1866,the worst scenario for Prussia.
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a) Why would Russia help out Austria-Hungary, especially after Vienna supported Allied actions against Russia during the Crimean War? Furthermore, A-H and Russia had conflicting interests in the Balkans, making them geopolitical enemies.
b)One could absolutely get France to join the war on Austria's side. However, this would be disastrous to Austria's position amongst the German kingdoms, as the French were seen as Germany's primary nemesis.
b)One could absolutely get France to join the war on Austria's side. However, this would be disastrous to Austria's position amongst the German kingdoms, as the French were seen as Germany's primary nemesis.
Austria was isolated in Europe. Russia was hostile as the poster above mentioned. France was made vague promises of territory (which was never delivered) by Bismarck to stay out of the war. Britain was not likely to intervene in a continental conflict between Prussia and Austria.
Prussia was run by the skilled diplomat Bismarck, and not be that idiot Kaiser fifty years later. Prussia was also viewed as the underdog against Austria at the time, so other powers didn't feel threatened by a Prussian victory. So it would require a major POD for Russia to intervene on behalf of Austria.
Prussia was run by the skilled diplomat Bismarck, and not be that idiot Kaiser fifty years later. Prussia was also viewed as the underdog against Austria at the time, so other powers didn't feel threatened by a Prussian victory. So it would require a major POD for Russia to intervene on behalf of Austria.
TFSmith121
Banned
In addition to the above, the Prussians and Russians had what amounted to a de facto alliance in the Alvensleben agreement from 1863. A Prussian-Italian-Russian alliance, with all three picking up appropriate territories and a Hungarian buffer state in the middle is more likely than multiple-powers dogpiling on the Prussians/North Germans.
Best,
Best,
Bismarck had secured the Russian benevolent neutrality well before the beginning of hostilities, same as it happened in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870. OTOH, relation with Austria were much less friendly, not just because of Crimea and the potential conflict of interest in the Balkans but also because during the Polish insurrection of 1863 Austria had joined France and Britain in berating Russian repression.
No chance at all of Russia intervening against Prussia in either case.
In 1866 Nappy was not ready to intervene, preferring to play the role of the peace broker and wrongly believing that France might receive post-war compensations from Prussia (which Bismarck had hinted about during the Biarritz meetings of 1865, without however committing to anything firm). Anyway the glacial pace of French mobilisation would not have allowed him to deploy troops on the Rhine before the end of the war.
No chance at all of Russia intervening against Prussia in either case.
In 1866 Nappy was not ready to intervene, preferring to play the role of the peace broker and wrongly believing that France might receive post-war compensations from Prussia (which Bismarck had hinted about during the Biarritz meetings of 1865, without however committing to anything firm). Anyway the glacial pace of French mobilisation would not have allowed him to deploy troops on the Rhine before the end of the war.
Pomphis
Banned
*worst scenario" ? How about a major german-austrian victory, followed by prussia asking for french help, followed by france intervening on the side of prussia and talking loudly about the rhine border, followed by nationalist-german revolts in rhineland and westphaila and berlin, followed by prussia collapsing.
Worst is that Bismarck is killed by the bullets that missed him OTL, the Austrians frustrate the Prussian advance at Sadowa exposing the unprepared state of the Prussian army for a long war, Nappy III begins making vague threats of intervention, Britain offers mediation, and the lack of a lightning victory means the Southern German states remain in the Austrian camp for the foreseeable future and Saxony remains outside of the Prussian sphere of influence for a time.
Stating that France would not do A or B because they did not do them kind of goes against the point of alternate history discussion. Its perfectly possible for Napoleon III to come to a different conclusion, more in line with his instincts.
In meaningful terms, this might mean that Prussia has to send some considerable force to the Rhineland, and loses Sadowa. If its a narrow victory for Austria, then the war begins to drag, but if we are talking worst case scenario then its the Crown Prince being defeated and killed on the field of battle, and Austria able to advance.
In meaningful terms, this might mean that Prussia has to send some considerable force to the Rhineland, and loses Sadowa. If its a narrow victory for Austria, then the war begins to drag, but if we are talking worst case scenario then its the Crown Prince being defeated and killed on the field of battle, and Austria able to advance.
Coming to a different conclusion is certainly possible, implementing it may be a little more difficult even in an alternate history setting. The war of 1859 is a very good example: the Prussians decided to come to the support of Austria under the clauses of German Confederation; unfortunately their mobilisation was so slow and badly planned that they started having serious numbers of troops on the Rhine only after the war was already over. Pity.
Even if France can't mobilise in time, Prussia is going to have to take notice of them...unless whoever is running the show (Roon?) is a complete hard balls guy who will leavee a whole flank open on the assumption France hasn't got anything they can push through it.
Von Roon was the minister of war, and thearchitect of the army reform in 1862; however military decisions were the bailiwick of von Moltke the Elder, who was certainly not too easy to frighten. On top of everything there were obviously the King and Bismarck. It took just three weeks from the declaration of war to the decisive battle of Sadowa, and it was just too short a time for Napoleon to make up his mind and for his army to mobilise.
Von Moltke's campaign plan in 1866 made the best use of "modern technologies" such as railways and telegraph and modern tactics perfected during the war with Denmark. It may have been based on some risky decision (chief of them marching to the battlefield of Sadowa with three converging columns) but worked like clockwork. If the French had started a mobilisation there was time enough to re-route troops toward the Rhein.
Von Moltke's campaign plan in 1866 made the best use of "modern technologies" such as railways and telegraph and modern tactics perfected during the war with Denmark. It may have been based on some risky decision (chief of them marching to the battlefield of Sadowa with three converging columns) but worked like clockwork. If the French had started a mobilisation there was time enough to re-route troops toward the Rhein.
Thank You - my main point in that was if the French declared war, even with a slow mobilisation, would Moltke (I guess) have held his nerve and not diverted forces, or would he have felt the need to send some to the frontier, thus changing the balance of forces and perhaps leading to some crucial butterflies at Sadowa?
I would say yes, he would. There are various reasons for this: the French army is still the same who fought at Solferino, in terms of tactics, armament and logistics; the Landwehr is an effective force after von Roon's reforms, in particular fighting on the defensive; von Moltke has the advantage of internal communications, better railways than France and effective control on them; most importantly, Nappy is not his uncle and he's also sensitive to the mood of French voters (who were not pro-war in 1866, contrary to what happened in 1870).
The most important question though is this: do you believe that Bismarck, who has been cultivating Louis Napoleon since 1855 and had met him at length in 1864 and 1865 at Biarritz, cannot read him like an open book?
The most important question though is this: do you believe that Bismarck, who has been cultivating Louis Napoleon since 1855 and had met him at length in 1864 and 1865 at Biarritz, cannot read him like an open book?
It gets better than that. At one point during the Battle of Konniggratz Wilhelm, Moltke, and Bismarck were gathered together on a hilltop discussing matters when they suddenly found out that it was within range of the Austrian artillery thanks to several shells landing close by, forcing them to make to make a rapid and less than dignified departure. Simply have an Austrian gunner be slightly luckier and suddenly the Crown Prince, commanding Field Marshal, and Chancellor are dead in an explosion of blood, gore, and bone. Considering how close the battle was something like this could upset matters, at which point the Prussians would be retreating under less than ideal discipline, having to pass through an awkward narrow mountain pass, and then territory that they had already picked bare of supplies on their way to the battle.
Although thinking about things it could end up being swings and roundabouts - with the future Wilhelm II being only seven his childhood and development could be greatly changed without Bismarck taking a hand and Wilhelm I being more involved. Whilst in terms of prestige and raw power a Prussia that was forced to cede territory and potential leadership of Germany in a defeat they could also be seen, from our timeline's perspective, as better off with a potentially more balanced King and if Germany were to form more peacefully avoiding a number of future wars.
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Russians were shortsighted.
Allow the birth of a new great power (and potential menace)next to them,when they could crush in the cradle.
Same for France.
If Prussia had been destroyed from a great alliance of Austria,Russia,France in 1866,the war of 1870 (and the fall of French II Empire),and WW-I (with the fall of Czarist Empire) would have been avoided.
Austria would check the German States,and a balance of power could be achieved between the three Empires.
This is true, but none of the leaders at the time had the benefit of hindsight that we have.
Prussia was the weakest of the Great Powers for most of the 19th century. It was the underdog in the wars against Austria and France. Prussia was expected to lose both wars at the time.
Few people (including Bismarck himself) could foresee Prussia evolving into Germany and transforming from the weakest Great Power to the dominant power on the Continent.
Prussia was also generally friendly with Russia at the time, and even had the Russians somehow predicted that they'd unify Germany, why's that a bad thing? They're a natural ally, with German expansion coming at the cost of France (who mean nothing to Russia) or Austria (who are rivals in the Balkans); meanwhile the Russians wanted to expand at the cost of the Austrians or Ottomans.
Ottoman Empire was the best hunting ground for Russia.
Every European Powers (starting to Napoleon I ) could find a good agreement with Czars, pushing Russia to conquest of Costantinople.
Not a bad idea for Bonaparte...he Roman Emperor of West and Aleksandr I Roman Emperor of the East.
Tellus Stabilita" .
Every European Powers (starting to Napoleon I ) could find a good agreement with Czars, pushing Russia to conquest of Costantinople.
Not a bad idea for Bonaparte...he Roman Emperor of West and Aleksandr I Roman Emperor of the East.
Tellus Stabilita" .