It's bad enough that they dont trust each other but not bad enough that they can't work with each other. Assuming the worst is one thing, acting on it is another.
We are talking about Davis here. Assuming the worst of a general he already distrusts is going to make him act to do something about it - Davis is not good at being patient with people (its not just Johnston).
Just as it stopped him in OTL when he tried to have Johnston courts-marshalled in mid-1863 for Vicksburg. Too many powerful political men supported Johnston and it was already difficult for Davis to get them to cooperate with him without persecuting the main general they supported over a minor set back
And this is far less of a minor setback than you think it is. Vicksburg is controversial in who is at fault. East Tennessee is lost either by a) the Federals being that damn good, which no Confederate politician will accept, or b) Johnston failing to deal with them.
So unless Johnston's supporters argue that Davis undermined Johnston, it won't be easy to find a way to argue that someone else should be blamed. And of course, the more "Johnston's supporters" and "Davis's enemies" are the same people, the worse for Joe in dealing with Jeff.
Tullahoma did not destroy the AoT's capacity to be an effective force. The AoT ITTL is probably in a better condition than in OTL as it does not suffer from open feuding amungst its highest ranking officers, its Army commander will communicate with its Corps commanders, it is in no worse condition supply wise than OTL as Johnston was just as capable an administrator as Bragg if not better. It is far from a beaten force.
Regardless of whether they were originally troops from the AoT that doesn't change the fact they would be returning to reinforce that army.
Far from beaten, yes. In good shape, no. Especially for someone who hasn't commanded a single Confederate army without describing it as in bad shape (OTL).
Well the point is that they may never leave. If that's the case, Johnston won't be gaining them, so the reinforcements sent to him may be less than OTL. Davis and others may see it as needing less men.
No particular need to be irrational here beyond the usual neglect of the AoT.
The Confederate plans for the Peninsula Campaign had always been to give up the Peninsula and fight the decisive battles around Richmond, none of the Confederate High Command ever entertained any notion of defeating McClellan on the Peninsula itself. The only difference of opinion was whether there should be an immediate withdrawal to Richmond or a stage by stage withdrawal. Johnston conducted the campaign well withing the boundaries of what was expected of him and what was viable and followed the Confederate strategy for the campaign. To categorise his withdrawal on the Peninsula as chosing to retreat rather than fight ignores the fact that the whole point of the campaign was with withdrawal in the first place.
Which is why Davis had such great confidence in him in regards to all of this?
This brings up a general note I'd like to address at the bottom of this.
Furthermore Seven Pines/Fair Oaks wasn't forced on him, he had chosen to attack. He chose to attack at Beaver Dam Creek two days before hand as well by G.W. Smith balked and called it off. When Johnston laucnhed his attack at Seven Pines/Fair Oaks he was under no pressure whatsoever from Richmond to attack, further reinforcements in the form of Thoephilus H. Holmes Division and Roswell Ripley's brigade were in the process of arriving and the Richmond Authorities were perfectly happy to wait for their arrival before any offensive action was attempted. Johnston saw an opportunity to smash an isolated part of the Federal Army and tried to take advantage of it.
Right. But it and possibly First Bull Run/Manassas are the only examples of that. Two battles in a year or so of command? A year and some months counting anything in Tullahoma.
Ignoring the time he's incapacitated since not even an unreasonable ogre is going to count that as "choosing not ti fight".
But the AoT ITTL Johnston inherits isn't the AoT he inherited in OTL and it is in much better shape. With no way to judge what he would have done with a well supplied army you cannot definitively say "he would just say he's short of everything but the enemy". Johnston will likely attribute Rosecrans' greater numbers for his being driven from Tennessee but it is by no means certain he will attribute a lack of material and horse with the army to the defeat as well.
It is extremely unlikely that he won't, given that the AoT
is short of everything but the enemy and Johnston has never been optimistic about supply matters when commanding an army.
And of course if he isn't short of everything but the enemy, why is he retreating without a fight? He can't win this one unless he's better able to communicate than OTL, and preferably avoids lavishing praise on the AoT's condition prior to taking command.
Davis confidence in him will be badly shaken but not gone unless Johnston is defeated in a major battle or continues to fall back. He will be prepared to give Johnston some leeway but unless Johnston acts offensively very quickly, even just the once, then Davis will start increasing the pressure and his patience will wear thin.
Why will he give Johnston leeway after Johnston loses East Tennessee without a fight?
I'm not underestimating anything. Davis will put a lot of pressure on Johnston to resume the offensive and if he doesn't his position as commander will become tenuous but Davis wont sack him just for Tullahoma.
Yeah, its not as if Tullahoma hasn't caused the loss of what remains of Tennessee. I'm not sure why this isn't a big deal to President "we can and should hold everything" Davis, particularly considering how big a blow losing Chattanooga is.
Why the hell has it gotten to the stage that me of all people is defending Davis?! I hate Davis! But you and Snake Featherston are treating him like some abominable ogre who was incapable of making a rational decision.
Because your argument rests on the idea that Johnston and Davis can cooperate.
Snake disagrees.
Meanwhile I'm skeptical of Davis seeing things as favorably as you do in regards to Johnston's failure/s (or perceived failures).
In other words: I don't get it either. This is beyond messed up. The only way this could make less sense would be if 67th defends Lincoln as making the right choice to remove McClellan.
The fact that AoT still has its offensive capability will stay Davis' hand in removing Johnston. Once Johnston shows what he will do with that Army and reinforcement then Davis will make his decision. If Johnston stays idle for a couple of months and withdraws then he will fire him but if Johnston launches an offensive he will leave him in command for a bit longer.
And I never said Johnston would try a "Chickamauga" like battle. I favour him intercepting Thomas' Corps as its isolated at Davis's Cross Roads and attempting to do to that what he tried to do to Slocum at Bentoville. I expect Thomas to hold out for a day or two and for Rosecrans to rush to the scene, leading to Johnston moving his Army to a defensive stance but perhaps trying another flank attack before pulling back while Rosecrans either stands static on the field or falls back to Chattanooga making the battle a major engagement but inconclusive.
Then Longstreet would arrive a few days later and become influential in anything that happens after.
That kind of attack is perfectly plausable.
Possibly. And Chickamauga-like is picked as an example of the battle Bragg was able to get the AoT to actually fight, instead of dealing with officers who will be falling short in attempts to pick off isolated elements - and I'm not convinced they'll be more aggressive under Johnston than under Bragg. Less mutinious, maybe, but more aggressive, no.
And the note mentioned earlier:
We have a problem here.
Either:
1) Davis was willing to work with Johnston and Johnston's persecution complex was the root of problems more than Davis's behavior.
2) Davis wasn't willing to work with Johnston despite Johnston trying to do his best.
3) Davis was an unreasonable ogre on the issue.
My argument is #1, with a healthy dose of skepticism in how much trust Davis has in Johnston when Johnston is reinforcing his (Davis's) suspicions. Losing East Tennessee is a lot more serious than Gettysburg when it comes to harming the Confederacy's position, and losing it without a fight will come off in the worst possible way to those who think a fight is possible (Davis is the sort that would think it was, especially if he's been told that the army is in good shape).
Snake is arguing #3, obviously.
How did your argument go from #2 to being essentially #1?
I don't know if I'm even able to follow that change as this discussion became a matter of "will Davis tolerate Johnston?" rather than "what will Johnston do?".
And I'm not sure what to make of what role Bragg will have in this, so I'm not trying to make sense of it on my own. But Bragg being Bragg, he's likely to be a voice for the worse.
