1943-4 Early operation Dragoon, Italy bipassed

WI instead of going for Sicily and Italy wi the allies had attacked Sardinia, then Corsica then mainland France?

Could it have come off?

Might it have placed the Western allies stronger POST war.

What would happen to Italy?
 
Not gamed that one out, or done much research on it, but would like to. Gaming out ANVIL type operations of April 1944, like Eisenhower wanted, or a earlier January 1944 execution made things 'difficult' for the German side.

Politically its difficult since first the Brits became focused on taking Sicily to reopen the Mediterranean sea route, & then Churchill was infatuated with securing Italy and great things in the Balkans, the Lubjana gap and all that. But, assuming the Allies do decide to forego Op HUSKY & all that followed in that direction:

A. Sardinia/Corsica were poorly defended in the spring and summer of 1943. With air support from Algeria its possible to overrun those islands even as Tunisia is in the final stages of battle. OTL the Joint Chiefs proposed Sardinia be invaded as early as March 1943. If its made a priority its possible as early as May or even April 1943. OTL it took the US Air Force support services two months to establish a base structure for 1000 aircraft on Corsica, in January 1944. If the resources put into developing the south Italy airfields are directed to Sardinia/Corsica its not unreasonable to think 2000 to 3000 aircraft can be based there mid 1943. That puts a lot of southern Europe in range of Allied medium bombers and fighter cover.

B. Sans the Italian campaign a rather robust Allied army group is at large & unemployed. In July 1943 Op HUSKY placed that AG ashore in the second largest amphib op of the MTO/ETO. It does look like there are possibilities in that context for S France.

One payoff for the Allies is the need to feed and support the liberated Italian population is waived away. 1943-44 feeding and providing coal to the impoverished provinces of south Italy sucked away a uncomfortable chunk of Allied cargo shipping. I don't know if that would be the case where Frances southern Maritime provinces are liberated.

...
What would happen to Italy?

Italy continues a economic death spiral, the war is increasingly unpopular, the Facist Grand Council finally removes Mussolini, the surrender option is eventually choosen, the Germans support a counter coup and try to maintain a Facist Italian state. At some point the Allies are sucked into some sort of secondary Italian campaign with a much smaller force than OTL. Postwar the details are a bit different for Italy, but the major trends are the same.
 
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Not gamed that one out, or done much research on it, but would like to. Gaming out ANVIL type operations of April 1944, like Eisenhower wanted, or a earlier January 1944 execution made things 'difficult' for the German side.

Politically its difficult since first the Brits became focused on taking Sicily to reopen the Mediterranean sea route, & then Churchill was infatuated with securing Italy and great things in the Balkans, the Lubjana gap and all that. But, assuming the Allies do decide to forego Op HUSKY & all that followed in that direction:

A. Sardinia/Corsica were poorly defended in the spring and summer of 1943. With air support from Algeria its possible to overrun those islands even as Tunisia is in the final stages of battle. OTL the Joint Chiefs proposed Sardinia be invaded as early as March 1943. If its made a priority its possible as early as May or even April 1943. OTL it took the US Air Force support services two months to establish a base structure for 1000 aircraft on Corsica, in January 1944. If the resources put into developing the south Italy airfields are directed to Sardinia/Corsica its not unreasonable to think 2000 to 3000 aircraft can be based there mid 1943. That puts a lot of southern Europe in range of Allied medium bombers and fighter cover.

B. Sans the Italian campaign a rather robust Allied army group is at large & unemployed. In July 1943 Op HUSKY placed that AG ashore in the second largest amphib op of the MTO/ETO. It does look like there are possibilities in that context for S France.

One payoff for the Allies is the need to feed and support the liberated Italian population is waived away. 1943-44 feeding and providing coal to the impoverished provinces of south Italy sucked away a uncomfortable chunk of Allied cargo shipping. I don't know if that would be the case where Frances southern Maritime provinces are liberated.



Italy continues a economic death spiral, the war is increasingly unpopular, the Facist Grand Council finally removes Mussolini, the surrender option is eventually choosen, the Germans support a counter coup and try to maintain a Facist Italian state. At some point the Allies are sucked into some sort of secondary Italian campaign with a much smaller force than OTL. Postwar the details are a bit different for Italy, but the major trends are the same.

I agree with all this.

But the difficulty is how you sustain a defend a foothold in southern France without a larger one in northern France tying down most of the spare (as in, not deployed in Russia, or defending Italy) Wehrmacht. Even with significant assistance from the local French.

Defending Corsica is easy - you've got a 40-60 mile anti-tank ditch filled with water. But there's nothing in the lower Rhone Valley between you and however many panzer divisions the Germans decide to hurl at you.
 
Defending Corsica is easy - you've got a 40-60 mile anti-tank ditch filled with water. But there's nothing in the lower Rhone Valley between you and however many panzer divisions the Germans decide to hurl at you.

Not a lot of these to spare in 1943, they are mostly in Russia getting chewed up, and the ones in France are rebuilding from being chewed up in Russia

Anvil doesn't have to be a rush to Berlin, either. Makes for great bases for Thunderbolt and the new Mustang.
It just ties down the Heer from other places they need to be as well, say Normandy.

Like Winter, Op. Sledgehammer is coming.
 
As much as Churchill looked at the Balkans, it is worth noting that Brooke looked as Italy as a 'strategic trap'

Whatever went to Italy had to pass through a bit of a bottleneck. Worse still for Germany, once there, it would not be so easy to get back again; hence a strategic trap.

I need to look it up, but I believe some 25 German divisions were sitting in Italy. Those could theoretically be deployed somewhere else if need be.

I believe Brooke also looked at the threat of invading Italy rather than actually do it. German troops would have to be dispersed along the entire coast line of Italy which could suck up more division. Brooke tried to use the one area where UK had the absolute upper-hand: sea power! The ability to make a landing wherever they wanted and to bombard whatever they chose. It is not to be over-looked in this scenario. The Med in 1943 is 'British'.

Any threat of invading Italy North of Rome should give Kesselring a fright.

The 'fun' thing about a trap is, that once sprung, there is no more maskirovka'. Now it is to defend what is there.

Without having tied up a substantial number of German divisions in Italy, Southern France itself could be a bit iffy.

PS: Sardinia is DRY. I am not sure if there would be enough water available for any major influx of people. Ile de Corse is not much better in that department.

If food and water by the tons must be carted there, it will suck up additional cargo ships. Sardinia and Ile de Corse can hardly feed themselves.
 
As much as Churchill looked at the Balkans, it is worth noting that Brooke looked as Italy as a 'strategic trap'

Whatever went to Italy had to pass through a bit of a bottleneck. Worse still for Germany, once there, it would not be so easy to get back again; hence a strategic trap.

I need to look it up, but I believe some 25 German divisions were sitting in Italy. Those could theoretically be deployed somewhere else if need be.

I believe Brooke also looked at the threat of invading Italy rather than actually do it. German troops would have to be dispersed along the entire coast line of Italy which could suck up more division. Brooke tried to use the one area where UK had the absolute upper-hand: sea power! The ability to make a landing wherever they wanted and to bombard whatever they chose. It is not to be over-looked in this scenario. The Med in 1943 is 'British'.

Any threat of invading Italy North of Rome should give Kesselring a fright.

The 'fun' thing about a trap is, that once sprung, there is no more maskirovka'. Now it is to defend what is there.

Without having tied up a substantial number of German divisions in Italy, Southern France itself could be a bit iffy.

PS: Sardinia is DRY. I am not sure if there would be enough water available for any major influx of people. Ile de Corse is not much better in that department.

If food and water by the tons must be carted there, it will suck up additional cargo ships. Sardinia and Ile de Corse can hardly feed themselves.
Good points.

Regarding the difficulty of supplies to Sardinia and Corsica I think that the required garrison in both cases would be small. The invasion forces would be largely withdrawn quickly.

Though engineers and othet construction troops would replace them and then the air force units to provide air defence, anti shipping and strategic bombing.

Given Allied command of the western Mediterranean supplies should be adequate. After all, Husky and Avalanche were feasible.
 
At some point the Allies are sucked into some sort of secondary Italian campaign with a much smaller force than OTL
I'm not at all sure that needs to happen. IMO, the WAllies could use commandos, a/c, & MTBs to harass the Germans, while supplying an Italian Resistance.
 
Italy continues a economic death spiral, the war is increasingly unpopular, the Facist Grand Council finally removes Mussolini, the surrender option is eventually choosen, the Germans support a counter coup and try to maintain a Facist Italian state. At some point the Allies are sucked into some sort of secondary Italian campaign with a much smaller force than OTL. Postwar the details are a bit different for Italy, but the major trends are the same.

It would be much better to go along @ivanotter; the strategic trap. Take Sardinia and Corsica then Maskirovka - threaten Crete and other Greek isles. Make the Germans run around the Med and use your superior air to sink their transports. Perhaps at some point when having decided on France look as going for Sicily if only to draw forces into that island too! Then use airpower to destroy the road and railnetwork of Italy to make those German troops there stay for a prolonged time. It won't be a nice time for Italian civvies though.

Postwar Italy would look quite different though with Communist partisans very active and a change of Italian government - perhaps even a civil war resulting. Facists vs Communists vs Royalists vs.. That may eventually drag the Allies into the fray.
Also Trieste may end up with Yugoslavia without a NZ division going for it.
 
Postwar Italy would look quite different though with Communist partisans very active and a change of Italian government - perhaps even a civil war resulting. Facists vs Communists vs Royalists vs.. That may eventually drag the Allies into the fray.

If our own TL has taught us anything, it's that America and Britain will do what it takes to keep Italy from going communist.

It could be messier, however.

(On the other hand, a lot of priceless art and architecture probably won't get destroyed.)
 
If our own TL has taught us anything, it's that America and Britain will do what it takes to keep Italy from going communist.

It could be messier, however.

(On the other hand, a lot of priceless art and architecture probably won't get destroyed.)

Yeah I agree to that - but that would probably somewhat more difficult than Greece. Still Italy would be another place than OTL. I guess.
 
WI instead of going for Sicily and Italy wi the allies had attacked Sardinia, then Corsica then mainland France?

Could it have come off?

Might it have placed the Western allies stronger POST war.

What would happen to Italy?
Hi, I think that one of the main reasons (not the only one) why the allies gave up an invasion of northern France in summer of 1943 (they gave up on it even before Torch in 1942) was the lack of air support for the invasion fleet. They simply would not have enough fighter plane force to defend their beaches from concentrated attacks of Luftwaffe. And that was in the north with all the airbases in the south of England.

I mention it because the same problem in increased proportions would exist if invading southern France in 1943 or as a main invasion in early 1944. The only land of comparable distance to the invasion beaches as in northern France would be a very hilly Corsica with very few places to build airbases. Sardinia and north Africa would be too far for fighter planes to effectively operate from. So not only would you not have enough fighter planes in 1943 but even if you had them, you would have nowhere to fly them from. In fact, planning for Dragoon even as a second invasion in late July/August 44 was very risky for exactly that purpose (if Luftwaffe simply gave up on Normandy and kept its forces intact).

And if you ask whether I do not overestimate the power of Luftwaffe, well, imagine a concentrated attack of say five JG's of 750 fighter planes, escorting several hundred two-engined bomber planes and one or two hundred fighter bombers (Fw 190 F and G type), arriving under radar a la operation Bodenplatte and concentrating on LST ships on the beaches. How many allied fighter planes would you need to defend against such force, with bases in Corsica, Sardinia and north Africa. Even if you wanted to have at least 500 fighter planes above the beaches at any moment (at that would probably not suffice anyway), you would have to triple or quadruple the number as there would be a limited time the fighter planes would be able to operate in the invasion area.

Add to that problems like less damage caused to German infrastructure by allied bombers (ie. Germans can arrive faster), far longer distances from which allied troops are being brought (the allies managed to bring in roughly one division a day in Normandy from the south of England distant c. 200 km, it would be a fraction of that in southern France), the same problem with distance with supplying and you can imagine why they did not try.

Regards, Petr
 
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