Ive seen claims (most notably by Astrodrsgon in the Whale has Wings) that the most important Lend Lease to the Soviet Union during WW2 was British Lend Lease in 1941.
Doing some research threw up this, which is one of the best sources i can find regarding what was delivered when.
http://www.historynet.com/did-russi...ase-helped-the-soviets-defeat-the-germans.htm
466 tanks had arrived in the USSR by the end of 1941 and 30-40% of the 205 medium or heavy tanks (ie 61 to 82) in front of Moscow were British.
1470 fighters were in service with the soviet air force on 1 January of which 99 were hurricanes.
Lets assume if the USSR could put something in service Britain could put the same thing in service in Malaya since they would not need as much training.
How much of a difference would half of those units make in Malaya.
Lets say 30 tanks and 50 hurricanes. Lets say the RAF maintain a 12 plane rotating CAP over Force Z, would force Z survive?
What would the effects on the war in Russia be if just these forces were diverted. Could Moscow fall? Would Stalin feel that Britain is not contributing enough?
The British also (among many other things) supplied hundreds of specialised machine tools allowing for some factories to be brought into operation sooner than might have been the case.
Regarding Force Z
I think had the original plan for a rotating cap of 4+ Buffaloes over Force Z would have made a massive difference.
For a start the Attacking Japanese formations each of about 15-18 Aircraft (which arrived in stages) would not have the luxury of forming up for an attack with the impunity that they experienced in OTL - i.e. conducting a Hammer and Anvil torpedo attack or formation bombing.
Therefore the attacking wings would suffer higher losses and be less effective in the attack which would have to be rushed in the face of fighter support.
Italian and German bombers attacking British shipping and fleets in the med were often broken up by a literal handful of Fairey Fulmar's and while I have no doubt that the IJN Land based bomber crews would press home their attacks with the utmost courage and skill their aircraft lacked even the most basic armour plate or self sealing fuel tanks and proved vulnerable to .50 cal fire (As Butch O'Hare and his colleagues were to prove in F4F-3's a few months later).
As for the difference some Valentines would make - just look at the difference 7th Amoured Brigade made during the fighting Withdrawl of the remnants of 17th Indian Inf Division and the 'militia' Burma Inf Division from Rangoon after the Sittang river disaster - shame the 7th hadn't turned up then - probably would not have been a disaster!
Or the Difference 16 Matilda IIs made in East Africa
The Japanese tactic of avoiding attacking a given British Brigade head on and instead infiltrating the flanks to avoids its considerable fire power and also setting up roadblocks often forced the British unit to abandon its position - however when ever they did - the roadblocks (fallen trees arranged as an Abatis) covered by crewed weapons (MMGs and Mortars) forced the British units (who now considered themselves to be cut off) to abandon soem or all of their motor transport and therefore most of their artillery and supply train as well as in some cases their wounded - while the men got out on foot with only what they could carry.
This seriously degraded a units fire power and ability to fight effectively each time it happened - as they would have been reduced to just man portable crew served weapons and small arms.
The 7th Armour Brigade in Burma on several occasions using their M3 Stuart light tanks broke through roadblocks - and reopened roads allowing Motorised elements of a given unit to extract or allow for said unit to be resupplied and therefore continue fighting.
Had they not done so its unlikely that much of the 'British' forces would have managed to extract themselves from the Rangoon region.
I'm not suggesting that a battalion of Valentines would have turned the tide in Malaya but in other theatres particularly early war a relative handful of Matilda IIs often made a massive impact and if husbanded their presence would certainly slow the IJAs efforts to defeat the British in Malaya.
A good POD here (IMO) is that the Valentine is pushed for development earlier (some sources claim the ball could have started rolling in Feb 1938 rather than April 1939) and production is also started correspondingly earlier in Canada and also at New South Wales Government Railways Factory in Sydney instead of the later Sentinel.
Another is the withdrawl of the Hong Kong Garrison and Force C - and these units are used to form the nucleus of a new Division - now if those earlier built Canadian Valentines arrived with C Force in the form of a Tank Battalion with subsequent Australian tanks arriving in early 42
For example 1st Battalion, The King's Own Rifles of Canada (OTL a home guard formation in WW2) - gets re rolled as 1st Battalion, The Saskatchewan Dragoons in July 1940 (with an influx of volunteers for overseas service) and deploy with 60 odd Valentines and 10-20 light tanks + other support vehicles when C - Force gets sent to Malaya/Singapore.
As for 50 Hurricanes......IIRC the Japanese had 500 aircraft to less than 200 British in that theatre and the Japanese used them better.
I think 50 more aircraft would be nice but I suspect that to rectify the aircraft situation in Malaya and Singapore required a bigger POD - possibly several - for a start one where 400 RAF fighters (and most of their pilots) were not wasted in pointless patrols over Occupied France in 1941.
At the end of the day - losing Malaya and Singapore (and Hong Kong) wouldn't lose Britain the war - Russia being knocked out however was far more serious and while I would far rather that our boys got all of the Tanks and aircraft that they needed in North and East Africa, Malta and then the Far East - Britain acted correctly in sending the Russians as much as they could spare in order to ensure that they stayed in the war.