The German regiments of the Danish army were rebellious in 1848.
In 1864 the Holstein conscripts didn't show up when called and the Lauenburg Regiments was dissolved. 2 of the Sleswig regiments were unreliable. The Danish officers had until 1848 had the right to use the German aristocratic "von". That war of course change the attitude towards German. Oh by the way von Moltke had been given leave from his service in the Danish army and then too up service in the Prussian one! His brother remained a loyal Danish civil servant in the Postal service. Higher level Danish officers had a wery realistic perception of Danish military capabilities. De Meza didn't want to sacrifice 1/3 of the army at Danneverk as the premier wanted. So he disobeyed orders and withdrew the army. Other officers held their troops in similar concern, knowing they only had a limited number and would have to preserve fighting capabilities. Thus the rotation policy regarding Dübbol so that almost every regiment had to spend some time in the field-works. But then on the other hand we also had colonel Blimps like the commander at Lundby.
The reason for the retreat from the fortress of Fredericia is not at all clear, and this could be the strong defensive point after Dübbol, if the will had been there. A build-up there during the siege at Dübbol would have the Danes ready for the second round and would be instrumental in keeping the Prussians from crossing over to Fyn. But that would have required extra troops, not available in 1864, but maybe a British contingent of 10000 could do the trick. And modern artillery!
2 things regarding the naval side.
Rolf Krake was vulnerable to plunging fire as she had a weak deck armour. The ship only showed up in Alssund after the initial Prussian landings of 5000 troops and the captain thought the battle lost and withdrew. Another reason for his not running berserk amid the Prussian boats could be his knowledge of the Danish minelaying in Alssund, primitive, nothing like sea-mines of 1914 or later, and his not wanting to plow through it in the middle of battle.
That late appearence of the Rolf Krake would be a bad omen for a later Prussian crossing to Fyn.
Foreing naval support would run the risk of cruising Danish shallow waters. Of course they would recieve pilots, but the British and, only slightly possible IMHO, Swedish ships were not designed for Danish waters. This and the needs of immediate response during battle would be detrimental to allied ships.
Another thing is the vulnerability of wooden ships to fire from entrenched guns, all too well demonstrated in 1849, when two Danish ships, a ship of the line and a frigate, were hit and set afire when attacking insurgent positions at Eckernförde in Sleswig. With the new Prussian artillery this would be much more the case.
In 1864 the Holstein conscripts didn't show up when called and the Lauenburg Regiments was dissolved. 2 of the Sleswig regiments were unreliable. The Danish officers had until 1848 had the right to use the German aristocratic "von". That war of course change the attitude towards German. Oh by the way von Moltke had been given leave from his service in the Danish army and then too up service in the Prussian one! His brother remained a loyal Danish civil servant in the Postal service. Higher level Danish officers had a wery realistic perception of Danish military capabilities. De Meza didn't want to sacrifice 1/3 of the army at Danneverk as the premier wanted. So he disobeyed orders and withdrew the army. Other officers held their troops in similar concern, knowing they only had a limited number and would have to preserve fighting capabilities. Thus the rotation policy regarding Dübbol so that almost every regiment had to spend some time in the field-works. But then on the other hand we also had colonel Blimps like the commander at Lundby.
The reason for the retreat from the fortress of Fredericia is not at all clear, and this could be the strong defensive point after Dübbol, if the will had been there. A build-up there during the siege at Dübbol would have the Danes ready for the second round and would be instrumental in keeping the Prussians from crossing over to Fyn. But that would have required extra troops, not available in 1864, but maybe a British contingent of 10000 could do the trick. And modern artillery!
2 things regarding the naval side.
Rolf Krake was vulnerable to plunging fire as she had a weak deck armour. The ship only showed up in Alssund after the initial Prussian landings of 5000 troops and the captain thought the battle lost and withdrew. Another reason for his not running berserk amid the Prussian boats could be his knowledge of the Danish minelaying in Alssund, primitive, nothing like sea-mines of 1914 or later, and his not wanting to plow through it in the middle of battle.
That late appearence of the Rolf Krake would be a bad omen for a later Prussian crossing to Fyn.
Foreing naval support would run the risk of cruising Danish shallow waters. Of course they would recieve pilots, but the British and, only slightly possible IMHO, Swedish ships were not designed for Danish waters. This and the needs of immediate response during battle would be detrimental to allied ships.
Another thing is the vulnerability of wooden ships to fire from entrenched guns, all too well demonstrated in 1849, when two Danish ships, a ship of the line and a frigate, were hit and set afire when attacking insurgent positions at Eckernförde in Sleswig. With the new Prussian artillery this would be much more the case.
Good stuff