1863 - Bragg resigned from the Army of Tennessee

[Nytram01]

Following the dissapointment of Murfreesboro - where the Confederates seemed on the cusp of a great victory only to end up conceeding the battlefield and retreating to Tullahoma - Braxton Bragg is heavilly criticized by his subordinates for his conduct of the battle. He becomes deeply depressed and dispondent with the lack of support he was recieving from his subordinates and, despite recieving the support from President Jefferson Davis and General Joseph Johnston - then commanding the Department of the West - he decided to step down as the Commander of the Army of Tennessee.

This leaves that Army without a commander. The only logical solution is to give the position to Joe Johnston so he will likely be given the job. So, with this in mind, a number of questions would need answering, split into two sections.

1) what happens when Grant crosses the Mississippi at Bruinsburg? Who does Davis send to help Pemberton if Johnston is busy with the AoT?

2) how does Johnston fair in Tennessee against Rosecrans? Does he do any better in the Tullahoma Campaign than Bragg did? Does the Tullahoma Campaign even happen if Johnston is there?

 

[Anaxagoras]

Interesting POD. In early 1863, the AoT was much stronger vis-a-vis the AotC than it would be against the army group Sherman would lead against it a year later, so while Johnston would remain his cautious self, I doubt he would adopt the same passive strategy that he did in the Atlanta Campaign.

Plus, unless the POD results in additional command structure changes, Johnston would have overall authority for the entire Western Theater, if I understand the situation correctly. In all the commands Johnston held during the war, he made a constant effort to bring reinforcements to the point where he himself was, which makes it possible that he would neglect the Vicksburg front in favor of the Tennessee front.

In other words, this change might be very good for Grant, but rather bad for Rosecrans.

 

[Elfwine]

Interesting POD. In early 1863, the AoT was much stronger vis-a-vis the AotC than it would be against the army group Sherman would lead against it a year later, so while Johnston would remain his cautious self, I doubt he would adopt the same passive strategy that he did in the Atlanta Campaign.

Wait, what?

Johnston had - for most of the Atlanta campaign (the very beginning aside, in other words) - an army about 60% of the size of Sherman's force. When did Bragg have that favorable a ratio in the Tullahoma Campaign?

If Johnston wasn't willing to do more than half hearted offenses that stalled whenever some obstacle, including a balky subordinate, came up with odds that favorable, why is he going to risk it in Tennessee?

I don't mean to bog this down in dissing or defending Johnston, but his record in 1864 does not suggest a man who would go to great lengths to take risk in Tennessee, and the AoT's situation is horrid whoever is in charge for reasons that aren't entirely within their control (and those reasons are likely to be used as excuses to do what Johnston usually used excuses to do).

Plus, unless the POD results in additional command structure changes, Johnston would have overall authority for the entire Western Theater, if I understand the situation correctly. In all the commands Johnston held during the war, he made a constant effort to bring reinforcements to the point where he himself was, which makes it possible that he would neglect the Vicksburg front in favor of the Tennessee front.

In other words, this change might be very good for Grant, but rather bad for Rosecrans.

The problem is getting reinforcements sent to Tennessee, which is not likely - even if Davis trusts Johnston to do something useful with them.

Davis is more concerned about the fate of Vicksburg than Tennessee OTL, what changes that here?

 

[Nytram01]

Interesting POD. In early 1863, the AoT was much stronger vis-a-vis the AotC than it would be against the army group Sherman would lead against it a year later, so while Johnston would remain his cautious self, I doubt he would adopt the same passive strategy that he did in the Atlanta Campaign.

Plus, unless the POD results in additional command structure changes, Johnston would have overall authority for the entire Western Theater, if I understand the situation correctly. In all the commands Johnston held during the war, he made a constant effort to bring reinforcements to the point where he himself was, which makes it possible that he would neglect the Vicksburg front in favor of the Tennessee front.

In other words, this change might be very good for Grant, but rather bad for Rosecrans.

In Virginia in 1862 Johnston was quite content to leave Jackson in the Valley and to send troops from his own army at the Rappahannock line to support Magruder at Yorktown when given a viable reason for it. In Mississippi, following the fall of Vicksburg, Johnston heavilly reinforced Bragg's AoT at the expense of his own army when it became clear his front was going to be quiet. So the idea that Johnston tried to bring reinforced to him without considering the effect it would have elsewhere is not totally correct.

As long as Johnston has an army of comparable size to Rosecrans he'll be content to operate with just that, not offensively perhaps but he would not be totally against sending reinforcements to Mississippi if the situation there is more dire than that in Tennessee.

Johnston would likely spend the first month or so dealing with administration and organization of the Army of Tennessee so is unlikely to be looking for a battle straight away.

As to Mississippi, what about Bragg being sent to reinforce Pemberton? Could you see Bragg asking for some of the Cavalry of the AoT under Wheeler if he could be convinced to go there? Since Johnston would have pretty much all the Cavalry in the West with the AoT it would not be an unreasonable request.

 

[Nytram01]

Wait, what?

Johnston had - for most of the Atlanta campaign (the very beginning aside, in other words) - an army about 60% of the size of Sherman's force. When did Bragg have that favorable a ratio in the Tullahoma Campaign?

If Johnston wasn't willing to do more than half hearted offenses that stalled whenever some obstacle, including a balky subordinate, came up with odds that favorable, why is he going to risk it in Tennessee?

I don't mean to bog this down in dissing or defending Johnston, but his record in 1864 does not suggest a man who would go to great lengths to take risk in Tennessee, and the AoT's situation is horrid whoever is in charge for reasons that aren't entirely within their control (and those reasons are likely to be used as excuses to do what Johnston usually used excuses to do).

The problem is getting reinforcements sent to Tennessee, which is not likely - even if Davis trusts Johnston to do something useful with them.

Davis is more concerned about the fate of Vicksburg than Tennessee OTL, what changes that here?

Thing about the Atlanta Campaign is that Hood is as much at fault for the abortive offensives as Johnston. If Hood had shown half the level of aggressiveness as a Corps Commander under Johnston as he did as an Army commander than there would have been far more Confederate attacks within that campaign. Johnston gave him ample opportunities to attack but he shied away from them and Johnston, being the type to invest his confidence completely in subordinates he trusted, never questioned Hood's judgement until after Kennessaw Mountain when Louis T. Wigfall told him that Hood had been criticising him to Davis. In fact, considering the differance between Hood the Corps Commander and Hood the Army Command I highly doubt Hood had any intention to attack at all when Johnston told him to. And you cant really lay all the blame on Johnston for trusting Hood as much as he did at that time, if it had been Stonewall Jackson that Johnston put his trust in he'd be praised for doing it.

Anyway, the state of the Confederate transportation in the west is dreadful. It takes a long time to get reinforcement from any state to another and not all the reinforcement arrive promptly, if at all, so reinforcing whoever goes to Mississippi, or reinforcing the AoT for that matter, is going to be just as difficult in TTL as reinforcing Johnston was.

Vicksburg is lost the second Pemberton choses not to promptly reinforce Bowen after the Battle of Grand Gulf so not matter who goes to Mississippi they will fail, unless Pemberton can be persuaded to abandon Vicksburg.

 

[Elfwine]

Thing about the Atlanta Campaign is that Hood is as much at fault for the abortive offensives as Johnston. If Hood had shown half the level of aggressiveness as a Corps Commander under Johnston as he did as an Army commander than there would have been far more Confederate attacks within that campaign.

And heaven forbid Johnston order Hood to attack as ordered. Johnston is far more responsible for the abortive offenses than Hood because he is the army commander and Hood's superior officer.

Johnston gave him ample opportunities to attack but he shied away from them and Johnston, being the type to invest his confidence completely in subordinates he trusted, never questioned Hood's judgement until after Kennessaw Mountain when Louis T. Wigfall told him that Hood had been criticising him to Davis. In fact, considering the differance between Hood the Corps Commander and Hood the Army Command I highly doubt Hood had any intention to attack at all when Johnston told him to. And you cant really lay all the blame on Johnston for trusting Hood as much as he did at that time, if it had been Stonewall Jackson that Johnston put his trust in he'd be praised for doing it.

Johnston is being blamed for refusing to push things when someone came up with an excuse for an attack to be called off. His total lack of skepticism and determination when it came to dealing with Hood was not a good way to discourage Hood's far from praiseworthy behavior, or to win battles.

If Johnston really and truly wanted to attack, Hood's objections should have been met with something far more like "you have your orders, sir" and far less like "well, I guess this means we can't attack because General Hood won't cooperate."

Jackson could be relied on as an army commander's right hand man and demonstrated that when given trust. Hood couldn't and didn't. And as someone who has never really worked with Hood before, Johnston has no reason to be so confident in him. Not to mention that Hood is new to corps command, so Johnston really should be watching carefully - not treating him as the one reliable man in an army of pro-Davis men or something.

Note on all of the above: The Hood of 1864 is a despicable man, of this we probably aren't in any disagreement, but Johnston's decision to lean on him like this is a major blunder for Joseph Johnston.

Anyway, the state of the Confederate transportation in the west is dreadful. It takes a long time to get reinforcement from any state to another and not all the reinforcement arrive promptly, if at all, so reinforcing whoever goes to Mississippi, or reinforcing the AoT for that matter, is going to be just as difficult in TTL as reinforcing Johnston was.

And yet OTL we get 15,000 men or more sent to Johnston. The same or more as was sent to Bragg for Chickamauga by Lee (and more than Johnston sent to Bragg, but I digress).

Vicksburg is lost the second Pemberton choses not to promptly reinforce Bowen after the Battle of Grand Gulf so not matter who goes to Mississippi they will fail, unless Pemberton can be persuaded to abandon Vicksburg.

Not necessarily. Grant crossing the river doesn't equal a victorious campaign, though I suppose we may be using the term 'abandon" differently.

"leave it to a minimal defense force and send the army into the field", yes. "forget about it entirely", not necessary.

Either way, though, Davis seems to think Vicksburg isn't lost, and we know how well Johnston's method of communication works at persuading Davis to do what he (Joe) wants. For the sake of discussion, yes Davis is a twit, not the point - the POD involves a different assignment for Joe, not Davis getting a working brain, right?

 

[Nytram01]

And heaven forbid Johnston order Hood to attack as ordered.

Johnston is being blamed for refusing to push things when someone came up with an excuse for an attack to be called off. His total lack of skepticism and determination when it came to dealing with Hood was not a good way to discourage Hood's far from praiseworthy behavior, or to win battles.

If Johnston really and truly wanted to attack, Hood's objections should have been met with something far more like "you have your orders, sir" and far less like "well, I guess this means we can't attack because General Hood won't cooperate."

Jackson could be relied on as an army commander's right hand man and demonstrated that when given trust. Hood couldn't and didn't. And as someone who has never really worked with Hood before, Johnston has no reason to be so confident in him. Not to mention that Hood is new to corps command, so Johnston really should be watching carefully - not treating him as the one reliable man in an army of pro-Davis men or something.

You not exactly right when you say Johnston had never worked with Hood before as Johnston had been Hood's commander throughout the Peninsula campaign. During that time he developed the opinion that Hood was a good officer who maintained discipline well but was perhaps too aggressive. Hood's reputation come 1864 was pretty much that - aggresive to a fault but a good all-round officer - that's why Johnston's happy to have him when Hood arrives with the AoT. Here, he thinks, will be the perfect man to act as the offensive arm of his army.

Johnston has no way of knowing that Hood's going to be unreliable as a "right hand man" as it's Hood's first Corps Command, nor does he know that Hood will not only criticise him constantly to the President throughout the campaign while promoting himself as a replacement but will council Johnston to do one thing while telling Davis he told Johnston to do something else.

Johnston's greatest strenght and weakness as a commander was his unshakable trust in subordinates. Once he had decided to give someone his confidence they had to fail pretty drastically for them to lose that confidence - or backstab him as Hood did. Jackson, G.W. Smith, Longstreet and Hood all had that faith and out of all of them only Jackson proved worthy of it. You could say that Johnston wasn't all that good at sorting the good from the bad.

For giving Hood such as free hand I certainly will give Johnston criticism - and I think he should have put far more faith in Hardee at the start of the campaign than Hood - but I will not blame Johnston solely for the abortive attacks in the Atlanta Campaign as Hood's behavour was just as detrimental to the Confederate operation as any failure of Johnston's was, if not more so.

I will still stand by my belief that had D.H. Hill or Longstreet or someone who wasn't after Johnston's job been in Hood's place as a Corps Commander in the AoT then there would have been far more offensive operation conducted by the Confederates within that campaign.

And yet OTL we get 15,000 men or more sent to Johnston. The same or more as was sent to Bragg for Chickamauga by Lee (and more than Johnston sent to Bragg, but I digress).

I didn't say it was impossible to reinforce troops in the west, just that it was very difficult. By the time Johnston had built an army the size of the one Pemberton took into Vicksburg Grant had 77,000 men.

Not necessarily. Grant crossing the river doesn't equal a victorious campaign, though I suppose we may be using the term 'abandon" differently.

"leave it to a minimal defense force and send the army into the field", yes. "forget about it entirely", not necessary.

Either way, though, Davis seems to think Vicksburg isn't lost, and we know how well Johnston's method of communication works at persuading Davis to do what he (Joe) wants. For the sake of discussion, yes Davis is a twit, not the point - the POD involves a different assignment for Joe, not Davis getting a working brain, right?

Once Grant crosses the Mississippi at Bruinsburg the last chance the Confederates have to stop his successful crossing in the battle of Port Gibson. If Pemberton had acted promptly to Bowen's news of the attempted Federal crossing at Grand Gulf and sent only Carter Stevenson's big division in support he could have pinned Grant down at Bruinsburg and maybe driven him to the river.

Once the Confederate fail at Port Gibson Pemberton becomes obsessed with Vicksburg and neglects the most important position in that part of Mississippi, Jackson. Jackson is the main transportation hub that needs to remain in Confederate hands if they want to defeat Grant but all that is assigned to it is 6,000 men at most. Again, if Pemberton had put only Stevenson's division there then Jackson would have been secured.

Grant could be caught on the march during the Vicksburg Campaign - as John Gregg tried to do at Raymond - but not by Pemberton. While Grant marches direct to Jackson with the intent of cutting off Vicksburg from the rest of the south Pemberton sits impotantly at Edwards Station refusing to move. When Johnston arrived in OTL, because of Pemberton's impotance, two of Grant's three Corps were advance on Jackson - a force of some 25-27,000 men - and he could only call on 6,000 men for Jackson's defense, while the 9,000 reinforcements he's expecting will only arrive a day after Sherman and McPherson descend on Jackson.

Because Pemberton is so indecisive once Grant has secured his position on the eastern bank of the Mississippi at Bruinsburg and Grand Gulf Vicksburg is lost unless Pemberton moved his army to intercept Grant somewhere.

Personally, with hindsight I'll admit, I find Vicksburg to be a completely worthless position on the Mississippi for the Confederates and the neglection of the defense of Jackson to be criminal.

 

[Elfwine]

You not exactly right when you say Johnston had never worked with Hood before as Johnston had been Hood's commander throughout the Peninsula campaign. During that time he developed the opinion that Hood was a good officer who maintained discipline well but was perhaps too aggressive. Hood's reputation come 1864 was pretty much that - aggresive to a fault but a good all-round officer - that's why Johnston's happy to have him when Hood arrives with the AoT. Here, he thinks, will be the perfect man to act as the offensive arm of his army.

There's a big difference between having someone as a brigade commander where you rarely deal with them directly and having them serving directly under you. Not to mention that I'm not sure where Hood got a reputation as "a good all-round officer" or good at maintaining discipline. Judging by the condition of his division after Antietam when it comes to administration, Hood is...well, all lion. No fox, and not much bee (for want of a better animal) either.

Johnston has no way of knowing that Hood's going to be unreliable as a "right hand man" as it's Hood's first Corps Command, nor does he know that Hood will not only criticise him constantly to the President throughout the campaign while promoting himself as a replacement but will council Johnston to do one thing while telling Davis he told Johnston to do something else.

He has no reason to put such great trust into Hood, either. Even if he doesn't suspect Hood is as bad as he was, he should not assume Hood is the greatest guy since coffee.

Johnston's greatest strenght and weakness as a commander was his unshakable trust in subordinates. Once he had decided to give someone his confidence they had to fail pretty drastically for them to lose that confidence - or backstab him as Hood did. Jackson, G.W. Smith, Longstreet and Hood all had that faith and out of all of them only Jackson proved worthy of it. You could say that Johnston wasn't all that good at sorting the good from the bad.

That would be putting it mildly.

For giving Hood such as free hand I certainly will give Johnston criticism - and I think he should have put far more faith in Hardee at the start of the campaign than Hood - but I will not blame Johnston solely for the abortive attacks in the Atlanta Campaign as Hood's behavour was just as detrimental to the Confederate operation as any failure of Johnston's was, if not more so.

No, it was not more so. Not even equal. Johnston, again, is the commander of the army and Hood's superior officer. He bears ultimate responsibility as well as the responsibility for having his orders followed. It is his job to make his subordinates follow his orders. That Hood is failing to follow them and Johnston is doing nothing about it reflects very poorly on Johnston. What other general in the war besides McClellan was so willing to listen to subordinates who claimed attacks were impossible?

I will still stand by my belief that had D.H. Hill or Longstreet or someone who wasn't after Johnston's job been in Hood's place as a Corps Commander in the AoT then there would have been far more offensive operation conducted by the Confederates within that campaign.

While this may be true, judging by how Johnston reacted to Hood OTL, he bears a heavy share of the responsibility for the lack of them. I really and truly want to know why you think that he isn't at least as responsible as Hood for aborted attacks when he's letting Hood get away with ignoring his supposed wishes. If he (Johnston) wants to attack so badly, why isn't Hood being told to attack on be relieved or otherwise dealt with? WHY?

Why is Johnston letting Hood ruin his plans again and again?

I didn't say it was impossible to reinforce troops in the west, just that it was very difficult. By the time Johnston had built an army the size of the one Pemberton took into Vicksburg Grant had 77,000 men.

Once Grant crosses the Mississippi at Bruinsburg the last chance the Confederates have to stop his successful crossing in the battle of Port Gibson. If Pemberton had acted promptly to Bowen's news of the attempted Federal crossing at Grand Gulf and sent only Carter Stevenson's big division in support he could have pinned Grant down at Bruinsburg and maybe driven him to the river.

Once the Confederate fail at Port Gibson Pemberton becomes obsessed with Vicksburg and neglects the most important position in that part of Mississippi, Jackson. Jackson is the main transportation hub that needs to remain in Confederate hands if they want to defeat Grant but all that is assigned to it is 6,000 men at most. Again, if Pemberton had put only Stevenson's division there then Jackson would have been secured.

Grant could be caught on the march during the Vicksburg Campaign - as John Gregg tried to do at Raymond - but not by Pemberton. While Grant marches direct to Jackson with the intent of cutting off Vicksburg from the rest of the south Pemberton sits impotantly at Edwards Station refusing to move. When Johnston arrived in OTL, because of Pemberton's impotance, two of Grant's three Corps were advance on Jackson - a force of some 25-27,000 men - and he could only call on 6,000 men for Jackson's defense, while the 9,000 reinforcements he's expecting will only arrive a day after Sherman and McPherson descend on Jackson.

Because Pemberton is so indecisive once Grant has secured his position on the eastern bank of the Mississippi at Bruinsburg and Grand Gulf Vicksburg is lost unless Pemberton moved his army to intercept Grant somewhere.

Personally, with hindsight I'll admit, I find Vicksburg to be a completely worthless position on the Mississippi for the Confederates and the neglection of the defense of Jackson to be criminal.

While I agree with most of this, Johnston is not exactly bending over backwards to find a way to make this work, either. Except on his terms, which are basically impossible to meet.

I think also that the force that will be arriving soon at Jackson is being underestimated - soon as within the day.

Not to mention how Johnston gives up even before the attack. As in, he doesn't even try to defend it - just conduct a rear guard action and get out of there.

The thing that I'd mainly like to focus on though is that his commitment to the offense leaves everything to be desired. Is the AoT in shape to attack in this campaign (Tullahoma)? Probably not. But that doesn't lead to any reason to expect Johnston to do better than Bragg - since his own record at being flanked out of positions is pretty bad judging by the Atlanta Campaign again (not enough flanking on the Peninsula to compare).

Unless Johnston is willing and able to do more than wait for Rosecrans and fight a campaign based on reacting to his movements and crying about how he has to defend Tennessee with a one eyed sergeant and a three legged mule (couldn't resist being able to use the expression, please don't take it more seriously than was intended), there's not much the Confederates can do to defend it whether the AoT is stronger than OTL or not.

 

[Snake Featherston]

One problem with this I have is that Davis *hated* Johnston. It was worse than the Lincoln-McClellan feud because Lincoln could and did do what was necessary for the Cause even if he hated a general. Davis wanted to lose the war instead yielding for The CauseTM. If Bragg resigns, Davis would try first to find a pro-Davis general to take charge of the Army of Tennessee instead of Joe Johnston.

And in any case it's hard to see any way to prevent the Tullahoma Campaign, Rosecrans only screwed up once (though 'twas a Big Damn Screw-up) and Johnston would not have the manpower to fight Rosecrans. He might keep Chattanooga a Confederate city but that'd be the best-case scenario.

 

[Snake Featherston]

Thing about the Atlanta Campaign is that Hood is as much at fault for the abortive offensives as Johnston. If Hood had shown half the level of aggressiveness as a Corps Commander under Johnston as he did as an Army commander than there would have been far more Confederate attacks within that campaign. Johnston gave him ample opportunities to attack but he shied away from them and Johnston, being the type to invest his confidence completely in subordinates he trusted, never questioned Hood's judgement until after Kennessaw Mountain when Louis T. Wigfall told him that Hood had been criticising him to Davis. In fact, considering the differance between Hood the Corps Commander and Hood the Army Command I highly doubt Hood had any intention to attack at all when Johnston told him to. And you cant really lay all the blame on Johnston for trusting Hood as much as he did at that time, if it had been Stonewall Jackson that Johnston put his trust in he'd be praised for doing it.

Anyway, the state of the Confederate transportation in the west is dreadful. It takes a long time to get reinforcement from any state to another and not all the reinforcement arrive promptly, if at all, so reinforcing whoever goes to Mississippi, or reinforcing the AoT for that matter, is going to be just as difficult in TTL as reinforcing Johnston was.

Vicksburg is lost the second Pemberton choses not to promptly reinforce Bowen after the Battle of Grand Gulf so not matter who goes to Mississippi they will fail, unless Pemberton can be persuaded to abandon Vicksburg.

Given Hood wanted Johnston's job, if he *had* done what Johnston ordered him to do and Johnston won he would not have become commander of the Army of Tennessee. In that army's history there was defeat as much from intrigue among its generals as from the various Union generals it fought. Bragg re-inforcing Johnston, as you note, is useless because Pemberton thought of his responsibility as being to hold Vicksburg, leaving aside that if he stood there and was besieged the CSA would not merely lose the city but also Pemberton's army.

Too, Johnston's faults are many, but Sherman was also skilled enough to avoid except at Kennesaw Mountain attacking Confederate positions headlong. They'd have to make it so Sherman *had* no other choice and they had plenty of opportunities. All those opportunities ended up with was Sherman in Atlanta and Hood marching off to break his army on the Rock of Chickamauga.

 

[Nytram01]

There's a big difference between having someone as a brigade commander where you rarely deal with them directly and having them serving directly under you. Not to mention that I'm not sure where Hood got a reputation as "a good all-round officer" or good at maintaining discipline. Judging by the condition of his division after Antietam when it comes to administration, Hood is...well, all lion. No fox, and not much bee (for want of a better animal) either.

It's a reputation, doesn't mean its totally accurate. Hood's never been in a position to show all his faults since he's been so far down the chain of command so to the Confederacy at large he's seen as one of their best young officers. Hood's reputation as an aggressive commander is far more well known however.

He has no reason to put such great trust into Hood, either. Even if he doesn't suspect Hood is as bad as he was, he should not assume Hood is the greatest guy since coffee.

That would be putting it mildly.

Which is certainly Johnston's failure. He misjudges Hood as a man and as a general and gives him a level of faith and trust he is unworthy of and pays for it.

No, it was not more so. Not even equal. Johnston, again, is the commander of the army and Hood's superior officer. He bears ultimate responsibility as well as the responsibility for having his orders followed. It is his job to make his subordinates follow his orders. That Hood is failing to follow them and Johnston is doing nothing about it reflects very poorly on Johnston.

While this may be true, judging by how Johnston reacted to Hood OTL, he bears a heavy share of the responsibility for the lack of them. I really and truly want to know why you think that he isn't at least as responsible as Hood for aborted attacks when he's letting Hood get away with ignoring his supposed wishes. If he (Johnston) wants to attack so badly, why isn't Hood being told to attack on be relieved or otherwise dealt with? WHY?

Why is Johnston letting Hood ruin his plans again and again?

You've seem to misunderstand me somewhat. I'm not absolving Johnston of his portion of the blame. He made many mistakes and, even if he didn't, as commander of the army the buck would ultimately rest with him but just because Johnston didn't force attacks doesn't mean that Hood shouldn't be criticised for shying away from them when given the opportunity to attack. Johnston is at fault for not forcing the attack but if Hood had been doing his job Johnston shouldn't have needed to force thos attacks.

While I agree with most of this, Johnston is not exactly bending over backwards to find a way to make this work, either. Except on his terms, which are basically impossible to meet.

I think also that the force that will be arriving soon at Jackson is being underestimated - soon as within the day.

Not to mention how Johnston gives up even before the attack. As in, he doesn't even try to defend it - just conduct a rear guard action and get out of there.

Whle the reinforcements Johnstn would recieve were not insubstancial making them into a cohesive force would take time which he didn't have.

Would you fancy trying to defend a positon that had only been quickly fortified with only 6,000 men at your immediate disposal, no idea of when reinforments would arrive of what condition they would be in, let alone how many there would be, then have to organize them into something resembling a cohesive army when two Corps of your enemy commanded by his most trusted general, with battle experiance as a unit advance and engaged you?

The thing that I'd mainly like to focus on though is that his commitment to the offense leaves everything to be desired. Is the AoT in shape to attack in this campaign (Tullahoma)? Probably not. But that doesn't lead to any reason to expect Johnston to do better than Bragg - since his own record at being flanked out of positions is pretty bad judging by the Atlanta Campaign again (not enough flanking on the Peninsula to compare).

Unless Johnston is willing and able to do more than wait for Rosecrans and fight a campaign based on reacting to his movements and crying about how he has to defend Tennessee with a one eyed sergeant and a three legged mule (couldn't resist being able to use the expression, please don't take it more seriously than was intended), there's not much the Confederates can do to defend it whether the AoT is stronger than OTL or not.

To be honest, I wouldn't have any expectations of Johnston doing better in the Tullahoma Campaign than Bragg but I think it'd be interesting to see how the AoT would do around the border of Tennessee and Georgia. Simply having an Army commander they like ad trust (regardless of whether that trust was well place or not) could make a big differance around Chickamagua and Chattanooga, especially since Bragg spent a lot of that time dismembering his own army,

 

[Elfwine]

It's a reputation, doesn't mean its totally accurate. Hood's never been in a position to show all his faults since he's been so far down the chain of command so to the Confederacy at large he's seen as one of their best young officers. Hood's reputation as an aggressive commander is far more well known however.

Would appreciate - assuming you have a specific source (looking for more information) you mentioning where Hood is ever mentioned as an all-around good officer, though.

You've seem to misunderstand me somewhat. I'm not absolving Johnston of his portion of the blame. He made many mistakes and, even if he didn't, as commander of the army the buck would ultimately rest with him but just because Johnston didn't force attacks doesn't mean that Hood shouldn't be criticised for shying away from them when given the opportunity to attack. Johnston is at fault for not forcing the attack but if Hood had been doing his job Johnston shouldn't have needed to force thos attacks.

I'm not saying Hood shouldn't be criticized. But the blame for those attacks not occurring rests primarily on Johnston's shoulders, and I say this as someone who would heat the tar if Johnston tried to have Hood tarred and feathered.

What Hood should have done does nothing to make up for Johnston's failure to make him do it.

Whle the reinforcements Johnstn would recieve were not insubstancial making them into a cohesive force would take time which he didn't have.

Would you fancy trying to defend a positon that had only been quickly fortified with only 6,000 men at your immediate disposal, no idea of when reinforments would arrive of what condition they would be in, let alone how many there would be, then have to organize them into something resembling a cohesive army when two Corps of your enemy commanded by his most trusted general, with battle experiance as a unit advance and engaged you?

I wouldn't fancy being a Confederate general in the first place (for being in a crummy position is a regular fact of life), but I wouldn't write of Jackson two days before its even attacked. He doesn't need to do a whole lot with these troops. He needs to hold Jackson. That's pretty simple as tasks go.

In this regard, I miss the Johnston who managed First Bull Run. That Johnston was willing and able to deal with a force far less prepared than what he had at Jackson.

To be honest, I wouldn't have any expectations of Johnston doing better in the Tullahoma Campaign than Bragg but I think it'd be interesting to see how the AoT would do around the border of Tennessee and Georgia. Simply having an Army commander they like ad trust (regardless of whether that trust was well place or not) could make a big differance around Chickamagua and Chattanooga, especially since Bragg spent a lot of that time dismembering his own army,

It might, but its more likely to be different than better.

 

[Nytram01]

One problem with this I have is that Davis *hated* Johnston. It was worse than the Lincoln-McClellan feud because Lincoln could and did do what was necessary for the Cause even if he hated a general. Davis wanted to lose the war instead yielding for The CauseTM. If Bragg resigns, Davis would try first to find a pro-Davis general to take charge of the Army of Tennessee instead of Joe Johnston.

Thing is that around the time I proposed Bragg resign Davis had given Johnston the power tobe judge, jury, executioner and replaced over Bragg. Meaining, if Johnston had found just reason he could have relinquished Bragg of the AoT command and taken the job himself with Davis' consent. Johnston found the Army to be in good healt, well provided for and many of the solider still having faith in Bragg so he didn't see the need to replace Bragg and give him his support.

 

[Snake Featherston]

Thing is that around the time I proposed Bragg resign Davis had given Johnston the power tobe judge, jury, executioner and replaced over Bragg. Meaining, if Johnston had found just reason he could have relinquished Bragg of the AoT command and taken the job himself with Davis' consent. Johnston found the Army to be in good healt, well provided for and many of the solider still having faith in Bragg so he didn't see the need to replace Bragg and give him his support.

He does this in late 1863 for what reason? A theater commander with consistent powers, as opposed to one with vague and meaningless powers would have been a crucial step to a Confederate victory in the Vicksburg Campaign, as Johnston could have then ordered Pemberton whether he wanted to or not to fight Grant together and Grant would have faced two armies with superior numbers, instead of defeating them both in detail.

Victory's never a sure thing in any battle, but that would have been a major change in the strategic position of the Confederacy relative to Grant's armies. Similarly, Davis assigned Johnston to that position another time, both times giving his subordinates the ability to inform Davis directly without consulting Johnston. It's not characteristic of Davis any more than McClellan suddenly turning into Speedy Gonzalez would be of McClellan in an ATL.

 

[Nytram01]

Would appreciate - assuming you have a specific source (looking for more information) you mentioning where Hood is ever mentioned as an all-around good officer, though.

It was an internet source from what I recall - probably the Hood apprieciation society now I think on it - it was something I saw a long time ago that stuck with me. If I find it I'll put the link up.

I'm not saying Hood shouldn't be criticized. But the blame for those attacks not occurring rests primarily on Johnston's shoulders, and I say this as someone who would heat the tar if Johnston tried to have Hood tarred and feathered.

What Hood should have done does nothing to make up for Johnston's failure to make him do it.

Then we have no more to discuss on this matter. I have said that Johnston has ultimate blame for not forcing the issue but Hood must have a share of it for failing to do his job and you have said Hood failed to do his job and Johnston has ultimate blame. Differance being that I am more pro-Johnston and you seem to be more pro-Hood, but basically we seem to have agreed on it,

I wouldn't fancy being a Confederate general in the first place (for being in a crummy position is a regular fact of life), but I wouldn't write of Jackson two days before its even attacked. He doesn't need to do a whole lot with these troops. He needs to hold Jackson. That's pretty simple as tasks go.

What is the terrain like around Jackson? Is it possible to fotify the position easilly enough that Johnston can hold the position with a botched Army that has no existing command structure before two powerful Corps of Federals led by Grant's most trusted officers arrive? How easy is it to flank the position? How effective do you think a force of potentially 15,000 men throw together at the last minute within no prior experiance of fighting as a unit could be againsr two Corps of comparible size repectfully that have been together for a decent period of time and have an experianced and organized Command structure?

It would take a miracle of organization and administration to make the Confederate force that was to mass at Jackson effective in such a short amount of time.

In this regard, I miss the Johnston who managed First Bull Run. That Johnston was willing and able to deal with a force far less prepared than what he had at Jackson.

Perhaps had he recieved more assurances that the Government trusted him after 1st Manassas he would have continued to act more decisively. With no reason for his ranking amungst the Five Full Generals forthcoming from the President he was left to interpret it as a rebuke and a public display of dissastisfaction in his performance from the Commander-in-Chief. When the Richmond authorities interferred heavilly in his district and Army command and he brought these matters to Davis he was rebuked for not following orders. When he withdrew from Centerville to the Rappahannock line on the orders of Davis he recieved another rebuke from Davis for the withdrawal and was criticised for leaving behind only around 1,500,000 pounds of material from a total of 6,000,000 - almost 500,000 of which was spoiled food. When he commanded the forces on the Peninsula Campaign his orders to other forces in his district - not those with the army - to such as degree that he never had effective command over them until he was at the gates of Richmond - Huger in particular. When he returned from his wounding he was placed nominally in the position as Commander of the West but Davis never channelled anything through his office but instead left him to play a glorified Quartermaster and pencil-pusher.

By the time he take control at Jackson, Johnston's relationship with Richmond is only just about workable. Those in power in Richmond have never deemed it necessary to explain their actions to Johnston and have left him to come to his own conclusions about things, and Johnston concludes that the Richmond authorities dont trust him and aren't prepared to let him do his job without interferance.

It is notable that when Johnston learns that Lee has become Commander-in-Chief in 1865 and it is Lee who returned him to field command his attitude in regards to "making do" is far better than it was under Davis. The main differance between them was that Lee expressed his trust and confidence in Johnston's abilities and gave him reasons for why he did or could not do something while Davis never did.

 

[Elfwine]

It was an internet source from what I recall - probably the Hood apprieciation society now I think on it - it was something I saw a long time ago that stuck with me. If I find it I'll put the link up.

No rush.

Then we have no more to discuss on this matter. I have said that Johnston has ultimate blame for not forcing the issue but Hood must have a share of it for failing to do his job and you have said Hood failed to do his job and Johnston has ultimate blame. Differance being that I am more pro-Johnston and you seem to be more pro-Hood, but basically we seem to have agreed on it,

Not so much pro-Hood as anti-buck passing. If a subordinate is falling short, the commander is obligated to try to do something about that.

But yeah, we've said all we can without repeating ourselves. This was not a good day for either man, I think we can leave it there amicably.

What is the terrain like around Jackson? Is it possible to fotify the position easilly enough that Johnston can hold the position with a botched Army that has no existing command structure before two powerful Corps of Federals led by Grant's most trusted officers arrive? How easy is it to flank the position? How effective do you think a force of potentially 15,000 men throw together at the last minute within no prior experiance of fighting as a unit could be againsr two Corps of comparible size repectfully that have been together for a decent period of time and have an experianced and organized Command structure?

It would take a miracle of organization and administration to make the Confederate force that was to mass at Jackson effective in such a short amount of time.

I'm not sure I agree. The Johnston who managed to handle 1st Bull Run smoothly seems to have been a lot less flustered (or if you prefer, frustrated) by working with a hastily flung together command structure.

And how much does Johnston know about what he's facing? Asking because Gregg obviously has poor intel prior to his engagement with McPherson, so I'm assuming something has changed between that and Johnston's "I am too late." upon arrival.

Johnston is not being expected to turn the oncoming force into something that can do much more than hold its ground against the attacks of two men Grant likes but who aren't exactly tactical geniuses.

Perhaps had he recieved more assurances that the Government trusted him after 1st Manassas he would have continued to act more decisively. With no reason for his ranking amungst the Five Full Generals forthcoming from the President he was left to interpret it as a rebuke and a public display of dissastisfaction in his performance from the Commander-in-Chief.

All I can say is that if Johnston felt that not being as senior as he thought he should be was a rebuke, his ego is a little too sensitive. Not necessarily oversized - just too sensitive.

When the Richmond authorities interferred heavilly in his district and Army command and he brought these matters to Davis he was rebuked for not following orders. When he withdrew from Centerville to the Rappahannock line on the orders of Davis he recieved another rebuke from Davis for the withdrawal and was criticised for leaving behind only around 1,500,000 pounds of material from a total of 6,000,000 - almost 500,000 of which was spoiled food. When he commanded the forces on the Peninsula Campaign his orders to other forces in his district - not those with the army - to such as degree that he never had effective command over them until he was at the gates of Richmond - Huger in particular. When he returned from his wounding he was placed nominally in the position as Commander of the West but Davis never channelled anything through his office but instead left him to play a glorified Quartermaster and pencil-pusher.

By the time he take control at Jackson, Johnston's relationship with Richmond is only just about workable. Those in power in Richmond have never deemed it necessary to explain their actions to Johnston and have left him to come to his own conclusions about things, and Johnston concludes that the Richmond authorities dont trust him and aren't prepared to let him do his job without interferance.

And it has never occurred to him to wonder why Davis has such a poor view of his capacities and yet has put him in an important position twice. Johnston never tried to work out his difficulties with Davis. If he had spent half the energy he spent complaining about being persecuted and showed a quarter of the ability he did at Bull Run, maybe Davis would listen to him more. But when Johnston is bucking heads with Davis at every reasonable opportunity and some unreasonable ones,

It is notable that when Johnston learns that Lee has become Commander-in-Chief in 1865 and it is Lee who returned him to field command his attitude in regards to "making do" is far better than it was under Davis. The main differance between them was that Lee expressed his trust and confidence in Johnston's abilities and gave him reasons for why he did or could not do something while Davis never did.

So all Johnston needed was to have his precious ego reassured that he was regarded as a wonderful guy and a good general.

Yes I am being as sarcastic as possible.

Why does Johnston expect Davis to express confidence in him when to the information Davis has - with very little in the way of convincing counterevidence by the uncommunicative or ineffectively communicative Johnston - he looks like someone who won't fight and won't cooperate?

Davis doesn't owe Johnston an explanation for his orders. Now it might be nice for Davis to be a better boss, but Johnston can come to other conclusions than "Davis hates my guts".

It is probably unreasonable in the extreme to expect that Johnston will be the same man Lee is. But it is not unreasonable to expect him to do the kind of things Lee did to maintain a working relationship with Davis. "The boss doesn't trust me. What can I do to make him think differently?" should not be answered with "I'll support his opponents."

Davis does want to be informed of what's going on, not left to assume that Johnston will (to look at Atlanta) have "some plan" that might work if he doesn't just decide to abandon the city.

I despise Hood (of '64) as an officer who filled Polk's shoes as Lincoln's best general brilliantly and I don't like Davis's micromanaging twit management style, but Johnston has to offer something other than "have faith in me" to be someone I would trust the way he seems to have wanted (needed?) to be trusted. Always having an excuse for falling short - and I'm pretty sure that no one in the Confederacy can do much in the Vicksburg campaign if Pemberton isn't cooperative (though on the other hand, Johnston can try harder to coordinate with him instead of moving away from Pemberton as he pulls out of Jackson) and more-or-less convinced that the Peninsula was an unwinnable situation, though possibly more could have been done, it wouldn't have been by much.

But I say the latter with the benefit of more information than Davis had from Johnston.

 

[Anaxagoras]

Thing is that around the time I proposed Bragg resign Davis had given Johnston the power tobe judge, jury, executioner and replaced over Bragg. Meaining, if Johnston had found just reason he could have relinquished Bragg of the AoT command and taken the job himself with Davis' consent. Johnston found the Army to be in good healt, well provided for and many of the solider still having faith in Bragg so he didn't see the need to replace Bragg and give him his support.

IIRC, the fact that Davis had given Johnston such authority was never quite clear to Johnston. Davis thought he had made it clear that Johnston had such authority, but Johnston himself was unsure whether or not he had the authoirty. It was one of the many cases of disastrous miscommunication between these two men throughout the war.

 

[River of Death]

Let's get back to the original post, people.

Following the dissapointment of Murfreesboro - where the Confederates seemed on the cusp of a great victory only to end up conceeding the battlefield and retreating to Tullahoma - Braxton Bragg is heavilly criticized by his subordinates for his conduct of the battle. He becomes deeply depressed and dispondent with the lack of support he was recieving from his subordinates and, despite recieving the support from President Jefferson Davis and General Joseph Johnston - then commanding the Department of the West - he decided to step down as the Commander of the Army of Tennessee.

This leaves that Army without a commander. The only logical solution is to give the position to Joe Johnston so he will likely be given the job.

I disagree with the premise. Giving Johnston the command is certainly a logical solution - derailed a bit by his unwillingness to assume command (as has been critically examined earlier on this thread). But IMO we are dismissing a number of other possibilities, which I now present so that they may be analyzed and shot down.


1: Beauregard.

IIRC he is next in seniority, or at least close to it. At the time he was serving as commander of the....I forget the name....the Atlantic coast department or whatever it's called. He did a very credible job defending Charleston against attack for most of 1863.

But in the grand scheme of things, given the Union's spotty track record in combined operations (some good some not so), and the overall competence of lower-level Confederate commanders, I wonder if he was being wasted in that Department. Certainly he had the rank to command the AoT, and would probably not made a total botch-up of it. Of course, his relationship with Davis was no better than Johnston's....


2: Pemberton.

Until the end of 1862 Pemberton was in charge of the same I-forget-the-darn-name Coastal Department, which Beauregard assumed command of when Pemberton went to Vicksburg. This implies that their ranks are comparable, thus their potential areas of service are comparable.

To get this to actually work would require someone else to take over at Vicksburg, perhaps Johnston in person, perhaps Beauregard, perhaps other. This being a double command-switch makes it less likely. On the other hand, A: Davis seemed to get along with Pemberton somewhat better than Johnston et al. but B: thought at least as highly of Johnston's abilities. Given that Davis was also darn obsessed with Vicksburg it stands to reason that he may put the solidly defensive Johnston in charge there and the more erratic but more offensive Pemberton in Tennessee....maybe.


3: Van Dorn et al.

Yeah those guys. Whatever happened to them after Corinth in late 1862? Because I have no idea. As an army commander, Van Dorn would also have the rank to take over the AoT, though he probably wouldn't do a very good job of it. Still, it's an option.

(By et al. I mean anyone else in Mississippi and/or Arkansas at this time, probably incompetent, who we never hear about again in the history books after Corinth and Prarie Grove, respectively)


4: Hardee or Polk

Until someone is officially named to command the AoT it will need an interim commander - most likely the ranking Corps commander (and darn it I forget which of the two it is). But why not just promote them to Army command outright with (or without) a nice Full General commission and keep the command problem localized to the AoT.

Polk, being politically crafty, would make a huge campaign for the post if it did become available. Given his friends in Richmond and everywhere he could very reasonably get it........and then run the AoT straight into the ground once 1863 heats up.

Hardee would be less likely given his impression as simply "Old Reliable", but if anyone in power in the CSA actually thinks for once (so not going to happen) he would probably be the best overall commander for the job. I cannot see him declining it if it is actually offered.


?5? - Lee

Very very difficult to pull this one off. He's available, sitting behind the Rappahannock River with his army dispersed in winter quarters and seemingly no current threat in Virginia. He has the required rank. He's a darn good prospect at this point in the war, coming off of his 1862 victory-fest.

The two hurdles are that Lee would want to stay in Virginia, and Davis would want him to stay in Virginia as well. The only way to get this to work is if every other reasonable option fails, so Johnston plus 1-4 for some reason cannot happen. At which point Davis would be forced to order Lee west, and Lee would ultimately not refuse the direct order.

In that case, expect action in both theaters quickly. Newly appointed Hooker will not wait until spring when he gets a new and seemingly inferior opponent (probably Longstreet). On the other hand Lee will almost for sure go on the offensive in Tennessee as quickly as possible. I would love to see a Lee-Rosecrans matchup in Middle Tennessee (which will of course degenerate into a Lee-Thomas matchup, which I would love even more).

 

[Elfwine]

I disagree with the premise. Giving Johnston the command is certainly a logical solution - derailed a bit by his unwillingness to assume command (as has been critically examined earlier on this thread). But IMO we are dismissing a number of other possibilities, which I now present so that they may be analyzed and shot down.

Others will have different views, mine are basically that the best option is to persuade Bragg to stay (and kick Polk out of the AoT) or find a way to make Johnston a better commander than he showed himself to be in 1863 and 1864.

1: Beauregard.

IIRC he is next in seniority, or at least close to it. At the time he was serving as commander of the....I forget the name....the Atlantic coast department or whatever it's called. He did a very credible job defending Charleston against attack for most of 1863.

But in the grand scheme of things, given the Union's spotty track record in combined operations (some good some not so), and the overall competence of lower-level Confederate commanders, I wonder if he was being wasted in that Department. Certainly he had the rank to command the AoT, and would probably not made a total botch-up of it. Of course, his relationship with Davis was no better than Johnston's....

Department of South Carolina, Georgia, & Florida. And Beauregard's ideas on strategy range from unrealistic to...well, let me put it this way. His plans are the Civil War's equivalent of Sealion. His performance in the field has been iffy at best.

2: Pemberton.

Until the end of 1862 Pemberton was in charge of the same I-forget-the-darn-name Coastal Department, which Beauregard assumed command of when Pemberton went to Vicksburg. This implies that their ranks are comparable, thus their potential areas of service are comparable.

To get this to actually work would require someone else to take over at Vicksburg, perhaps Johnston in person, perhaps Beauregard, perhaps other. This being a double command-switch makes it less likely. On the other hand, A: Davis seemed to get along with Pemberton somewhat better than Johnston et al. but B: thought at least as highly of Johnston's abilities. Given that Davis was also darn obsessed with Vicksburg it stands to reason that he may put the solidly defensive Johnston in charge there and the more erratic but more offensive Pemberton in Tennessee....maybe.

Pemberton is considerably junior to Beauregard, though I don't have the exact dates offhand - sufficient to say, Pemberton is a lieutenant general more than a year after Beauregard is a full general.

And Pemberton's career has been...well, let me put it this way. Limited.

3: Van Dorn et al.

Yeah those guys. Whatever happened to them after Corinth in late 1862? Because I have no idea. As an army commander, Van Dorn would also have the rank to take over the AoT, though he probably wouldn't do a very good job of it. Still, it's an option.

(By et al. I mean anyone else in Mississippi and/or Arkansas at this time, probably incompetent, who we never hear about again in the history books after Corinth and Prarie Grove, respectively)

Kirby-Smith is a slim possibility, but unlikely to be transferred.

4: Hardee or Polk

Until someone is officially named to command the AoT it will need an interim commander - most likely the ranking Corps commander (and darn it I forget which of the two it is). But why not just promote them to Army command outright with (or without) a nice Full General commission and keep the command problem localized to the AoT.

Polk, being politically crafty, would make a huge campaign for the post if it did become available. Given his friends in Richmond and everywhere he could very reasonably get it........and then run the AoT straight into the ground once 1863 heats up.

Hardee would be less likely given his impression as simply "Old Reliable", but if anyone in power in the CSA actually thinks for once (so not going to happen) he would probably be the best overall commander for the job. I cannot see him declining it if it is actually offered.

He did later, but he might not here. So far Hardee is the best bet - though that's not saying very much. I believe Polk is senior, unfortunately. Polk was Lincoln's best general, enough said.

?5? - Lee

Very very difficult to pull this one off. He's available, sitting behind the Rappahannock River with his army dispersed in winter quarters and seemingly no current threat in Virginia. He has the required rank. He's a darn good prospect at this point in the war, coming off of his 1862 victory-fest.

The two hurdles are that Lee would want to stay in Virginia, and Davis would want him to stay in Virginia as well. The only way to get this to work is if every other reasonable option fails, so Johnston plus 1-4 for some reason cannot happen. At which point Davis would be forced to order Lee west, and Lee would ultimately not refuse the direct order.

In that case, expect action in both theaters quickly. Newly appointed Hooker will not wait until spring when he gets a new and seemingly inferior opponent (probably Longstreet). On the other hand Lee will almost for sure go on the offensive in Tennessee as quickly as possible. I would love to see a Lee-Rosecrans matchup in Middle Tennessee (which will of course degenerate into a Lee-Thomas matchup, which I would love even more).

Hooker has to get the Army of the Potomac in order, so he may still wait for spring. And Longstreet is Lee's senior subordinate, so if by some chance Lee is sent elsewhere, he's the logical successor.

As for Lee-Rosecrans or Lee-Thomas...

Poor Lee. Especially vs. Thomas.

It also ought to be noted that the AoT is even less shape for an offense in December or January than the Army of the Potomac. Lee isn't going to be able to fix this easily or quickly (this isn't a slight to his abilities, but its a very, very large task).

 

[Fiver]

Hood's reputation as an aggressive commander is far more well known however.

Consider Johnston's position. Hood is not a cautious or cowardly commander. If anything, he has a reputation for being too aggressive. So when this aggressive commander does not want to attack, it means a lot and the most logical explanation is that the attack has virtually no chance of success, not that Hood is a backstabbing weasel.