlamps could be seen from that porthole, each burning with an intensity that was unreal. They were scattered across the landscape like cracks in crystal glass. You could tell which were mercury; which were sodium. One could even see the first Christmas lights of the year. It was a sight that only a select few would ever see in their lives.

It seemed like they could fly up there forever.

***

Mission Control was monitoring the reentry of Atlantis. Landing at Edwards Air Force Base, they would feel peak forces over the Pacific. Mechanical had reviewed the TV footage a few hours before the return sequence began, and from the fuzzy, low resolution footage, it seemed like a perfectly normal strike. The control center was usually quiet at this part in the flight. The flight director was sitting in his chair, watching the small Space Shuttle icon make its way on the projector screen, and waiting for any prompts from the other flight controllers. Years later, he could still recall the exact moment when it happened. 18:01:45, Central Time.

“Flight, MMACS.” ²

“What is it, MMACS?”

“I’ve lost two temperature sensors in the right wing.”

“Two of them?”

“Yes, two, one in the leading edge and another in the chine. There is no commonality.”

“No commonality.”

“Flight, GNC.” ³

“Yes?”

“We’re seeing a divergence in trim between the left and right wings. Appears to be drag induced.”

At that point, it appears that the commander knew what was happening. “Let me just tell you exactly what I think about your little analysis, MMACS. I think I have about sixty seconds to do it!” ⁴

Atlantis, Houston, say again?”

“Flight, MMACS. We’ve lost tire pressure on the right outboard tire.”

Johnson begins an angry and tearful monologue, but becomes difficult to hear only moments after. Expects conclude afterwards that hot plasma was formed from the melting of the aluminum Shuttle frame, disrupting radio communications. What exactly he said, nobody knows.

“Uh, MMACS, Flight. There’s no commonality between the temperature sensor instrumentation and that tire instrumentation?”

“No commonality.”

“Flight, INCO,⁵ we’re not expecting such a hit on communications.”

“No onboard system config changes right before we lost data? “

“That’s correct, Flight, all looked good. We should be getting a strong signal right now.”

For the first time, everyone in the room looks up. The implications are obvious.

Atlantis, Houston, UHF comm check.”

“We have radar tracking… multiple objects.”

Atlantis, Houston, UHF comm check.”

“Lock the doors. Our discussions are on these official loops only. No data, no phone calls, no communication anywhere into or out!” ⁶
________
¹Capsule Communicator. A member of the astronaut corps that acts as the voice of Mission Control.

² Mechanical, Maintenance, Arm and Crew Systems. This division of Mission Control handles structural systems of the Shuttle.

³ Guidance, Navigation, and Controls Systems Engineer. Handles Shuttle navigation.

Over 700 tiles on the historical STS-27 were damaged, but the heat shielding was never breached. The real commander, Robert L. Gibson, believed that a divergence in the trim of the wing elevons would be the signal of a failing reentry, after which the orbiter would only last for under a minute. He was proven right in the Columbia disaster of 2003. Names were changed on this particular mission out of respect.

Integrated Communications Officer. Handles Shuttle radio communications.

In case of an accident, Mission Control becomes in effect a crime scene. All logs and computer states are preserved to make sure investigators can figure out what happened.
 
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"Hoot" Gibson OTL said he would let Mission Control know exactly what they he thought of their analysis.

Some actual pictures of the damage.
Yeah, the historic STS-27R damage was forward on orbiter, while the STS-107 damage was on the wing, much further aft. Based on the data drop-outs we see here, I'm presuming that the author is going for a clone of the STS-107 foam shedding, not the SRB TPS loss from STS-27R. One thing that would be different is that the earlier flight had the arm, and would be easily able to image the RCC panels in a way that it was not able to image the forward tiles. Given the more accessible location, and the higher contrast (RCC is a light grey, not the black of the tiles), NASA would have a better idea of the damage, and there would probably have been an effort to reduce thermal loads on the damaged wing.

Edit: Also, the flight would be STS-27R.

STS-27 was also known as STS-51-I, during the launch of which Commander Joe Engle famously said "That cloud is BLACK".
 
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Yeah, the historic STS-27R damage was forward on orbiter, while the STS-107 damage was on the wing, much further aft. Based on the data drop-outs we see here, I'm presuming that the author is going for a clone of the STS-107 foam shedding, not the SRB TPS loss from STS-27R. One thing that would be different is that the earlier flight had the arm, and would be easily able to image the RCC panels in a way that it was not able to image the forward tiles. Given the more accessible location, and the higher contrast (RCC is a light grey, not the black of the tiles), NASA would have a better idea of the damage, and there would probably have been an effort to reduce thermal loads on the damaged wing.

Edit: Also, the flight would be STS-27R.

STS-27 was also known as STS-51-I, during the launch of which Commander Joe Engle famously said "That cloud is BLACK".

As STS-27 was the public designation, it will be continue to be used for the duration of the timeline. In addition, the historical issue was that this was a DoD flight. The secure video had serious issues:
Robert Gibson said:
Their conclusion, which they did not pass back to us, was 'oh, you know what? That's not tile damage, those are just lights and shadows we're seeing in this video.' So in other words, the resolution on the encrypted video was that bad that they based a conclusion on it that was in gross error. ... If I had said hey, I think this is important enough for us to break the encryption and send you guys clear video, oh, it would have been pandemonium down there at DOD. But in hindsight, oh man, that's what we should have done. Because they were drawing an incorrect conclusion from it and they were not telling us what their conclusion was.
 
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As STS-27 was the public designation, it will be continue to be used for the duration of the timeline.
I still hold that 27R should be used just for clarification.
In addition, the historical issue was that this was a DoD flight. The secure video had serious issues:
A hole in the RCC is going to look a lot different than a series of gouges in the tiles. If we look at were the damage is, if you've had an RCC hit, the damage will be a hole in a large, grey structure. It's going to offer high contrast, and won't look like a shadow at all. The historical damage on the otherhand, doesn't look like much:

main-qimg-173e55ce852f81ed9907d037862003d0.webp

img3.jpg


It's going to be a lot harder to say this is shadows:

800px-Impact-test.jpg


IIRC, the arm kinematics only allowed for on-orbit imaging of the tile damage from one or two view points. Based on how far out the presumed hits to the RCC panels were, you should be able to get imagery of both the top and bottom of the RCC. Once the astronauts see the hole in the RCC, they are going to be telling mission control that it isn't shadows, and heck, the imagery, even if poor quality, will show the damage
 
A hole in the RCC is going to look a lot different than a series of gouges in the tiles. If we look at were the damage is, if you've had an RCC hit, the damage will be a hole in a large, grey structure. It's going to offer high contrast, and won't look like a shadow at all. The historical damage on the otherhand, doesn't look like much:

Why is this necessarily a hit on the RCC? It was the specific location of the tile that was lost that saved Atlantis. Instead of exposing the normal aluminum skin, it exposed a heavy antenna mounting, with thicker than average aluminum. Things easily could have gone differently.

EDIT: I apologize for not having noticed you thinking this was a hit on the RCC earlier. Sorry if this was implied.
 
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Why is this necessarily a hit on the RCC? It was the specific location of the tile that was lost that saved Atlantis. Instead of exposing the normal aluminum skin, it exposed a heavy antenna mounting, with thicker than average aluminum. Things easily could have gone differently.

I thought the exposed area was made of Stainless Steel, which combined with its thickness allowed Atlantis to survive the damage to its tiles.

But yeah, there is no need to move the damaged portion to the RCC panels, there are after all plenty of ways to get a LOC Situation with STS. Challenger and OTL Columbia, Atlantis near-miss being a hit as shown here. Michael Bay...

This, is gonna suck...for NASA.
 
I thought the exposed area was made of Stainless Steel, which combined with its thickness allowed Atlantis to survive the damage to its tiles.

But yeah, there is no need to move the damaged portion to the RCC panels, there are after all plenty of ways to get a LOC Situation with STS. Challenger and OTL Columbia, Atlantis near-miss being a hit as shown here. Michael Bay...

This, is gonna suck...for NASA.

I've seen sources disagree about what exactly the material was. It was, in all sources, under an antenna mounting, which accounts for the thickness.
 
Why is this necessarily a hit on the RCC? It was the specific location of the tile that was lost that saved Atlantis. Instead of exposing aluminum, it exposed a steel plate. Things easily could have gone differently.
Because by the time you get to the point where you see temperature sensor drop-outs in the order you described them you have to have a hit on the RCC to get a heat-path that kills the sensor connections, and provides a heat-path back to the wheel well. It feels like you mashed together 107 and 27R without fully understanding the mechanics of either. Given that, I'd recommend that you redo the entry bit after you reread both the CAIB report and the STS-27R OV-104 ORBITER TPS DAMAGE REVIEW TEAM SUMMARY REPORT.

I thought the exposed area was made of Stainless Steel, which combined with its thickness allowed Atlantis to survive the damage to its tiles.

But yeah, there is no need to move the damaged portion to the RCC panels, there are after all plenty of ways to get a LOC Situation with STS. Challenger and OTL Columbia, Atlantis near-miss being a hit as shown here. Michael Bay...

This, is gonna suck...for NASA.
The baseplate for the L-Band antenna is what protected the structure from the heat following the loss of the tile. However, what our esteemed author describes is not what is likely to happen with tile damage on the chine.
 
The baseplate for the L-Band antenna is what protected the structure from the heat following the loss of the tile. However, what our esteemed author describes is not what is likely to happen with tile damage on the chine.

If you're going to be rude about it, I'm not sure why I should discuss this.
 
I don't see how "our esteemed author" is anything but patronizing.
I was being overly snarky, and for that I apologize.

Now, given the above, my point about where the impact is relative to the way in which the orbiter sees sees the failure cascade is valid (there is no path that gets you from the leading edge of the wing to the main gear wells without punching through the RCC, which would have been visible to any inspection). Personally, I see two options:

You have a 107 like hit, and an on-orbit inspection is conducted, which shows the degree of the problem. There is no STS-29R stack assembled, and no EDO pallet in the bay to extend the mission life, so the crew have to come down in a busted bird. The make their last pleas to be that the manned program doesn't end (it won't anyway, the Soviet Union and their program is still a going concern). The crew dies as heroes, but the shuttle is tainted, and probably only makes a very small handful of flights.

The hit is similar to the historic 27R hits, and the bits about the damage and effects of the orbiter get re-done. While temperature sensors going out is reasonable, the units picked and the order would be different. There would also be a lot less differential drag, which means that they wouldn't see the deflection in the control surfaces and use of the RCS jets.

Either way, I would expect there to be a small handful of additional flights - Hubble, LDEF return, and any DoD missions that can't be re-manifested Each of these flights would see the other orbiter sitting on the other pad ready to perform a launch-on-need flight to try and bring a crew home. Commercial Titan III probably goes from being an also-ran with only four launches and five payloads to being an interim work-horse that sees American institutional use for many years - maybe even with Centaurs as there were two completed Centaur G's and components from the other five Gs that were on order got reprogrammed into the USAF Centaur-T.
 
II: Cancellation
Updates will be weekly.

Cancellation

“My fellow Americans,

Nearly three years ago, I addressed a national tragedy, the death of seven brave Americans on the Space Shuttle. It is with great sadness that I must do so again. At quarter to eight tonight, Space Shuttle Atlantis broke up over the Pacific Ocean. Howard Johnson, Lewis Miller, Richard Kirk, Tom Baines, and William Mueller, were all lost.

They were the kind to know the risks, the inherent dangers of spaceflight, and go on to face them. There, against the endless void, they triumphed. Because of their courage, their tenacity, we will miss them even more.

For the families of the fallen, we understand how difficult this must be. We grieve with you. We will stand up for you. Those you loved died serving and protecting this country, and for that, we will always be thankful.

The cause in which they died will continue, it must continue. We cannot, and they would not, shy away from the challenges that lie ahead. When we set West, over 150 years ago, there were many dangers. Many did not make it to California, or Washington. Yet, we remember and respect these brave pioneers, and they did not die in vain. Americans will continue to lead in space.

As we end this day, and go into the next, remember the bravery of the Atlantis Five. They were, and are, heroes.

God bless their families, and God bless America.”

—President Ronald Reagan, December 6th, 1988

***

The investigation of the Atlantis disaster began only moments after it happened. After loss of signal at 7:08 PM Eastern Time, a space flight contingency was declared. Twelve minutes later, the President as well as members of Congress were notified. Soon afterwards, the family members of the Atlantis crew were assembled in the crew quarters and received condolences and assurances from NASA administrator [x]. Data at all NASA sites and contractors was impounded at 8:30 PM, as to assist in the investigation. The Atlantis Accident Investigation Board, first convened at 5:00 AM the next day, started the official inquiry into the event.

Unfortunately, recovery of debris was impossible. Unlike the shallow Atlantic impact site of Challenger, Atlantis broke up over deep Pacific waters. What could have been a major line of investigation was barred to the AAIB. In addition to flight data, all they had was crew audio, footage of material hitting the underside of the wing, and the poor quality images of the damage. The classified nature of the mission also complicated matters. On the urging of an emergency December session of Congress, a preliminary report is released: Altered manufacturing processes changed the composition of the SRB’s nose cone. A piece of ablative material broke off the right solid rocket motor, piercing the delicate heat shielding of the craft. This allowed hot gasses to interact with the soft aluminum structure of the Space Shuttle, ripping it apart. One consolation is that the crew had to have lost consciousness instantly: none were wearing helmets, and the air outside the crew cabin was near vacuum.

Assurance of a painless death placated most networks, who moved on from the story after the end of the month. Military men, not schoolteachers being on board helped too. However, members of an emergency joint congressional hearing were shocked by the Shuttle program’s progress. After the Challenger disaster, Congress was very sympathetic to the needs of the agency. The government provided NASA two billion dollars in 1987, no strings attached, to produce Challenger’s replacement, Space Shuttle Endeavor. This time, the environment is different. Most congressmen had no idea how fragile the Space Shuttle’s protective tiles were. The optics of Mission Control ignoring the advice of the astronauts was terrible, yet the circumstances that justified the decision classified. They knew very little about how the Shuttle program actually works, but were informed that a refit to make failures like this impossible would be very expensive. There were warning signs of an economic recession on the horizon, one that could be massive, and the JSC advised that to keep the Shuttle cost effective, an additional orbiter would have to be built. On December 22nd, only a few days before the end of the session, a bill to end the Shuttle Program reached the Senate floor.

The vote is rushed, ill-advised, narrow, and controversial. Some space historians think it would not have made it to the President’s desk if Louisiana senator J. Bennett Johnston was not at home fighting off a freak illness. Former Alabama representative Ben Erdreich recalled in a 2006 interview: “We were scared. Scared and panicked. We didn’t want to look like we were ignoring the catastrophe, and we didn’t want to look like we were forcing astronauts onto a deathtrap. If we’d just let the investigation finish, and dealt with it in the next session, I’m sure we’d still see the Shuttle flying today.”

There were hopes that the President would veto the bill, but he was truly disheartened with the Shuttle’s failures, and no longer saw it as worth the risk. In his last signing as President, President Ronald Reagan officially cancelled the Space Transportation System on January 2nd, 1989.

It was not an immediate shutdown of the Shuttle program. Four more flights will be made between 1990 and 1991, performing missions impossible on the Titan IV and retaining the workforce along the space coast in the short term. NASA leadership assured Congress that every step would be taken to ensure the safety of the crew. In addition, the bill implored the next President to quickly decide the nature of a post-Shuttle space program. Still, the Space Shuttle, and the hard-won Space Station Freedom, were lost forever. At NASA, and especially at the Johnson Space Center, home of NASA’s manned spaceflight division, there was anger, disappointment, and despair at such a clearly confused and short-sighted decision. Everywhere, though, there was the question.

‘What’s next?’
 
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First off, it's 22nd, not 22st, unless you meant 21st, @QueenofScots...

Good update, though, and I wonder what's coming next...

Good catch. I've written a decent buffer of installments to keep this kind of thing from happening, but some things always make it through. As for the future, 1989 will be quite the year, regardless of the outcome...
 
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