1916: No Verdun, CP Eastern Front offensive

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Deleted member 1487

I searched and didn't see this what if so here goes:
What if the CPs did not launch the Verdun offensive in 1916, nor the Italian offensive and instead attacked the Russians with the full weight of the German and A-H armies?

Romania would certainly stay neutral if the Russians are on the defensive and the A-H army wouldn't fall apart as it did during the Brusilov offensive.
Let's say that instead of attacking along the German front, the offensive was launched in Ukraine with mixed German-Austrian commands and is overall commanded by a German general and staff (Mackensen and von Seeckt again so as to deny OberOst more press).

Launching in Spring after the thaw (May) it would aim to capture Ukraine, prop up the Austrians, keep the Romanians neutral, and perhaps force hasty attacks from the Entente forces in Italy and France.

What would the result of this be?
 
Verdun inflicted marginally more casualties on the French but fundamentally failed to achieve its strategic objective of draining the French manpower pool or breaking their morale, whereas in the East, the only fear that to go too deep and still fail to achieve political resolution. With hindsight, we know that the Russians were in deep trouble already on the home front and that they were not a position to meaningfully resist a determined attack, so it seems clear the Germans would have had better luck if they spent the year decisively trying to end the war in the east. A treaty similar to B-L might have been achieved over a year early, though the French would have likely made slight gains in the west in the meantime.

Still, that sounds like a good trade off to me. Plus, it opens a wide range of options as to how post-war Russia might look like. If it surrenders early enough, a communist coup is still possible but less likely. None of this admittedly ends the war in German favor but it'd give them a far better shot to do it than their stalemate at Verdun.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
Germany holds in east. The French and UK launch a strong offensive, which will be very bloody for the Entente. Merely bloody for the Germans. Germans will lose a little land, but manageable. Italy/A-H is Italy attacking for heavy Italian losses.

In the East, the CP should be able to bust east. The Germans will find a flank to turn. I am not sure they can take Kiev, but I would start with the Germans gaining 100 to 150 miles of frontage. Russia will burn the ground and evacuate Slavs. Cause more food issue for Russia, but does not move up the collapse that much. CP get a little food and other useful loot from areas taken. Romania not entering war means 1 million more tons of cereal. Few free CP armies. This is the big gain.

USW is interesting call. I don't have enough reading to give good opinion, but it is critical if the USA comes in war. USA not coming in war means CP win, so lets say USW happens for discussion purposes.

It save Falkenhayn job. Russia will change government before he can launch the grand offensive of 1917. Being the knock one out of the war, he attacks east, and Russia leaves the war by July 1917. Then he turns west in 1918. Looks lot like CP win, but if the USA enters, maybe we have WW1 ending in 1919 or 1920 with Entente win.
 
Total casualties in this battle were something like 750k-950k, absolutely horrific even by the standards of the day. Eliminate this and the Western Front improves notably for the Germans. Hit Russia hard enough and grind their 1916 offensive to a halt will also give AH some breathing room along with the hope to ward off the wolf problem seen in the area (Germany and Russia actually stopped fighting each other to deal with the wolves at least once). Push harder into Russia, especially if Riga, Minsk, and Chisnau can be taken (ideally Kiev but unlikely until 1917) then Russia will likely come to the table. Remember that BL was partially a result of Russian desperation fo get out of the war, so the Czar will probably not agree to such a stringent treaty, though some sort of accomodation is not unreasonable (maybe Estonia and Byelorussia remain Russian, Ukraine is smaller, compensation is paid to Russia, and Finland has different borders for instance). Then Germany can turn its eyes to France and Italy, maybe coordinating a very serious offensive into the Po River Valley to knock Italy out of the war or turning all eyes on France for some sort of major offensive. Without the need to withdraw to the Hindenberg Line, the French might be forced into a WWI Dunkirk if the Germans can break them at Arras and head for the Channel. That would also trap a large British force there along with the rest of the Belgian army.
 
EVF would have to be eliminated, he was categorically against making a decisive effort in the east; but a post tannenberg pod that doesn't see hindenberg succeed him would be regarded as a giant insult and be politically unworkable
 

Deleted member 1487

Germany holds in east. The French and UK launch a strong offensive, which will be very bloody for the Entente. Merely bloody for the Germans. Germans will lose a little land, but manageable. Italy/A-H is Italy attacking for heavy Italian losses.

In the East, the CP should be able to bust east. The Germans will find a flank to turn. I am not sure they can take Kiev, but I would start with the Germans gaining 100 to 150 miles of frontage. Russia will burn the ground and evacuate Slavs. Cause more food issue for Russia, but does not move up the collapse that much. CP get a little food and other useful loot from areas taken. Romania not entering war means 1 million more tons of cereal. Few free CP armies. This is the big gain.


USW is interesting call. I don't have enough reading to give good opinion, but it is critical if the USA comes in war. USA not coming in war means CP win, so lets say USW happens for discussion purposes.
USW was opposed by Falkenhayn and Bethmann-Holweg by late 1916 because it would mean war with the US and they wanted to cut a peace deal. US entry means no peace deal is possible, while no US means there is some room to negotiate. Not only that, but IOTL the army ran the navy's numbers about the Uboat offensive and found them to be highly flawed, informing Ludendorff of this fact only to be ignored. ITTL Falkenhayn is already primed to listen, so would take these numbers to heart and bludgeon the navy with them when the subject is brought up; plus he has the Kaiser's support without Verdun and Bethmann-Holweg's too. In fact without Verdun Falkenhayn is not politically vulnerable, especially without A-H collapsing in the East and Romania remaining neutral.


It save Falkenhayn job. Russia will change government before he can launch the grand offensive of 1917. Being the knock one out of the war, he attacks east, and Russia leaves the war by July 1917. Then he turns west in 1918. Looks lot like CP win, but if the USA enters, maybe we have WW1 ending in 1919 or 1920 with Entente win.
Of course with Falkenhayn in power then the economy doesn't have nearly as much trouble as IOTL, because there will be no Hindenburg program, which means no Coal Crisis, Transportation Crisis, Turnip Winter, production collapse, or massive labor unrest resulting from Ludendorff's attempts to militarize factories.

Also without the massive waste of materials production will be significantly higher in 1916 and much higher in 1917. Plus no starvation (though hunger), the rail net holds up much better, people aren't as cold because coal is better managed, more labor is freed up by not building useless factories, and labor/the homefront stays much more stable. This is a massive improvement over OTL, which means Germany could actually last into 1919 and maybe 1920 if worse comes to worse.

I don't think the US entering the war is likely at all, though I understand it makes a much more interesting story if the US stays in.
Still, even if the US enters in this scenario, Germany would be stronger and have the A-Hs in a much better situation, so could perhaps work out a favorable peace deal in 1918 if they play their cards right over Belgium. Without Ludendorff this is very much possible, as Falkenhayn was willing to compromise, as was Bethmann-Holweg.
 
The tricky part about no Verdun is that Germany is then doing nothing from February 1916 to perhaps June 1916 when the eastern front weather might be suitable for an offensive (after the 1914-1915 Carpathian winter, another winter operation probably wouldn't be tried). Thats a long time to be doing nothing when Germany suppoisedly can't survive war for much longer.

Politically Falkenhyn has to come up with a war plan that can win the whole war in 1916, a long eastern front centric war with a 1918 victory time frame which makes sense in hindsight wouldn't be considered workable in the timeframe of early 1916.
 
Falkenhayn & Kaiser

The biggest problem is that it is very hard seeing Falkenhayn doing this. I might therefore suggest a modified version of this. The POD is there is some sort of friction between Wilhelm and Falkenhayn at beginning of 1916. The Kaiser was so erratic this is clearly plausible. Part of the friction is that Wilhelm has become convinced of an Eastern strategy for 1916.

Despite this Falkenhayn being Falkenhayn goes ahead with Operation Judgment despite Wilhem's opinion. However since he believes his job is hanging by a thread he pays it more attention and avoids "see what you want to see" mode. The result is as of 1 March he orders the offensive suspended and after a week of intense study switches to an East stategy reluctantly and "temporarily''.

Something to note is avoiding Verdun completely and massively redeploying to the east means there is a chance of Entente success at the Somme because there will be much stronger French participation and the French had better tactics than the BEF (borderline faint praise) With a short sharp Verdun they will be forced to commit some strength there they intended for the Somme.

There is the tricky question of whether the change in German strategy causes Conrad to call off/postpone Trentino.

I would also point out if the CP merely take Rovno and Tarnopol they deny Brusilov key staging areas making his historical offensive impossible.

There is also the possibility of mission creep which is what essentially happened in 1915 repeating itself. So what begins as a very limited "brief" offensive could expand into something as ambitious as a Take Kiev strategy.

Lastly there are the Romanians. Clearly their joining the Entente is avoided. There is the question of their possibly joining the CP. However there is a possibility that while they will be reluctant to join outright they may give the Heer the right to pass through their territory which would make it easier to outflank Brusilov and threaten Odessa.
 
Something to note is avoiding Verdun completely and massively redeploying to the east means there is a chance of Entente success at the Somme because there will be much stronger French participation and the French had better tactics than the BEF (borderline faint praise) With a short sharp Verdun they will be forced to commit some strength there they intended for the Somme.

Agreed. The BEF would also have more time to train their forces for the offensive without the pressure on Verdun forcing them to attack early, further increasing its effectiveness.
 

Deleted member 1487

Agreed. The BEF would also have more time to train their forces for the offensive without the pressure on Verdun forcing them to attack early, further increasing its effectiveness.

Why wouldn't the pressure on the Russians and their threats to make a separate peace force the British to launch an early offensive like IOTL? After the 1915 offensives against Russia, the West owes Russia support, especially if the Germans do what Tom B suggests, as they will launch their costly Lake Naroch offensive to support the French.

The biggest problem is that it is very hard seeing Falkenhayn doing this. I might therefore suggest a modified version of this. The POD is there is some sort of friction between Wilhelm and Falkenhayn at beginning of 1916. The Kaiser was so erratic this is clearly plausible. Part of the friction is that Wilhelm has become convinced of an Eastern strategy for 1916.

Despite this Falkenhayn being Falkenhayn goes ahead with Operation Judgment despite Wilhem's opinion. However since he believes his job is hanging by a thread he pays it more attention and avoids "see what you want to see" mode. The result is as of 1 March he orders the offensive suspended and after a week of intense study switches to an East stategy reluctantly and "temporarily''.

Something to note is avoiding Verdun completely and massively redeploying to the east means there is a chance of Entente success at the Somme because there will be much stronger French participation and the French had better tactics than the BEF (borderline faint praise) With a short sharp Verdun they will be forced to commit some strength there they intended for the Somme.

There is the tricky question of whether the change in German strategy causes Conrad to call off/postpone Trentino.

I would also point out if the CP merely take Rovno and Tarnopol they deny Brusilov key staging areas making his historical offensive impossible.

There is also the possibility of mission creep which is what essentially happened in 1915 repeating itself. So what begins as a very limited "brief" offensive could expand into something as ambitious as a Take Kiev strategy.

Lastly there are the Romanians. Clearly their joining the Entente is avoided. There is the question of their possibly joining the CP. However there is a possibility that while they will be reluctant to join outright they may give the Heer the right to pass through their territory which would make it easier to outflank Brusilov and threaten Odessa.
I've read the Falkenhayn-Wilhelm relationship as Wilhelm implicitly trusting Falkenhayn until Romania entered the war. I cannot recall a single instance of Wilhelm having any influence over the military once the war started that didn't stem from Falkenhayn 'asking' for something.

I fully agree that Falkenhayn is a very difficult obstacle to overcome; I was interested in what the results of a different strategy would be, even though it would be outside the conceptual realities of OHL in 1915-6.
Perhaps if intelligence is better and Falkenhayn realizes that further efforts at Verdun past March are pointless he will abandon the offensive, but mission creep and personal investment in that strategy are very difficult things to overcome.

As to the French at the Somme, I understand their tactics improved so much based on the experiences of Verdun, which cemented the lessons of 1915 and enhanced them. So if Verdun isn't launched, the French won't be nearly as skilled on the attack as they were IOTL, though they will be better than 1915. But without Verdun the Germans won't think that the French are committed elsewhere and pull troops out of the French sector on the Somme, which was IOTL THE great reason for French success during the Somme campaign. So the French will do significantly worse at the Somme than IOTL, but without Verdun their overall losses for the year will be lower.

I wonder if it might be possible for Falkenhayn to consider that on account of having a limited reserve in February 1916 (IIRC 20 divisions), which was not enough to attack on both banks of the Meuse river simultaneously, something he writes worrying about in his memoirs, could have potential resulted in a strategy of inflicting losses on the Russians, who he already knows cannot do well against the German artillery train, to economize his commitments AND force the Entente into hasty action on the Western Front like he hoped to do with the Verdun offensive. A winter campaign in Ukraine is not like the situation in the Carpathians in 1914-5, so he could launch a series of limited offensives to tie down the Russians (though I realize he thought they were already crippled from 1915), potentially bring the Romanians into the war on the CP side, and maybe force a separate peace again. It would also potentially open up Ukrainian farmland to CP harvesting.
Also the fear of Russia making a separate peace would conceivably force the Entente to attack in the West before they were ready, which Falkenhayn already thought would be a disaster. Of couse that would require him to not be disenchanted with the idea of being able to force the Russians out of the war, which is why he went after the French in 1916.

Edit:
What about poison gas? The French had gas masks that were able to deal with Green Cross in 1916, so it made little impact upon its debut. But the Russians were a generation behind on gas mask technology. So Green Cross could make a much bigger impact against the Russians if used on the offensive and with an artillery scheme devised by someone like Bruchmüller, who IIRC had already been the Eastern Front's artillery expert.
I know that Franz Josef had banned gas use by his forces, but I'm not sure if he forbid its use on A-H force's fronts.
 
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BlondieBC

Banned
Why wouldn't the pressure on the Russians and their threats to make a separate peace force the British to launch an early offensive like IOTL? After the 1915 offensives against Russia, the West owes Russia support, especially if the Germans do what Tom B suggests, as they will launch their costly Lake Naroch offensive to support the French.


...

I wonder if it might be possible for Falkenhayn to consider that on account of having a limited reserve in February 1916 (IIRC 20 divisions), which was not enough to attack on both banks of the Meuse river simultaneously, something he writes worrying about in his memoirs, could have potential resulted in a strategy of inflicting losses on the Russians, who he already knows cannot do well against the German artillery train, to economize his commitments AND force the Entente into hasty action on the Western Front like he hoped to do with the Verdun offensive. A winter campaign in Ukraine is not like the situation in the Carpathians in 1914-5, so he could launch a series of limited offensives to tie down the Russians (though I realize he thought they were already crippled from 1915), potentially bring the Romanians into the war on the CP side, and maybe force a separate peace again. It would also potentially open up Ukrainian farmland to CP harvesting.

Also the fear of Russia making a separate peace would conceivably force the Entente to attack in the West before they were ready, which Falkenhayn already thought would be a disaster. Of couse that would require him to not be disenchanted with the idea of being able to force the Russians out of the war, which is why he went after the French in 1916.

I think the BEF has to be used or run a high risk of Russia/France leaving the war separately from the UK. Not a given, but a big risk. So I tend to agree the BEF will be used for something in 1914, and based on the doctrine of the day, it will be an attack into a flank somewhere.

The way I read Falkenhayn is he was a man trying to knock out enemy nations from weakest to hardest. So the question becomes "How big a POD does it take for Falkenhayn to see Russia as the one who is easier to break?" We can argue as little as a single spy giving him a clear picture of how bad off Russia was at the time. Or one can argue it would have taken another major Russian setback in 1914 or 1915. I don't fully trust his post war book on this matter, since the book is partially to make him look better. Unless we have something like his journal during the war or minutes of meetings at GHQ during the war, I don't know exactly how can determine for sure.
 
I think the BEF has to be used or run a high risk of Russia/France leaving the war separately from the UK. Not a given, but a big risk. So I tend to agree the BEF will be used for something in 1914, and based on the doctrine of the day, it will be an attack into a flank somewhere.

The way I read Falkenhayn is he was a man trying to knock out enemy nations from weakest to hardest. So the question becomes "How big a POD does it take for Falkenhayn to see Russia as the one who is easier to break?" We can argue as little as a single spy giving him a clear picture of how bad off Russia was at the time. Or one can argue it would have taken another major Russian setback in 1914 or 1915. I don't fully trust his post war book on this matter, since the book is partially to make him look better. Unless we have something like his journal during the war or minutes of meetings at GHQ during the war, I don't know exactly how can determine for sure.


EVF is the obstacle in and of himself... perhaps one could have Wilhelm die and be replaced by son in 1915 who replaces EVF for being an overbearing douche and the replacement (knoblesdorff? Hindenberg? opts for an eastern attack)
 

Deleted member 1487

EVF is the obstacle in and of himself... perhaps one could have Wilhelm die and be replaced by son in 1915 who replaces EVF for being an overbearing douche and the replacement (knoblesdorff? Hindenberg? opts for an eastern attack)

Hindenburg is a mess in and of himself, but it would get the attack in East that we are talking about. IIRC the Crown Prince was a Hindenburg adherent.

I think the BEF has to be used or run a high risk of Russia/France leaving the war separately from the UK. Not a given, but a big risk. So I tend to agree the BEF will be used for something in 1914, and based on the doctrine of the day, it will be an attack into a flank somewhere.
1914? In 1916 the BEF was gone, instead we have the British army. Yes, it had to be used in 1916 or risk the alliance falling apart, so IMHO it doesn't matter which ally is hit, but simply that the pressure is brought to bear and the other allies have to react. Not sure where there is a flank in 1916 though.

The way I read Falkenhayn is he was a man trying to knock out enemy nations from weakest to hardest. So the question becomes "How big a POD does it take for Falkenhayn to see Russia as the one who is easier to break?" We can argue as little as a single spy giving him a clear picture of how bad off Russia was at the time. Or one can argue it would have taken another major Russian setback in 1914 or 1915. I don't fully trust his post war book on this matter, since the book is partially to make him look better. Unless we have something like his journal during the war or minutes of meetings at GHQ during the war, I don't know exactly how can determine for sure.
Yeah, I agree that his book is not the best tool. This is much better IMHO:
http://www.amazon.com/German-Strategy-Path-Verdun-Development/dp/0521841933
Falkenhayn is clearly describing a much different strategy to what he planned at the time, which fell apart as quickly as the French did once the offensive started. Once they retreated the entire strategy was no longer viable, as it was predicated on the Germans pretty much standing still and launching a slow von Mudra-type offensive on the East Bank of the Meuse. Instead the French ran away and pulled the German infantry away from their artillery support, while at the same time pulling back to the very best artillery shelters on the Western Front. At that point the entire plan fell apart, yet things continued because Falkenhayn bet the farm on this one strategy and far too much effort had gone into preparing for it to call it off in the first few days.

I suppose he needed to know that the French were much more obstinant than thought an the Russians more vulnerable than thought. Overall the strategy for Verdun was sound, but it fell apart quickly in execution and mission creep prevented it from being called off; bad intelligence kept it going far beyond the time where it was profitable.

Something would need to make Falkenhayn think the Russians were vulnerable morale-wise for him to try again after the failure to bring them to peace talks in 1915; I do think that it could have broken the Southwestern Front morally if there was a Verdun-scale offensive (or larger really) on the Ukrainian Front, especially if it brought Romania in the war.
 
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BlondieBC

Banned
EVF is the obstacle in and of himself... perhaps one could have Wilhelm die and be replaced by son in 1915 who replaces EVF for being an overbearing douche and the replacement (knoblesdorff? Hindenberg? opts for an eastern attack)

He had such a good 1915. And Verdun starts in Feb 1916, so hard to fire him. In many ways the war is won, the the big mistakes start. I never believed EvF did not intent to take Verdun as the were slaughtering the French. The problem is they lost surprise. Due to the weather, they waited a week to attack to due rains. It was a heavy flood year. The French moved up a corp to reinforce. A lot of this is EvF fault. If surprised is required, he should have been more careful to wait til the weather clears, not move troops in anticipation of the weather. Fix this one mistake, and they will take Verdun. The kill ratio early on was very good for the Germans. It will be a shorter (weeks or couple of months) battle with a morale breaking loss to the French. And then he can continue to attack another French bulge either nearby or another location. The way the lines did a 90 turn from east along Marne to South along Muese means you will always have a bulge unless Nancy and Belfort are abandoned.

So if we were placing bets, I would be you need another major setback for Russians in 1915 as the only way. Something like instead of retreating the Russians poor more men into Poland and endup having a couple armies captured. The only other options I would even think about betting would be EvF learning of Conrads plans well ahead of time and knowing he can't stop Conrad. Then maybe you can get a joint offensive.

Now if you gave me a time machine, and I could give them the optimal strategy but not tell EvF why. And he would execute. I would go with still doing Verdun but delayed by a week. It has a hard cutoff date from Grand Offensive to holding action sometime in April. And launch an attack with heavy chemical weapons use against Russia. Either solo into Belarus/Baltics or with A-H into Ukraine. Hopefully, Conrad will come along for his share of gains once he know of the May attack. You have a good chance taking Verdun by April and then catching the Russians by surprise. Plus if A-H (hopefully) is massing forces for a May attack in the east, the Entente can tell this from troop movements of A-H, and hopefully make Verdun more of a surprise.
 

Deleted member 1487

He had such a good 1915. And Verdun starts in Feb 1916, so hard to fire him. In many ways the war is won, the the big mistakes start. I never believed EvF did not intent to take Verdun as the were slaughtering the French. The problem is they lost surprise. Due to the weather, they waited a week to attack to due rains. It was a heavy flood year. The French moved up a corp to reinforce. A lot of this is EvF fault. If surprised is required, he should have been more careful to wait til the weather clears, not move troops in anticipation of the weather. Fix this one mistake, and they will take Verdun. The kill ratio early on was very good for the Germans. It will be a shorter (weeks or couple of months) battle with a morale breaking loss to the French. And then he can continue to attack another French bulge either nearby or another location. The way the lines did a 90 turn from east along Marne to South along Muese means you will always have a bulge unless Nancy and Belfort are abandoned.

So if we were placing bets, I would be you need another major setback for Russians in 1915 as the only way. Something like instead of retreating the Russians poor more men into Poland and endup having a couple armies captured. The only other options I would even think about betting would be EvF learning of Conrads plans well ahead of time and knowing he can't stop Conrad. Then maybe you can get a joint offensive.

Now if you gave me a time machine, and I could give them the optimal strategy but not tell EvF why. And he would execute. I would go with still doing Verdun but delayed by a week. It has a hard cutoff date from Grand Offensive to holding action sometime in April. And launch an attack with heavy chemical weapons use against Russia. Either solo into Belarus/Baltics or with A-H into Ukraine. Hopefully, Conrad will come along for his share of gains once he know of the May attack. You have a good chance taking Verdun by April and then catching the Russians by surprise. Plus if A-H (hopefully) is massing forces for a May attack in the east, the Entente can tell this from troop movements of A-H, and hopefully make Verdun more of a surprise.

http://www.wereldoorlog1418.nl/battleverdun/slachtoffers.htm
Month: French losses: German losses:
February

24,000

25,363
March

65,000

56,244

April

42,000

38,299

May

59,000

54,309

June

67,000

51,567

July

31,000

25,969

August

27,000

30,572

Total

315,000

282,323

Early on the Germans were not getting that favorable of a casualty ratio.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
Yeah, I agree that his book is not the best tool. This is much better IMHO:
http://www.amazon.com/German-Strategy-Path-Verdun-Development/dp/0521841933
Falkenhayn is clearly describing a much different strategy to what he planned at the time, which fell apart as quickly as the French did once the offensive started. Once they retreated the entire strategy was no longer viable, as it was predicated on the Germans pretty much standing still and launching a slow von Mudra-type offensive on the East Bank of the Meuse. Instead the French ran away and pulled the German infantry away from their artillery support, while at the same time pulling back to the very best artillery shelters on the Western Front. At that point the entire plan fell apart, yet things continued because Falkenhayn bet the farm on this one strategy and far too much effort had gone into preparing for it to call it off in the first few days.

I suppose he needed to know that the French were much more obstinant than thought an the Russians more vulnerable than thought. Overall the strategy for Verdun was sound, but it fell apart quickly in execution and mission creep prevented it from being called off; bad intelligence kept it going far beyond the time where it was profitable.

Something would need to make Falkenhayn think the Russians were vulnerable morale-wise for him to try again after the failure to bring them to peace talks in 1915; I do think that it could have broken the Southwestern Front morally if there was a Verdun-scale offensive (or larger really) on the Ukrainian Front, especially if it brought Romania in the war.

Sorry on date. Got threads confused.

I have generally sticked to books before 1929 (free), and it was pretty clear EvF was making excuses about Verdun. Also the fact the other commands disagree, and no one has ever produced written orders supporting EvF AFAIK, makes it an easy call.

Now technically, EvF should have been able to call it off. At least seems like, and reset for attack some where else. The Germans were good at moving units, so you fall back to the lines and destroy fortresses you took.
 

Deleted member 1487

I have generally sticked to books before 1929 (free), and it was pretty clear EvF was making excuses about Verdun. Also the fact the other commands disagree, and no one has ever produced written orders supporting EvF AFAIK, makes it an easy call.
Read the latest scholarship on the subject, much has come to light since 1929. There were tremendous efforts to slander EvF during and after the war, which the author of the above link gets into detail about. EvF didn't really have a Christmas memorandum, at least not one that can be found, but there is ample evidence about the strategy he was planning on prior to the battle. There was also a stop-line planned that was north of Verdun.
IIRC it was the Souville-Tavannes-Vaux triangle that was supposed to be the halt line. With Souville captured then Verdun is meaningless, as Souville gives observation of the West Bank for artillery, so any French attack gets observed and broken up by artillery, while infantry hide out in the basements of the captured French forts.

I cannot more highly recommend "German strategy and the path to verdun" as THE definitive book about Verdun in English.


Now technically, EvF should have been able to call it off. At least seems like, and reset for attack some where else. The Germans were good at moving units, so you fall back to the lines and destroy fortresses you took.
Preparing for Verdun shows that it was actually pretty hard to get everything in place, though it was easier for the Germans than the French. Moving around 1500 artillery pieces in those hills and moving some 20 divisions would take probably a month to mass them for anything else. Also he was under enormous political pressure from Hindenburg-Ludendorff, so he needed a success to be able to secure his job. Beyond that though he was getting bad intelligence suggesting he was fulfilling his strategy of inflicting 3 or more casualties for every 2 taken by the Germans. German intelligence picked up the rotation of French divisions via Petain's Noria system, so they thought that French divisions were being wiped out every two weeks, which gave Falkenhayn the picture of fulfilling his goal, which was of course incorrect, but he was primed to believe his strategy was right and the intelligence he was being fed fit his preconceived notions.

Also EvF had poor tactical concepts of defense and morale and thought that abandoning captured ground that was so expensively gained was impossible. Ludendorff had a different conception of ground, having served on the Eastern Front, so wasn't emotionally attached to captured ground as EvF was, which enabled him to accept Lossberg's painfully learned lessons about proper defense. Falkenhayn wasn't able to just abandon the captured ground at Verdun, because it would be an admission of defeat and likely the loss of his job, but the ground couldn't be held because Souville meant that the French had superior observation of German positions, which meant that defending that ground was impossible. So they had to keep attacking to take Souville. They nearly did but ultimately failed, but in the process Falkenhayn thought he was winning the attrition battle. He was actually, but not by enough margin to justify the cost.
 
Edit:
What about poison gas? The French had gas masks that were able to deal with Green Cross in 1916, so it made little impact upon its debut. But the Russians were a generation behind on gas mask technology. So Green Cross could make a much bigger impact against the Russians if used on the offensive and with an artillery scheme devised by someone like Bruchmüller, who IIRC had already been the Eastern Front's artillery expert.
I know that Franz Josef had banned gas use by his forces, but I'm not sure if he forbid its use on A-H force's fronts.

Gas on the Eastern Front is an interesting topic. I do recall seeing a few references to 1915 gas attacks. One claimed phosgene was being used there in the summer which would be much earlier than it was in the west (Dec IIRC) Though maybe the article was in error. However my vague recollection is that these were all Ober Ost ops and did not involve Mackensen or Linsingen. I also recall one account of the Romanian campaign that strongly implied (but did not exactly state outright) that gas was used there.

You may find this interesting/useful: http://www.warrelics.eu/forum/imper...-kummant-gas-masks-and-ww1-technologies-9327/
 
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