1940 peace: Soviet alertness?

[Equalist]

Assuming a negotiated peace between the UK and Nazi Germany in 1940/1941 (with the POD either being Halifax succeeding Chamberlain or the destruction of the BEF at Dunkirk), how much more likely will it be for the Soviets to anticipate Operation Barbarossa? What absurd explanation for eastern military buildups would Hitler have to come up with? And would a greater Soviet alertness have been able to offset the German advantages (less aerial losses to the RAF, no Afrika Korps, no delay of Barbarossa, greater aid from France, Spain; etc.)

I have increasingly come to believe that Stalin was terrified of provoking the Germans, and would have accepted any German excuses in order to justify his delusions, but I'm not at all sure.

 

[Catspoke]

Assuming Hitler is able to motivate the German people to go to war in such a situation. (In this time line there is less of a reason for the Germans to go to war (no need to secure raw materials to defeat the west)).

The German could have over a thousand extra aircraft from no BOB and Crete etc. 4 extra panzer divisions (DAK, plus a couple refitting in France from the Balkans IOTL).
Probably a couple of extra Italian divisions and an Italian air group as well. These probably more than compensate for the lack of surprise.

I am assuming the Soviets will be expecting an attack and are ready. IOTL the Soviet shut off economic shipments after France but turned them on after August 1940 once the intensity of the Battle of Britain became apparent. So they are paying attention, and there is no other reason for Germany to be maintaining such a huge army in the east.

Also the Germans won't be receiving economic aid from the Soviets, but could purchase stuff on the open market, up to the willingness of world markets to sell them stuff.

 

[andys]

Might part of a peace treaty with the UK includes the supply of large numbers of lorries to the Germans to improve their logistics? Maybe even include supplying Middle Eastern oil in the deal as well? Both of which would improve the rate of advance of the invasion when it starts.

 

[James Ricker]

Might part of a peace treaty with the UK includes the supply of large numbers of lorries to the Germans to improve their logistics? Maybe even include supplying Middle Eastern oil in the deal as well? Both of which would improve the rate of advance of the invasion when it starts.

the Germans had stockpiled enough oil for the campaign seasons of 41 and 42. Access to enough oil to supply their military what alter the 1943 campaigns drastically.
The Russians will win eventually but at a much higher cost, the victory will come when Germany runs out of Infantry

 

[kvnrthr]

Would the Soviets necessarily perform much better though? The purge still happened and there are still plenty of incompetent commanders at all levels. The Soviets even in June 1942 still bungled terribly, and a few months or so of extra warning isn't going to turn them into the Soviets of 1944 or even 1942.

In this scenario, Germany has access to overseas trade (barring anyone who voluntarily embargos it) since the RN won't blockade them, so more fuel and other goods. No bomber offensive allows them to save a lot of manpower and materiel that might have been drained later. No extra fronts in Africa draining their air and land forces, no worry of naval invasions in France or in the Mediterranean. Additionally, I think with Britain at peace the Americans are far less likely to get into the war, so their enormous productive capacity never makes itself felt.

I believe in this case they win against the Soviets convincingly. For all their weaknesses, a peace with Britain allows the Germans so many advantages that do a lot to offset them. They never lose air superiority over the Soviets, they inflict more casualties that at the very least prevents them from building up well trained forces, and either the Soviets go belly up completely or are bled white and incapable of retaking the lost land.

 

[Drizzt]

Would the Soviets necessarily perform much better though? The purge still happened and there are still plenty of incompetent commanders at all levels. The Soviets even in June 1942 still bungled terribly, and a few months or so of extra warning isn't going to turn them into the Soviets of 1944 or even 1942.

In this scenario, Germany has access to overseas trade (barring anyone who voluntarily embargos it) since the RN won't blockade them, so more fuel and other goods. No bomber offensive allows them to save a lot of manpower and materiel that might have been drained later. No extra fronts in Africa draining their air and land forces, no worry of naval invasions in France or in the Mediterranean. Additionally, I think with Britain at peace the Americans are far less likely to get into the war, so their enormous productive capacity never makes itself felt.

I believe in this case they win against the Soviets convincingly. For all their weaknesses, a peace with Britain allows the Germans so many advantages that do a lot to offset them. They never lose air superiority over the Soviets, they inflict more casualties that at the very least prevents them from building up well trained forces, and either the Soviets go belly up completely or are bled white and incapable of retaking the lost land.

Also chances are with Britain "peaced out" there wont be any Lend and Lease for the Soviets, since the program would have been cancelled or never existed. Extending it to the USSR was a lot easier, than reinstating it on their behalf would be. Let alone starting it from scratch.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Part of the problem for Germany is that they've lost the element of strategic surprise, so there would need to be a tension and build up like the invasion of Poland or any of the previous peacetime occupations Hitler engaged in. That is what the Soviets anticipated, especially Stalin, as that had been the pattern to that point, and Hitler was afraid of being unable to rouse the German people to war once again if there was peace with the British before he could invade the USSR. So the build up to war would have to be at least a week, which was enough time to get the Soviets ready when they saw the political pattern they were looking for. The thing is would that be enough to offset German advantages gained ITTL that have been laid out above? Even mobilized the Red Army wasn't exactly the pinnacle of efficiency.

 

[Post]

Would the Soviets necessarily perform much better though? The purge still happened and there are still plenty of incompetent commanders at all levels. The Soviets even in June 1942 still bungled terribly, and a few months or so of extra warning isn't going to turn them into the Soviets of 1944 or even 1942.

In this scenario, Germany has access to overseas trade (barring anyone who voluntarily embargos it) since the RN won't blockade them, so more fuel and other goods.

And so would the Soviets. I aee the UK trading with them. And without USW they get to Murmansk unatacked.

 

[Anarch King of Dipsodes]

Assuming a negotiated peace between the UK and Nazi Germany in 1940/1941 (with the POD either being Halifax succeeding Chamberlain or the destruction of the BEF at Dunkirk), how much more likely will it be for the Soviets to anticipate Operation Barbarossa? What absurd explanation for eastern military buildups would Hitler have to come up with? And would a greater Soviet alertness have been able to offset the German advantages (less aerial losses to the RAF, no Afrika Korps, no delay of Barbarossa, greater aid from France, Spain; etc.)

I have increasingly come to believe that Stalin was terrified of provoking the Germans, and would have accepted any German excuses in order to justify his delusions, but I'm not at all sure.

1) In 1940-1941, the German armed forces looked fairly busy: the Battle of Britain and the Blitz, the Battle of the Atlantic, the Balkan campaign, the North African campaign. WIth all that going on, was Germany really going to start a huge new war? It didn't make sense.

2) In 1940-1941, Britain was fighting in multiple theaters (all of the above, plus East Africa and Iraq/Syria) and suffering major defeats in most of them. Stalin suspected Britain of conniving to achieve its traditional strategy in a war with a powerful Continental enemy: find a powerful Continental ally to do the heavy lifting (and make a separate peace whenever it was to Britain's advantage). They did it against Napoleon, and against Bourbon France; even arguably against Spain. Stalin was determined not to play the part of Britain's cat's-paw, and the more Britain tried to warn him, the more he dismissed the warnings as provocations designed to entangle the USSR in Britain's war.

If Britain capitulates in 1940, both of those factors go away. Heck, if Italy remains neutral (more probable IMO than Britain rolling over), both factors would be greatly diminished, IMO enough to shift Stalin's thinking.

Also, with the end of the war, secrecy becomes much harder, even in Germany. The chance of keeping preparations secret from all the foreigners in Germany is nil, IMHO. Plus Hitler would try to get Italy and Spain to join in, which means a lot more opportunities for leaks. Also Japan; and possibly even Pétainist France.

 

[Ramontxo]

And so would the Soviets. I aee the UK trading with them. And without USW they get to Murmansk unatacked.

I think that under treaty the UK should have to accept the same blockaded rules they applied so no convoys or naval trade with the USSR. Also in this case the Japanese can trade freely with the Ducht for oil and so don't need to go south. They will probably go north. So a USSR that cannot import any material has to divide it's forces will surely fight to the end but I don't see how they could manage the equivalent to Bragation ITTL. The absolute best they could get would be an tie after losing most of its west.

 

[Post]

I think that under treaty the UK should have to accept the same blockaded rules they applied so no convoys or naval trade with the USSR.

Why would they sign such a treaty?

 

[Catspoke]

If I were the Soviets in this case, some mild appeasement might be best. I am assuming this peace goes down around early June 40, France is still in, so its a joint British-French armistice followed by a peace. Probably light terms since the military situation for Britain-France is better than later June. So probably more of a peace back to 1914 boundaries, and some economic and military concessions from France. Italy is not in yet.

The Soviets could still then avoid invading Buknovia (outside the initial M-R agreement which annoyed Hitler). The Soviets could avoid pushing Hitler on Bulgaria or Finland influence. And keep up the same level of economic shipments without interruptions. All the while prepping and hoping to avoid Hitler attacking in 1941.

Make it very difficult for Hitler to create that diplomatic incident needed.

 

[Ramontxo]

In the SCW the RN enforced rules of blockade that prohibited Franco's navy to intercept ships out of the territorial waters but permitted them (even to British ships) inside. I think the same would apply here

 

[Michele]

Assuming a negotiated peace between the UK and Nazi Germany in 1940/1941 (with the POD either being Halifax succeeding Chamberlain or the destruction of the BEF at Dunkirk), how much more likely will it be for the Soviets to anticipate Operation Barbarossa? What absurd explanation for eastern military buildups would Hitler have to come up with? And would a greater Soviet alertness have been able to offset the German advantages (less aerial losses to the RAF, no Afrika Korps, no delay of Barbarossa, greater aid from France, Spain; etc.)

I have increasingly come to believe that Stalin was terrified of provoking the Germans, and would have accepted any German excuses in order to justify his delusions, but I'm not at all sure.

The greater Soviet preparedness and alertness would not be enough to offset the German advantages initially, but you are listing too many of those.

1. The delay for Barbarossa happens anyway. It's the weather, and the delay in Heer preparations, not Marita-Merkur.
2. No Afrika Korps, and no 2. and 5. PD spent in Yugoslavia, mean more tanks - but they also mean more logistical strain. I don't know if this actually doesn't benefit the Soviets.
3. There is no reason why France, let alone Spain, would contribute more in this ATL.
4. The losses to the RAF are a big advantage, even though they also require more fuel, but you have to place the POD in 1940, not in "1940/41". '41 is after the Battle of Britain.

 

[Bougnas]

1940 British/German peace WIs seem to be really popular right now for some reason, but I've never understood why people would assume that the British would just happily sit out while the last remaining great european continental power gets butchered by Germany (and Japan in some instances), and why the US would get even more neutral than prewar.

A peace in 1940 is merely a pause until Germany invades the USSR, as even British politicians willing to make peace would understand that Germany would remain a huge threat to their interests, even more so if they take control of western USSR. What this POD would do is effectively allow the British to recoup their losses, actually put proper weapons into service instead of rushing older equipment to replace losses at Dunkirk (not all that likely though) and get the Commonwealth forces to North Africa or mainland UK, as I highly doubt that the British would accept a peace deal where they can't ensure their security.
By the way, what about the war with the Italians? Same treaty as with Germany?

Similarly, the fact that there's peace in Europe for the time being doesn't mean that the US won't implement their post-Fall of France military reforms and pre-mobilization plans, or send equipment that the UK sometimes bought itself, sometimes even according to prewar agreements. And the moment the UK goes to war again, the US will likely support them or even intervene.

So honestly I don't think that a 1940 peace POD would change how the war develops after Barbarossa, unless the Anglos prefer the taste of the Anglo-American/Nazi war.

 

[Peg Leg Pom]

I am assuming this peace goes down around early June 40, France is still in, so its a joint British-French armistice followed by a peace. Probably light terms since the military situation for Britain-France is better than later June.

I think it more likely that some sort of deal is done during the Winter War rather than after the attack on Western Europe.

 

[Bougnas]

I think it more likely that some sort of deal is done during the Winter War rather than after the attack on Western Europe.

That's probably more viable indeed.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

1940 British/German peace WIs seem to be really popular right now for some reason, but I've never understood why people would assume that the British would just happily sit out while the last remaining great european continental power gets butchered by Germany (and Japan in some instances), and why the US would get even more neutral than prewar.

Because you're ignoring the reality of Britain's very bad situation. Their finances are exhausted, they have no L-L ITTL, India is in revolt and demanding immediate independence, and they are out of allies beyond some of their white settler colonies. They're not really in a position to help the USSR without L-L and restarting the war isn't going to make them look good internationally, plus they have more to gain by letting the dictators beat each other senseless.

 

[fasquardon]

Assuming a negotiated peace between the UK and Nazi Germany in 1940/1941 (with the POD either being Halifax succeeding Chamberlain or the destruction of the BEF at Dunkirk), how much more likely will it be for the Soviets to anticipate Operation Barbarossa? What absurd explanation for eastern military buildups would Hitler have to come up with? And would a greater Soviet alertness have been able to offset the German advantages (less aerial losses to the RAF, no Afrika Korps, no delay of Barbarossa, greater aid from France, Spain; etc.)

I have increasingly come to believe that Stalin was terrified of provoking the Germans, and would have accepted any German excuses in order to justify his delusions, but I'm not at all sure.

The Soviets would definitely have thought a German attack was more likely without Britain distracting German energies. Still, while it would be obvious (just as it was in OTL) that the Germans were likely to attack, the when would still be unclear and the drip-drip of posturing and negotiating temporary diplomatic resolutions would make it easy to think that this or that surge in troop numbers was another negotiating ploy, rather than the precursor of an actual attack.

And the Soviets in OTL were kinda hitting alertness fatigue. That could easily happen again in a scenario where the UK had already been defeated. Staying on max alert for months on end... Well, the level of that maximum slowly drops as people get worn out.

I'm not sure that a lack of war with Britain would be enough to butterfly the Balkan campaign. And all told, if the Nazis didn't do a Balkan campaign, I think that would be a net positive for the Soviets. The German flank would be less well anchored, the minor Axis allies that provided vital manpower would be able/willing to provide less (especially Italy, whose importance on the Eastern Front is enormously underrated), the Germans would be less prepared and would attack into less favourable weather. Of course, if Britain is out of the war, all that may not be enough. British support in the early stages of the Great Patriotic war were extremely important for keeping the Soviets on their feet. And while I think it's impossible for the Germans to win in the same year they attack the Soviets, the year after, like OTL's 1942, they could have decent odds of destroying the Soviets as an organized state.

Now, the Japanese managed to do this to Nationalist China in OTL, and it didn't win their war, but so long as the US stays out, its hard to see how the disorganized remnant of the USSR would be more than a nuisance to the Germans as they murdered their way towards Hitler's idea of utopia.

The Soviets could still win this, but no doubt, they are overall in a worse place than OTL. And with Britain already defeated, Japan might be more willing to break their neutrality treaty with the Soviets. Especially since a Britain that makes peace in Europe before Japan launches its offensives in Southeast Asia will have Japan more concerned about biting off more than they can chew if they go with the navy's plan.

What the US does in this scenario would be very interesting.

fasquardon

 

[Equalist]

The greater Soviet preparedness and alertness would not be enough to offset the German advantages initially, but you are listing too many of those.

1. The delay for Barbarossa happens anyway. It's the weather, and the delay in Heer preparations, not Marita-Merkur.
2. No Afrika Korps, and no 2. and 5. PD spent in Yugoslavia, mean more tanks - but they also mean more logistical strain. I don't know if this actually doesn't benefit the Soviets.
3. There is no reason why France, let alone Spain, would contribute more in this ATL.
4. The losses to the RAF are a big advantage, even though they also require more fuel, but you have to place the POD in 1940, not in "1940/41". '41 is after the Battle of Britain.

In regards to the last point, I was referring to the actual peace treaty being signed sometime between mid 1940 and early 1941. The armistice would of course take place, in the summer of 1940.