Calbear is 100% correct. As early as the early 1920's the planners had concluded that in case of war with Japan, the PI were on their own & that they could not expect significant reinforcement from the US in any reasonable time.
Having said that,IF MacArthur responds quickly after PH (as in does not let AF get caught on ground) and makes sure that supplies are stashed in Bataan, then Bataan & Corregidor hold out much longer & eat up much more in the way of Japanese resources. The death march or equivalent still happens since a major part of the problem was the Japanese had made no provision for large numbers of POWs. Of course, Japanese attitudes & behaviors are the same.
Another failure was leaving Wainwright in Corregidor in command of ALL US forces in the PI. Because of this the Japanese could force a surrender of all US forces, even those still capable of effective resistance and/or guerrilla war in the Southern PI. If Wainwright is ONLY in command of Luzon forces, then Short can continue in the south, as even the Japanese will respect the fact that Wainwright cannot order the surrender of troops he does not command.