1863 - Bragg resigned from the Army of Tennessee

[Elfwine]

They would have gone on longer due to understanding one of the principle rules of Civil War fighting: attacks exhaust enemy armies and there's still tactical room to get around in the enemy's rear for truly Napoleonic battles. They would also have had the sense not to order Pickett's Charges or Malvern Hills.

Yeah. The kindest thing I can think to say about either is that they'd be a bloody (for the attacker) battle if they worked. And that if being as close to Sealion as you can get without extraterrestrial bats.

Not the way to win a war for the side needing to conserve its precious manpower, even if fighting offensive battles in and of itself was far from illegitimate.

Well, in the actual fighting between Jackson and Banks and then Jackson and Pope in that campaign Jackson showed why he was the CS Sherman, the best strategist in the CS Army, not a remotely equal tactician. Though unlike Sherman he actually liked battles.

Yeah. Unfortunately. Jackson's tactical deployments seem to vary from near disaster to ridiculously costly (Brawner's Farm? C'mon Jackson, even you are better than this).

Eh, I wouldn't go *that* far. At Belmont, the one defeat Grant had his troops, while undisciplined, did what he told them to both times, while Lee's failures in 1861 showed he was never good at actually directing a fight as opposed to entrusting that to his subordinates. The difference was that Grant was actively involved in fighting and read battles like musical scores, Lee trusted too much to subordinates when only two (Jackson and Longstreet) were equal to that kind of warfare and kept doing it when it was a hindrance, not a help.

Fair enough. Still, Grant seems to have been able to deal with the realities he faced, and that shows here. I'm going to take the 1861 issue to PMs since its not related to the main subject.

If Thomas had managed to get Grant's trust instead of Sherman, I daresay that it's possible for the mirror timeline to Up With the Star whereby the War in the West ends in May of 1864 as opposed to that in the East. Thomas to me is the example of the *other* kind of successful war the US Army would have been able to fight.

Now that would be an awesome team up. If I was more interested in writing a post-war timeline, I wouldn't mind trying to write that as an alt-Civil War.

IMHO Johnston could easily pull off a victory at the ATL-style Chickamauga campaign but the result would be due to Rosecrans having become overconfident and poorly distributing his troops, the kind of situation any competent general could turn into a victory. And Johnston definitely was competent.

However Johnston's unlikely to do much to any of the troops Thomas commands as OTL Chickamauga was a bloody battle that was more of Rosecrans losing than Johnston winning. TTL Chickamauga would be equally bloody and a victory over Rosecrans' right would in all likelihood exhaust CS manpower and momentum by the time they hit the Rock of Chickamauga, which might make it a quasi-Murfreesboro.

Agreed on both halves here. I suppose you could have the same fluke of luck happen in both timelines, but its such a bullshit-improbable fluke that repeating it would be only useful if the goal was to study post-battle consequences with Johnston commanding the sorely hurt AoT instead of Bragg - rather than an alt-campaign.

 

[Snake Featherston]

Yeah. The kindest thing I can think to say about either is that they'd be a bloody (for the attacker) battle if they worked. And that if being as close to Sealion as you can get without extraterrestrial bats.

The attack at Cold Harbor made sense, as if Grant broke through there he'd not only shatter the ANV but he'd also get Richmond in the process. At Malvern Hill the attack was senseless as Lee's subordinates warned him and Pickett's Charge was not something made for any reason as Lee's subordinates noted. Cold Harbor itself was Grant's "biggest failure" so to speak, but where it had *a* reason there was none for Lee's bloodbaths. And in these battles you see how Hood could have possibly thought the Franklin-Nashville campaign was a good idea.

Not the way to win a war for the side needing to conserve its precious manpower, even if fighting offensive battles in and of itself was far from illegitimate.

Even moreso when your capital is only 100 miles from that of the enemy and the enemy can just keep coming at you. Lee's tactics could bring splendid results in individual battles but were always self-destructive.

Yeah. Unfortunately. Jackson's tactical deployments seem to vary from near disaster to ridiculously costly (Brawner's Farm? C'mon Jackson, even you are better than this).

As did Sherman's. Both also wanted to wage war against enemy civilians, not just the soldiers and both were the greatest strategists of their respective sides. Both were ironically also not necessarily right in the head......

Now that would be an awesome team up. If I was more interested in writing a post-war timeline, I wouldn't mind trying to write that as an alt-Civil War.

The interesting question is that since the war in the West was the less strategically "ritzy" campaign what such a victory there would have been. Either way, Thomas allowed to conduct Rocky Face Gap as he wanted was very likely to have bagged Johnston's army, Sherman conducting it as he did meant Johnston escaped.

Agreed on both halves here. I suppose you could have the same fluke of luck happen in both timelines, but its such a bullshit-improbable fluke that repeating it would be only useful if the goal was to study post-battle consequences with Johnston commanding the sorely hurt AoT instead of Bragg - rather than an alt-campaign.

Well, it'd still be a stroke of luck for the Confederacy and a battle that's a self-inflicted defeat for Rosecrans salvaged by Thomas from complete rout, it'd just work differently and come across as a hybrid of Bentonville and Murfreesboro. OTOH, if Johnston routs the right wing under Rosecrans sufficiently he would still be able to besiege Chattanooga but unlikely to have the manpower to halt any sufficiently determined US action to relieve it (and a joker in the deck here is if Johnston wins this battle without ANV re-inforcements is whether or not that kind of victory would incline Davis to send those re-inforcements over Lee's objections to it). If Davis doesn't, then Grant would take over as per OTL, accumulate sufficient manpower and Chattanooga would end the way it did IOTL without a Knoxville and due purely to lack of CS manpower and a different kind of political infighting.

It'd seem In Spite of a Nail but would actually follow the Horseshoe Nail.

 

[Nytram01]

Rosecrans was probably thre best maneuver specialist of the war. His Tullahoma Campaign is a masterpiece of maneuver that no other general of the war equalled. However he didn't deal well with tactics and wasn't confident in his own abilities so he never managed to gain any kind of killer instinct.

The Tullahoma campaign is likely to be just as successful as OTL regardless of who is in command for the Confederates but the Mountains of North Georgia are not suited to Rosecrans style maneuvers. Its relatively simple to plan and execute ambushes of troops moving through that area. Bragg attempted to do so at Davis's Cross Roads but his tactical ineptitude and the lack of support of his subordinates led to the opportunity of attacking an insolated Federal Corps being squandered.

If Rosecrans attempts to continue his advance into Georgia as he did in OTL and Johnston makes the same decision Bragg did then Thomas's Corps may be the one to feel the initial impact of the Confederate blow at Davis's Cross Roads. The chance to smash Thomas was very real there - Thomas would of corse make it very difficult and might hold on till reinforcements arrive but the chance to smash him was very real - and the major battle may end up taking place there rather than Chickamauga.

Bragg in OTL faced almost total disobediance from his subordinates in the Chickamauga Campaign. His orders to attack Thomas weren't followed until he forced them to be and his orders to attack Crittenden weren't followed. This may not be the case if Johnston commands and the senior officers of the army support him.

 

[Snake Featherston]

Rosecrans was probably thre best maneuver specialist of the war. His Tullahoma Campaign is a masterpiece of maneuver that no other general of the war equalled. However he didn't deal well with tactics and wasn't confident in his own abilities so he never managed to gain any kind of killer instinct.

The Tullahoma campaign is likely to be just as successful as OTL regardless of who is in command for the Confederates but the Mountains of North Georgia are not suited to Rosecrans style maneuvers. Its relatively simple to plan and execute ambushes of troops moving through that area. Bragg attempted to do so at Davis's Cross Roads but his tactical ineptitude and the lack of support of his subordinates led to the opportunity of attacking an insolated Federal Corps being squandered.

If Rosecrans attempts to continue his advance into Georgia as he did in OTL and Johnston makes the same decision Bragg did then Thomas's Corps may be the one to feel the initial impact of the Confederate blow at Davis's Cross Roads. The chance to smash Thomas was very real there - Thomas would of corse make it very difficult and might hold on till reinforcements arrive but the chance to smash him was very real - and the major battle may end up taking place there rather than Chickamauga.

Bragg in OTL faced almost total disobediance from his subordinates in the Chickamauga Campaign. His orders to attack Thomas weren't followed until he forced them to be and his orders to attack Crittenden weren't followed. This may not be the case if Johnston commands and the senior officers of the army support him.

That last part of the last sentence is the big if. The OTL Army of Tennessee saw the same kind of scheming against Johnston as against Bragg, and ITTL it's not entirely clear whether a rapid deposition of Bragg would have discouraged any of those same people from proceeding to do that with Johnston. The Army of Tennessee was too much the CS AoTP to get along like it should have with actually fighting the enemy as opposed to each other.

Johnston's history of retreat without battle and distrust of him on the part of Davis might make the Tullahoma campaign a much bigger disaster for Johnston than it was for Bragg.

 

[Elfwine]

The attack at Cold Harbor made sense, as if Grant broke through there he'd not only shatter the ANV but he'd also get Richmond in the process. At Malvern Hill the attack was senseless as Lee's subordinates warned him and Pickett's Charge was not something made for any reason as Lee's subordinates noted. Cold Harbor itself was Grant's "biggest failure" so to speak, but where it had *a* reason there was none for Lee's bloodbaths. And in these battles you see how Hood could have possibly thought the Franklin-Nashville campaign was a good idea.

Precisely.

Even moreso when your capital is only 100 miles from that of the enemy and the enemy can just keep coming at you. Lee's tactics could bring splendid results in individual battles but were always self-destructive.

Yeah. I'm not sure if this in and of itself enough if one avoids the out and out fail moves just named, but...sufficient to say, this isn't what we need here.

As did Sherman's. Both also wanted to wage war against enemy civilians, not just the soldiers and both were the greatest strategists of their respective sides. Both were ironically also not necessarily right in the head......

Jackson seems to have had Asperger's syndrome, Sherman...I have no idea what was wrong with his brain, but he clearly had screws loose at the start of the war. Not in the sense some people write him off as a pyromaniac lunatic, but not exactly the most stable minded guy in the army, either.

The interesting question is that since the war in the West was the less strategically "ritzy" campaign what such a victory there would have been. Either way, Thomas allowed to conduct Rocky Face Gap as he wanted was very likely to have bagged Johnston's army, Sherman conducting it as he did meant Johnston escaped.

Yep. This is why I don't think very well of Sherman as a general.

Well, it'd still be a stroke of luck for the Confederacy and a battle that's a self-inflicted defeat for Rosecrans salvaged by Thomas from complete rout, it'd just work differently and come across as a hybrid of Bentonville and Murfreesboro. OTOH, if Johnston routs the right wing under Rosecrans sufficiently he would still be able to besiege Chattanooga but unlikely to have the manpower to halt any sufficiently determined US action to relieve it (and a joker in the deck here is if Johnston wins this battle without ANV re-inforcements is whether or not that kind of victory would incline Davis to send those re-inforcements over Lee's objections to it). If Davis doesn't, then Grant would take over as per OTL, accumulate sufficient manpower and Chattanooga would end the way it did IOTL without a Knoxville and due purely to lack of CS manpower and a different kind of political infighting.

It'd seem In Spite of a Nail but would actually follow the Horseshoe Nail.

Oh?

 

[Snake Featherston]

Yeah. I'm not sure if this in and of itself enough if one avoids the out and out fail moves just named, but...sufficient to say, this isn't what we need here.

The other side of that kind of warfare is it wrecks some of the most necessary to protect Confederate territory. It's not a good idea to scour clean that 100 miles so that you depend only on the Valley to feed you, at some point someone's going to get the idea to Kill It With Fire.

Jackson seems to have had Asperger's syndrome, Sherman...I have no idea what was wrong with his brain, but he clearly had screws loose at the start of the war. Not in the sense some people write him off as a pyromaniac lunatic, but not exactly the most stable minded guy in the army, either.

They both were more George S. Patton than Dwight D. Eisenhower. The thing is that both are parallels of each other as much as Grant and Lee were. Again, whoever wrote OTL in this war was lazy.

Yep. This is why I don't think very well of Sherman as a general.

Eh, I think Sherman and Jackson were comparable: smart professors who would have been instrumental in professionalizing their armies postwar, but not necessarily the greatest handlers of battles. That said, Sherman *did* wield an army group effectively in a campaign, in a war where most people on both sides had problems wielding one army for one battle.....

Oh?

The course of Chickamauga and Chattanooga might parallel the OTL courses of both on a superficial level, with a Confederate attack against a poorly-distributed Army of the Cumberland led by an overconfident general but the resemblances are only superficial and they happen for different reasons that amount to the same end result.

 

[Elfwine]

The other side of that kind of warfare is it wrecks some of the most necessary to protect Confederate territory. It's not a good idea to scour clean that 100 miles so that you depend only on the Valley to feed you, at some point someone's going to get the idea to Kill It With Fire.

And there's no good way to hold both the Northern Virginia region in question (between DC and Washington) AND the Valley vs. an enemy who outnumbers you.

Admittedly, depending on the Valley (or any other given single source) is begging for it to be killed with fire (literally), so you can't win for losing in this situation.

They both were more George S. Patton than Dwight D. Eisenhower. The thing is that both are parallels of each other as much as Grant and Lee were. Again, whoever wrote OTL in this war was lazy.

Yeah. I'm just glad a Thomas-Longstreet comparison is imperfect, but in this light its clearly an attempt to make it look like the author isn't just copying characters from one side to another.

They are both still underrated hammerers who are most known for being successful in a defensive sort of way despite the fact their big triumphs are offensive.

Eh, I think Sherman and Jackson were comparable: smart professors who would have been instrumental in professionalizing their armies postwar, but not necessarily the greatest handlers of battles. That said, Sherman *did* wield an army group effectively in a campaign, in a war where most people on both sides had problems wielding one army for one battle.....

This is true. Especially the last bit. But I still hold Thomas in higher esteem than Sherman.

Better Sherman than a lot of guys that got command of anything larger than a brigade, but a lot of those people were failures to the point you'd think the author hates people.

The course of Chickamauga and Chattanooga might parallel the OTL courses of both on a superficial level, with a Confederate attack against a poorly-distributed Army of the Cumberland led by an overconfident general but the resemblances are only superficial and they happen for different reasons that amount to the same end result.

Which probably means the 1864 campaign is different - particularly as Johnston is not the kind of option he was in 1864. Assuming Davis doesn't remove him, he's the "tried and found wanting" rather than "tried, founding wanting, but maybe it'll work here'.

 

[Snake Featherston]

And there's no good way to hold both the Northern Virginia region in question (between DC and Washington) AND the Valley vs. an enemy who outnumbers you.

Admittedly, depending on the Valley (or any other given single source) is begging for it to be killed with fire (literally), so you can't win for losing in this situation.

All the more reason to avoid if one can help it repeated fighting over the same parts of Virginia, meaning the CSA has to hold very far forward in Virginia and that's one of the real reasons that it really didn't do as well in the Eastern theater as people credit it for having done.

Yeah. I'm just glad a Thomas-Longstreet comparison is imperfect, but in this light its clearly an attempt to make it look like the author isn't just copying characters from one side to another.

They are both still underrated hammerers who are most known for being successful in a defensive sort of way despite the fact their big triumphs are offensive.

They both were soundly savaged by their respective section for opposite reasons after the war: Longstreet for becoming a Republican, Thomas for having been a "traitor" to his state. Hence the irony that on both sides some of their greatest generals were despised despite having been better than generals held in higher esteem than they were.

This is true. Especially the last bit. But I still hold Thomas in higher esteem than Sherman.

Better Sherman than a lot of guys that got command of anything larger than a brigade, but a lot of those people were failures to the point you'd think the author hates people.

To be blunt, Thomas should have had command of the army in 1864, not Sherman, and appointing Sherman was a case of Grant's kind of cronyism. Sherman still won victories and outgeneraled Johnston so it's not the most negative example of cronyism, but Thomas should have had command and Sherman under him. Especially given that Thomas had seen Sherman at *his* worst during the war.

Which probably means the 1864 campaign is different - particularly as Johnston is not the kind of option he was in 1864. Assuming Davis doesn't remove him, he's the "tried and found wanting" rather than "tried, founding wanting, but maybe it'll work here'.

OTOH, since Johnston's obviously not the answer, who's Davis going to use against the Union commander in 1864? He's not that many options to turn to. The most optimistic case is Pat Cleburne as far as the CS war effort but I can't see that. Maybe Hardee, but I can't see that either. The worst-case scenario would be Polk.

 

[Elfwine]

All the more reason to avoid if one can help it repeated fighting over the same parts of Virginia, meaning the CSA has to hold very far forward in Virginia and that's one of the real reasons that it really didn't do as well in the Eastern theater as people credit it for having done.

Yeah?

They both were soundly savaged by their respective section for opposite reasons after the war: Longstreet for becoming a Republican, Thomas for having been a "traitor" to his state. Hence the irony that on both sides some of their greatest generals were despised despite having been better than generals held in higher esteem than they were.

True. But its not quite as absurdly close a parallel as the other two.

To be blunt, Thomas should have had command of the army in 1864, not Sherman, and appointing Sherman was a case of Grant's kind of cronyism. Sherman still won victories and outgeneraled Johnston so it's not the most negative example of cronyism, but Thomas should have had command and Sherman under him. Especially given that Thomas had seen Sherman at *his* worst during the war.

No argument on any of this.

OTOH, since Johnston's obviously not the answer, who's Davis going to use against the Union commander in 1864? He's not that many options to turn to. The most optimistic case is Pat Cleburne as far as the CS war effort but I can't see that. Maybe Hardee, but I can't see that either. The worst-case scenario would be Polk.

Polk or Beauregard...

If I was a soldier in the AoT, I'd shoot myself and spare myself the misery they'd bring.

 

[Snake Featherston]

Yeah?

It was not enough to repeatedly keep the Yankees north of the Rapidan with the CSA reduced to a single granary and by both 1863 and 1864 on the starting line of Burnside's campaign.

True. But its not quite as absurdly close a parallel as the other two.

True. And the Union had no John Bell Hood unless we count Phil Sheridan and his record in the Valley indicates Sheridan was rather too cautious to be a Hood.

Polk or Beauregard...

If I was a soldier in the AoT, I'd shoot myself and spare myself the misery they'd bring.

There's also the political problem of replacing an anti-Davis man with a Davis man and how Davis might end up going about it. He was not the most tactful of political leaders.....

 

[Elfwine]

It was not enough to repeatedly keep the Yankees north of the Rapidan with the CSA reduced to a single granary and by both 1863 and 1864 on the starting line of Burnside's campaign.

Which is rather uncomfortable, to put it mildly.

True. And the Union had no John Bell Hood unless we count Phil Sheridan and his record in the Valley indicates Sheridan was rather too cautious to be a Hood.

Yeah. Though his behavior as a cavalry corps leader left everything to be desired (including how his fighting involved ridiculously high casualties for no gain) except inspiring high morale in his men.

Who would be the Confederate Hancock? Or Union Cleburne?

Neither seem to have an exact fit.

Still. If the big ones look similar...

There's also the political problem of replacing an anti-Davis man with a Davis man and how Davis might end up going about it. He was not the most tactful of political leaders.....

This would be interesting, but in a train wreck sort of way. As if OTL wasn't bad enough.

 

[Snake Featherston]

Which is rather uncomfortable, to put it mildly.

And implies a lot given that this was a line chosen by the biggest idiot to command the Army of the Potomac and that General Hooker's defeat and Meade's victory and the maneuver campaigns of late 1863 didn't alter this line much in any meaningful sense. But this goes back to people's underestimation of the AoTP which like the Army of Tennessee had better junior officers and enlisted men than it did overall commanders until mid-1863/the end of the war.

Yeah. Though his behavior as a cavalry corps leader left everything to be desired (including how his fighting involved ridiculously high casualties for no gain) except inspiring high morale in his men.

Who would be the Confederate Hancock? Or Union Cleburne?

Neither seem to have an exact fit.

John B. Gordon might be a CS Hancock, with the whole competent and charismatic Junior Officer thing, while the Union lacks a Cleburne but had its own Polk in Oliver Howard. Again, it's like OTL had a lazy hack writer.

This would be interesting, but in a train wreck sort of way. As if OTL wasn't bad enough.

Yes, because the OTL Atlanta Campaign had enough politicization from both sides, but here the Confederate side would vastly overshadow the Union side. One thing's for sure, I wouldn't want to be the Confederate commanding officer in that situation.

 

[Elfwine]

And implies a lot given that this was a line chosen by the biggest idiot to command the Army of the Potomac and that General Hooker's defeat and Meade's victory and the maneuver campaigns of late 1863 didn't alter this line much in any meaningful sense. But this goes back to people's underestimation of the AoTP which like the Army of Tennessee had better junior officers and enlisted men than it did overall commanders until mid-1863/the end of the war.

Yeah.

John B. Gordon might be a CS Hancock, with the whole competent and charismatic Junior Officer thing, while the Union lacks a Cleburne but had its own Polk in Oliver Howard. Again, it's like OTL had a lazy hack writer.

Howard wasn't as prone to backstabbing his superiors, was he? I mean, he was definitely someone who should never have been given a corps (at least in the East - I don't know as much about what he did int he West), but...

Yes, because the OTL Atlanta Campaign had enough politicization from both sides, but here the Confederate side would vastly overshadow the Union side. One thing's for sure, I wouldn't want to be the Confederate commanding officer in that situation.

It probably did OTL, but this...

Best case scenario? Davis gives up and surrenders. Its that impossible. I know its not going to happen, but its just all-but-destined to be a tragic farce.

 

[Snake Featherston]

Howard wasn't as prone to backstabbing his superiors, was he? I mean, he was definitely someone who should never have been given a corps (at least in the East - I don't know as much about what he did int he West), but...

No, but he was still an inflexible and rather rigid preacher-general whose handling of fighting left much to be desired and was esteemed for his morality more than his skills on the job, so to speak.

It probably did OTL, but this...

Best case scenario? Davis gives up and surrenders. Its that impossible. I know its not going to happen, but its just all-but-destined to be a tragic farce.

I think the truly ironic bit would be if as IOTL Davis expects only one big offensive at a time, not two at once and then Grant's big six armies campaign starts going great guns in Georgia and Virginia both. Turning that into a stalemate for Confederate armies is going to be difficult in the extreme, and the US Armies in the West are going to do far better than IOTL. The mere reality of two large offensives may produce faster demoralization among the enlisted men and whoever commands in that case would have.....issues...commanding the AoT that make OTL ones look like a Sunday stroll in the park.

 

[Elfwine]

No, but he was still an inflexible and rather rigid preacher-general whose handling of fighting left much to be desired and was esteemed for his morality more than his skills on the job, so to speak.

Agreed. The worst part is that he was a layman. Polk at least was a bishop gone to war.

I think the truly ironic bit would be if as IOTL Davis expects only one big offensive at a time, not two at once and then Grant's big six armies campaign starts going great guns in Georgia and Virginia both. Turning that into a stalemate for Confederate armies is going to be difficult in the extreme, and the US Armies in the West are going to do far better than IOTL. The mere reality of two large offensives may produce faster demoralization among the enlisted men and whoever commands in that case would have.....issues...commanding the AoT that make OTL ones look like a Sunday stroll in the park.

How much worse could the OTL situation get? Fragging superior officers?

 

[Snake Featherston]

Agreed. The worst part is that he was a layman. Polk at least was a bishop gone to war.

And proved a very Borgian kind of Bishop.

How much worse could the OTL situation get? Fragging superior officers?

Much, much worse. Fragging might come into play, but another possibility is cases of mutiny where CS troops simply won't attack against Yankee forces, and if the commanding general has Bragg's idea of discipline......

However if the situation is one where the CS general is doing his damndest to conduct the battle and his generals won't listen to him and the enlisted men don't respect him at the same time as US forces are sweeping down with three armies under either Sherman or Thomas then the history will be less a tragifarce and more akin to the Battle of Kiev.

 

[Elfwine]

And proved a very Borgian kind of Bishop.

I'm assuming you have something more than merely being a fighting cleric or even being a backstabbing douchebag in mind.

Much, much worse. Fragging might come into play, but another possibility is cases of mutiny where CS troops simply won't attack against Yankee forces, and if the commanding general has Bragg's idea of discipline......

Even if they don't...

Gulp.

However if the situation is one where the CS general is doing his damndest to conduct the battle and his generals won't listen to him and the enlisted men don't respect him at the same time as US forces are sweeping down with three armies under either Sherman or Thomas then the history will be less a tragifarce and more akin to the Battle of Kiev.

I don't know much about that battle, but it sounds like a glorious day...for the enemy.

 

[Snake Featherston]

I'm assuming you have something more than merely being a fighting cleric or even being a backstabbing douchebag in mind.

Him being a stupid backstabbing fighting cleric. The invasion of Kentucky was a moment of Idiot Ball grabbing that comprehensively should have meant Pope never had another independent field command.

Even if they don't...

Gulp.

Even if they don't the US armies will still be moving into the heartland of the South, and the US armies will be finding that Confederate soldiers can in fact be dealt curbstomps. The Confederate armies will be led incompetently in a major strategic zone and the results of the defeats and how they'd play out throws a spanner in the works of the Democrats' plans.

I don't know much about that battle, but it sounds like a glorious day...for the enemy.

Kiev was one of the greatest Axis victories of WWII and happened more due to Soviet political infighting than German military skill.

 

[Elfwine]

Him being a stupid backstabbing fighting cleric. The invasion of Kentucky was a moment of Idiot Ball grabbing that comprehensively should have meant Pope never had another independent field command.

His 1861 invasion or the 1862 invasion?

Polk was Lincoln's best general, that's for sure.

Even if they don't the US armies will still be moving into the heartland of the South, and the US armies will be finding that Confederate soldiers can in fact be dealt curbstomps. The Confederate armies will be led incompetently in a major strategic zone and the results of the defeats and how they'd play out throws a spanner in the works of the Democrats' plans.

Yeah. OTL Sherman was successful but not overwhelmingly so until well into the year. This timeline...

Kiev was one of the greatest Axis victories of WWII and happened more due to Soviet political infighting than German military skill.

There's probably a lesson here that should be remembered for AH writers - great victories tend to require incompetent (and infighting to the point of self destruction is definitely a form of incompetence) opposition. Genius on its own isn't enough.

 

[Snake Featherston]

His 1861 invasion or the 1862 invasion?

Polk was Lincoln's best general, that's for sure.

The one in 1861 that let the Union be the liberators instead of the invaders, meaning the South was strategically hurting from the start of the war in the West.

Yeah. OTL Sherman was successful but not overwhelmingly so until well into the year. This timeline...

TTL his maneuver campaigns may bring on big battles he doesn't expect but he may get some of Grant's golden luck and start dealing the kind of curbstomps Thomas did.

There's probably a lesson here that should be remembered for AH writers - great victories tend to require incompetent (and infighting to the point of self destruction is definitely a form of incompetence) opposition. Genius on its own isn't enough.

And it's still a great victory even when the victory is more to exploiting the other side's mistakes than direct action of the winning side.