1930s US Army "Sanity" Options?

I figured out during my drive work today why we've come to quibble over relatively minor matters to get the US Army up to snuff. The Army that landed in Normandy was superb. Sure it did have its weak points, but all and all the Germans were steam rolled after the bocage break out in July 44 until October/November 44. After the only real strategic crisis in Dec 44 it took only 5 months to win final victory in May '45. The US Army had staggering logistical and material superiority over its enemies. It had an unprecedented level of mechanization and motorization. Its field artillery was world class.
There may have been some other people involved I think. Your northern neighbour for one and the locals played a part. The French Army filled out the kit for several divisions that the US Army did not have to man. Everybody except the French was running out of infantry in the last 8 months of the war. The British were seriously considering transferring miners into the army and aircrew in training transferred to the army as infantry. My point is that the US Army in Europe operated as part of a joint system.
 
There may have been some other people involved I think. Your northern neighbour for one and the locals played a part. The French Army filled out the kit for several divisions that the US Army did not have to man. Everybody except the French was running out of infantry in the last 8 months of the war. The British were seriously considering transferring miners into the army and aircrew in training transferred to the army as infantry. My point is that the US Army in Europe operated as part of a joint system.

Oh, I absolutely understand that. I know off hand the British and Polish manpower was severely limited by this time. IIRC the Canadians were also going through a conscription crisis. The FFI was transferring and organizing into the regular French Army, with mixed results. The WAllies war effort was definitely a team effort. I'm merely limiting my scope to the US Army since that's what the thread is limited to.
 
It is true that coastal artillery units in the US Army were not useful anywhere during the war except in the PI. However this was not known in 1939/1940. Once it was obvious that you weren't going to see Axis ships approaching the US coast in areas where you had coastal artillery (a couple of random shootings by Japanese submarines or landings of agents by U-boats don't count, and occurred well out of any coastal fortifications) then these units were reduced and repurposed. Similarly AAA and fighter units for continental air defense were never needed, but until the war had been going on a while this was not clear. Maritime search and ASW, on the other hand, was needed throughout the war based in the US and US territories.

If you look at the Rainbow plans (1-5) you'll see that the emphasis was on how does the USA defend the USA/western hemisphere based on who the opponent(s) are, and what Allies we might count on. In July, 1940 France had fallen and while Churchill was saying brave things it was certainly not clear that the UK would be able to stay in the fight against Germany. Not SEALION but if the U-boats had somewhat more success (plausible) and Hitler offered an acceptable deal to the UK (not ASB) then an armistice/settlement was certainly possible. Yes, Hitler was going to invade the USSR in spring 1941 - but the USA did not know that. There was the possibility that Germany could now build up the Kriegsmarine, and potentially have bases in French possessions in the Caribbean and South America. Certain South American countries had pro-Nazi sympathies. What all of this means is that the USA in 1940 would have been reckless to gut coastal artillery, continental air defense (AAA and fighters).
 

Driftless

Donor
It is true that coastal artillery units in the US Army were not useful anywhere during the war except in the PI. However this was not known in 1939/1940. Once it was obvious that you weren't going to see Axis ships approaching the US coast in areas where you had coastal artillery (a couple of random shootings by Japanese submarines or landings of agents by U-boats don't count, and occurred well out of any coastal fortifications) then these units were reduced and repurposed. (snip)

At least at the start of shooting, wasn't there a "fleet-in-being" element to the coastal artillery, even if immobile? And effect that might be true for both internal and external consumption. Local politicians might worry and complain a hair less about the protection of their harbor and beloved city, if protected by a 40 year old big gun emplacement out on the point. The sinking of the Blucher in Oslofjord by the guns of the Oscarborg, probably cemented the notion - at least early on.....

You might be able to attach some similar credibility to the coastal guns at the Canal as well - at least as a scare weapon for any would be attacker.

Still, the time, effort, and expense commited to those fixed defenses would have been better spent on other tools, but that probably wasn't apparent yet.
 
The fast way to make a fortress(s) on Wake would have been to take a few old USN warships, fill void spaces with concrete and bring into the lagoon at high tide with the aid of camels, then emplace.
Unsinkable ships. Add more concrete to decks if bombing and long range naval gunnery thought to be a problem

Like this ship Oregon, in 1940 museum condition
010309.jpg

Far more useful this way than an ammunition barge.

I've been harping on for a while now about taking a couple of 8" turrets off of Saratoga or Lexington and mounting them on Utah while keeping the AA guns and ensuring radar was added by October 1941...using Fearless Leader's Wake Island scenario as the start point, Utah could have sailed in November 1941 with enough additional reinforcements to hold Wake
 
It is true that coastal artillery units in the US Army were not useful anywhere during the war except in the PI. However this was not known in 1939/1940. Once it was obvious that you weren't going to see Axis ships approaching the US coast in areas where you had coastal artillery (a couple of random shootings by Japanese submarines or landings of agents by U-boats don't count, and occurred well out of any coastal fortifications) then these units were reduced and repurposed. Similarly AAA and fighter units for continental air defense were never needed, but until the war had been going on a while this was not clear. Maritime search and ASW, on the other hand, was needed throughout the war based in the US and US territories.

If you look at the Rainbow plans (1-5) you'll see that the emphasis was on how does the USA defend the USA/western hemisphere based on who the opponent(s) are, and what Allies we might count on. In July, 1940 France had fallen and while Churchill was saying brave things it was certainly not clear that the UK would be able to stay in the fight against Germany. Not SEALION but if the U-boats had somewhat more success (plausible) and Hitler offered an acceptable deal to the UK (not ASB) then an armistice/settlement was certainly possible. Yes, Hitler was going to invade the USSR in spring 1941 - but the USA did not know that. There was the possibility that Germany could now build up the Kriegsmarine, and potentially have bases in French possessions in the Caribbean and South America. Certain South American countries had pro-Nazi sympathies. What all of this means is that the USA in 1940 would have been reckless to gut coastal artillery, continental air defense (AAA and fighters).

a lot of those coast defense battalions and regiments were mobile 155 guns and anti aircraft battalions (which got 90 mm guns as soon as possible). The towed 155 guns ended up as general support battalions, while the AA guns had their uses most definitely. Now the big guns were mostly stripped of most of their personnel by 1944 and indeed some guns got scrapped even before the war ended.
 
...
So let's take a set back and look at some actual doctrinal and training deficiencies the US Army had in Europe.

Infantry-tank cooperation was poor in North Africa, although it improved as the War continued.

The breakdown seems to have started with the post 1940 doctrine of the independant tank battalions being held in Armored Groups at the corps/army level, the same as non division artillery or engineer battalions. The assumption was that when necessary the tank battalions would be peeled off to the divisions. This created a enviroment where thetanks & infantry at the battalion and company level did not train often enough together. Company and battalion leaders lacked sufficient hands on training with tanks actually present. They really did not understnd how to integrate optimal combined arms tactics with tanks & infantry platoons. Battle experience helped the infantry units that fought in Sicilly & Italy but the experience was not passed on to the infantry regiments not yet in combat in any significant way. That is the non veteran divisions that entered combat from June 1944 had to learn OJT the fine details in their first 60-120 days of combat.

Perhaps had the US more tanks to train with 1920-1939 the tactics of tanks and rifle squads & platoons operating as a integrated team would have been better instilled in the mobilizing army of 1940-43.

The system of Close Air Support was a bureaucratic nightmare in the early phases of the way. CAS requests had to be brought above the Corps level before Quesada implemented crucial changes.

The Marines had gone a long way to breaking the code on this in Nicaragua 1926-32. The Army was aware of the use of CAS in the Nicaraguan small unit battles. A embryonic CAS was contained in the Armys Strike Aviation doctrine. But, somewhere also the way 1932-1943 the concept was lost. The big bomber doctrine came to dominate & what had been thought of as strike aviation moved upwards away from the tactical battle. Maj Gen Dolittle lost sight of the tactical support side in Africa & was lecturing the US Army ground commanders on how inefficient it was to use his finite bomber force in penny packet attacks on front line fighting.

Again, with sufficient funds in 1930-38 the Army can fly both a experimental heavy bomber force, and a tactical force thus keeping up pre 1940 development of technical maters and doctrine.

Logistics nearly fell apart because most French ports were wrecked in the Summer of 44, and unable to be used.

Actually they were still in German hands. Cherbourg was the only operating French port in Allied hands in France in July and August, the Marsailles port group & Le Hrave were added in September, & then Antwerp had its entry blocked by the Germans until late November. The Bereton Port group was not captured in July as intended, nor in September as expected. Middletons corps was insufficient to force the capture of Brest, and grossly to small to also take St Malo, L Orient, St Nazaire, & Nantes as well. All they managed through September was St Malo, the smallest of the group. This was in part because of sending the bulk of US 3rd Army east in August. The original plan of Op Overlord depended on the Third Army turning west & attacking all the Bereton Ports. The decision to turn 3rd Army 180 degrees & send it off to Germany, leaving a single corps to execute its mission was a radical change in strategy.

I'm unsure how aything you might do in 1922 or 1932 would change this. The leaders at and were thinking flexiblly in response to a radically altered situation and tried to take advantage of a incrediblly unexpected opportunity. Underestimating the German defense of the Bereton ports was not a obvious mistake that anything done in 1928 might head off.
 
Last edited:
Top