67th Tigers
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Actually a bit more favourable, about 52,000 vs 80,000 PFD or 65,000 vs 95,000 Present.
1863 - Bragg resigned from the Army of Tennessee
- Thread starter Nytram01
- Start date
Actually a bit more favourable, about 52,000 vs 80,000 PFD or 65,000 vs 95,000 Present.
As the one arguing Johnston fell short:
The problem is that Johnston is choosing not to push the attack because his subordinate has claimed that something has come up. He has chosen to take Hood's word - Hood, who has no experience worth noting as a corps commander (technically he sorta-kinda was for a very short time at Chickamauga) - that the attack can't succeed. And so he, instead of trying to find a way to make it work to to deal with the threat or anything that would push it forward, just falls back and passively submits to Hood's judgment.
An aggressive general would say "There's cavalry on your flank? Detach some men to deal with it." not "Abort the attack."
Mentioning Hood's inexperience because there is no good reason to make this newly promoted cripple your right hand man, but Johnston chose to do so - regardless of whether he was good, bad, or just a weasel.
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Johnston's Army of the Shenandoah in 1861 is arguably the most professional army on the Continent and has probably the best command chain there is at that time. Beauregard's Army of the Potomac (CS) is much less professional but has an established command chain. Taking over at 1st Manassas Johnston merely had to bring order back to an establish command chain and get the units in the right place - that's a big differance to creating a command chain potentially in the midst of battle, as may have been the case at Jackson.
When Johnston arrives he is told by Gregg and W.H.T. Walker that Sherman's corps has gotten between Jackson and Vicksburg. He tell's Davis he is too late as the Federals have gotten between the two Confederate forces and split them apart. Gregg, however, tells Johnston that Sherman is isolated and so Johnston tell's Pemberton to advance on Sherman with as much force of the Army of Mississippi as he can to break through and reach him, in the meantime he will try to hold Jackson as long as possible. While Pemberton sleeps on his orders then holds a council of war where he decides to disobey them Johnston learns that Sherman isn't isolated but has McPherson's Corps alongside him and they are advancing on his position, meaning that the majority of Grant's Army of the Mississippi is advancing upon him.
Johnston thus makes the decision to abandon Jackson so as to protect the few men he has in the hopes that he can divert Pembeton north to Canton so the two can link up and present a united front against the Federals but the fact that Pemberton has attempted to march south instead of east and is no where near where Johnston expected him to be, plus the fact that a Confederate traitor took a copy of Johnston's orders to McPherson's HQ lead to the defeat of the AoM at Champion Hill and the Confederate forces are kept seperate.
Johnston traded Jackson for time with the intention of linking up with Pemberton so they could face Grant on more equal footing but it didn't work. Considering Pemberton ignored Johnston's orders anyway Johnston could accomplish nothing by defending Jackson. He didn't have the manpower or material to hold it indefinitely.
Furthermore it wasn't just Sherman and McPherson who were advancing on Jackson. Grant was with them. Grant actually spent the night after the capture of Jackson in the Hotel room Johnston had used. If Sherman and McPherson proved unable to move such a small defensive force as could be deployed by the Confederate then certainly Grant was capable of moving them.
Johnston was extremely sensitive to the matter of rank and seniority - mainly because it was pretty much all he had except his father's revolutionary sword and pistols and the loving company of his wife - but it wasn't as if this is a secret we discovered in hindsight. The whole US Army pre-war knew that Johnston was obsessed with matters of rank and seniority, Davis himself had had to deal with one of Johnston's quarrels with the US government on such a matter when he was secretary of war so it wasn't as if he was completely unaware that ranking the generals as he did would make Johnston upset.
Confederate Law stated that ranks and seniority in the new army would be determined by ranks and seniority in the old army and by that Johnston, as the only general to leave the Union for the Confederacy, would have expected to be ranked top but Davis manipulated Confederate Law to give his friends the better deals. He forced through amendments that made it so an officer could only claim relative rank to their US one in the arm in which you currently served. This accounted quite legally for Johnston's fall from 1st to 4th in Confederate rankings while also promoting Davis' friends Samuel Cooper and Albert Sidney Johnston to 1st and 2nd respectively.
However Davis neglected to explain this to his generals and when Johnston's unusally passionate letter reached him all he sent back in reply was a message stating that Johnston's arguments were one-sided, unfounded and unbecoming.
But Davis didn't give Johnston any support even in the direct aftermath of 1st Manassas.
Davis let the War Office, the Confederate Congress and the Adjutant General interfer at will in the running Johnston's department and Army in Northern Virginia in 1861. When Davis himself ordered Johnston to pull back from the position at Centerville to less exposed positions along the Rappanhannock and Johnston followed those orders Johnston recieved a minor rebuke for withdrawing - cause Lee had arrived in Richmond and expressed dissapointment to Davis that the withdraw had happened. Davis, further, permitted Lee and the War Office to order around troops in Johnston's department without keeping Johnston informed, sometimes even countermanding orders Johnston had already issued, and let Johnston become completely isolated on the Peninsula with no up to date news of what was happening elsewhere.
After Johnston returned from his injuries Davis gave him the Department of the West Command but retained all the real power for himself. He made the Department Commanders job obsolete by making it not only acceptable but pretty much manditory for all officers in the West, from Army command downwards, to send him their reports, inquries and whatnot without sending them through Johnston or even informing Johnston that they had sent anything at all. Davis refused to give Johnston any freedom in moving any troops anywhere without Presidential approval. Davis reduced Johnston's role to simply a glorified quartermaster who only dealt with mundane paperwork.
After the failure of the Vicksburg Campaign Johnston and Davis' relationship was unreparable. Davis tried to pin sole blame for the failure on Johnston's shoulders and have him courts-marshalled.
So Davis certainly showed very little trust in Johnston from a very early period of the war and he certainly put very little effort into resolving their personal feud either.
A few words of support could have helped. Not saying it would have solved everything but it certainly would have improved their relationship. Fact is that Davis treated Johnston with high-handed dismissal from a very early point in the war and expected to be treated with respect in return. Davis did very little to create a good working relationship with Johnston and certainly did pretty much nothing to heal any hurt between them.So all Johnston needed was to have his precious ego reassured that he was regarded as a wonderful guy and a good general.
Yes I am being as sarcastic as possible.
Why does Johnston expect Davis to express confidence in him when to the information Davis has - with very little in the way of convincing counterevidence by the uncommunicative or ineffectively communicative Johnston - he looks like someone who won't fight and won't cooperate?
Davis doesn't owe Johnston an explanation for his orders. Now it might be nice for Davis to be a better boss, but Johnston can come to other conclusions than "Davis hates my guts".
It is probably unreasonable in the extreme to expect that Johnston will be the same man Lee is. But it is not unreasonable to expect him to do the kind of things Lee did to maintain a working relationship with Davis. "The boss doesn't trust me. What can I do to make him think differently?" should not be answered with "I'll support his opponents."
Davis does want to be informed of what's going on, not left to assume that Johnston will (to look at Atlanta) have "some plan" that might work if he doesn't just decide to abandon the city.
I despise Hood (of '64) as an officer who filled Polk's shoes as Lincoln's best general brilliantly and I don't like Davis's micromanaging twit management style, but Johnston has to offer something other than "have faith in me" to be someone I would trust the way he seems to have wanted (needed?) to be trusted. Always having an excuse for falling short - and I'm pretty sure that no one in the Confederacy can do much in the Vicksburg campaign if Pemberton isn't cooperative (though on the other hand, Johnston can try harder to coordinate with him instead of moving away from Pemberton as he pulls out of Jackson) and more-or-less convinced that the Peninsula was an unwinnable situation, though possibly more could have been done, it wouldn't have been by much.
But I say the latter with the benefit of more information than Davis had from Johnston.
Even Lee's few words of support in 1865 improved Johnston's mindset and had Davis been willing to offer him something similiar - honestly or otherwise - it would have gone a long way to convince Johnston that Davis might actually have some faith in him and wasn't just setting him up to take the fall.
The fact that Davis never gave Johnston any real support and showed very little faith in him from very early on was just as much a reason for their very poor relationship as Johnston's poor communication and consorting with Davis' opposition was.
Well I suppose if we consider the Army of the Shenandoah (and Beauregard's army) to be a division...yeah, okay.
Still a matter of assembling something that consists of multiple brigades with nothing between them and the "army" commander.
Still, I I'm not sure I would call it the most professional army on the continent, even ignoring the British army.
Even so, Johnston is not being expected to do something that requires a particularly fine tuned command structure.
No one is asking for "indefinitely". What is being expected is for him to do something to try and hold it as long as possible instead of get out as soon as possible. Failing that, to retreat towards Pemberton, not away from him.
Is Pemberton being a twit? Definitely. But things aren't being helped by having less assistance from Johnston.
I'm all for praising Grant, but I think this is painting Johnston's situation as completely untenable to the point even trying to fix it is unrealistic.
Since that is exactly what they are - I am not remotely sympathetic. And I'm reasonably sure Davis did spell out that it was based on field rank seniority (though possibly not about "the arm of the service they were in").
Don't quote me as an authority until I hunt down a source, but I'm sure I've read that.
Interfere defined as? Defined as opposed to the role they're supposed to play, that is.
No, I'm not saying all went as its supposed to - but that's where a reasonable, persuasive general responds to the situation with a mixture of logic and charm to address the problem, not where one acts as if this is the beginning of the Seven Punishments of Joseph.
What are we defining as Johnston's department anyway? Looking at this as a consequence of Davis's cheerful forming of departments that really should have been merged. Having (for instance) the Valley be technically separate in some arcane way would suit Davis entirely too well.
Picking the Valley just for the sake of example.
And Johnston's attempts to address this were the voice of reason and charm, calculated to make anyone except Davis understand how he could do a lot more if he could get those reports sent to him.
Or maybe they weren't, and Johnston's failure to do anything with the position made Davis act because Johnston wouldn't.
Fact is also that Johnston never tried to build anything remotely resembling a constructive response or to do anything but act like a persecuted victim either.
I'm not a fan of Davis. I'm just even less of a fan of the guy who throughout the war acted as if he was nothing but a scapegoat and a victim and who constantly came up with excuses for falling short of expectations.
It does not seem to have occurred to him that being that kind of person was confirming Davis's lack of confidence in him.
The fact that Johnston never tried very hard to present his position in a way that would persuade an opponent makes it rather difficult in Davis's position (but not on his side) to accept his judgment. And that Davis is just setting him up to take the fall...Davis had issues coming out of his behind, but this is part of why I have such a hard time being sympathetic to Johnston. Its not enough that Davis and he can't get along personally. Its not enough that he has reason (to his lights) to think Davis is being unreasonable. Davis is out to get him. Right. Sure.
But as an example of why I look at Johnston as whining:
Take what he did around Atlanta in 1864. Davis asks him for his plans in some kind of useful detail so that he (Davis) can work with them.
Johnston...doesn't provide. What is Davis supposed to do? Just blindly trust that Johnston will do what he's never looked like he would do before?
Johnston, who has made it clear he opposes the president's strategy and sides with his (Davis's) opponents and communicates more with them than with him?
I like to think of myself as fair minded, and I know that's not altogether true (and probably this is an example), but I can't look at this in a favorable light no matter how much I agree he was in a mostly no-win situation at Vicksburg, as an example of something where Davis was at his worst (not just in regards to Johnston).
To turn this back to your what if (I don't mind the argument but I think we're getting bogged down into a general debate on Johnston), I think that Johnston will treat the AoT and its situation as exactly the kind of no-win situation that proves Davis is out to get him.
Its in a terrible position logistically. Its outnumbered (even without sending more troops in the late spring/early summer of 1863 - partially because Johnston was calling for them - in Mississippi), outgunned, has a cavalry force that can best be described as under-performing, and is expected to hold a position I'm not sure even an aggressive and optimistic commander would describe as favorable.
And this is assuming Davis does nothing other than hand over command to Johnston and expect him to hold Tennessee. God have mercy if he expects an attack (unrealistic, not necessarily out of character, and probably expected).
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I said arguably. The Army of the Shenandoah was undboutedly the most professional force in Virginia and pretty much the entire Confederacy at the time.
Anyway, I think your underestimating the difficulty of creating a cohesive force in battle from almost nothing.
If Johnston retreated "towards" Pemberton he would have to move through Sherman and McPherson's Corps to do it. He went North towards Canton because that was pretty much the only way he could go. Further he expected Pemberton to be marching on Clinton at the time and could have been justified in expecting Canton to be close enough so that the two could link up.
Jackson was going to fall. Even if Johnston defended it tooth and nail until every last Confederate defender was dead. It couldn't be saved. The situation at Jackson specificially was unwinnable. Had Pemberton obeyed his orders then perhaps it wouldn't have been.
Johnston weighted the merits of defending the town in the hope Pemberton would arrive in time to strike the federal rear and save the defenders at Jackson from being decimated against the merits of giving up Jackson but saving the men so he could link up with Pemberton and face Grant on more equal footing, he thought the second option had more chance of securing Confederate success. That Pembeton hadn't moved at all and when he did would eventually move south meant both options were doomed to fail.
They may have been one-sided, unfounded and unbecoming but Johnston's arguments and his unusually passionate letter showed just how upset he was with the rankings. A more cosiderate man than Davis would have explained things to him exactly and told him this was not a reflection on anything he had done and nor were any of the generals expected to be his superior in the near future and this would have kept their relationship on more friendly terms but Davis just took offense to it and damned Johnston for questioning him.
The fact that the seniority was decided by the relative rank of the arm in which they currently served was not explained at all to Johnston. All he knew was that the Cofederate Congress had decreed that ranks and seniority in the new army would be determined by ranks and seniority in the old one.
The difference between it being interferance and doing their job is that they were far more heavyhanded with it. Cooper, Myers and Northrop refused ligitimate requests to increase staff, assign quartermasters and commisarries to divisions and an inspector of transportation to Johnston's command for no apparent reason, Cooper and Benjamin demanded muskets and rifles be taken off of sick men for redistibution to other departments thus depriving Johnston of the means of resupplying men returning to duty, Northrop refused to let Johnston acquire supplies from farmers in Northern Virigina where his army was but demanded that those supplies be sent to Richmond to be redeployed to Northern Virginia, when Northrop put the meat packing plant at Thoroughfare Gap he ignored all of Johnston's protests about the matter, Myers demanded to know the names of every man who needed blankets before he sent any when Johnston requested some for his army during winter, Benjamin sent men into Johnston's army armed with furloughs to recruit infantrymen to new units of cavalry and artillery, Benjamin made it acceptable for all officers in Virginia to ignore Johnston and deal with him directly and decisions Johnston made about strategy or command set up would be overruled by Benjamin with no just reason given. The Confederate Congress forced Johnston's Army to go through regimental, brigade, company and battery elections while they faced McClellan across the lines at Yorktown, severly disrupting the command chain at a most dangerous time.
Johnston took up many of these matters with Davis who simply rebuked him for not following orders. At this time Johnston had done nothing to earn the mistrust of Davis but write a passionate letter about the rankings of the five full generals and oppose Davis desire to organize companies by state.
Johnston's department was the Valley before 1st Manassas, Northern Virginia including the Valley from the aftermath of 1st Manassas and Northern Virginia and Eastern Virginia when he took command at Yorktown. When Johnston was on the Peninsula the Valley was still part of Northern Virginia and still his.
Johnston didn't expect to retain active command over Northern Virginia when he was on the Peninsula - in fact he told Jackson, Ewell and Field that he was going to rely on their initiative while he was away - but he expected to be kept informed of events unfolding in that department. He wans't.
Benjamin Huger's command at Norfolk was in Johnston' department but pretty much every order he sent to Huger before arriving at the gates of Richmond were countermanded. So little control had he been able to exersize over Huger due to Richmond's interferance that he actually requested Huger be removed from him since it was only a nominal command.
Basically, what it comes down to is that Davis and Johnston both behaved badly towards each other and weren't prepared to mend the rift and thus are both at fault. We can argue who did what from now to eternity but that wouldn't change the fact that their poor relationship was the fault of both men.
Johnston, as I said earlier, will likely spend most of his time in before Rosecrans begins his advance dealing with administration and organization. He may try to get the Army reorganized and Wheeler replaced but likely wont get to - due to the affore mentioned problems in the Davis/Johnston relationship.
He will not be on the offensive in the Tullahoma Campaign but will pull his army back in better condition than Bragg did. The interesting bit then occurs in the mountains of North Georgia where the front is constricted. An attack there even from someone as defensively minded as Johnston is not out of the question and if Bragg could score such a victory as Chickamagua with his disunited command struture and bad tactical aptitude then Johnston could do so as well.
Johnston, however, is unlikely to try a besiege Chattanooga nor send Longstreet off to Knoxville so unless he defeats the Army of the Cumberland more decisively than OTL - which I find unlikely at any rate due to George Thomas - he would likely take a passive role in building defenses to hold off the next Federal advance. This, however, will not be what Davis wants and he will come under increasing pressure to attack into Tennessee.
That, in itself wont cost Johnston his job but if, when Grant comes from Mississippi, he cannot hold his positions and keep the Federals at bay he will get sacked, maybe not immediately but certainly well before the Army reaches Atlanta, and most likely Longstreet would take his place.
This is assuming, of course, that whoever is sent to Mississippi to help Pemberton also fails to stop Grant.
Well, the whole Confederacy, yes. Virginia? I'm not sure.
I'm counting both sides, I would take it over any of the other Confederate forces, definitely.
As for the difficulty: Not intentionally, but I think the fact Johnston doesn't have to create all that much to make it a cohesive force for the immediate future is also an issue. If he can manage to more or less smoothly integrate the Army of the Potomac with the Army of the Shenandoah on the fly, he can do that with the Jackson forces.
Apologies in advance for anything that follows sounding like its meant to mock - it isn't.
And the only possible route is to march directly towards Sherman and McPherson. Can't pull away and then march towards Pemberton.
And this does not excuse Johnston for picking the option least likely to hold the vital railroad center for the Confederacy.
Agreed. However, two things:
1) What are the odds of one of the other full generals being his superior, other than if Davis (haha) has one of them as Supreme Commander of the Confederate Army?
2) Why is Johnston so sensitive that having three (Cooper, Sidney Johnston, Lee in that order if I remember correctly) men in the entire Confederate army is a blow? I mean, yes a more considerate man would deal with that, but a more reasonable man wouldn't have that problem.
And in the old army, Joe is a lieutenant colonel of the line. That he assumed that he would be made an officer based on staff rank is his problem.
And thus this is a place for - I hate to repeat myself - a Lee-like letter patiently explaining things and saying that he will cooperate as far as possible.
Not arguing the guys you mentioned are being buttheads, though. Just faulting Johnston's response. Complaining about being mistreated is not a good way to deal with someone like Davis - however buttheaded the buttheads are.
Why? (to both)
It would be interesting to know if they were countermanded because Johnston was planning something contrary to what Davis intended or because Davis couldn't resist micromanaging.
Why would he do better than Bragg? Looking at this not to fault him - just pointing out that the situation sucks. Especially for a guy who (For whatever reason, let's leave it there) has a bad relationship with Davis and Northrop - although it seems Northrop hates the AoT anyway.
I agree with most of this, but I don't think Johnston would try something like Chickamauga - not as Bragg did, at least.
And looking at that in terms of Bragg's determination to hit the Federal army. Or the reorganization (I can't imagine a Johnston who won't cobble together an ad hoc division at Jackson forming his army into two wings at the last minute at Chickamauga) - though whether that's good or bad I don't know.
Snake Featherston
Banned
Having read one of the only more recent books on the Atlanta Campaign (it's received surprisingly little coverage given how important it is in pop culture) I think that Johnston's conduct reflected a desire to defeat Sherman if Sherman screwed up. Yet when Hood took over from him, Davis and Hood and Bragg actually executed the same strategy Johnston was using, trying to get the Union generals to make mistakes due to lacking an option to fight and win a defensive battle.
A big mistake Johnston made was in not even bothering to communicate with Davis or effectively with his generals what his plans were. This was in contrast to Sherman who regularly communicated with *his* superiors and with *his* subordinates and proved able to adapt his plans to the battlefield more easily than did Johnston.
The advantage Bragg had over most other Western generals was that he was a fighter with an aggressive desire to take the battle to the enemy. Unfortunately Bragg was too prickly to work properly in the charisma-dependent CS Army, where Johnston was too leery of battle to actually fight. Against something like the Tullahoma Campaign it's a good question what Johnston would have done.
A big mistake Johnston made was in not even bothering to communicate with Davis or effectively with his generals what his plans were. This was in contrast to Sherman who regularly communicated with *his* superiors and with *his* subordinates and proved able to adapt his plans to the battlefield more easily than did Johnston.
The advantage Bragg had over most other Western generals was that he was a fighter with an aggressive desire to take the battle to the enemy. Unfortunately Bragg was too prickly to work properly in the charisma-dependent CS Army, where Johnston was too leery of battle to actually fight. Against something like the Tullahoma Campaign it's a good question what Johnston would have done.
Well what other forces were in Virginia at that time?
The Army of Northeastern Virigina under McDowell and the Army of the Shenandoah (US)/Army of the Valley (not sure what it was called) under Patterson. Patterson's Army certainly didn't distinguish itself and McDowell's was a green army that couldn't even march in order and broke and ran when the first Confederate attack hit it. Hardly a high quality professional army like Johnston's AoS was.
What other forces am I missing?
Magruder's Army near Yorktown and Huger's command at Norfolk weren't bad but weren't in the AoS's league.
Perhaps he could have done more in the moment, I dont know. Maybe not but we have to remember that Grant's army was very professional and quite experianced and a far cry from the army that couldn't dislodge Jackson's division at Mannassas. Even if he had managed it he would still have to give up Jackson in the long run.
Sherman and McPherson are coming from the West, blocking Johnston route towards Edwards Station - where Pemberton is - and the route south would be moving too far away from the action, as would the route east. Northward there is nothing between him and Canton and Canton is close enought to Clinton for Pemberton to be able to link up with him if Pemberton had been marching east. As he begins his march north on the Canton road Johnston sends a message to Pemberton to move North to link up with him, expecting to unite at Canton, its at that point that he recieves Pemberton's message telling him that the AoM was going South.
And it certainly doesn't excuse Pemberton for neglecting the main transportation hub in that part of Mississippi and not assigning a strong enough force to defend it. The Confederates, as a whole, put too much emphasis on Vicksburg and not enough on Jackson.
To answer 1, Davis did bring Lee back from the Carolina's to coordinate the statregic deployment of troops in Virginia in 1862. This made Lee, Johnston's direct superior. Unusally Davis and Johnston agreed that they needed someone to coordinate strategic deployment in Virginia since it would reflect poorly on Davis if he did it and Johnston couldn't do it while he was with the AotP(CS) and nobody in the war officer or Cooper had shown any aptitude for such as task, so Lee was brought it with both mans consent. When the list of five full generals was made however the odds of Johnston being commanded by anyone else was low.
To answer 2, its because Johnston had spent his entire adult life, his entire professional career being obsessed with Rank and believed he had been robbed of his rightful rank before. After the Mexican-American War the United States Government, in a celebratory spirit, decreed that any officers in command of volunteer units would return to the regular army with the rank they held in those volunteer unit. Johnston was a colonel of voltigeurs so he should have been a Colonel when he returned to the regular army but the US War Office decided that because he had only recieved two brevet promotions and not three he was only entitled to a Lieutenant-Colonel's ranks. Johnston felt himself wronged and spent over 10 years petitioning this until his nephew's brother-in-law John B Floyd gave him his promotion to Colonel in late 1859 (I think it was).
Johnston's rank as Colonel was ignored for the ranking. As a Colonel he had seniority over Lee but while he had been waiting for a unit to be assigned to him in the Line the US Quartermaster General had died and he had been promoted to take that job. He had been a Colonel of the line rank in the old army as well but had just never seen service in it.
And the thing about rank being determined by staff and line ranks depending on which bit you served previously and currently was not that well known and certainly had never been told to Johnston. Had he been told of it he may have protested - being obsessed over rank and seniority as he was - but he would have accepted it and gotten on with his job, as he did in OTL anyway.
Well, as we've pretty much established, Johnston didn't have the capability to write a Lee like letter of protest explaining everything clearly. And if we haven't established that I suggest you have a quick flick through Johnston's Narrative.
Not sure which "both" your asking about so I'll explain what I can about that bit of my last post.
He was initially assigned to command the Valley district, once he took command at 1st Manassas he took over Beauregard's Northern Virginia District and once he arrived at Yorktown and took control from Magruder he took over the Eastern Virginia District and had Huger's command at Norfolk assigned to him. Every time he took over a new district he retained his command over the other ones.
Johnston didn't expect to exersize active command over Northern Virginia while he was on the Peninsula because he was too far away. By the time any messages reached him from Jackson, Ewell or Field the situation in Northern Virginia could have already changed to make any orders his issued obsolete, he couldn't judge the front clearly from hundreds of miles away and so decided to leave the Northern Virginian department in the hands of Jackson, Ewell and Field.
Johnston wanted to be kept up to date on news of what was happening in the Northern Virginian department because if the forces there were swept asside he would have to pull his army back to defend Richmond and if didn't know what was happening to his rear he couldn't judge whether any danger from there was more immediate than the danger from McClellan and if things went very wrong in Northern Virginia and he didn't recieve prompt news of it his enitre army could potentially be trapped on the Peninsula.
Johnston wasn't kept up to date because of Cooper and Lee. He had asked Cooper to forward him any messages from Northern Virginia, Cooper sent all messages meant for Johnston to Lee. Lee dealt with all request from Northern Virginia himself while telling Johnston of what was happening only sparingly and often a few days after what he had order had already occured. Lee may have done this in an attempt to lessen Johnston's burden but even so he willfully intercepted Johnston's mail and kept Johnston in the dark about that and how the Northern Virginian district was doing.
Mainly it was that Huger was ordered to defend Norfolk longer than either Johnston or he wanted to and that when Huger pulled back from Norfolk he was sent to Petersburg rather than to Dewry's Bluff as Johnston wanted. The order to remain at Norfolk longer was an attempt to save the ships that were being built so they could be moved up river and to remove some weapons from the town but I'm not sure why Huger was ordered to Petersburg.
I didn't mean he'd do better in combatting Rosecran in the Tullahoma campaign than Bragg, just that the Army would be in better spirits than it was under Bragg and more united.
And assuming Longstreet comes West in TTL then a Chickamauga style battle is possible even with Johnston in command, particularly as Johnston respects and trusts Longstreet a great deal and Longstreet would be happy to go on the offensive if the opportunity was right to do so.
Johnston's reorganization and admistative work with the Army of Tennessee in OTL was not insubstancial. He retored a beaten and demoralized army to fighting fitness in very quick order in 1864 and in 1865 he performed a minor miracle in creating a cohesive Army for Bentonville. He has it in him to perform great acts of administration and organization and if a battle like Chickamauga happened he would be more than willing to do it.
Hitler has long been mocked for failing to understand Rommel's position that losing a position was better than holding the position a few days longer and then losing the position and the defending army but men like Pemberton had a similar problem to Rommel's in that Jefferson Davis gave a very strong impression that if the choice was losing a city sooner or losing the city and the defending army a few days/weeks later then the latter was preferred.
Hood's behavior during the Atlanta campaign while serving under Johnson is, in my view, deeply suspicious given his overall record of aggressive command both prior to serving under Johnson and after he took over from Johnson and, when combined with his conspiring for Johnson's command while behaving much more cautiously than the norm and his nearly instant reversion to a more aggressive policy once he took over...
Unfortunately Jefferson Davis, once he had made up his mind, was pretty much impossible to budge no matter how hard someone like Joe Johnston might (or might not) have been willing to try to mend fences. One shudders to imagine what might have happened if Davis had taken issue with Robert E Lee.
I've suspect that Davis had psychological issues since he had, years earlier, ignored well meaning advice from friends and family and taken himself and a new bride into a proverbial plague zone resulting in her death. From that moment he responded extremely poorly to any effort to convince him of error.
As for Johnston, Nytram01 summed it up by mentioning Johnston's nearly miraculous resurrection of an army of any kind of morale and effectiveness in time for the Battle of Bentonville, not to mention that Lee selected Johnston out of all the many generals available for the position.
Hood's behavior during the Atlanta campaign while serving under Johnson is, in my view, deeply suspicious given his overall record of aggressive command both prior to serving under Johnson and after he took over from Johnson and, when combined with his conspiring for Johnson's command while behaving much more cautiously than the norm and his nearly instant reversion to a more aggressive policy once he took over...
Unfortunately Jefferson Davis, once he had made up his mind, was pretty much impossible to budge no matter how hard someone like Joe Johnston might (or might not) have been willing to try to mend fences. One shudders to imagine what might have happened if Davis had taken issue with Robert E Lee.
I've suspect that Davis had psychological issues since he had, years earlier, ignored well meaning advice from friends and family and taken himself and a new bride into a proverbial plague zone resulting in her death. From that moment he responded extremely poorly to any effort to convince him of error.
As for Johnston, Nytram01 summed it up by mentioning Johnston's nearly miraculous resurrection of an army of any kind of morale and effectiveness in time for the Battle of Bentonville, not to mention that Lee selected Johnston out of all the many generals available for the position.
With all possible due respect to the Army of the Shenandoah (I vote we call Patteron's the Army of the Valley until one of us can be bothered to look it up, or if its the same as Johnston's, keep it to distinguish the two), calling it an elite professional army is...
Well, ridiculous. And McDowell's army had been fighting all day in bad conditions, and on the attack. Nor did it all break - minor note, but we do have to note that some units held together and fought a decent retreat.
Characterizing the Army of Northeastern Virginia (never its real name, but it'll do) by its worst elements is overgeneralizing.
Either way, an army as good as the Army of Shenandoah in 1863 is not hard to find from units that have been trained and in the field for a year or more (I think most of the troops Johnston has on hand are from 1862, but don't quote me).
How long is the long run? A week? A month? Three days?
Also, Jackson's division? Wait, what? No offense, but where did this term come in?
So there's no possibility of taking the route south and then marching west. Also, if Sherman and McPherson are such a barrier to Johnston advancing west, why is Pemberton expected to march east through them? He has a larger force (<20,000 I think).
A hearty amen here. Pemberton should never have been given field command, which is what the Vicksburg campaign wound up giving him, either.
In other words, a circumstance unlikely to arise and even less likely to last.
Okay, from my reading Floyd made Johnston a brevet colonel but never full rank.
And it would make more sense that it was determined that way than that someone is deliberately out to deny Joe his deserved seniority out of sheer spite. Speaking from "Now, how would I react here?"
I'll spare myself the pain. Reading his reports in the OR is frustrating enough. He's clearly a smart fellow and he clearly has objections he thinks are valid, but he can't express them worth a damn. Pity he appears to have been short on good writers on his staff - having him tell one that he has something he wants to say and letting them help with the writing...of course, I'm not sure someone like him (or most others) would think of that, but while wishing for better outcomes, this came to mind.
Johnston clearly was able to deal with people face to face better than with a pen, judging by his ability to be "Uncle Joe" more than "General Johnston". That comes off as a man who at least feels empathic.
And I figure that has to be noted in his favor.
Makes sense, and you covered the both - why Johnston felt he should be informed and why he wasn't.
The problem:
1) Better spirits and more united...maybe. Better supplied? I'm not sure there's much to scare up. Johnston was good at this, but its not as if Bragg was an incompetent loser.
2) The problem is that Johnston is not likely to be a) seeking one or b) committing to one as things get heated. It would be very characteristic of Johnston to regard failure on day 1 as grounds for not fighting on day 2.
Fight somewhere else, yes, fight here, no.
"Time to cut our losses" is something I'd expect to hear from Johnston before Bragg or Lee. Which is not meant to praise the latter two, but its not as likely to lead to what worked OTL at Chickamauga.
Polk working better with Johnston than Bragg, or Harvey Hill doing so, or...
Maybe.
I hate defending Davis here, but in fairness to him, the position is kind of important. And Pemberton, judging by Champion's Hill, couldn't handle flexibility if he had it. This is not a field general, or at best is a very green one.
No argument here. I don't like Davis, I'm not very impressed with Johnston, but Hood in 1864 disturbs me. This is a man who at best has learned nothing and at worst has learned a lot he has no business using like this.
A fascinating what if would be Hood supporting Johnston the same way he undermined him OTL, but it probably wouldn't get anywhere.
Unfortunately Jefferson Davis, once he had made up his mind, was pretty much impossible to budge no matter how hard someone like Joe Johnston might (or might not) have been willing to try to mend fences. One shudders to imagine what might have happened if Davis had taken issue with Robert E Lee.
One also points out for the umpteenth time how Lee dealt with Davis having a Ph.D. in stubbornness and how neither Bragg or Johnston had the ability to do so. One also points out WHY Davis took issue with some men, and it wasn't just for lulz.
When someone like Joe Johnston isn't trying to mend fences, and is instead treating himself as a victim of Davis's malevolence (whether or not this is exaggerated, this is how he came off) and joining with Davis's opponents...
This is asking for a lot for Davis to consider it a petty feud on his part rather than a sign he's justified.
Spoken from a naturally narrow minded, black and white thinking individual, which most of you fortunately aren't - but which Davis was, at least in effect (whether it was "natural" isn't the point). So I honestly think Davis was acting within what he saw as perfectly legitimate behavior, the fact he was an ass and stubborn is something that has to be dealt with, not fought, for anyone dealing with him.
Quite possibly true here.
What generals?
No, really. "All the many" is all well and good, but who else is available? Who else meets the minimum criteria to be accepted?
Or for that matter, does Lee know anything about?
Or is close enough to the area to make any difference?
I assume you meant to say 1861 .
Perhaps I am a little harsh on the McDowell's army and maybe that comes from the fact that it did lose but even so it hardly did itself any favors as far as presenting itself as a professional force goes on its march from Washington to Centerville where if couldn't even march in cohesive order and had to take many breaks.
The AoS may not have been an elite professional army but it certainly looks a lot more professional than any of its contemporaries in 1861. Maybe they were just quick to react a professional standard and it took a year for other units to reach their level.
I meant to say Jackson's brigade, not division. A bit of lazy proof-reading on my part.
The long run would be however long it took for Pemberton to arrive to support him. Johnston may be able to buy a day or so by defending Jackson, and that may be enough time for some of the reinforcements to arrive, but Jackson's still going to fall. Just a matter of time.
Well going South would mean crossing the Pearl River and putting a natural obsticle between the Confederates and Federals which would split the Confederates further from each other and make Grant's job even easier.
Pemberton was ordered to march east when Johnston thought Sherman was isolated at Clinton between Jackson and Edwards Station. Johnston had not countermanded those orders when he learnt McPherson was with Sherman and advancing on him. If Pemberton had followed his orders he should have been advancing to Clinton as the battle of Jackson began which meant that his Army should have been able to march north easilly enough to link up at Canton. Pemberton only intended to bring 16,000 men with him and leave the res of his Army at Edwards Station to defend Vicksburg.
Well, either way Johnston had recieved a promotion to Colonel before Lee had but it was disregarded when the five full generals rankings was announced. Whether that was because he hadn't served in the Line as a colonel or because it was a brevet promotion and Davis had made them worthless for everything except courts-marshals doesn't change the fact that it didn't count.
Johnston did rely on G.W. Smith to write his messages to Davis early in the war and Smith was a prolific writer who was good with written words but of course they drifted apart after Seven Pines.
Johnston's style was definatly more geared towards personal command and contact than anything else. He was able to connect with men and make them like him, he had the common touch. Even one of his harshest critics - Mary Chestnut - grudgingly admitted that he had a god given gift to draw men to him, to gain their loyalty and admiration with little effort.
Joe Johnston's personality may have been a factor in why Polk was better behaved under him than he had been under Sidney Johnston, Beauregard or Bragg. Certainly Polk was a good friend of Joe and liked him.
D.H. Hill, tacless soul though he may have been, also was drawn somewhat into Johnston's cult. I dont recall seeing much criticism of Joe from Hill, and considering Hill - personality wise - was the American Bernard Montgomery then that very unsual.
Longstreet with the AoT would be Johnston's right hand and if Longstreet was prepared to attack then he would be able to sway Johnston just as much as Hood was able to sway Johnston to withdraw at Cassville.
Chickamauga may end up being more like Bentonville under Johnston but with the AoT not being a meer shell of its former self the punch would be much bigger and more effective.
No, but thank you for noting I miswrote that. "An army as good as the Army of Shenandoah had been in 1861 in 1863..."
As in, by 1863 the standards the Army of Shenandoah achieved should not be particularly difficult for troops that have been in service for a year or more.
This I would agree with. I credit Jackson. And, I'm reasonably sure, another positive mark in Johnston's record of Building Armies. Someone less good would have undone anything Jackson did any then some, Johnston didn't (and that's assuming he didn't improve on it - which I think is probably unfair).
No worries. Just making sure we're not talking about two different things.
Agreed. But then, a lot of things are a matter of time, and holding as long as possible may have better results than not.
This though is kind of no-win with the late arrival of any significant reinforcements, I'll give Johnston that.
This is where I'm going to get a map before responding, if you don't mind. I think this isn't impossible, but Pemberton's lack of cooperation is making things a lot harder than they should be. Even if Johnston is moving in a favorable way, Pemberton...goddamn you, Jeff, why him of all people. Better than Beauregard, I suppose. Beauregard had air between his ears.
But it not counting as the same as a full, line rank colonelcy would not be an unreasonable conclusion, rather than it being specifically out to get him.
Shame that (on Smith). And too bad for Johnston that this seems to have worked better on privates than corps commanders.
Yeah. I'm not convinced it would, but it would be an excellent chance for him to show whether he was really the sort to do that sort of thing.
The main problem I can see is if that if day 1 is costly and unsuccessful, Johnston may consider it a sign that fighting here is a bad idea, rather than that the plans for day 2 need to take that into account.
But a Johnston doing what he did at Bentonville at Chickamauga...
I don't know why but great generalship always pleases me. And Johnston showed what makes me impressed with him at First Bull Run at Bentonville. Too late to do any good, but that's for reasons beyond his control in the context of the campaign, so he should be given praise where its due.
Its probably true that by 1863 the standard of professionalism the AoS achieved in 1861 wouldn't be impressive but it was for 1861. Again its probably the fact that the AoS reached a higher standard quicker than others.
Well, we must remember that Jackson wasn't the only officer of note in that Army. Pendleton was its artillery chief, A.P. Hill was an infantry regiment commander and JEB Stuart commanded its cavalry. With them and Jackson training it I dont think there any wonder how it become so professional so quickly. When Johnston took over he brought with him W.H.C. Whiting and Edmund Kirby Smith and built Jackson's command into a army rather than a training camp. The AoS was spoilt for high quality officers in those days and had it been a war where only such a small army as the 9,000 or so men in that was needed then it would be remembered in far higher estime.
Pemberton was a great administrator and organizer and had he been a chief of staff he would have been absolutely fantastic but as an Army commander he was out of his depth. In a way he was a victim of his own talent as one area he excelled in was military politics and he was promoted ridiculously quickly to a high rank.
Beauregard had a lot of natural talent as a soldier and general, its just a pity he was so prone to grandiose and unrealistic thinking and couldn't deal with realistic goals and details.
A lot of the problem is Johnston had relied on the wrong Smith due to circumstances. Had Edmund Kirby not been injured at 1st Manassas then reassigned to East-Tennessee he would have been perfect as one of his chief subordinates. Dont know if Kirby was as good at writing as G.W. but he was a much better soldier.
It is the right kind of situation for a Bentonville like attack to happen. Again Longstreet will be the decisive factor in many of Johnston's decisions.Yeah. I'm not convinced it would, but it would be an excellent chance for him to show whether he was really the sort to do that sort of thing.
The main problem I can see is if that if day 1 is costly and unsuccessful, Johnston may consider it a sign that fighting here is a bad idea, rather than that the plans for day 2 need to take that into account.
But a Johnston doing what he did at Bentonville at Chickamauga...
I don't know why but great generalship always pleases me. And Johnston showed what makes me impressed with him at First Bull Run at Bentonville. Too late to do any good, but that's for reasons beyond his control in the context of the campaign, so he should be given praise where its due.
I just thought. The AoT command set up would be: Commander - Johnston, Corps Commanders - Longstreet, Polk, Hardee. If only we could change Polk for D.H. Hill or Breckenridge then we'd be onto something potentially magnificent.
Agreed. Just tying this to the Jackson situation.
Pendleton was its artillery chief...no wonder its not remembered well.
No, but seriously, while he had administrative ability he should have been kept out of battle entirely. Otherwise, yeah. Good men there.
Agreed on Pemberton, Beauregard...the problem is that his grandiose and unrealistic thinking gets in the way of displaying any real ability.
I'm not sure, but I'm no fan of either Smith so I'll take your word for it.
One would hope. The two worked together well and Longstreet is an able officer. That can't help but be a good thing.
Agreed. Send Polk to Mississippi? Take advantage of the fact Davis likes Polk and tell him how you'd really miss him and...
No, but seriously, Davis might like the idea. And its a good way to keep him somewhere he can't make things any worse than they already are.
Might be hard to make more than a temporary promotion to corps commander for Hill or Breckinridge, but that's okay.
What do you do with Buckner's men though? Buckner might not appreciate being made a division commander, but making a corps for him is really ridiculous.
Snake Featherston
Banned
And to be fair to Pemberton his countermove *was* a militarily valid one. Unfortunately for Pemberton Grant said "supply line schmupply line" and was busy stomping Johnston by the time Pemberton realized there was no supply line. Not very many generals did that in the Civil War, and the only Confederate to do that was Lee.....
Agreed. Its the tactical bungling (including being unable to get Loring to be a good little subordinate) that turned it from "No one beat Grant. Not even Lee." to "Pemberton screwed up."
And in fairness to both Johnston and Pemberton, Grant was exactly the worst possible kind of opponent for men like Johnston and Pemberton (neither of which have ever been described as visionary in my reading).
Thomas might be just as good if we're measuring generalship as an abstract, but he doesn't have the what-have-you kind of crazy insight of "You know, if I put myself between two enemy armies, I can fuck them both up." that Grant had here.
I think Thomas could do it. I don't think he would.
Mentioning Thomas as the best or second best Union general of the war, but not someone who had that kind of idea.
Rosecrans would be a lot easier to take on for a Johnston. Even if he (Rosy) keeps his head on straight, he's just not that (Grant's) kind of good.
Snake Featherston
Banned
Well, when you consider that both Grant and Lee won their earlier battles based on Refuge In Audacity and exploiting the other guy's mistakes as opposed necessarily to what Grant or Lee themselves did......there's a reason those two are in each other's caliber and not anyone else's (and also why the CSA needed competent generals, not a wannabe Mary Tzu).
Grant had the same opportunity in the Vicksburg campaign that Pope did during the Second Bull Run campaign, unlike Pope he made good use of it as the Confederacy's internal divisions were used to his benefit (like Davis demanding Pemberton hold Vicksburg, Johnston demanding Pemberton's army join his and beat Grant's army and then Vicksburg stays Confederate) just like Lee used the need to protect Washington to make merry with Union weaknesses.
Pemberton followed the idea of war as maneuver and territory, or the Halleck/McClellan idea of warfare. Like Grant and Bragg, Johnston saw the enemy army as the key point, but only Grant saw it in the context of a campaign to wear down and completely annihilate the enemy force over a duration of time, as opposed to an Austerlitz.
So if Johnston faces someone like Rosecrans, he may get spanked far harder in a Tullahoma Campaign as Rosecrans, like Sherman, preferred maneuver but unlike Sherman actually preferred to fight battles (which like Sherman Johnston did not so much). If he faces someone like Thomas, the Union smashes the Confederacy at Rocky Face Gap and that's the end of the Western War in early 1864 assuming Johnston has the same personality as OTL in such a situation.
Like Grant, Thomas wanted to smash enemy armies, unlike Grant he thought of it in singular battles as opposed to campaigns and like Grant he was very successful, just in a different fashion.
But Johnston v. Rosecrans could possibly turn into a different kind of Chickamauga/Bentonville hybrid of Rosecrans remains overconfident from outflanking Johnston and Johnston manages to keep his head together. Rosecrans doesn't need to be a Mary Tzu to drive Johnston out of Chattanooga with a Tullahoma-style maneuver campaign. Sherman pushed him back to Atlana with far more rough-hewn maneuvers than that.
Yeah. A half dozen guys like Longstreet (or Cleburne, even without changing corps commanders) would have gone a lot further than another Lee. Assuming Lee wasn't a bad general in this context for the sake of continuing the discussion on hand rather than repeating our earlier one on Lee.
That's the thing though. Grant saw this as "Wow this is a great opportunity." Pope...didn't realize the other half was an issue. And wasn't good enough to make the two halves operate at cross purposes, as you said.
Grant seems to have learned the hard way nothing good ever comes quickly. Maybe that's it.
Yeah. Give me Thomas any day I can't have Grant and some days over Grant.
Rosecrans is missing a few subtler aspects, like a cool head and ability to sleep, that hold him back from living up to what his brains promise.
Might not matter in the Tullahoma Campaign, will in a Chickamauga-like battle.
That would be an interesting scenario accordingly (Johnston vs. Rosecrans).
Neither one of them is exactly well suited to handling things going to hell. A battle that ends with both generals thinking they were whipped is probably not likely, but its easy enough to imagine.
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Snake Featherston
Banned
They would have gone on longer due to understanding one of the principle rules of Civil War fighting: attacks exhaust enemy armies and there's still tactical room to get around in the enemy's rear for truly Napoleonic battles. They would also have had the sense not to order Pickett's Charges or Malvern Hills.
Well, in the actual fighting between Jackson and Banks and then Jackson and Pope in that campaign Jackson showed why he was the CS Sherman, the best strategist in the CS Army, not a remotely equal tactician. Though unlike Sherman he actually liked battles.
Eh, I wouldn't go *that* far. At Belmont, the one defeat Grant had his troops, while undisciplined, did what he told them to both times, while Lee's failures in 1861 showed he was never good at actually directing a fight as opposed to entrusting that to his subordinates. The difference was that Grant was actively involved in fighting and read battles like musical scores, Lee trusted too much to subordinates when only two (Jackson and Longstreet) were equal to that kind of warfare and kept doing it when it was a hindrance, not a help.
If Thomas had managed to get Grant's trust instead of Sherman, I daresay that it's possible for the mirror timeline to Up With the Star whereby the War in the West ends in May of 1864 as opposed to that in the East. Thomas to me is the example of the *other* kind of successful war the US Army would have been able to fight.
IMHO Johnston could easily pull off a victory at the ATL-style Chickamauga campaign but the result would be due to Rosecrans having become overconfident and poorly distributing his troops, the kind of situation any competent general could turn into a victory. And Johnston definitely was competent.
However Johnston's unlikely to do much to any of the troops Thomas commands as OTL Chickamauga was a bloody battle that was more of Rosecrans losing than Johnston winning. TTL Chickamauga would be equally bloody and a victory over Rosecrans' right would in all likelihood exhaust CS manpower and momentum by the time they hit the Rock of Chickamauga, which might make it a quasi-Murfreesboro.