Along the lines of the British "X Sanity" threads that have popped up lately, I am curious as to whether there are any things that the US Army (including the Air Force, since it was part of the Army at the time) could reasonably have done better in the 1930s to prepare for World War II?
1930s US Army "Sanity" Options?
- Thread starter Workable Goblin
- Start date
It would have required money. In the two decades the funds per man were cut below just about every other army of the industrial nations. Given the funds here are a few suggestions.
1. Fund a mobilization planning staff. Particularly for the industrial side of mobilization. The US Army was poorly prepared for this in 1939-42 largely because the tiny cadre could not support anything remotely adequate for researching and planning industrial mobilization, or of mobilizing a operational army of more than 250,000 to 500,000. Capability for both this tasks had to be built from scratch from 1939, & took the better part of three years to accomplish the industrial mobilization side.
2. More attention to amphibious warfare. Under War Plan Orange the US Army was to provide a expeditionary force of 50,000 men in the first six months and 100,000 in under 12 months. This was for service across the Pacific. But other than the Joint Army Navy board there was only token participation in developing amphibious warfare. The Joint Board was mostly concerned with strategic, large scale operational, and numbers development. On the tactical & hands on side the Army provided a average of one battalion for amphibious training every 2-3 years over two decades, few liaison or observation officers to the USN training or tests and experiments. For six years from 1932 to 1939 I'm hard pressed to find evidence the Army participated in any joint amphibious warfare training/planning outside the Joint Board.
3. Retain more motorized units during the demobilization of 1919-1923. A example is the Field Artillery was reduced from eight to two motorized artillery regiments, & those were reduced units with the effective strength of a battalion each. Until the conversion of the 7th Cavalry Brigade to a experimental motor/mech unit in the latter 1930s there was no test bed for the theoretical ideas in circulation for mechanized warfare. Attempts to use a infantry division in that era as a test unit were largely ineffectual for lack of funds.
4. Funds to continue development of tactical & "Strike" aviation. The thin funds for R & D in the 1930s went into heavy bomber development. The Army was forced to curtail testing and training in tactical aviation as the 1930s spun out. We had dive bombers & effective close air support in the Nicaragua campaign in the 1920s. Udet observed the US Army aircraft in dive-bombing demonstrations in the 1920s. But, in the 1940s the US Army had to play catch up to everyone else in CAS & did not completely get its act together until 1944.
5. Take a closer look at the rifle battalion weapons. The BAR was obsolete & the HMG/MMG support inadequate. A light MG in the rifle company was badly needed.
6. Make tanks a required part of every training exercise interwar. During WWII regular army & reserve officers trained interwar were inconsistent in their ability to train and operate combined arms formations. While they broke the code at corps & division level the regimental and battalion commanders were not consistently up to speed on training with and integrating tanks into battalion/company combat.
7. Keep at least four infantry divisions at full strength & fully staff four Corps HQ. Training with full size formations suffered badly interwar as repeated funding cuts left the entire army a cadre force.
8. The field artillery shined first & best in WWII, but there was still room for improvement. Lighter radios were possible with the technology of the era, but as with most other things there was not the money to progress the development further. Having the full suite of howitzers, guns, AT guns, and AA weapons tested & ready for production in 1939 would help in the early battles of 1942. All the designs used in WWII were on paper & most partially tested by 1939, but little was actually ready for full scale production
9. Tactical aviation was mentioned earlier. Doctrinally the interceptor/pursuit/fighter arm was neglected & hence development. The single engine fighters of 1939, both in production & being tested were effectively point defense weapons. For a offensive capable army a long range fighter was badly needed. Perhaps larger, more frequent, and better organized training exercises interwar would have revealed this.
1. Fund a mobilization planning staff. Particularly for the industrial side of mobilization. The US Army was poorly prepared for this in 1939-42 largely because the tiny cadre could not support anything remotely adequate for researching and planning industrial mobilization, or of mobilizing a operational army of more than 250,000 to 500,000. Capability for both this tasks had to be built from scratch from 1939, & took the better part of three years to accomplish the industrial mobilization side.
2. More attention to amphibious warfare. Under War Plan Orange the US Army was to provide a expeditionary force of 50,000 men in the first six months and 100,000 in under 12 months. This was for service across the Pacific. But other than the Joint Army Navy board there was only token participation in developing amphibious warfare. The Joint Board was mostly concerned with strategic, large scale operational, and numbers development. On the tactical & hands on side the Army provided a average of one battalion for amphibious training every 2-3 years over two decades, few liaison or observation officers to the USN training or tests and experiments. For six years from 1932 to 1939 I'm hard pressed to find evidence the Army participated in any joint amphibious warfare training/planning outside the Joint Board.
3. Retain more motorized units during the demobilization of 1919-1923. A example is the Field Artillery was reduced from eight to two motorized artillery regiments, & those were reduced units with the effective strength of a battalion each. Until the conversion of the 7th Cavalry Brigade to a experimental motor/mech unit in the latter 1930s there was no test bed for the theoretical ideas in circulation for mechanized warfare. Attempts to use a infantry division in that era as a test unit were largely ineffectual for lack of funds.
4. Funds to continue development of tactical & "Strike" aviation. The thin funds for R & D in the 1930s went into heavy bomber development. The Army was forced to curtail testing and training in tactical aviation as the 1930s spun out. We had dive bombers & effective close air support in the Nicaragua campaign in the 1920s. Udet observed the US Army aircraft in dive-bombing demonstrations in the 1920s. But, in the 1940s the US Army had to play catch up to everyone else in CAS & did not completely get its act together until 1944.
5. Take a closer look at the rifle battalion weapons. The BAR was obsolete & the HMG/MMG support inadequate. A light MG in the rifle company was badly needed.
6. Make tanks a required part of every training exercise interwar. During WWII regular army & reserve officers trained interwar were inconsistent in their ability to train and operate combined arms formations. While they broke the code at corps & division level the regimental and battalion commanders were not consistently up to speed on training with and integrating tanks into battalion/company combat.
7. Keep at least four infantry divisions at full strength & fully staff four Corps HQ. Training with full size formations suffered badly interwar as repeated funding cuts left the entire army a cadre force.
8. The field artillery shined first & best in WWII, but there was still room for improvement. Lighter radios were possible with the technology of the era, but as with most other things there was not the money to progress the development further. Having the full suite of howitzers, guns, AT guns, and AA weapons tested & ready for production in 1939 would help in the early battles of 1942. All the designs used in WWII were on paper & most partially tested by 1939, but little was actually ready for full scale production
9. Tactical aviation was mentioned earlier. Doctrinally the interceptor/pursuit/fighter arm was neglected & hence development. The single engine fighters of 1939, both in production & being tested were effectively point defense weapons. For a offensive capable army a long range fighter was badly needed. Perhaps larger, more frequent, and better organized training exercises interwar would have revealed this.
But, I must repeat how most of the Army defects found in 1939 start with lack of funds. Absent increased spending the Army was screwed.
10. Less interdepartmental rivalry with the Navy and Marines.
Together top leadership of Army and Navy indicate areas that need more cooperation. They identify a higher priority for island defense in the Pacific against a more aggressive Japan in China. Defense of Wake and Guam are placed higher as they are the stepping stones to keep Philippines supplied and equipped should any confrontation with Japan occurs.
Together top leadership of Army and Navy indicate areas that need more cooperation. They identify a higher priority for island defense in the Pacific against a more aggressive Japan in China. Defense of Wake and Guam are placed higher as they are the stepping stones to keep Philippines supplied and equipped should any confrontation with Japan occurs.
There are a few problems with this:
- The Navy had long written off the Philippines as indefensible, despite occasional flirtations with strategies intended to quickly relieve a siege. The position of the Japanese astride any reasonable route to the islands meant that running ships through would require a long campaign of island-hopping, so that there would be more than enough time for the Japanese to capture them. The Navy almost always resisted Army efforts to commit Navy units to holding or relieving the Philippines.
- Similarly, they had long written off Guam as indefensible. Although there was some flirtation with the idea of making it a fortress, it was, again, too forward and in any case physically difficult to use as a naval base (Apra Harbor is shallow and coral-choked, or at least was at the time). Besides, fortification was forbidden by treaty until it was too late to fortify it.
- The value of Wake was only appreciated shortly before the war, due to technological advances that made long-range aircraft more useful. It had a very shallow lagoon that would be almost impossible to use as a naval base, along with hard coral bars across the entrance, so it required a large amount of work just to make it capable of operating PBYs or other patrol aircraft. Hence it was unlikely for the Navy to rate it as even worth defending until pretty late. Given how shoestring the Japanese invasion was IOTL, this might still be enough, though, and in that case it would be useful as a forward patrol station.
Do it, do it!Boy, If I ever starts a thread "sanity options for the French armies" it might be 500 pages long
Sure, but there were surely things they could have done better with what they had, even if only with hindsight?
Having the country accept that they can't rely totally on the Navy for security would definitely be the biggest thing, though. Or at least having them recognize that if the Air Force is supposed to be one long arm of American defense, then they actually, you know, have to spend money on it...
OK, so the Navy and Army sort of write off the Philippines but they see the dagger that Guam would represent if it could be defended. Make more of a concerted effort to defend Guam. Turn it into an aircraft carrier and a B-17 base, is this possible under the treaty limits?
For the Philippines, the Army has a better battle plan for retreat to Bataan, upgrades roads in this area and supply depots on the Peninsula. The Army plan is not to defend the entire island of Luzon but just the Bataan peninsula.
Greater use of land based fighters for Guam and a better anti aircraft defenses would aid plus having some die hard marines. Could a few squadrons of P-38's and A-24's (SBD Dauntless) in Guam make a difference. Can Guam be made into an aircraft carrier, is that within the treaty limits with Japan?
Also, what if through testing, high altitude bombing of naval ships was deemed ineffective, what would be the result of this? Less reliance on B-17's in the Pacific and more reliance upon dive and torpedo bombers resulting in perhaps the need for more range in USAAC dive bombers and a joint plan for a better US Army/Navy dive bomber development and training to its tactics leading to a few more SBD Dauntless/ A24 Banshee squadrons in the Pacific
At the base of all of this is greater cooperation between the Army and Navy and Army, Navy, and Marines.
Second, need more funding from Congress earlier.
For the Philippines, the Army has a better battle plan for retreat to Bataan, upgrades roads in this area and supply depots on the Peninsula. The Army plan is not to defend the entire island of Luzon but just the Bataan peninsula.
Greater use of land based fighters for Guam and a better anti aircraft defenses would aid plus having some die hard marines. Could a few squadrons of P-38's and A-24's (SBD Dauntless) in Guam make a difference. Can Guam be made into an aircraft carrier, is that within the treaty limits with Japan?
Also, what if through testing, high altitude bombing of naval ships was deemed ineffective, what would be the result of this? Less reliance on B-17's in the Pacific and more reliance upon dive and torpedo bombers resulting in perhaps the need for more range in USAAC dive bombers and a joint plan for a better US Army/Navy dive bomber development and training to its tactics leading to a few more SBD Dauntless/ A24 Banshee squadrons in the Pacific
At the base of all of this is greater cooperation between the Army and Navy and Army, Navy, and Marines.
Second, need more funding from Congress earlier.
I'm not sure, but it doesn't really matter. It's not allowed to have heavy artillery, and there are Japanese islands just a little ways away (the Northern Marianas). There's nothing that can be done to keep the Japanese from sailing up with a few battleships to blow the heck out of any air bases that could be built while land-based fighters keep the Americans from hitting back with their own air power. So, indefensible.
Not so much the Pederson, which IMO, was an inferior design to the Garand, but the .276 cartridge would have been the single best change possible. The U.S. might STILL be using the caliber to this day.
As has already been noted the U.S. Army was provided such a small budget that getting anything more than a new combat rifle in a new caliber would be damned near impossible.
Obergruppenführer Smith
Banned
I doubt it, the one used during the testing (the one that was not lubricated) was not really all that different from the .30-06.
Driftless
Donor
Was the doctrine pretty sound, but just not enough funds to supply both equipment and live training? The Army seemed to prefer twin engine planes for the attack role vs the Navy/Marines single engine dive bombers. So even if money issues are partly hand-waved away, do you have some work at cross-purposes?
To replace the BAR, would you start from scratch with a home-grown gun, or license build someone else' in .30-06 (Madsen, FM 24/29, Zb v.26, etal)?
How about an earlier appearance of an intermediate AT gun (like the Ordnance 6lber(57mm) the US license built and used for a time)
Most of the fighters of the early to mid 30's tended to be smaller, shorter-legged planes and while the P-38 had more range, it's best use wasn't as an escort. How about a somewhat less sophisticated plane with range and fire power for that long range offensive role. An earlier long nose XF-50?(Since this is USAAC - it could be inline or radial powered?) Or get Alexander Kartveli in a better position to develop his designs at an accelerated pace(P-35 and it's "begat's") preceding the P-47 ?
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longsword14
Banned
The basic issue was that rearmament took too long, and that the men were not trained enough. It might be impossible to get a better army along the lines argued by CdG, but anything to change the army's nature would be useful.I meant 500 pages long only by listing the issues
Proper employment and further refinements would automatically follow is you go for an earlier build-up and well trained group of men.
Increased funding and combined arms practice will cancel out many perceived or real shortcoming of a particular weapon, or weapon system.
Now about the hardware. Stick the muzzle brakes on artillery pieces ASAP so the carriages can be produced lighter and cheaper. Allows for self propelled 105mm on M3 halftrack to actually work, unlike the T19 that was plagued with too big recoil for it's light weight. Self propelled artillery of 105-155-203 mm is a must. Introduce heavier mortars (4 in plus) on a wide scale. Towed 37mm ATG is a joke, introduce the 75mm with muzzle brake on split trail carriage - basically the US ZiS-3. Better ammo ASAP for all AT guns, also AP ammo for 37mm AAA. Have the tank's 37mm gun uses ammo from 37mm AAA.
Make sure that radial-powered tanks have the intermediate gearbox so the height is under control - allows for either a lighter tank with same armor protection, or same weight with better protection. Don't hesitate with introduction of 76 and 90 mm guns in self-propelled form, turreted or otherwise.
Make APCs based on light and medium tanks - US produced light and medium tanks are great for that, and industry can churn them in numbers. Twin 37mm (later 40 mm) AAA on medium tank hull, single on light tank.
More of improved and/or lighter 0.30 Brownings. M1 Carbine with automatic fire, 30 rd mag, folding stock introduced earlier.
Now about the hardware. Stick the muzzle brakes on artillery pieces ASAP so the carriages can be produced lighter and cheaper. Allows for self propelled 105mm on M3 halftrack to actually work, unlike the T19 that was plagued with too big recoil for it's light weight. Self propelled artillery of 105-155-203 mm is a must. Introduce heavier mortars (4 in plus) on a wide scale. Towed 37mm ATG is a joke, introduce the 75mm with muzzle brake on split trail carriage - basically the US ZiS-3. Better ammo ASAP for all AT guns, also AP ammo for 37mm AAA. Have the tank's 37mm gun uses ammo from 37mm AAA.
Make sure that radial-powered tanks have the intermediate gearbox so the height is under control - allows for either a lighter tank with same armor protection, or same weight with better protection. Don't hesitate with introduction of 76 and 90 mm guns in self-propelled form, turreted or otherwise.
Make APCs based on light and medium tanks - US produced light and medium tanks are great for that, and industry can churn them in numbers. Twin 37mm (later 40 mm) AAA on medium tank hull, single on light tank.
More of improved and/or lighter 0.30 Brownings. M1 Carbine with automatic fire, 30 rd mag, folding stock introduced earlier.
Maybe. The primary reason historically was that the Army Chief of Staff (the one and only Douglas MacArthur, guy's like a bad penny, always seems to turn up) and the Ordnance Department decided that the Army had so much .30-06 that it wasn't reasonable to get a new round. Of course that "huge supply" was a joke. The U.S. procured 25+ BILLION Cal .30 Ball during the war.
Obergruppenführer Smith
Banned
You might want to actually read writings by people who do know the issues at hand instead of having a knee jerk bashing of MacArthur.
Summary: the resulting .276 (.276 T2) would not have been much different from .30-06, and it would take the developments of the 1950s for something better to come out. In other words, for all the wrongs MacArthur might have done, he was right in this case.
To quote the author from the comments on a possible postwar development:
What bugs me is why after WWII the Army didn't pick up the .276 where they left off. All of the projectile development was pretty much done (unlike in Britain, where projectile development of the .280 was a bugbear all the way to its cancellation), and the advent of ball propellants and a less-tapered case could have resulted in a really compact and slick little round. I did an estimate the other day on what a .276 designed for ball propellants and with the taper of .308 would look like, and we're talking a case less than 1.75" long, using the same base as the .35 Remington. A really compact little round, and lighter than anything else (including .280) that was being seriously proposed post-war.
I know why Ordnance didn't do this, but it was for all the wrong reasons in my opinion. Forget the .280 British, forget the .30 Light Rifle, the .276 Light Rifle would have been a helluva round.
You REALLY do go out of your way to be nasty don't you?
Ironically I read that article earlier today.
BTW: You should be very thankful you decided be this level of pointlessly insulting with me. If you had done it to another member you would be on a seven day vacation.
Obergruppenführer Smith
Banned
Apologies if that sounded like an insult to you. I've just felt that too many people were mindlessly bashing MacArthur for the wrong reasons, especially with the .276 fandom you see whenever the cartridge talk comes up.