1930's Scandinavian Defense Union

Little reminder of the history of the scandinavian states esp. Norway and its possible repercussion on such "new" union plans with a probable dominating Sweden.
But it is not a Union here, it is a "mutual defence pact if attacked" with maybe some prewar preparations but that is not necessary, so the four states are left just as they are, completely independent, until attacked. (Not the most efficient way of creating a common defense, but we are not trying to make them win.) So, none of the states is dominant, and in peacetime there is no common activity at all, but there are plans for common military leadership if they are attacked.
 
Let's use a bit of handwavium here and assume that a Fennoscandian defense union including Estonia and Latvia exists on January 1, 1939.

Let's also assume that the Soviet Union opts to attack that entity later that year, the primary objectives of such an initiative being the occupation/cession of the Estonia, Latvia, and Karelia; the secondary objectives being the occupation/cession of all Finland or the installation of a Soviet-aligned government therein.

How does this union fare against such an act of aggression?
 
Let's use a bit of handwavium here and assume that a Fennoscandian defense union including Estonia and Latvia exists on January 1, 1939.

Let's also assume that the Soviet Union opts to attack that entity later that year, the primary objectives of such an initiative being the occupation/cession of the Estonia, Latvia, and Karelia; the secondary objectives being the occupation/cession of all Finland or the installation of a Soviet-aligned government therein.

How does this union fare against such an act of aggression?
If we suppose that the six states do act as a monolithic entity, and that they use all their available resources against the enemy, it might be like an enlarged version of the Winter War, and since they have six times the power of OTL Finland, the Soviet losses before the Russians got their act together might be so large that the war ends without ceding any land.
 
If we suppose that the six states do act as a monolithic entity, and that they use all their available resources against the enemy, it might be like an enlarged version of the Winter War, and since they have six times the power of OTL Finland, the Soviet losses before the Russians got their act together might be so large that the war ends without ceding any land.

What about Estonia and Latvia? They would be harder to defend, methinks.
 
What about Estonia and Latvia? They would be harder to defend, methinks.
But we do not have the OTL overwhelming Russian numerical superiority here, so the defense might be able to hold out for some time. The defenders do suffer from lack of equipment, and the Russians are still a bit more numerous than the defenders, so it is not an ideal situation anyway.
 
If we suppose that the six states do act as a monolithic entity

Is there anything in the OTL 20s and 30s history of these nations that would prompt us to suppose this could really happen? I think the chances of this alliance falling into indecision and division in the face of a determined outside attack is more likely than maintaining consistent unity of purpose.

As to defending Estonia and Latvia - it would be very, very hard. The Nordics are not going to keep more than a token amount of non-local troops in the area, lest the Soviets accuse them of "threatening stability" and "aggression" and mobilizing and sending troops to defend them if attacked would be slower than even the Soviet steamroller in its 30s shape, because of the exigencies of political, organizational and logistical inertia. So, initially, there definitely would be a high Russian numerical superiority. Jointly defending Finland would be a cakewalk in comparison, as there the most important front is very narrow and eminently defensible even with just Finnish troops until foreign reinforcements could arrive after some weeks. But because of more open terrain and the Red Army being able to bring its bigger numbers to bear more quickly, the Estonian and Latvian militaries would be in trouble within days.

The main hope of the alliance would be to bluff the Soviets into thinking it is too costly to attack these nations, not actual defence if Stalin decides to go with an invasion anyway. Maintaining an (at least externally) united front would be crucial. I am personally afraid, though, that there are too many weak points in this front that Stalin and Hitler can use to weaken it in the late 30s.
 
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There are several problems to this defence leaugue.

As already said, Sweden was strongly neutral and isolationist in this era - free of alliances in peace to be neutral in war was the official policy. This needs to change and those that said "either, or" (meaning, either we defend Stockholm from the Karelian Isthmus together with the Finnish army or we do it alone in the suburbs of Stockholm) need to gain political influence and power much earlier.

The invasion of Norway 1940 was a fluke that should not have been possible, but German audacity made it possible. Norway was dependent on her large marchant marine and thus the goodwill of the Royal Navy. The Norwegians thought they only needed friendly relations with Britain and Sweden, and none could invade them. Their army was beyond pathetic in 1940, and that it managed to fight as well as it did was more evidence of the tenacity of the Norwegian soldier than any testimony to the quality of their army. You need to convince Norway that the Soviets or Germany could be any kind of threat to them for them to be interesed in any kind of alliance.

Denmark needs to see a use in an alliance, too. Their policy of disarmament and neutrality towards Germany was seen as the better policy as they could never hope to match Germany.

Finland probably needs to have a less brutal civil war. Perhaps if the Finnish social democrats, like their Swedish brethren, turn anti-communist earlier and stand on the sidelines or even side with the white side in the civil war, making it end much sooner and reprecussions be much milder, that would make Finland much more palatable as an alliance partner to Swedish social democrats. A more staunch Swedish support for Finland during the civil war and for some reason a less infected language issue in Finland in the 20s and 30s should also help make an alliance with Sweden more palatable for the Finnish nationalists.

The Nordic countries would also need common enemies.

How about this:

The 1905 separation between Sweden and Norway goes smoother - it is not started uniliterally by the Norwegians bur rather negotiated, and the two countries remain allies even if they separate politically.

Russia claims that it should occupy Narvik and the Swedish iron ore railroad during ww1 to bring in British supplies (that went through Archangelsk and later Romanov-na-Murman/Murmansk) and have an ice-free port in the North Sea? This causes Norway and Sweden to view Russia with more suspicion and Norway to be a bit less fond of Britain, as Britain did not outright reject the project (to not ruffle Russian feathers). The idea of the Russians wanting Narvik and the connecting railroad gets implanted in the Swedish and Norwegian peoples and governments. Sweden rushes troops north to protect the railroad and re-affirms its alliance with Norway, causing Norwegian support for the alliance to strengthen.

German nationalists decide to boycott the referendum of Schleswig and Holstein, resulting in the Danes winning both Duchies after ww1, which is decried by Germany, and much nationalist posturing is made in Germany about regaining them (that OTL did not happen with Schleswig). At some time in the 20s, parts of the Schwarzer Reichwehr also becomes known, resulting in the Danes fearing the German army and increasing their defences. Also, the Soviets infiltrade or bribe Danish communists to rise on Bornholm in an attempt to gain the island as a naval base to move their positions up during the Soviet Civil war and hopefully block the British fleet that is blockading Petrograd/Leningrad. The rising fails, partially because the Germans land part of the Baltic Division - the Germans try to refuse to leave (not a central German policy, but a decision of the local commander) but are forced to in late 1919 by the Allied Control Commision. Denmark thus fear both Germany and the Soviets.

The Finnish social democrats take the same path as ther Swedish brethren, swearing off revolutionary change in the 1890s and from 1907 working the parliamentary route. They distance themselves from the communists, and once the communists rise 1917, they vocally and firmly decry violence between brothers and the communist armed revolution. Parts of them fight on the white side, but most stand on the sidelines. The civil war is shorter and much less brutal, and the social democrats of Finland are much more palatable to the Finnish elite, allowing them to be part of several governments. The Lappo movement faces much more opposition from the government as the social democrats are part of it and after a small and failed insurrection, they are pretty mcuh neutralised.

The Soviets, either because Trotsky remains or Stalin is more expansionist, take the opportunity during the Schwarzer Reichswehr scandal to invade Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and move their positions up in the Baltic Sea and start demanding Hangö and the Karelian Isthmus from Finland (to "secure Leningrad") and Petsamo as well. Norway and Sweden see Petsamo as the first step towards Narvik and the iron ore railway and Denmark sees Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as the first step towards Bornholm. Estonians and Latvians flee in large numbers to Finland and Sweden, including the merchant and military marines of both nations and exile goverments for both nations are established in Sweden despite Soviet demands to turn the people and the naval vessels over.

In 1927, the Kazan cooperation between Germany and the Soviet Union becomes known and the Nordic countries, fearing an aggressive Germano-Soviet Alliance, meet to form an alliance, a customs union and a monterary union. The first one is hammered out pretty quickly. All nations agree to aid each other to the "greatest extent possible" by any nation not in the alliance that suffers agression as determined by the LEague of Nations charter. The defence union will be purely defensive, free of alliances with any other power and otherwise neutral in any conflict.

The customs and monetary unions are harder to get through, but go through in 1930 after the intial effects of the Great Depression.
 

yourworstnightmare

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All the Nordic countries had very different perspectives and were in different situations:

-Finland was threatened by the USSR, and from Finland's prespective sending men to defend Denmark from the Germans while the Russians breathed down their necks was completely unthinkable
-Denmark, same thing as Finland. Sending men to protect another country when the Germans look dangerous south of the border was just not happening.
-Norway, felt their position was secure, and trusted good relations with the UK was a security guarantee enough.
-Sweden, was preoccupied by creating the "folkhem" and felt their position was secure.

So something need to be very different for this to change.
 
even if this happens, I think you end up having Sweden under the Nazi heel, as well as much of this alliance.
 
The reason the Germans decided to invade Norway was because of the Allied threat to Swedish iron ore being shipped down by sea in Norwegian waters. If the Allies did not threaten that, Germany may not invade.

So the first question is now whether Germany will risk taking on a Scandinavian Defense Union. It is whether Britain would risk a plan to disrupt the flow of iron ore by violating Norwegian neutrality and mining its waters. If the operation would risk having Denmark, Sweden, and Norway become de facto allies of Germany, it might never happen.
 
All the Nordic countries had very different perspectives and were in different situations:

-Finland was threatened by the USSR, and from Finland's prespective sending men to defend Denmark from the Germans while the Russians breathed down their necks was completely unthinkable
-Denmark, same thing as Finland. Sending men to protect another country when the Germans look dangerous south of the border was just not happening.
-Norway, felt their position was secure, and trusted good relations with the UK was a security guarantee enough.
-Sweden, was preoccupied by creating the "folkhem" and felt their position was secure.

So something need to be very different for this to change.
If we suppose that TTL is roughly similar to OTL but that sometime in the mid to late 1930s enough people in leading positions agree that there is a need for some common military setup in this region to counterweight the dictators closeby, then we could have a compromise solution where all the countries give a quarter of their military strength for use by the pact, while retaining three quarters in the home country. This way they make a sizable effort while not stripping themselves naked. A quarter of everything.

For example, Finland had some 200 000 soldiers in the winter war, which makes 50 000 for the pact. Sweden mobilised 320 000 in april 1940, and if we extend that to 400 000, we get 100 000 for the pact, Denmark, Norway and Estonia+Latvia give 50 000 each, so we thus have a total of 300 000 to add to the local forces of whichever country is attacked first. Not a very well equipped and trained force, but it is something more than each on their own.
 
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