1914 - No War in the West

BooNZ

Banned
were the French( in theory) able to punch through the Belgian fort without siege artillery ? could they have sold it to the public opinion, national and international ??
I believe Glenn239 was referring to the Ardennes, which did not include any Belgium fortifications - I don't think international opinion cared as much about the Ardennes as heartland Belgium - Churchill expressed concern a German violation of the Ardennes alone might not suffice to bring Britain into the war. That said, I doubt France would violate Belgium neutrality without a nod from Britain, which would be a long time coming. Joffre was very keen with the option of advancing through Belgium, but restrictions from French political masters meant French preparations were limited to what one man could do in his own time.

However, the Ardennes is very difficult territory to traverse, with very limited infrastructure not at all sympathetic to a French advance. With presumably German occupied Luxemburg to the east and hostile Belgium fortifications to the North-west, any advance would lack strategic depth and would become increasingly exposed the further they advanced - substantially shadowed by Germans with access to advanced rail networks through Luxemburg. The ingredients for a western Battle of Tannenberg.
 
were the French( in theory) able to punch through the Belgian fort without siege artillery ? could they have sold it to the public opinion, national and international ??

French artillery is lighter than the Germans, relying upon the 75mm at Division (the Germans add 105mm Howitzers that improve Germany's ability to engage defended lines and fire upon French artillery) and 155mm at Corps or above. The Germans possess the 420mm Big Bertha designed to penetrate the Belgian forts, a weapon unmatched in the French arsenal and only added to the German's right before hostilities. We might debate if they made a difference but I generally think that France was ill-equipped to take on fortifications, especially the Belgian ones. This likely betrays the fact that they intended a mobile war and would avoid forts, laying siege as they are surrounded after the fact, and that they have no intent to go after Belgium. I think we infer that France cannot violate Belgium. Thus France would need to sell such artillery as it relates to the German forts. I hold to this limit on France but I can be persuaded that if the war goes badly the option may become too appealing to resist, as likely disastrous as they may be.
 
At least within this discussion I am holding firm to the conviction that France will not open the war by violating Belgium. As an adjunct I have assumed here Germany makes the same calculation, hand wave, but I think we can argue its plausibility. I am open to discussing the consequences of France moving on Belgium in 1914, I think it is a dramatic alteration in the war and quite the migration of butterflies.

Either France goes through the Ardennes or Russia sees the writing on the wall and denounces its alliance with France and requests a ceasefire from the Central Powers. Which do you pick?

Instead I am accepting that the French launch their offensive at the "weak" center vaguely centered on Thionville.

The last thing on Earth the French intended to do in 1914 was launch a frontal assault on the Metz-Thionville fortress complex.

Russia is neither cowardly nor an easy foe, she has weak points that open and grow faster in this "East First" scenario, that is all.

Russia is neither weak, nor cowardly, nor an easy foe. But you forgot one more thing on the list. Russians aren't stupid either. If the Anglo-French are not undertaking their maximum effort, the Russians will start talking to the Germans to either compel them to do so, or face the consequences.

But then that is more properly a function of improving Germany's OTL plan, I think the OP has us either have no war at all or at least a greatly redacted war to the West that in my opinion needs to remove the great wheel through Belgium to make any serious "no war in the West" discussion.

Any serious no war in the West discussion requires a different France than the historical, not a different Germany.

One my changes is remove Moltke the Younger before 1913, I am hoping to find cause in 1912 or 1911 in one of the other crisis situations to have him fall off his horse, take a bullet or infuriate the Kaiser. He suffers the same ambition the Kaiser did, the boots he looked to fill looked too big for him so he overcompensated in all the wrong ways.

You need Joffre and Poincare to take bullets, not Moltke.
 
@Aphrodite

My apologies in painting with a broad brush for sake of brevity, I think I have sacrificed clarity and misconstrued your position. If I am correct you seek to have France apply Plan XVII but have Third Army either shift downward or launch an offensive in the area of Thionville, likely supported by the Fourth. I assume France does not violate any of Belgian territory. Assuming the French gather no invasion of Belgium is coming after some delay Firth Army is available to further this drive distantly aimed at Coblenz? Recall I am only proposing to strip German 1st and 2nd, leaving the strength of the Third on the Western front. And I am not certain all of the 1st and 2nd can be accommodated, combined they possess some 26 Divisions, likely not more than 20 go East, leaving some 6 Divisions to reinforce somewhere. I hope that is fair to your thinking.

The issue in the neutrality of Belgium is not the actions of the French army (which now do not matter since any chance of a French success has been thrown away). The issue is in the Russian response when it becomes clear they've been betrayed by the French and that no useful contribution to the war will be forthcoming from the French.
 
I believe Glenn239 was referring to the Ardennes, which did not include any Belgium fortifications - I don't think international opinion cared as much about the Ardennes as heartland Belgium - Churchill expressed concern a German violation of the Ardennes alone might not suffice to bring Britain into the war. That said, I doubt France would violate Belgium neutrality without a nod from Britain, which would be a long time coming. Joffre was very keen with the option of advancing through Belgium, but restrictions from French political masters meant French preparations were limited to what one man could do in his own time.

The last thing the British would want is the French asking them permission to do something the British can never grant permission for. What the British interventionists would want is for the French to take action unilaterally and presented them with a fait accompli that they can say, "we did not want the French to do this, but now they've done it, so we need to move forward from here".

However, the Ardennes is very difficult territory to traverse, with very limited infrastructure not at all sympathetic to a French advance.

The German 3rd and 4th Armies executed a successful attack on the French 3rd and 4th armies by marching through the eastern Ardennes and defeating them in the western Ardennes. The German 3rd and 4th Armies then continued their offensive into France using the Ardennes for their lines of communication. If the Germans actually did it going west the French could contemplate doing it going east. It's the same forest in either direction.
 
The issue in the neutrality of Belgium is not the actions of the French army (which now do not matter since any chance of a French success has been thrown away). The issue is in the Russian response when it becomes clear they've been betrayed by the French and that no useful contribution to the war will be forthcoming from the French.

The French would still be launching an all out offensive all the way down the Franco-German border with several drives into A-L and a main thrust at the perceived center opposite Thionville, German troops are still on the Belgian border in Luxembourg and Germany has consistently asked permission to transit Belgium, here likely meaning the Southern tip rather than the entirety since 1st and 2nd Armies have been sent East. You still have five German Armies facing France and until those two Armies appear in the East the situation is not yet clear, Russia assumes it faces more than the 8th from the get go and no one truly believed Germany would sack Belgium. In the opening hours and days the whole affair opens as each side assured itself it would. The difference is the Russians losing two Armies in East Prussia versus just one, a German offensive towards Warsaw in the first weeks and an unknown showing by A-H. France's offensives fair no better than the Battle of the Frontiers and the war in the West is stalled but France is doing its thing to pin five Armies. The sober reality is that the war cannot end by Christmas victorious, Russia will need to double down on a long war versus the CPs and hope attrition actually saves them.
 
East First, is as the German High Command believed, simply ASB Batshit crazy. Only by making bizarre assumptions and contortions can it get to the Germans surviving six weeks. Nothing vaguely realistic can have them doing better than OTL.

1) The most the rail lines can handle is two additional German armies East. The fourth one always comes a couple of weeks later. This is not going to lead to great gains in the East.

In OtL, the CP have four Austrians and One and a half German Armies in the East (After Moltke shifts the two corps to the East) . With this force, the Germans fail in their advances against the Russians in Poland. Not until Gorlice, after the Russians had suffered huge casualties from failed offenses into East Prussia, had been blockaded for months and run down their supplies, do the CP make any real progress.

The added forces are not likely to do any good because the Russians get two armies back by avoiding the August offensive. In fact they will do even better than that because they'll move to the defensive

2) The added forces aren't going to save Conrad either. Conrad is overly aggressive and will continue his northern offensive. He will still be crushed by the flank attack in his rear and will be lucky to escape. In OTL he does so by the skin of his skinny chin chin.

The net result is if you send two armies East, you will give up all the gains in the west to achieve nothing in the East. If you send the fourth, you will remove 1/8 of the German army from the order of battle- even dumber

3) The French will be more than strong enough to deal with five German armies.

The Germans are not brillant. They make mistakes and to say that they will start the war with an established doctrine of a contnous trench warfare is silly. We know exactly ho they fight and its seen in the opening battles of the war. They don't fare well enough to handle the French forces that are freed

Nor can Moltke make the dispositions ascribed to him Moltke cannot know what Joffre will do and must deploy his forces to handle various possibilities. Does Joffre go through Belgium and if so, do the Belgians resist? Or does Joffre go south to cut off the sixth and seventh German armies? Moltke must defend against both possibilites. This removes even more Germans from the battle

4) The French have more than enough to deal with Liege and Namur if t hey want. they have plenty of heavy siege guns including the large caliber naval guns that can be put on rails. In any case, Liege is not a formidable fortress and won't last long. The Germans are in a real hurry to beat the French and turn on the Russians. The French can take a couple ofweeks if they want


For twenty five years, German generals planned for this war. None of them came up with East first. These are not armchair generals but men who spent ther lives working on this problem and who's lives depended on getting it right. You need real powerful evidence to say they are wrong instead we get nothing but rosy assumptions
 
Either France goes through the Ardennes or Russia sees the writing on the wall and denounces its alliance with France and requests a ceasefire from the Central Powers. Which do you pick?

The last thing on Earth the French intended to do in 1914 was launch a frontal assault on the Metz-Thionville fortress complex.

Russia is neither weak, nor cowardly, nor an easy foe. But you forgot one more thing on the list. Russians aren't stupid either. If the Anglo-French are not undertaking their maximum effort, the Russians will start talking to the Germans to either compel them to do so, or face the consequences.

Any serious no war in the West discussion requires a different France than the historical, not a different Germany.

You need Joffre and Poincare to take bullets, not Moltke.

Fair enough, it is my understanding that Joffre hoped Germany would execute the wheel and leave the center weak, he focused his forces along that line. So far I have Poincare forbid him using Belgian territory so he is crushed in to that narrow space Northeast of Metz, I assume he is trying to bypass Metz itself and get to the Germans merely dug in versus in a fortress line. Thus my pessimism on that offensive, it is a narrow killing box over bad ground, but if we open Belgium then France can pour the 5th Army into a wider area still defended by two German Armies' worth of troops. Bigger battle.

See above.

Russia has likely lost two Armies the French are attacking as agreed and A-H may be doing just as badly, Germany may be moving on Warsaw and the war opened far less successfully, but I think it is too early to call it quits. I think Russia has a crisis of confidence but it is not yet hopeless, otherwise we hand Germany a victory sticker.

I will welcome that but I have tried to keep France as close to how she sat, and tried to keep her on plan as I think events were anticipated. The German left punch through Belgium was known but still doubted, Joffre is argued to have hoped for it and left only weak forces to deal with it since he assumed his own offensive would make it moot. I do not think France is changing much to be where we are and stay the course in these opening weeks. The question mark being how well indeed does France proceed n the attack?

Joffre falling out may not help me much, his commitment to the near blind and beserker attack is what likely spoils France's advantages, later he got much better but it might be unfair to let me rearrange all the Kings and their men. Who do you suggest takes France into war as hobbled by misbeliefs as Joffre?
 

NoMommsen

Donor
Dear Lord, even by the standards of Germanowank East first threads, this is silly

First, as Zuber notes- there never was an East first option
And with two simple sentences, you place yourself firmly in the camp of "Fit the facts to my desired outcome". While the other manage to argue in a quite enlightening and respectful fashion, you only make assertions and seem to believe OTL is the gold standard. Sorry, but no.
Dear @XLII The underlined part of your comment could be applied to too many comments/posts of the quoted, that it would fill almost a book of its own, if I would try to quote them here as well.

But in htis case you might have forgottenYou forgot :
In short, the outcome of the Rhineland fighting would be the destruction of the four German armies, the occupation of the Rhineland and the loss of such vital industry as the iron mines. The war will be over no matter what the British do

But there follow also :
Going East means the war will be lost in a matter of weeks
East First, is as the German High Command believed, simply ASB Batshit crazy. Only by making bizarre assumptions and contortions can it get to the Germans surviving six weeks.




Dear @Aphrodite for ...
Given how bad the Germans think going East is, we need powerful evidence that they are wrong
and similar remarks of you I would like to ask you again for a source.
...
beside your very own assumption of what you think/wish the german generals thought about a more/much more numerous deployment of troops in the east with offensive tasks to perform ?
 
11. GB negotiates the peace. Not sure about BL (but close). France left as power. German fleet (shown as worthless) is reduced. GB much wealthier

When in the war before the last year did the German Navy show it was Worthless . Was the Germany coast ever attacked
By a major Fleet unlike the British Coast . And something to think about is the German Navy was out gunned by the British , French and Russian Fleet 42 capital ships to 17 .
 

NoMommsen

Donor
For twenty five years, German generals planned for this war. None of them came up with East first.
I would agree, that there was never an actual 'plan' named "East First".

But AFAIK there was an "Aufmarsch II" (or eastern deployment ... or deployment plan focussing on more troops against Russia ... or however we wanna call it ... stupid struggling about semantics) for the mobilization period of 1909/1910, 1910/1911, 1911/1912 and 1912/1913.

These are 4 "plans" of deployment in at least the last 6 (work for a deployment plan started the yea before and was finalized on the change to the year of its "activation", i.e. theplans for the period 1912/13 were finalized around X-mas 1911 to be written down until 31.03.1912 to be activated) years prior to WW 1.

And therefore I would render the above quoted rather ... questionable.



I would also agree, that non of these deployment-plans for "Aufmarsch II (Deployment II)" or as it was sometimes called "Aufmarsch Ost (Deployment East)" or even "Großer Ostaufmarsch (Great Eastern Deployment)" (this seems to have been used for the deployment 1912/1913) had the scope, grandezza ... or sillyness(?) of the plans modelled/inspired by the famous Schlieffen-memorandum.

For two reasons :
  1. Until 1911/1912 there was never the necessary logistical basis (railsways, roads) as well as suitable space to deploy more than four armies (and even this only with strains and compromises) into east-Prussia at a beginning of hostilities
  2. Ofc nobody could be sure about the french and therefore a substantial force to defend the western border had to be deployed there.
How things looked or would have looked in late 1912 or even in late 1913, beginning 1914 ...
We know only partially about the study of "Aufmarsch II" for the 1913/1914 mobilization period and also only about the possible western deployment of only two armies in the west.
Unfortunatly there doesn't seem to be more info left for us today, at least none I have access to.
 

BooNZ

Banned
East First, is as the German High Command believed, simply ASB Batshit crazy. Only by making bizarre assumptions and contortions can it get to the Germans surviving six weeks. Nothing vaguely realistic can have them doing better than OTL.

So says the mouthy pot

1) The most the rail lines can handle is two additional German armies East. The fourth one always comes a couple of weeks later. This is not going to lead to great gains in the East.

No, OTL a single German army smashed the two best Russian armies. At a minimum, three German armies destroy the Russian 1st and 2nd armies and swiftly envelope the fortresses in Russian Poland, with the stores of munitions for the Russian field armies.

In OtL, the CP have four Austrians and One and a half German Armies in the East (After Moltke shifts the two corps to the East) . With this force, the Germans fail in their advances against the Russians in Poland. Not until Gorlice, after the Russians had suffered huge casualties from failed offenses into East Prussia, had been blockaded for months and run down their supplies, do the CP make any real progress.

No, OTL the Russians were facing only 1 of 8 German armies and a single Germany smashed the two best Russian armies. The early destruction of those two Russian armies leaves the Russians scrambling to cover multiple German armies.

The added forces are not likely to do any good because the Russians get two armies back by avoiding the August offensive. In fact they will do even better than that because they'll move to the defensive

No, Joffre illustrated the nature and intent of the Franco-Russian offensive military strategy (enshrined in treaty), when he continued to launch costly offensives, despite the vast majority of the German armies heading west. This contrasts with your suggestion the Russians would shit the bed at the mere rumour of 2-3 German armies might appear in East Prussia.

Due to the more limited German rail infrastructure to East Prussia, the Russians know they can expect an early numerical advantage, irrespective of the German deployment choices. It is entirely consistent with both prevailing Russian military doctrine of maintaining the initiative and treaty commitments to France, to either attack per OTL, or even commit additional Russian forces to the offensive.

The reality is there is no way for the Russians to know German intent before the Russian deployment plans at locked in place around day 9. Further, there is no way for the Russians to recognize in their calculations the full extent of the qualitative disparity between Russian and German forces until after the first significant engagement/ catastrophe.

2) The added forces aren't going to save Conrad either. Conrad is overly aggressive and will continue his northern offensive. He will still be crushed by the flank attack in his rear and will be lucky to escape. In OTL he does so by the skin of his skinny chin chin.

No, OTL the Russian 9th Army (your flanking force) was released from the Northern front, which is not going to happen in this scenario. Further, under Plan G the Russian 4th Army was to be deployed against the Germans, which would also be logical under this scenario. So instead of a 5 v 4 numerical advantage over A-H, the Russians will be facing a 3 v 4 deficit, with the prospect of an additional German Army turning up on its flank. Meanwhile, the Russian 4th, 9th and 10th armies are expected to contain 3 German armies.

Further, OTL Conrad's mindless A-H offensives in this scenario serve a purpose of holding Russian forces in place, so those forces can be enveloped/ flanked and destroyed. [German maneuver doctrine recognized the need to hold an enemy in place through vigorous assault to successfully flank or envelope an enemy force].


The net result is if you send two armies East, you will give up all the gains in the west to achieve nothing in the East. If you send the fourth, you will remove 1/8 of the German army from the order of battle- even dumber

No, OTL the only thing achieved in the west was guaranteeing the belligerence of Belgium and Britain, ensuring the majority of German available resources being tied up for the rest of the war in a battle of attrition on a broad western front, with the balance being used to prop up A-H.

3) The French will be more than strong enough to deal with five German armies.

No, OTL the French made no headway against two German armies across the German-French frontier. If Belgium neutrality is respected, the French would struggle to launch an offensive featuring more than 3 armies at any one time, including diversionary offensives of no strategic importance. With the benefit of hindsight, three entrenched German armies could hold the French, but a fourth German army would be optimal. Five German armies is clearly over kill.

The Germans are not brillant. They make mistakes and to say that they will start the war with an established doctrine of a contnous trench warfare is silly. We know exactly ho they fight and its seen in the opening battles of the war. They don't fare well enough to handle the French forces that are freed

On attack against the French and British, the Germans were mostly effective, but not brilliant. However, before 1916, the British and French forces have neither an effective offensive doctrine, nor sufficient equipment (heavy artillery and vast quantities of munitions) to seriously challenge German defenses. A key advantage of the Germans initially staying on the defensive in the west, is the Germans enjoy the advantages of the defense during a period (i.e. before 1916) where the Anglo-French forces did not have the teeth to seriously trouble German defenses.

Nor can Moltke make the dispositions ascribed to him Moltke cannot know what Joffre will do and must deploy his forces to handle various possibilities. Does Joffre go through Belgium and if so, do the Belgians resist? Or does Joffre go south to cut off the sixth and seventh German armies? Moltke must defend against both possibilites. This removes even more Germans from the battle

No, the German intelligence reports by 1912/13 stated the French and Russians were adopting a more offensive mindset. In respect of the French/ German border, both the German and French leadership recognized there were very few viable options. However, with such a narrow front, the French would be compelled to launch offensives everywhere to 'maintain the initiative.

4) The French have more than enough to deal with Liege and Namur if t hey want. they have plenty of heavy siege guns including the large caliber naval guns that can be put on rails. In any case, Liege is not a formidable fortress and won't last long. The Germans are in a real hurry to beat the French and turn on the Russians. The French can take a couple ofweeks if they want

Now that is really a German Wank! A French advance through Belgium proper only works if Belgium is complicit, which with the benefit of hindsight we know is highly unlikely. The Germans have more than enough time to crush the Russian 1st and 2nd armies, and then pivot back with a devastating counterattack against the French using a rail network specifically designed for rapid deployment against French forces with stretched logistics. That was the explicit scenario/ plan explored by Schlieffen in his last and most onerous war game before his retirement in 1905/06.

For twenty five years, German generals planned for this war. None of them came up with East first. These are not armchair generals but men who spent ther lives working on this problem and who's lives depended on getting it right. You need real powerful evidence to say they are wrong instead we get nothing but rosy assumptions

No, the aforementioned Schlieffen war game / plan (his last and most rigorous) specifically contemplated a Russia first approach. There is no WW1 Barbarossa plan or eastern equivalent to the Schlieffen plan, since a strategy based on mobility and decisive counterattack is not prescriptive - it instead relies on qualitative advantages and execution flexible principles depending on the conditions. For example the Battle of Tannenberg
 

NoMommsen

Donor
East First, is as the German High Command believed, simply ASB Batshit crazy.
Well IMHO such a statement fits better remarks like :
Only by making bizarre assumptions and contortions can it get to the Germans surviving six weeks.
Going East means the war will be lost in a matter of weeks
In short, the outcome of the Rhineland fighting would be the destruction of the four German armies, the occupation of the Rhineland and the loss of such vital industry as the iron mines.

Really ? Six weeks into the war ?? End of September 1914 ???


A bit on 'facts' :
1) The most the rail lines can handle is two additional German armies East. The fourth one always comes a couple of weeks later.
This applies only to the last known planning for an eastern deployment of troops.
Planned with the 'logistical' knowledge at the change of 1911/1912.
Without the 'knowledge' of 2 1/2 years of further railways-building and preparations. Without the XX. Army Corps established (established in Oktober 1912) ... as the most obviuos changes since 1911/12.
This is not going to lead to great gains in the East.
No, OTL a single German army smashed the two best Russian armies. At a minimum, three German armies destroy the Russian 1st and 2nd armies and swiftly envelope the fortresses in Russian Poland, with the stores of munitions for the Russian field armies.
Have nothing to add here ;)

In OtL, the CP have four Austrians and One and a half German Armies in the East (After Moltke shifts the two corps to the East) . With this force, the Germans fail in their advances against the Russians in Poland. Not until Gorlice, after the Russians had suffered huge casualties from failed offenses into East Prussia, had been blockaded for months and run down their supplies, do the CP make any real progress.
I assume you refer to the battle of the Vistula and the battle of Lodz with the first two sentences.(Wasn't it YOU, who was keen on 'numbers' and getting them right ?)

In the first case it were ONE german and ONE austrian army against FOUR russian armies. The battle didn't result in territorial 'gains', but caused the russians loosing more than double the 'numbers' of man. In the second case it was ONE gedrman army against THREE russian armies ... only that this time the russian losses almost tripled the german losses.
These amount of losses could - IMHO - well count as 'gains' in a sense, even if they didn't result in territorial gains ... for various reasons.


The added forces are not likely to do any good because the Russians get two armies back by avoiding the August offensive. In fact they will do even better than that because they'll move to the defensive
HUH ??:eek:
Where does these two armies come from ???:confused:
With one or two german armies (ev. a third in the back still comming, if we stay with your IMO wrong assumption of german logistical capabilities in summer 1914) there will be NO russian army left.
It will be a 'Tannenberg' and 'Masurian Lakes' at the same time with russian 1st and 2nd army BOTH reduced to ahoddy remnants, as IOTL 'only' Samsonovs 2nd army.

Ahh, yes, your recurring claim, that the russians will 'immediatly' move to the defense. ... a claim supported by NO evidence at all. At lest I never found one and YOU never produced one, despite being asked for on this board numerous times.
Instead the evidences for the contrary - the russians acting offensive against East-Prussia, even if there start to appear much more german troops in time - are numerous.
-Like the franco-russian alliance itself and the agreements of french and russian staff talks prior to WW 1 for a russian attack against germany on day 15 of the russian mobilization,
-the reports of the french ambassador to St-Petersburg as well as the french military attache to St.Petersbourg 'urging' the russians towards attacks against germany since Viviani and Pincarè had left St.Petersburg after their state visit.
-the orders and letters exchanged between STAVKA and north-western front
-etc., etc.​

Your claim(s) don't gain argumentative weight, only by your continued repeating them.

And about the 'window of opportuinity' to change things between variant A and G of plan 19 and ...
...
4) The Russians are far more flexible than you give them credit for. M-9 is the last day to fully transfer the forces north but considerable forces can be shifted later. They actually deploy on a hybrid plan 19 and Plan 20 in OTL. The critical date would be August 15 when the forward advance starts. Plenty of time to pick up on things
...
Well, Lieutenant General N.N. Golovin states in
" The Russian Campaign of 1914
The Beginning of the War and Operations
in East Prussia "
published by
The Command And General Staff Scholl Press
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1933​
that the time-point of "no return" for the:
"final decision between variant "A" and vaiant "G" of the russian mobilization schedule MUST be made until 02:35 of the 9th day of mobilization, whence firast echolons reach stations of diverting routes"


(maybe later more)
 
Top