1945-1980 British car industry without badge engineering

Partly the reason why Morris badged versions of the FWD cars were made was to remedy the perception of Morris being neglected under BMC as well as to use the FWD cars as another way to integrate the BMC range after the Farina B / Farina C.

My contention though is that BMC should not have fully committed to FWD for all models early on, rather Morris should have been allowed to properly utilize its mechanicals to produce a profitable yet related range of conventional RWD cars possibly with independent suspension from the early-1960s onwards until the issues with the FWD have been ironed out to gradually be adopted over time across much of the Morris range.

The ATL Morris range could have produced an entry-level 3-box 2-door saloon car say Morris Farina to either sit between both the Austin Mini and Austin ADO16 or a shade above the Austin ADO16 in terms of size (think Vauxhall Viva HA / Ford Anglia 105E) to replace both the Austin A40 Farina and Morris Minor. The early 2/4-door Morris Marina meanwhile would sit between the Austin ADO16 and Austin ADO17 in terms of size and engines (butterflying away the OTL Austin Maxi whose elements would be adopted by updated versions of ADO16), with a larger RWD Morris 2/4-door saloon model loosely derived from the MG Magnette ZB sitting between the Austin ADO17 and Austin 3-litre (unless the latter is rebadged under another marque).

That is assuming Morris goes completely down the conventional RWD route as opposed to producing RWD cars with Hydrolastic / Hydragas suspension. As for ATL Morris not receiving an equivalent of the Austin Mini, the Morris Farina should be adequate as an effective and profitable challenger to steal sales from its RWD rivals until the late-1960s / early-1970s, where it could be replaced by a BMC equivalent of the Renault 7 and Volkswagen Derby if the issues of the FWD layout have already been ironed out by that point.
 
Though it would require a series of PODs to make Rootes a more viable prospect compared to OTL, Leyland Motors would be the best candidate since they could simply re-badge all subsequent Rootes models as Leylands to sit below Triumph. Leyland Motors had a desire to re-enter the car market under its own name and acquiring Rootes would allow Leyland to realise such a desire.

It should be easier for Leyland Motors to swallow a smaller company such as Rootes compared to a significantly larger company like BMC in OTL, especially if it acquires Jaguar instead of Rover thereby avoiding the OTL overlap with Rover and Triumph.
 
I wouldn't merge Leyland with Rootes. But reorganize Rootes so that there's just Humber, Sunbeam and Commer.

Hillman and Talbot becomes Humber, Singer becomes Sunbeam, Karrier becomes Commer.
 
Aside from having too many marques, Rootes post-war problems partly stem from acquiring debt-ridden Singer. Even without acquiring Singer and without the 1959-1961 Acton strikes adding almost crippling costs to the company's expansion plans / etc (and causing problems with the Imp), Rootes would still be faced with building a factory at Linwood for an unpayable loan from a UK government keen on nationalizing the motor industry.

If circumstances were more favorable in ATL such as no Singer, expansion of existing Rootes factory and no Acton strikes threatening to disrupt the company's expansion plans then Rootes paying off the loan becomes a more realistic possibility.

Yet Rootes would still have a nationalizing obsessed UK government to deal with and a need to rationalize its portfolio of marques, meaning it would be very tough for a thriving ATL Rootes to remain independent in such a scenario and leaving it with 3 options similar to OTL.

Those OTL options were BMC, Leyland and Chrysler. The latter filled the void after the previous two declined government invitations to invest / acquire the OTL moribund Rootes group.

BMC would likely still refuse to invest / acquire a thriving ATL Rootes partly due to its own issues, whereas a thriving OTL Leyland who had ambitions of re-entering the car market producing models under the Leyland brand (after discontinuing the Standard marque) would be more receptive to the UK government's invitation given the size of Rootes in return for the government loan payments to Rootes being further reduced or even cancelled.

That is compared to OTL where the UK government encouraged a thriving Leyland to merge with a much larger yet failing BMC to create British Leyland, let us not even mention OTL Rootes under Chrysler.

Any other scenario where Rootes manages to successfully rationalize its marques and remain independent would require a much earlier POD or few for it to even be an option.
 
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Was there a reason why the British government was so keen on maintaining national control of the automobile market? I mean I can understand telecommunications, but cars? What benefit did they assume the country would have, besides employing more people.
 
Was there a reason why the British government was so keen on maintaining national control of the automobile market? I mean I can understand telecommunications, but cars? What benefit did they assume the country would have, besides employing more people.

AFAIK it was something that had been hinted at as early as Labour's 1945 manifesto and within the post-war Labour government under Attlee there were said to be some 150 advocates of a nationalized volume production motor industry including people such as Stafford Cripps, the post-war state of the UK likely precluded such a move along with fierce opposition from within the motor industry.

The desire to nationalize the motor industry was later carried over to the the next Labour governments under Wilson (which include the likes of Tony Benn who played a major part in the formation of British Leyland in OTL), now under the guise of persuading the remaining British carmakers to amicably merge with each other at no cost to the taxpayer.
 
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Aside from having too many marques, Rootes post-war problems partly stem from acquiring debt-ridden Singer.
Perhaps the best way to avoid badge engineering is to let the market choose the winners and losers. In short, let Singer and the others fail without acquisition. This will require a hands off government policy, something hard to find in the 1950-1970 period, but the result will be fewer brands and models, and fewer yet stronger companies.

Circling back to BMC, Austin should have let Morris fail, or vice versa.
 
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OTL Rootes acquired debt-ridden Singer in 1956 for largely sentimental reasons on the part of William Rootes who started out as an apprentice at Singer upon leaving school from 1909 to 1913 when he left Singer to found his own company (initially starting out as a car sales agency). A more level-headed Rootes letting Singer fall would have partly helped matters, yet would still not be in a position to discontinue other marques short of a takeover by another company.

Interestingly Singer was once the 3rd largest carmaker behind Austin and Morris in 1929 yet during 1930s onwards it fell from grace, surviving through the decade with the Bantam plus a series of appealing sports cars and tourers despite the failure of the Chrysler Airflow inspired Singer Airstream along with short-lived yet partially successful motorsport programme. At one point during 1935 it tried to survive by presenting itself as a merger candidate to a number of companies, though there were no takers.

It would be easy enough to prevent Austin and Morris from merging to create BMC given the apparent conflict between Leonard Lord and William Morris, even more so with Miles Thomas succeeding William Morris who also loathed Lord and sought to follow a similar path of modernization to what Lord achieved at Austin.

At the same time both Austin and Morris were relatively minor players in global terms who prior to the merger creating the World’s 4th larger carmaker were more focused on fighting each other, the merger was attractive on the basis of allowing the combined companies to reduce costs by sharing components that could be bought / produced in greater numbers cheaply in order to effectively compete with US firms (who were expanding rapidly in Europe) as well as others such as Renault and Volkswagen.
 
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Interesting reading, quite nostalgic - the first car I learned to drive in '67 was on a Singer 1500 built 1950, there was a Sunbeam alternative - with a slightly bigger engine.
Ford and Vauxhall had the advantage in basing their model ranges by size, with further options on trim, and perhaps engines. It was an advantage in simplicity, and logistics, but competitors, could with their different market segment marques, move customers up and down the aspirational ladder e.g. from Hillman to Singer, to Humber.
Yes, what happened to Standard, like the Vanguard (RAF staff car), and Jowett fell by the wayside - liked the Javelin.
If think a big factor in the demise of BMC was the 'volume' sides obsession with quantity - ignoring quality, the people at Rover were criticised with their focus on quality.
Also, when BL folded, rather than Rover, IMHO I think they should have used the Triumph brand, it has more 'meaning', the big loss was no more Rover 75 a class car!
 
Our timeline Rootes acquired debt-ridden Singer in 1956 for largely sentimental reasons on the part of William Rootes who started out as an apprentice at Singer upon leaving school from 1909 to 1913 when he left Singer to found his own company (initially starting out as a car sales agency). A more level-headed Rootes letting Singer fall would have partly helped matters, yet would still not be in a position to discontinue other marques short of a takeover by another company.
Perhaps a middle path of someone talking financial sense to William Rootes so that he doesn't push to buy them, at least until they collapse when they can be purchased from the creditors without the overhanging debt?
 
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