"The 3-Power Alliance and a United State-Japanese War" by Kinoaki Matsuo, published in Japan October 1940, and published as an English translation, "How Japan Plans To Win" Little, Brown and Company, April 1942. The author was an intelligence liason between Japanese Foreign Office and the Admiralty, and a militarist trying to sway Japanese opinion.
There are some minimal sections missing, with "..." in the book. It doesn't say if they were blacked out of the copy that the US got, or if it wartime censorship on the part of the US translator. If its censorship, it certainly wasn't to keep secrets from Japan.
The book got into US hands, when a Japanese agent distributed it to supporters in California. According to the forward, there was an organization of Koreans that infiltrated Japanese networks and helped US intelligence.
The writing style is often contradictory, and seems aimed at assuring the reader that Japan can win a war with the US, and that such a war is inevitable. Often the tone is highly propogandistic, but there is a huge wealth of hard data.
The basic theme is that, in October 1940, the US is building a huge fleet, and that already the US has a better fleet than Japan. It describes how war will be inevitable, and how Japan can win that war, despite having a lesser fleet, and much smaller economy than the US.
The author regards it as critical that the war begin before the US transfers its fleet anywhere West of Hawaii, and preferably before it even gets there from the US and Atlantic.
Suprise attack fleets using submarines are one of the most important strategies he outlines, seeking to whittle down the US fleet, and keep parts of it occupied chasing them down, instead of concentrating.
Seizing Philippines, Guam, Singapore, and Hong Kong, he regards as critical at the beginning of the war, before the US fleet can protect especially Manila. This would leave the US with no bases west of Pearl Harbor. He believes that the US, in order to win the war, would have to invade places far from Pearl, and that these places are where Japan could engage the US fleet and win. That the US fleet will be far from bases or support, and have to guard the troop carriers.
Great concern over the US naval construction program. US pursues a Closed Door with the Monroe Doctrine in the America's and an Open Door in China, trying to interfere in Japan's sphere. The US doesn't recognize the New Order or Co-Prosperity Sphere.
It is clear that if either the US or Britain fights Japan, both will.
Then there is a section that could have been written by Marxists, about how the American Conscription act is backed by capitalists, while the American people and the labor organizations AFL and CIO are against it.
It describes in great detail the US ships being constructed. It describes a navy of the US in 5-7 years, with 32 Battleships, 18 Aircraft Carriers, 85 Cruisers. It predicts that the US will declare war on Japan in 1945.
It acknowledges that the US economy is several times larger than Japan. However the "not a single Japanese soldier will ask for his salary", while the US soldiers will be paid 20 times what a Japanese civil servant is paid, and while the Japanese will eat simply, the American soldier demands a sumptous feast each day. And while Americans will waste ammo and torpedos, The Japanese will be prudent, and only fire them when they will hit something.
Then it talks about American preperations:
Electric propulsion for ships. Larger Battleships than any ever built. It mentions the New Jersey. He doesn't take American submarines seriously, because he assumes that the harsh conditions of being on a submarine will render American sailors innefective.
As for the American Army, the regular army are mercenaries because they get a salary, while the National Guard are patriots, while the Reserves are draftees. However, he is impressed by the bravery of the American army in WW1.
He is very impressed by the US poison gas ability, and assumes it will be used. He quotes American generals who mention their use against ships.
He is impresseb by the quality of American gunpowder.
He is worried about Electric mass-driver guns. He mentions a possibility of a gun that can fire 800 kilometers, and is worried that the US has these guns hidden already.
He mentions television, which can allow a submarine to conduct reconnaissance that the headquarters can watch.
Flame throwers.
Radio controlled tanks.
Infrared night-scopes.
He doubts that death rays will be available in the coming war, and also ultrasonics.
He is afraid of bacteria weapons, though.
He mentions the training of US aviators, the course they take, their salaries, number of hours of training (325 hours a year). He seems amazed not only that they are paid $105 per month, but that they get their uniforms and all necessary things for free, while still in the academy.
He correctly worries that "it is feared that the United States air force may carry out a record-breaking air raid upon Japan, in order to intimidate her", and that Japanese cities will be devestated if the US air force can maintain bases nearby.
He analyses possible US and Japanese strategies:
If Japan's fleet is kept home, he describes how the US will take many islands, and blockade Japan, and bomb it, more or less what actually happened.
He believes that Japan should take offensive action to dismember the US navy, step by step, and to capture naval bases.
A suprise attack fleet should attack the US Pacific coast, attacking the fleet, and laying mines, and another fleet should destroy the Panama Canal.
Some else that was blacked out, either by the translator, or the copy he had to work with: "With the object of preventing the United States Fleet from advancing to the Western Pacific and in order to facilitate the operation of the Japanese Navy in the Western Pacific, and to stir up home morale, we should at once" [... the rest unavailable]
Assuming Germany is not involved, Japanese subs should go to the Atlantic, before the war begins, and distract the American fleet there.
Phillipines, Dutch East Indies (Indonesia), and Indo-China should be occupied.
He assumes that the US fleets in harbors will take steps to prevent suprise attacks (he was wrong). Then they will go to the Manila, and then attack Japan. The fleet would go from Panama to Pearl to Midway to Guam to Manila, and travel at 14 knots. He calculates the fuel needed, and assumes the fleet will zig-zag to throw off submarines. He assumes that before the US fleet would arrive, even if it started from Hawaii, Japan would occupy Philipines, Guam, Tatuila, Wake, and be near Midway.
While he thinks the US will have battleships that can fight near Japan using Pearl Harbor as a base, the support fleet wouldn't have that range.
He also mentions that the fleet will need to commandeer 500 commercial ships, and that this will cripple US trade, and prevent the US from fighting a long war. (he didn't realize how fast Liberty ships could be built).
Therefore he assumes that the US will take rash offensive action and try for an immediate recapture of Guam and the Philippines, or by occupying the Ogasawara Islands, bombarding Japanese coasts, bombing Japan, and forcing the Japanese fleet to fight them, which he assumes will be smaller than the US fleet.
He distinguishes between the possibilities of a short decisive war, and a long war of attrition. He is convinced that US doctrine is for a short war. He is sure that the US would lose a long war.
He says that Japan has little choice but to fight the kind of war the US chooses. He would prefer a short war, though, because it fits Japan's warrior nature. He is also worried about an unnamed other power joining against Japan in a long war, maybe the Soviet Union.
He forsees that up to the time of war, there will be diplomatic conversations in a crisis atmosphere. He is afraid that during this time, the US will move its Atlantic fleet to the Pacific. He regards it as critical, that Japan act before that happens. If the US fleet arrives in Hawaii, and sails westward, it is the last possible moment for Japan to strike, and have a good chance of winning. (was there a much larger US fleet at Pearl, Dec 7, 1941, than October 1940, when this book was written?)
During the war, when a US invasion fleet arrives to recapture Philippines, this is the moment Japan should have a naval battle with them, since the Americans will be far from bases then.
His basic assumption is that there are very few ports with facilities to base the US fleet in the Pacific, and that the US will have to invade ports from long distances, giving the Japanese an advantage of declining combat except when the US tries to invade these.
He then goes back to the problem of the US fleet getting to Pearl Harbor, and how Japanese submarines will get a few of them on the way there. When the US fleet does get there, he mentions "Even if the United States Fleet is fortunate enough to line up at Pearl Harbor, it will encounter an attack by the Japanese suprise-attack fleet" He expects this, and sub attacks, and mines will inclict some damage, but not decisive.
In considering the possibility that the US will start the war, he discounts the US ability to quickly mobilize. "But it is highly doubtful how smoothly the recruiting job will go, for in the eyes of the American nation, sacrifice of their bodies for their country would mean only that they were fighting for a small number of United States capitalists, therefore, there is no way of arousing patriotic feelings in Americans. (he never did realize the effect a suprise attack on the US would have on the American attitude.)
He thinks it will take 2 months for the US fleets to mobilize and get to Pearl Harbor.
In describing the suprise attack fleet, he says it is mostly subs, with maybe cruisers and destroyers, and possibly aircraft carriers, if the occasion demands.
He recognizes the possibility of US aircraft carriers bombing Japan, but is certain that air defenses will prevent it.
He then goes on to explain how Japan will win the big naval battle that eventually will occur, and how the US wheel shaped formation will be defeated by submarines sneaking past the outer screen and getting to the capital ships at night.
He regards Americans as pampered and unable to maintain efficiency with discomfort, while the Japanese are highly able to do this.
He discounts the effectiveness of US submarines, because of the discomfort factor. He also bases almost the entire war strategy on being able to defeat a larger US fleet with a smaller Japanese fleet, at a place that is far from any American naval base (and when the American's are escorting an invasion fleet). He assumes that the distance the Americans will have to travel, while guarding against Japanese submarines at the same time, will render them much less effective when they arrive at the place Japan chooses to fight them.
He knew that the US Navy provided greater comfort to its sailors than the Japenses, and he definetely knew that their rations were far superior, but he assumed that this would be balanced by American's needing greater comfort. Also, he thought this oppulence, would in the case of a long war, cancel out the US's much larger economy, through inefficiency.
He assumes that the US will not sue for peace. He later says that if Hawaii falls, the US will probably ask for an armistice.
Once having defeated the main US fleet, Japan can invade Midway and Hawaii. He assumes that Japanese civilians there will be interned during the war.
The postwar terms he wants, is Japanese posession of the Panama Canal, and the Central and South America becoming part of Japan's sphere. He makes no mention of invading the US mainland.
In considering more of Kinoaki Matsuo's, October 1940 book, its apparent, that while he had fundamental misconceptions about the ability of the United States to wage a sucessful war, he also had some wise ideas that were not followed by Japan during the war.
Specifically, two things that actualy are related:
1. The splitting up of the Japanese fleet into what would become the battles of Coral Sea and Midway, resulting in slight Japanese win at Coral Sea, and major defeat at Midway that basically turned the course of the war.
2. The lack of air defenses in Japan against something like Dolittle raid. He almost described it, as it would later happen, but assured the reader that Japanese air defenses would be alert.
One led to the other. The Japanese leadership was so traumitzed by the Dolittle raid, that they decided they had to try to eliminate US bases like Midway, and especially Pearl Harbor, to keep the US fleet further from Japan. They were over-confidant, and also countered the US fleet near Coral Sea.
By his doctrine, they should have been seeking either a climatic battle between the main Japanese and US fleets, at a place far from US bases, or pick off smaller US fleets, where possible.
At Coral Sea, they should have been concentrating their entire fleet. And Midway was inadvisable. He basically said that Midway, and Hawaii should only be attacked at the beginning of the war before the US fleet had mobilized there, or after the main US fleet had been defeated.
While the Pearl Harbor attack destroyed a lot of the US fleet, enough was left to leave his original strategy as valid.
What if, Japan had followed his plan, and concentrated against small US fleets, like at Coral Sea, with their entire fleet, and otherwise avoided battle, except when the US ventured far from its ports?
I think the war may have lasted longer that way, but eventually US construction of new ships would overwhelm what Japan had and could produce.