1962: Savitsky nukes USS Beale

OK, Vasili Arkhipov doesn't veto firing the nuclear torpedo. Numerous Cuban Missile Crisis ATLs (one of which is on its way to nineteen novels) then have the world blowing itself up.
Really? Kennedy hears that a nuclear torpedo destroys one US destroyer and immediately launches the 25,540 nukes ( https://ourworldindata.org/nuclear-weapons/ ) in the American arsenal? Was that actually how the president would have reacted?
Yes, I suppose that he would have had to do something. But wouldn't a more sensible response have been to take out a Soviet ship with a tactical nuke? And what would Khrushchev have done then? He was a survivor of the Great Patriotic War, which was probably second only to the Thirty Years War for causing suffering in a nation. He would have known what war is, and would no more want it than I would.
Mind, a nuclear exchange destroying two ships is bad news, and another mistake or two could have caused a spasm war, but I am dubious that it would have gone straight from Beale to Atomeggedon. Am I wrong?
 
Thanks, Warden, but is it continued? I can't find the next part. With us at DEFCON 1 I really want to see how it comes out.
EDIT: Never mind, I found them (tricky to find).
This escalation to Holocaust is more plausible than Amerigo Vespucchi' Cuban Missile War TL. Very good.
 
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Tom wrote:
OK, Vasili Arkhipov doesn't veto firing the nuclear torpedo. Numerous Cuban Missile Crisis ATLs (one of which is on its way to nineteen novels) then have the world blowing itself up.
Really? Kennedy hears that a nuclear torpedo destroys one US destroyer and immediately launches the 25,540 nukes ( https://ourworldindata.org/nuclear-weapons/ ) in the American arsenal? Was that actually how the president would have reacted?
Yes, I suppose that he would have had to do something. But wouldn't a more sensible response have been to take out a Soviet ship with a tactical nuke? And what would Khrushchev have done then? He was a survivor of the Great Patriotic War, which was probably second only to the Thirty Years War for causing suffering in a nation. He would have known what war is, and would no more want it than I would.
Mind, a nuclear exchange destroying two ships is bad news, and another mistake or two could have caused a spasm war, but I am dubious that it would have gone straight from Beale to Atomeggedon. Am I wrong?

No you're not wrong at all, a single incident would up the tensions but it would very soon be known this was not the start of a general attack. Further it's highly doubtful the B-59 would have survived the incident, (and as far as I've found no one on board expected to do so) because it would have been too close to the detonation. So likely the 'exact' cause is going to take quite a while to ascertain.

I tend to forget, as it seems many do, that Goldsborough isn't that "long" ago so an upfront question is going to be who's nuke was it? Something else to keep in mind is the B-59 apparently wasn't running near attack depth and they'd have to come up to launch which in and of itself significantly changes the profile of the encounter. Further once the torpedo is launched, unless it explodes as soon as it leaves the tube, everyone with hydrophones will KNOW a torpedo was launched and that shortly following that a nuclear explosion occurred. Again the main question/assumption would be it was nuclear armed, or that it caused a nuclear device to detonate which is not the exact same thing. And while the depth-bombs disrupted the acoustics of the area for a short time the active sonar tended to cut through that swiftly and so any change of aspect on the B-59 is going to be picked up. This works against the B-59 as well as they have no clear idea where any "targets" are at the moment, (note Ranger would have turned immediately AWAY from the contract and gone evasive as soon as the B-59 had been detected, part of the reason for the harassment was to disrupt any possible attack in the first place) and there are very few options for getting enough information to prosecute an actual "attack" on the American units. (Realistically the 'best' they can hope is to launch in the general direction of the American ships and 'hope' to get a proximity kill and as noted they'd probably be destroyed as well) One point that's overlooked is the most 'likely' outcome of loading and arming a nuclear torpedo is not that it's fired, but that under the circumstances it malfunctions and detonates.

Kennedy has to do 'something' for sure but while SIOP pretty much calls for nuking Russia if they even look like they are going to sneeze it was clear several years earlier that SIOP needed significant revision and the entire idea of nuclear only response to any conflict wasn't viable. Similarly Khrushchev has to appear 'strong' to keep in power it is understood at that level that the USSR cannot survive a conflict with the US at this time.

While either leader can expect revisionism, criticism, and the opposition to make political hay out of whatever decision they DO make the obvious choices are simply work out a peaceful solution or go to nuclear war with each other and all that implies. The main issue at this time is there was no direct communications available between the two and a lot of time-lag and go-betweens that added to the issues involved. It's a given both sides are going to go to higher alert levels with all that implies but "how" high is a significant and troubling point.

The afore mentioned story has ICBMs and IRBMs being put into positions of a 'few' minutes from launch, the problem is those points mean they would need to be prepared but also propellant loaded which while it greatly reduces the rest of the launch sequence is obvious and dangerous.

Firstly because they can now only be "held" for a couple of days at this level at best after which they had to stand down for about a week before they could be returned to service. Most obviously that means these missiles will be UNAVAILABLE for that time and no threat to anyone which means if you do NOT use them you will "lose" a large portion of your retaliation force for at least a week. (Further while the silos were a huge improvement on the semi-hardened and hardened shelters the missiles, once loaded with propellant HAD to be raised into the open due to venting and other issues. (And at that most of the Atlas force had to be raised BEFORE propellants were loaded as the early silos were not designed to allow fueling inside) More importantly, especially in Europe, this will not go unnoticed by the Soviets and can, (and would) be seen as a clear indication of hostile intent since, (as noted) once loaded with propellant the missiles must either be used in short order or be effectively out-of-service for a lengthy period. Under the circumstances this is would be seen as a definite sign of impending attack and frankly it would be a warranted assumption.

While I believe Power's and probably LeMay MIGHT suggest this course of action they will quickly point out that while this will greatly reduce the response time of the various missile forces it will also be a very provocative and probably unwarranted action. Simply put at this point in time we can take the missile force to a significantly higher state, (moved from shelters and erected) and NOT put propellant in them which both expands the available options but does NOT greatly, (again both side going to a higher alert has already increased tensions) escalate the situation. And frankly before the orders can be carried out it will become clear that this is not the start of a general conflict. Frankly they will be more concerned with what's going on in Cuba and action to be taken there than in Europe.
 
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