East First, is as the German High Command believed, simply ASB Batshit crazy. Only by making bizarre assumptions and contortions can it get to the Germans surviving six weeks. Nothing vaguely realistic can have them doing better than OTL.
So says the mouthy pot
1) The most the rail lines can handle is two additional German armies East. The fourth one always comes a couple of weeks later. This is not going to lead to great gains in the East.
No, OTL a single German army smashed the two best Russian armies. At a minimum, three German armies destroy the Russian 1st and 2nd armies and swiftly envelope the fortresses in Russian Poland, with the stores of munitions for the Russian field armies.
In OtL, the CP have four Austrians and One and a half German Armies in the East (After Moltke shifts the two corps to the East) . With this force, the Germans fail in their advances against the Russians in Poland. Not until Gorlice, after the Russians had suffered huge casualties from failed offenses into East Prussia, had been blockaded for months and run down their supplies, do the CP make any real progress.
No, OTL the Russians were facing only 1 of 8 German armies and a single Germany smashed the two best Russian armies. The early destruction of those two Russian armies leaves the Russians scrambling to cover multiple German armies.
The added forces are not likely to do any good because the Russians get two armies back by avoiding the August offensive. In fact they will do even better than that because they'll move to the defensive
No
, Joffre illustrated the nature and intent of the Franco-Russian offensive military strategy (enshrined in treaty), when he continued to launch costly offensives, despite the vast majority of the German armies heading west. This contrasts with your suggestion the Russians would shit the bed at the mere rumour of 2-3 German armies might appear in East Prussia.
Due to the more limited German rail infrastructure to East Prussia, the Russians know they can expect an early numerical advantage, irrespective of the German deployment choices. It is entirely consistent with both prevailing Russian military doctrine of maintaining the initiative and treaty commitments to France, to either attack per OTL, or even commit additional Russian forces to the offensive.
The reality is there is no way for the Russians to know German intent before the Russian deployment plans at locked in place around day 9. Further, there is no way for the Russians to recognize in their calculations the full extent of the qualitative disparity between Russian and German forces until after the first significant engagement/ catastrophe.
2) The added forces aren't going to save Conrad either. Conrad is overly aggressive and will continue his northern offensive. He will still be crushed by the flank attack in his rear and will be lucky to escape. In OTL he does so by the skin of his skinny chin chin.
No, OTL the Russian 9th Army (your flanking force) was released from the Northern front, which is not going to happen in this scenario. Further, under Plan G the Russian 4th Army was to be deployed against the Germans, which would also be logical under this scenario. So instead of a 5 v 4 numerical advantage over A-H, the Russians will be facing a 3 v 4 deficit, with the prospect of an additional German Army turning up on its flank. Meanwhile, the Russian 4th, 9th and 10th armies are expected to contain 3 German armies.
Further, OTL Conrad's mindless A-H offensives in this scenario serve a purpose of holding Russian forces in place, so those forces can be enveloped/ flanked and destroyed. [German maneuver doctrine recognized the need to hold an enemy in place through vigorous assault to successfully flank or envelope an enemy force].
The net result is if you send two armies East, you will give up all the gains in the west to achieve nothing in the East. If you send the fourth, you will remove 1/8 of the German army from the order of battle- even dumber
No, OTL the only thing achieved in the west was guaranteeing the belligerence of Belgium and Britain, ensuring the majority of German available resources being tied up for the rest of the war in a battle of attrition on a broad western front, with the balance being used to prop up A-H.
3) The French will be more than strong enough to deal with five German armies.
No, OTL the French made no headway against two German armies across the German-French frontier. If Belgium neutrality is respected, the French would struggle to launch an offensive featuring more than 3 armies at any one time, including diversionary offensives of no strategic importance. With the benefit of hindsight, three entrenched German armies could hold the French, but a fourth German army would be optimal. Five German armies is clearly over kill.
The Germans are not brillant. They make mistakes and to say that they will start the war with an established doctrine of a contnous trench warfare is silly. We know exactly ho they fight and its seen in the opening battles of the war. They don't fare well enough to handle the French forces that are freed
On attack against the French and British, the Germans were mostly effective, but not brilliant. However, before 1916, the British and French forces have neither an effective offensive doctrine, nor sufficient equipment (heavy artillery and vast quantities of munitions) to seriously challenge German defenses. A key advantage of the Germans initially staying on the defensive in the west, is the Germans enjoy the advantages of the defense during a period (i.e. before 1916) where the Anglo-French forces did not have the teeth to seriously trouble German defenses.
Nor can Moltke make the dispositions ascribed to him Moltke cannot know what Joffre will do and must deploy his forces to handle various possibilities. Does Joffre go through Belgium and if so, do the Belgians resist? Or does Joffre go south to cut off the sixth and seventh German armies? Moltke must defend against both possibilites. This removes even more Germans from the battle
No, the German intelligence reports by 1912/13 stated the French and Russians were adopting a more offensive mindset. In respect of the French/ German border, both the German and French leadership recognized there were very few viable options. However, with such a narrow front, the French would be compelled to launch offensives everywhere to 'maintain the initiative.
4) The French have more than enough to deal with Liege and Namur if t hey want. they have plenty of heavy siege guns including the large caliber naval guns that can be put on rails. In any case, Liege is not a formidable fortress and won't last long. The Germans are in a real hurry to beat the French and turn on the Russians. The French can take a couple ofweeks if they want
Now that is really a German Wank! A French advance through Belgium proper only works if Belgium is complicit, which with the benefit of hindsight we know is highly unlikely. The Germans have more than enough time to crush the Russian 1st and 2nd armies, and then pivot back with a devastating counterattack against the French using a rail network specifically designed for rapid deployment against French forces with stretched logistics. That was the explicit scenario/ plan explored by Schlieffen in his last and most onerous war game before his retirement in 1905/06.
For twenty five years, German generals planned for this war. None of them came up with East first. These are not armchair generals but men who spent ther lives working on this problem and who's lives depended on getting it right. You need real powerful evidence to say they are wrong instead we get nothing but rosy assumptions
No, the aforementioned Schlieffen war game / plan (his last and most rigorous) specifically contemplated a Russia first approach. There is no WW1 Barbarossa plan or eastern equivalent to the Schlieffen plan, since a strategy based on mobility and decisive counterattack is not prescriptive - it instead relies on qualitative advantages and execution flexible principles depending on the conditions. For example the Battle of Tannenberg