1930 germany Navy and its building for the 1930's

I may be getting it wrong, but wasn't there torpedo protection horrible since the sections did not run from side top side of the ship? This made there very vulnerable to a torpedo hit followed by capsizing.
You're probably right. I did say that they were good when they were launched. I'm fairly certain torpedos and torpedo protection had improved signidicantly between their launch and, say, Szent István's sinking.
 
But Germany had no realistic chance of matching British sea (surface ship) power. The clear lesson of WWI was that big gunships were all but useless but U-boats very effective.
I doubt that's the lesson they took away from WWI.

The lessons of WWI from a naval perspective are:

1.) An enemy with surface superiority can legally and effectively implement a blockade, thus gradually exacerbating supply problems even for a continental power like Germany.

2.) An enemy with a lot of submarines can try to implement a similar blockade but only with great difficulty and may ultimately fail, especially against the world's leading sea power.

3.) The Royal Navy can be tied down and limited to tactical victories by judicious use of a surface fleet.

Obviously having a superior fleet would be preferable, but it isn't possible, as you point out.

On the whole, though, the more pressing threat to the German regime in 1930 is domestic, not international, so spending more resources building up the navy isn't going to help matters there.

Hence, I would play for time by investing what I needed to keep a good corps of professional people in the navy and a progressive skill base in the design bureau, focus on more pressing matters, and hope that down the road more resources will be available for the navy.
 
And having a lot of U-Boats without French bases to spread them out in, is hardly worth it in 1938 as it just antagonizes the UK
 
And having a lot of U-Boats without French bases to spread them out in, is hardly worth it in 1938 as it just antagonizes the UK
Maybe the best idea is to build a huge fleet of landing craft so you can carry out a diversionary raid on the Isle of Wight, but tell the British it's targeted at Bulgaria so they don't suspect anything.
 
GERMANY 01 January 1930
IN SERVICE: 6 battleships-predreadnoughts,
5 protected cruisers, 3 light cruisers, 29 torpedo boats, 3 fishery protection
vessels, 2 dispatch vessels, 10 motor torpedo boats, 5 motor anti-submarine
boats, 2 mine transports, 29 minesweepers, 8
minesweeping boats
Building
Deutschland, 1/1940- Lützow Deutsche Werke, Kiel 5/2/1929 laid down

what would the best builds be for the German navy as 1/1/1930 if you were in charge with the different naval treaties in forced .

The primary missions of the German navy are coast defense, protection of German commerce, showing the flag/keeping Germany on the international scene, raiding an enemy's commerce and coast, maintaining the fleet as a viable fighting force and maintaining domestic warship construction capacity, keeping the Germany navy relevant to the German public and government.

I'll go with some version of the panzerschiffes to replace the predreadnoughts. New light cruisers to replace the old protected cruisers. The new cruisers will be a different design from the Konigsberg class - I'll hold off on building new cruisers till after Konigsberg enters service.. A main battery of 6 to 9 150mm guns, 6 to 8 secondary guns, reduce the torpedo armament back to that of Emden.

Of course I'll keep the Weimer policy of secret submarine testing and construction. The current treaties will eventually be modified, disappear or enforcement will be lax. Build an experimental ship or two of destroyer to small cruiser size in order to experiment with the new high pressure powerplants.
 

NoMommsen

Donor
GERMANY 01 January 1930
IN SERVICE: 6 battleships-predreadnoughts,
5 protected cruisers, 3 light cruisers, 29 torpedo boats, 3 fishery protection
vessels, 2 dispatch vessels, 10 motor torpedo boats, 5 motor anti-submarine
boats, 2 mine transports, 29 minesweepers, 8
minesweeping boats
Building
Deutschland, 1/1940- Lützow Deutsche Werke, Kiel 5/2/1929 laid down

what would the best builds be for the German navy as 1/1/1930 if you were in charge with the different naval treaties in forced .
Erhmm ... not fully correct, because the Reichsmarine simply did not have the men to man all of what was allowed by the ToV.
The had :
  • 4 pre-dreadnoughts in service :
    • Elsaß (which will be switched against the "reworked" Hannover at 25.02.1930)
    • Hesen
    • Schleswig-Holstein
    • Schlesien
  • Lothringen and Braunschweig are decommissioned at that time and keps as reserve.
  • no protected cruiser ... servicable
    • at that point of time only the Amazone" is still in service of the protected cruisers and due to be decomissioned on 15.01.1930. Beside "Berlin", "Hamburg" and "Arcona" all other "gazelles" are already strikken from the list of navy-ships (same will happen with "Arcona").
  • therefore "only" 3 light cruisers of the K-class
I assume from your T-boat count the 12 "destroyer/T-boats" of the predator and predator-bird classes - which actually were in service at or named date - are to be subtracted.
 
Submarines, submarines, & still more submarines! (Plus an aircraft carrier or two)

So the Germans start building submarines in 1930? And then more and more of those? In the most brazen and dangerous violation of the Treaty of Versailles?

So come 1936, the British are annoyed no end, and have a plan to react with full force at any provocation. With full British support, the French enter the Rhineland and kick the Wehrmacht out, instability ensues, and that's the end of the Nazi dreams.

That's the most extreme case of those proposed upthread, but several others boil down to Germany violating the spirit, if not the letter, of commitments they have undertaken, and raising each and every red flag in the Admiralty. That will be the end of any goodwill the Germans might have accrued in London on the basis of a too-harsh Treaty of Versailles, with all that that implies for the early Nazi stunts.
 
So the Germans start building submarines in 1930? And then more and more of those? In the most brazen and dangerous violation of the Treaty of Versailles?

So come 1936, the British are annoyed no end, and have a plan to react with full force at any provocation. With full British support, the French enter the Rhineland and kick the Wehrmacht out, instability ensues, and that's the end of the Nazi dreams.

That's the most extreme case of those proposed upthread, but several others boil down to Germany violating the spirit, if not the letter, of commitments they have undertaken, and raising each and every red flag in the Admiralty. That will be the end of any goodwill the Germans might have accrued in London on the basis of a too-harsh Treaty of Versailles, with all that that implies for the early Nazi stunts.
Indeed. I have said this before and must keep saying it. If we're going to inject hindsight into this calculation, then the best thing for the German government in 1930 on naval matters would unquestionably be to sideline anything but the most essential projects and focus on keeping the republic intact instead of military reconstruction. This is the surest way I know to prevent the fleet from being sunk by the British.

Even without hindsight, it's 1930. The world economy is collapsing, the Weimar Republic is bursting at the seams with extremist parties, and Germany is still, last I checked, a land-based power. If you're a politically astute policy-maker in the navy staff, is this really the right time to suggest antagonizing Britain by launching a major naval expansion program?
 
No, the big ships were very useful. Having 60% of the strength of the Royal Navy in WW1 kept the British far from the German coast, and this was the original reason for the bigger navy. And it would be true in WW2 too. Imagine an ASB gave Nazi Germany a Navy equal to 60% of the combined US/Royal Navy. There would be no D-Day. No invasion of Italy. Totally different war.

Yes. Berlin is bombed flat. A navy only guarantees sea use or denial. Any other conception of sea power is an error in military logic.
 
Top