1860s Army Comparison

Art

Monthly Donor
700,000+ horses, but probably scattered around,and probably none or almost none of them trained for warfare. This thread is like the 5th of 6th that has degenerated to "Great Britain would intervene and save the Confederacy! No they wouldn't! Yes they would!" It is getting kind of predictable. "The British hit man-sized targets in the Crimean War at 400+ yards, so they would do so again in North America, even though the terrain is totally different."
 
700,000+ horses, but probably scattered around,and probably none or almost none of them trained for warfare. This thread is like the 5th of 6th that has degenerated to "Great Britain would intervene and save the Confederacy! No they wouldn't! Yes they would!" It is getting kind of predictable. "The British hit man-sized targets in the Crimean War at 400+ yards, so they would do so again in North America, even though the terrain is totally different."

Actually it is more like there is a reason that Lincoln looked at people funny when they suggested invading Canada to head off war with the Secessionists. Also though the fact is if the British can hit targets at 400+ yards in the Crimea and Kent and Afghanistan this rather suggests that they could do the same in North America. However if you sincerely believe this to not be the case then what you need to do is engage in a little research to demonstrate that some environmental factor (and free hint it won't be terrain, there are plenty of quarter mile plus views on offer)....it may be the gravity is different...hell even if the gravity in North America were only different in the 1860s evidence of that would be in the geological record.
 
Interesting thread, although I couldn't read it completely. Do you reckon that adoptingnsomething like the Hythe training system could have helped minor powers like Spain or Sardinia (and later Italy?) or armies like the Russian one? I understand it would not be feasible to have the whole russian army shoot 100+ cartridges yearly, but maybe some selected corps could?
 

Saphroneth

Banned
700,000+ horses, but probably scattered around,and probably none or almost none of them trained for warfare.
I feel I should ask if you actually read the posts.

Of horses there is a great abundance- hardy Canadian horses, just fit for cavalry or artillery service. 200,000 horses can be had if wanted."' (Army and Navy Gazette, 28 December 1861)
I know for a fact that the Canadian horse was sold in large numbers to American buyers during the Civil War and was considered well fit for military service.


So 200,000 of the 700,000 horses were fairly readily available, and they were OTL used for warfare by the Union. So there's no particular reason they'd be less effective in British hands than in American, especially since the Americans have lost out on all those Canadian horses they got OTL.

"The British hit man-sized targets in the Crimean War at 400+ yards, so they would do so again in North America, even though the terrain is totally different."
RR has addressed one part of this, but I'd also like to point out that the British hit man sized targets at 400 yards more often than the Americans hit artillery batteries at a much shorter range (200 yards at Antietam and Federal troops can't suppress the Confederate artillery; the British could suppress Russian artillery at 600 yards successfully). Being able to hit something at long range does not only matter at long range, not if you're more accurate at long range than your enemy is at short range.


And to provide a citation for RR's point:
'In the Eastern theatre, however, we can say that the major battles were usually fought on relatively open farmland interspersed with small woods and the occasional stone- or timber-framed building. Even when a battlefield included a tangle of difficult undergrowth, such as the sodden malarial swamps of the Chickahominy or the rocky pine-clad Round Tops at Gettysburg, there were normally open fields of fire close at hand.'('Battle Tactics of the American Civil War,' Paddy Griffith, page 118)

This should not be surprising - after all, if you can't target an enemy more than 100 yards away because you can't see them, whence artillery?
 
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Interesting thread, although I couldn't read it completely. Do you reckon that adoptingnsomething like the Hythe training system could have helped minor powers like Spain or Sardinia (and later Italy?) or armies like the Russian one? I understand it would not be feasible to have the whole russian army shoot 100+ cartridges yearly, but maybe some selected corps could?

Yes is the short answer...The Americans themselves experimented with select groups of trained shots who proved quite successful for example

http://www.historynet.com/killers-in-green-coats.htm
http://www.historynet.com/killers-in-green-coats.htm
There is little reason other armies could not have adopted Hythe or another training system on a small scale.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
To avoid the thread being too bogged down on the point of accuracy specifically, I thought I'd mention something about morale.

The eternal question for handling soldiers is, basically, how do you convince them not to bugger off home? (Both on the march, and specifically in a battle).
There's several things you can use - fear, anger, humour, shame... pretty much any emotion, in fact. Fundamentally, you have to convince them that to not obey orders is worse than to obey them.
One way to do this is to make it very clear to the soldier that the possible death if you stay is to be preferred to the certain death of flight (for example, by being shot by your officer!) Another is to make the idea of flight so shameful - this is why honour works in battle - that the man would rather die than flee.
There's also the psychological aspect of it where we don't want to do the opposite of what others are doing. So long as we can see everyone else standing, we stand too... but this is also why a military unit seems to panic all at once. What's really happening is that running away has become "socially acceptable"!

One can understand a bayonet charge from this "shame" and "pride" point of view. It's one reason that soldiers were often told to advance with their guns unloaded - to stop to shoot the enemy is much more socially acceptable than to stop to load your gun, so it's easier for the charge to lose momentum. (I've read of 18th century troops being told not to open fire on the advance until their bayonets touched the enemy embrasures, this is a similar thing.)

And this also feeds into why natives armed with spears or dervishes with swords were often so surprising for field-trained European (or American) armies. After all, if they're charging they have no way to satisfy honour apart from reaching your position, so it's a stark choice between 'charge' and 'run'. As a result battles with melee-armed native forces tend to end decisively one way or the other - if you do enough damage to the onrushing enemy to break them, then you win; otherwise, you're in serious trouble.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
Yes is the short answer...The Americans themselves experimented with select groups of trained shots who proved quite successful for example

http://www.historynet.com/killers-in-green-coats.htm
There is little reason other armies could not have adopted Hythe or another training system on a small scale.
Myself, I think the Union should probably have adopted a Hythe (or similar) scheme around 1863 or so. That's the point where their industry is really starting to kick in, so they have the rifles to roll it out to at least a large percentage of the army, and it's also when there'e enough gunpowder and cartridges to pull it off as well. The Army of the Potomac doesn't engage with the ANV for months after Gettysburg, so that's an obvious period to do it in - the result is that the AotP is able to win battles more easily by suppressing artillery and defending riflemen, and as such get through siege situations more quickly.

The alternative is that McClellan does it over the early months of 1862 to the AotP specifically as he prepares it for the Peninsular campaign. While much of his army is still musket armed, there's scope for about 1/4 of the army to be skilled rifle shots (and it'll help the rest, too, theoretical accuracy of a smoothbore is quite high at close engagement range so long as it's a good smoothbore) and McClellan was in the Crimea so theoretically could have seen it.
 

Art

Monthly Donor
Hmmm. . . I was just thinking that the U. S. should have trained their army better, but aside from American and British rifle regiments, and Continental European light infantry and Jaeger regiments, the Europeans did not train to hit targets at over 80 yards, until the 1840s, when the percussion cap rifle-musket is invented. So it seems to me that there is not much time for the U. S. to have started Hythe training programs, and there were few wars in Europe that lasted more than 1 to 1 1/2 years from 1845 to 1860.
There were the Italian wars of Unification, which lasted less than 2 years at one time, the Crimea for Britain, France and Sardinia against Russia, and in the America's the Mexican war, which, in its occupation of nearly undefended territory was over, but for the revolt of the New Mexican and Californian peoples, was over by 1847. The rifle-musket saw action in all of those conflicts, as did the newly invented revolver. The whole regular
U. S. Army was hardly 16,000 men, and spread across the west of America. 16,000 men trained to this system would be of little use, because they would suffer the same fate as the regular British Army at the start of World War 1. That is, sent into action and used up over a year.
 
it seems to me that there is not much time for the U. S. to have started Hythe training programs,
This is rather contradicted by the fact that the US army introduced a musketry training programme based on the Hythe system in 1858. However:
'Although Heth precisely wrote out the steps for training soldiers in marksmanship, and the War Department dutifully published these instructions, the army at large took little heed. Neither soldiers or officers recorded anything about the training, and orders from the headquarters of the army failed to mention enforcement of this fundamental soldierly task. The great and recent technological development of the Minie ball was lost on most Civil War generals... Incredible as it seems, the war clouds of the Civil War did not signal the thorough use of Heth's A System of Target Practice army wide; rather, marksmanship training totally reverted to control by small unit commanders. It was ingrained in most leaders that training for firing a weapon was not necessary. One officer, later a general who commanded two different divisions during World War I, noted that his civil war predecessors sent entire regiments into battle without any rifle practice. Some soldiers fired their muskets for the first time during battle.' ('Marksmanship in the US Army,' W. Emerson, found here)

The whole regular U. S. Army was hardly 16,000 men, and spread across the west of America. 16,000 men trained to this system would be of little use, because they would suffer the same fate as the regular British Army at the start of World War 1. That is, sent into action and used up over a year.
Yet the musketry training given both to Kitchener's Armies and to the expanded US Army of WWI still managed to be more substantial than the musketry training given to the Union Army, despite the small size of the regular cadre in all three cases. This is a failure of will, not of resources.
 
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Saphroneth

Banned
So it seems to me that there is not much time for the U. S. to have started Hythe training programs
Not to pile on, but did you just say there was not much time between 1845 and 1860?

There were the Italian wars of Unification, which lasted less than 2 years at one time, the Crimea for Britain, France and Sardinia against Russia, and in the America's the Mexican war, which, in its occupation of nearly undefended territory was over, but for the revolt of the New Mexican and Californian peoples, was over by 1847. The rifle-musket saw action in all of those conflicts, as did the newly invented revolver.
Of the wars you listed, the Crimea gave impetus for both the British and the French to put into place advanced training systems. And that's not even including the Prussians, who came up with the idea without needing a war at all.

16,000 men trained to this system would be of little use
Thing is, I really do think you're wrong here. If the US Army had 16,000 men trained to the standard of Hythe, they'd have been able to win Bull Run incredibly convincingly - First Bull Run had about 36,000 men on the field, if even a quarter of the Union force was well enough trained to give aimed fire at 400 yards then they'd essentially rip through whatever they were facing.
 
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700,000+ horses, but probably scattered around,and probably none or almost none of them trained for warfare.

Aside from probably 1500[1] or so, probably none really trained for war. Though most likely these horses wouldn't be too scattered and would be found in breeding stock or in the towns and villages. Though their main purpose wouldn't be as cavalry mounts, but as draft animals for hauling the armies supplies and artillery (or as replacements when those in service are inevitably killed or worn down) and thousands were sold to the US historically in this period.

[1] Based on the number of volunteer cavalry troops in the Province of Canada come 1862, and assuming each of those troops is 55 men strong.
 
A further note on barrels

‘although we might justly boast of our twenty millions of population, we would be compelled to flee before their armies for the want of arms to defend ourselves. Suppose fifty thousand troops were to march now from Canada to the interior of New England or New York; how could they be resisted without guns?’[1]

We have seen previously that domestic industry had provided the Union fewer than 15,000 modern military rifles by mid-1862, and that the Springfield Armoury was dependent on iron imported from England to make its barrels. For the sake of completeness, however, we should examine whether domestic industry provides any evidence for the ability of the Union’s military machine to survive the closing off of British markets. To do this, we will examine the evidence provided to the Union’s 1862 Commission on Ordnance and Ordnance Stores, which interviewed all of the major suppliers to determine whether their contracts had been improperly issued.

This provides a chaotic picture. Some subcontractors were relying on one another to provide barrels; others were still unsure where they would get them. The table below brings some order to this chaos, summarising the supply chain for each firm:

Firm; Order; Source of barrels
Colt; 50,000; England.[2]
Remington; 10,000; Steel barrels, possibly American.[3]
Lamson, Goodnow and Yale; 50,000; N. Washburn of Worcester, Massachusetts.[4]
Anthony; 25,000; Washburn.[5]
Brooks; 10,000; Dinslow and Chase.[6]
Rice; 36,000; W. Mason of Taunton, Massachusetts (ultimately from Washburn).[7]
Union Arms Company; 65,000; Trenton Iron Company.[8]
Starr Arms Company; 50,000; English steel.[9]
Mason; 50,000; Washburn.[10]
Hoard; 50,000; Washburn.[11]
JD Mowry; 30,000; England.[12]
Hodge and Burt; 100,000; Undecided between Washburn, Trenton and Morris, Tasker and Co. of Philadelphia.[13]
W.W. Welsh; 18,000; Washburn.[14]
Sarson and Roberts; 25,000; Morris, Tasker and Co., using Craig and Koch’s iron from Reading, Pennsylvania. Also ordering barrels from England.[15]
Whitney; 40,000; Washburn.[16]
Muir; 30,000; Washburn, finished by Dinslow and Chase, from American steel.[17]
Amoskeag; 10,000; Washburn.[18]
Green Kendrick; 25,000; Dinslow and Chase.[19]
James Mulholland; 50,000; Washburn, or by himself, from American steel.[20]
F.L. Bodine; 25,000; W. Mason (ultimately from Washburn).[21]
Rogers, Spencer and Co.; 25,000; Washburn.[22]
CD Schubarth; 50,000; Rough from Washburn and Trenton, finished by Mr Ashton of Middletown.[23]
Total; 824,000

It should be noted that Washburn’s claim to be engaged to furnish 300,000 barrels to contractors actually understated the case: he was actually relied on for 409,000 barrels, either in whole or in part, plus a share of a contract for 50,000.[24] That contract was shared with the Trenton Iron Company, who claimed 65,000 barrels in their own name. Morris, Tasker and Co. had 25,000, and Dinslow and Chase had 35,000. Remington, whose stated ‘desire… to make all things of American manufacture’ must be set against the dependence on British steel of America in general and Remington in particular, accounted for 10,000.[25] With 100,000 barrels undecided between Washburn, Trenton and Morris, Tasker and Co, this left 130,000 barrels contracted for in Britain or from British materials.

Dinslow and Chase’s barrels, unusually, were made from American materials provided by the Damascus Steel and Iron Company, on Staten Island.[26] This was conclusively made from domestic ore rather than imports.[27] Unfortunately, in April 1862 Dinslow and Chase suffered a flood which ‘washed away several thousand feet of the embankment of the canal from which we draw our supply of water’.[28] As one of the contractors depending on them reported, ‘this untimely accident will prevent our making our first of May delivery;’ Dinslow and Chase, therefore, could not fill the gap left by separation from the British market.[29] Nor could Hewitt and the Trenton Iron Company, reliant on Marshall iron from England for a reliable product.[30] This left Washburn, of Worcester, Massachusetts, and Morris, Tasker and Company of Philadelphia as the only potential sources of barrels in a Trent War scenario.

Unfortunately, neither had managed to produce a reliable barrel by mid-1862. John B Anthony ‘found Washburn’s iron bad; nearly every barrel being imperfect’.[31] Sarson and Roberts were ‘losing 50 per cent on our own inspection’ of Morris’s barrels, while Lamson, Goodnow and Yale ‘learned that fifty per cent. of these [Washburn’s barrels] do not turn out well’.[32] Others were more circumspect about the average quality, but it was clear that there was no reliable domestic source of rifle barrels.[33] As a result, by mid-1862, many of the manufacturers were turning to the very British market that a Trent War would have closed off.

It was perhaps not a coincidence that the only company to have started making deliveries, Colt, was the one which had gone to Britain from the start.[34] In July 1861 they ‘made preparations for… the purchase abroad of barrels, locks, and such other parts as might be necessary’.[35] By March 1862, EK Root announced that

we have engaged 54,000 skelps of Marshall iron; have on hand 19,000; also have engaged 25,000 barrels of steel, solid, to be bored, and by us; we have also 20,000 barrels made in England, rough bored and first smooth bored. They have turned breech pins fitted... We have also ordered bar steel for 25,000 barrels in case our iron will not answer.[36]​

Other companies were increasingly coming to realise that the only source of barrels was Britain. John B. Anthony suspended its contact with Washburn when they managed to acquire 200 tons of English Marshall iron, hoping he could improve his iron in the meantime.[37] Sarson and Roberts, meanwhile, abandoned Morris, Tasker and Co’s poor-quality Pennsylvania iron and ordered 1,000 English barrels of Marshall iron instead.[38] They were unsure whether these would be available, however, and as the weapons which they started delivering on 4 November 1862 were second- to fourth-rate weapons using parts provided by the government we can conclude that this attempt was probably unsuccessful.[39] Guns made with steel generally relied on English materials; only a few used steel for the barrels, but many used steel for other parts of the weapon.[40] Separation from the British market, therefore, would have resulted in even lower domestic production.

Indeed, the inability of American domestic industry to provide barrels was already causing delays. John Rice reported in April that ‘the barrel work is so much behind that he cannot promise it before July… the present delay is owning to the non-success of the barrel maker in making barrels of a suitable quality by the methods he has been pursuing.’[41] F.L. Bodine complained that ‘Mr Mason, of Taunton, Massachusetts, furnishes my barrels, and he is responsible for their delivery in time to make good my order. He should have delivered 2,000 about a month since, but he has not yet done so’.[42]

Ordering 854,000 weapons in 1861 resulted in the delivery of fewer than 15,000 weapons by mid-1862. As such, it seems unlikely that dramatically increasing the number of barrels which domestic industry was expected to provide would magically inspire the creation of a working formula or enable American barrel-makers to produce a reliable product. Without Britain, therefore, domestic production for both government and private firms could be more or less written off.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[1] Robert H. Gallaher, Union Arms Company, to EM Stanton, 16 January 1862, in Stuart C. Mowbray and Jennifer Heroux (eds.), Civil War Arms Makers and their Contracts: A facsimile reprint of the Report by the Commission on Ordnance and Ordnance Stores, 1862 (Lincoln, RI, 1998), p.265
[2] Evidence of Mr EK Root, 26 March 1862; ibid, p.63
[3] Evidence of Mr Remington, 4 April 1862; ibid, pp.132-3
[4] Lamson, Goodnow and Yale to Edwin M. Stanton, 8 February 1862; ibid, pp. 160-1
[5] Evidence of John B. Anthony, 12 April 1862; ibid, p.169
[6] Evidence of WF Brooks, 15 April 1862; ibid, p.198
[7] John Rice to Hon. PH Watson, 1 March 1862, ibid. p.249; evidence of John Rice, 7 April 1862, ibid p. 252
[8] Charles Hewitt to RH Gallaher, 22 March 1862; ibid, p.269
[9] Evidence of Mr Wolcott 15 April 1862; ibid, p.288
[10] Evidence of William Mason, 4 April 1862; ibid, p.311
[11] C.B. Hoard to EM Stanton, 8 February 1862; ibid, p.332
[12] Evidence of Mr Cammann, 3 May 1862; ibid, pp.348-9
[13] James T. Hodge to J. Wise, 10 April 1862; ibid, p.356
[14] Evidence of WW Welch, 3 April 1862; ibid, p.370
[15] Evidence of Sarson and Roberts, 7 April 1862; ibid, p.381
[16] Eli Whitney to EM Stanton, 4 February 1862; ibid, p.385
[17] Evidence of William Muir, 3 April 1862; ibid, p.390
[18] EA Straw, Amoskeag Manufacturing Company, to J. Wise, 9 April 1862; ibid, p.400
[19] John Kendrick, to the commission on Ordnance and Ordnance stores, 11 April 1862; ibid, p.404
[20] Evidence of James Mulholland, 24 March 1862; ibid, p.407
[21] Evidence of F.L. Bodine, 2 May 1862; ibid, p.415
[22] Mr Tallman of Rogers, Spencer and Co, 12 April 1862; ibid, p.502
[23] Evidence of CD Schubarth, 27 May 1862; ibid, p.515
[24] Evidence of CB Hoard, 8 April 1862; ibid, pp.340-1
[25] Robert B. Gordon, ‘Materials for Manufacturing: The Response of the Connecticut Iron Industry to Technological Change and Limited Resources,’ Technology and Culture vol. 24 no. 4 (October 1983), pp. 613, 618-9; Geoffrey Tweedale, Sheffield Steel and America: A Century of Commercial and Technological Interdependence 1830-1930 (Cambridge, 1987), pp. 7-9, H. J. Swinney, ‘The Remington Story,’ Legacy- Annals of Herkimer County vol. 2 issue 4 (1987) [link]
[26] Dinslow and Chase to William Muir and Co., 11 April 1862, in Mowbray and Heroux, Arms Makers, p.392
[27] William George Neilson, The charcoal blast furnaces, rolling mills, forges and steel works, of New York, in 1867 (1867), p.273 [link]; see also p.267 [link]
[28] Dinslow and Chase to William Muir, 23 April 1862, in Mowbray and Heroux, Arms Makers p.393
[29] William Muir to Joseph Holt and Robert Dale Owen, 2 May 1862; ibid p.393
[30] Allan Nevins, Abram S. Hewitt, with some account of Peter Cooper (New York, 1967), pp. 196-9, 209-210
[31] Evidence of John B. Anthony, 12 April 1862, in Mowbray and Heroux, Arms Makers, p.169
[32] Evidence of Sarson and Roberts, 7 April 1862; ibid, p.381; Evidence of Mr Goodnow, 9 April 1862; ibid, p.163
[33] William W. Welsh to EM Stanton, 3 February 1862; ibid, p.369; Evidence of WW Welch, 3 April 1862,ibid, p.370; Evidence of Eli Whitney, 11 April 1862; ibid, p.386; Evidence of CD Schubarth, 27 May 1862; ibid, p.515
[34] Stuart Mowbray (ed.), Civil War Arms Purchases and Deliveries (Lincoln, RI, 2000), p.731
[35] EK Root to Hon EM Stanton, 10 July 1861, in Mowbray and Heroux, Arms Makers, p.60
[36] Evidence of Mr EK Root, 26 March 1862; ibid, p.63
[37] Evidence of John B. Anthony, 12 April 1862; ibid, p.169
[38] Evidence of Sarson and Roberts, 7 April 1862; ibid, p.381
[39] Mowbray, Arms Purchases p.964
[40] For barrels, ‘Statement of facts connected with the existing relations between the government, as principal, and the Starr Arms Company, as contractors’, in Mowbray and Heroux, Arms Makers p.285, and evidence of Mr Wolcott 15 April 1862; Mowbray and Heroux, Arms Makers, p.288. For other parts, John B. Anthony to Edwin M Stanton, 19 February 1862; Mowbray and Heroux, Arms Makers, p. 167
[41] J. Holt, Robert Dale Owen, PV Hagner to Brigadier General JW Ripley, 2 May 1862; ibid, p.253
[42] Evidence of F.L. Bodine, 2 May 1862; ibid, p.415
 

Saphroneth

Banned
Without Britain, therefore, domestic production for both government and private firms could be more or less written off.

Gosh, that makes the job of arming the Union even worse, doesn't it...


So as far as I can tell:

OTL 300,000 spare weapons 30 June 1862
Estimated shortfall of foreign guns anything from 160,000 to 510,000
Estimated shortfall of domestic guns is potentially as high as "all of them made after PoD" for want of British iron

So essentially in the event of a Trent War it's quite possible the Union would be left with their Present Under Arms as of Jan 1862 and no way to increase it, with any casualties coming directly from their front line strength with no way to recruit new brigades or shore up existing brigades with new regiments.
That's... not a good thing for the Union given that the Confederate Present Under Arms by mid 1862 surpassed the Union figure of the same type from Jan of that year... and given that in a Trent scenario they also have a hundred thousand or so Imperial troops to deal with.
To put it another way, the Union would have to inflict 25% more casualties than it takes, with worse weapons, just to stand still in relative army size.

Though it would be an interesting wargaming challenge to try to position troops to defend the Union under those conditions - you only have so many troops, casualties are effectively permanent, and the enemy has superior numbers and often a superior quality... I make it at most 41,000 troops from regiments in the pipeline - the ones which OTL entered service in Jan and Feb - and given troops lost due to being cut off that gives you pretty much 440,000 men all told present for duty (incl extra duty and sick). You have to deploy them to match a British/Canadian enemy with >100,000 troops, and a Confederate enemy which by April has something like 425,000 by the same definition - and don't forget the Royal Navy!
 
Executive Document 99

‘Our great want to speedily crush this rebellion is guns. We have an abundance of men.’[1]

‘It is very desirable that all the guns contracted for in Europe should be sent to us as soon as possible. We need them to complete the arming of our forces and to provide for renewal.’[2]

In the aftermath of the American Civil War, its vast expense naturally led to concerns that money had been spent improperly. As a result, in 1867 the House of Representatives requested a full accounting of all arms purchased during the war so that it could check for irregularities, which it subsequently published as Executive Document 99 of the 40th Congress, Second Session. Put simply, Executive Document 99 shows us (more or less, accounting for human error and imperfect records) what the Union bought and when. As a result, when coupled with other government documents, it provides us with the ability to determine the state of Union purchasing at the point at which a Trent war would have arisen.

As with all historical research, there are some methodological issues that must be encountered and resolved before conclusions can be drawn. The first is how closely the purchase date given in the document relates to the date at which the guns would be available to the Union. The necessity to inspect weapons to ensure they were fit for service to the troops, combined with the paucity of Ordnance officers and institutional weaknesses within the department, meant that guns were sometimes delivered to the Union well before they were ready for issue to troops.[3]

In some cases, disputes over the quality of weapons meant they were not officially purchased until much later. For instance, the Ordnance department purchased 10,000 rifled muskets from George Ramsdall on the understanding they were ‘a good serviceable weapon, and much better than the Enfield.’[4] In January 1862 he reported that he was now ready to deliver, and provided a sample weapon for the Ordnance department.[5] However, when Captain Crispin inspected the sample weapon, he was disquieted to discover that it was a .715 Austrian rifle, ‘an altered arm, said to be from the model adopted for the use of gun cotton,… of an inferior grade’ worth less than half the price the Ordnance Department had agreed.[6] There was some haggling over the terms, and it was almost immediately swept up in the Holt-Owen Commission’s review of the significant contracts issued by the department. In the end, the official purchase date of 22 May 1862 was much later than the Union authorities technically received the arms.[7]

However, this inaccuracy is balanced by other inaccuracies within the document. Samuel Smith, who contracted for weapons in Europe, announced he had 4,992 rifles ready for delivery on 13 March 1862, and a further 1,132 on 27 March.[8] However – perhaps from clerical error – the purchase date is given as August 1861, well before the guns were available to the Union.[9] Under ordinary circumstances, purchase dates are much closer to the date of arrival. On 3 January 1862, John Hoey reported his deliveries of Prussian smoothbore muskets as ‘December 6, 6,620, to-day, 5,000, and next week will place in the inspector’s hands 16,000 more.’[10] The purchase dates of these guns listed in Executive Document 99 were 21 December 1861, 11 January 1862 and 11 January 1862 respectively.[11] Howland and Aspinwall managed to despatch 8,000 Enfields from England before the Queen’s Proclamation prevented any further activities; the remainder of the weapons, 9,000 in all arrived by the steamer Edinburgh in March 1862.[12] Executive Document 99 lists exactly 8,000 Enfields received to 20 December 1861, and 8,940 Enfields delivered on 9 April 1862 (with a further 240 received on 28 April 1861).[13] The conclusion, then, must be that the figures more or less reflect an accurate representation of the month-by-month position of the Union, if not the day-by-day.

It should be noted that Executive Document 99 reconciles remarkably well to the information contained in Ripley’s report of 30 June 1862:[14]

Type;Per Ripley’s report;Per Document 99;Difference
Total foreign rifles;423,276;429,689;6,413 more in Document 99
Total foreign muskets;177,690;134,970;42,720 more in report
Total British rifles;116,740;116,763;23 more in Document 99
Total British muskets;8,999;8,999;n/a
Total domestic;30,788;36,193;5,405 more in Document 99

The overall error is to understate the number of foreign weapons by 36,284, and overstate the number of domestic weapons by 5,405. The former may have been caused by muskets which Ripley considered to be adequate subsequently being discovered to have serious flaws that led to the cancellation of contracts; the latter, more simply, is because erring on the side of caution has meant foreign rifles being incorrectly counted as domestic ones. The overall error, of c.5%, is unlikely to be material in the context of this assessment.

One more minor observation should be made at this stage. It has often been assumed, including by the author, that the 14,336 ‘army rifles with bayonet’ are Springfields. In fact, only 9,960 are ‘United States Rifles, .58’; 1,763 are varieties of the M1841, listed as ‘long range rifles,’ ‘Harpers Ferry rifles,’ ‘Yaeger rifles,’ ‘Mississippi rifles,’ and ‘rifles with sabre bayonet,’ with 9 of these having been converted to the Merrill breech-loading mechanism. A further 2,332 are American built versions of the Enfield, long and short, and 280 are ‘United States Rifles, altered to Maynard, .69’.[15] This is yet more proof, if proof were still needed, that domestic industry was nowhere near producing a regular supply of basic and standardised infantry weapons, let alone having the capacity to turn out millions of breech-loaders.

The only other significant methodological issue are the judgemental categories, where Executive Document 99 lists only blocks of purchases. Fortunately, there are only three of these: arms purchased from Herman Boker and Company, weapons bought by George L. Schuyler on his mission to Europe, and the purchases of the US representative in Belgium Henry S. Sanford. In order to present an accurate and full picture of the Union’s monthly resources, we should also allocate the production at the Springfield armoury to the domestic total.

Hermann Boker and Co. supplied 188,054 weapons to the Union by 10 June 1862, of a wide range of qualities.[16] Fortunately, the official attention necessitated by this variable quality makes it possible to reconstruct the number of weapons arrived at a number of key stages. For instance, we know that on 7 November 1861 5,440 .69 rifled muskets had arrived.[17] By 13 February 1862, this had risen to 61,485, of which 25,376 were good Austrian weapons between .54 and .58, 17,839 were ‘abandoned Austrian models’ altered from smoothbore flintlocks, and 17,349 were Prussian and French .69-.71 rifles, ‘open to grave and serious objection as superior military weapons’.[18] We also know that, “Prior to March 3, 1862, 81,770 rifled muskets had been placed under the control of the Ordnance department by Messrs. H Boker and Co.”[19] Based on these three key points, we can allocate 20,495 weapons per month for November, December and January; 20,285 for February; and 35,428 per month for March, April and May.

Equally fortunately, the details of Schuyler’s purchases are laid out in reasonable detail. Though the department had a habit of calling all good weapons ‘Enfields,’ this is not an insoluble problem. The October steamer, the Arago, carried 12,000 Dresden rifles; the City of Washington, sailing on 6 November, carried a further 12,955.[20] The Fulton, of November 12, carried 20,000 ‘Prussian’ (actually Austrian) rifles, and the Hamburg steamer of the 17th another 30,000.[21] The 10,000 ‘Enfields’ of unknown origin sent in October are presumably Austrian, as are the 10,000 additional ‘Enfields’ due to arrive before the end of December, but the 15,000 November Enfields seem to have been British given Schuyler’s overall pattern of purchases.[22] The last of Schuyler’s weapons arrived by the Bavaria, sailing at the end of March, but in the interest of fairness we will assume that most of the remainder actually arrived earlier than this.[23] Based on this, and allowing for the time needed for ships to arrive in America, we can allocate his purchases as follows:

Month;Dresden rifles;Austrian rifles;Enfield rifles;Vincennes rifles
November;24,955;10,000;0;0
December;0;50,000;15,000;0
January;0;10,000;0;0
February;2,021;48;04,558
April;79;0;0;0

The Sanford mission provides much less detail on when purchases were made, and the issue is complicated by the fact that Sanford was also the main conduit through which Boker and Co. purchases were made. As such, when he claims to have ’40,000 guns to be shipped in ten days… The gun business with my credits just received I shall probably close myself, stop the steamer which sails from Antwerp the 14th, and put them on board of her,’ it is unclear whether these guns were listed under Boker or Sanford.[24]

Balance suggests that Sanford’s purchases were made ‘A la fin de 1861, en pleine crise du Trent… en un peu plus de deux mois’.[25] In an attempt to ship 35,000 arms to the Union without scrutiny, Sanford attempted to false-flag the British steamer Melita under Belgian colours- a project which the British consul at Antwerp and the Belgian government were prepared to scuttle.[26] It also seems that Sanford sent 24,000 weapons by the steamer of 24th December.[27] These theoretical despatches of c.59,000 weapons compare remarkably closely to the 56,012 purchases assigned to him by Executive Document 99. If so, it is highly likely none would be available to the Union army in the event of a Trent war. However, we will be substantially more favourable than this, and assume that Sanford shipped his purchases in three equal deliveries which arrived with the Union in November, December and January.

Allocation of the weapons from Springfield Armoury can be made using a number of key figures. In FY1861, the armoury produced 13,803 weapons; in FY1862, 102,410; between the outbreak of the war and the end of June 1862, 190,810.[28] The armoury’s capacity as at December 1862 was 200,000 weapons per year, or 16,667 per month.[29] Assuming a steady rate of increase in capacity from August 1861, when Dyer took charge of the armoury and began expansion, to June 1862, we arrive at the following allocation:[30]

Month;Weapons
April - July;1850 per month
August;2,416
September;3,332
October;4,813
November;6,295
December;7,777
January;9,259
February;10,740
March;12,222
April;13,704
May;15,185
June;16,667

When all these sources are put together, the following picture emerges.

Month;Domestic;British rifles;British muskets;Continental rifles;Continental muskets
April 1861;1,850;0;0;0;0
May 1861;1,850;0;0;0;0
June 1861;1,972;0;0;0;0
July 1861;1,850;1,094;0;0;0
August 1861;7,415;2,260;8,999;13,405;7,698
September 1861;7,082;8,400;0;1,739;4,000
October 1861;7,193;7,348;0;9,927;0
November 1861;9,651;20,535;0;72,987;23,460
December 1861;11,319;28,742;0;93,559;19,579
January 1862;12,272;1,623;0;45,406;33,547
February 1862;14,092;5,465;0;36,594;
March 1862;12,222;5,901;0;47,587;0
April 1862;14,244;13,400;0;43,563;20,000
May 1862;25,004;7,617;0;54,697;25,000
June 1862;17,987;14,378;0;10,225;1,686
Grand Total;146,003;116,763;8,999;429,689;134,970

In graph form, as provided in the attachment, the dependence on foreign supply appears even more stark.
guns by month.png
Foreign deliveries tailed off during the Trent, but subsequently recovered. Even after the instruction to raise no further regiments, the Union still needed vast quantities of weapons to replace inadequate arms issued to troops through dire necessity, not to mention adequate weapons rendered unusable through inexperience in weapons care and handling.[31] The overall picture confirms all previous observations about the dependence on foreign weapons of the Union war machine in the first few years of the war.

The data provided also enables us to calculate a projected shortfall in the event of a war, based on the Union’s federal stocks of arms as at 30 June 1862.[32] This projection given here will provide a worst-case scenario, based on the assumption that the blockade and cessation of trade is 100% effective and the ending of British barrel imports completely shuts down Springfield Armoury. Others, however, are free to make their own alternative projections based on the evidence provided.[33]

Month;British arms;Continental arms;Springfield arms;Total shortfall
January 1862;1,623;78,953;9,259;89,835
February 1862;5,465;36,594;10,740;52,799
March 1862;5,901;47,587;12,222;65,710
April 1862;13,400;63,563;13,704;90,667
May 1862;7,617;79,697;15,185;102,499
June 1862;14,378;11,911;16,667;42,956
Total;48,384;318,305;77,777;444,466

As the federal arsenals contained 335,896 weapons on 30 June 1862, this suggests a deficit of 108,570 weapons over the first six months of the Trent War. Moreover, Ripley was clear at the start of June that ‘the number now on hand of good rifled arms, both American and foreign, for issue to troops in service is about 94,000.’[34] Counting only British and Springfield weapons as ‘good rifled arms,’ the loss of the 95,116 weapons purchased and produced between January and May would have wiped out this surplus entirely. When the supply of Austrian Lorenz rifles is added to this, it is clear that the federal government would have been running close to empty, if not beyond, within a few months of the outbreak of war.

As the seven states dealt with in a previous article had 64,530 arsenal and militia weapons available in January 1862, it is possible that this deficit could have been met by dredging the country for weapons. It would not have allowed them to increase the overall troop deployment, meaning the Union would have to fight two enemies with the same size of force that was insufficient to overcome one. However, emptying the arsenals and disarming the militia might have enabled them to maintain their historical troop level, by replacing weapons which broke or were lost.

However, even if it were possible to maintain the Union’s overall deployment level for 1862, this does not bode well for the coming year. Despite success in more minor theatres, the Union spent most of 1862 having its invasions of the South turned back before being invaded in turn. To suggest that the Union could perform better in a larger war with fewer soldiers carrying worse weapons, with a backdrop of greater financial instability, is to stretch credibility beyond its limits.

===============================

[1] Simon Cameron, secretary of war, to Hon. William L. Dayton, US minister in Paris, 12 November 1861; United States War Department, The war of the rebellion: a compilation of the official records of the Union and Confederate armies, Series 3 Vol. 1 (1899), p.630 [link]
[2] Thomas A Scott, assistant secretary of war, to Hon. H.S. Sanford, US minister to Belgium, 23 December 1861; War of the Rebellion series 3 vol. 1, p. 756 [link]
[3] Carl L Davis, Arming the Union: Small Arms in the Union Army (Port Washington, London: 1973), pp.14-37
[4] Simon Cameron to General Ripley, 25 July 1861, in Stuart C. Mowbray and Jennifer Heroux (eds.), Civil War Arms Makers and their Contracts: A facsimile reprint of the Report by the Commission on Ordnance and Ordnance Stores, 1862 (Lincoln, RI, 1998), p.31
[5] G.W. Ramsdall to General Ripley, 13 January 1862, in Mowbray and Heroux, Arms Makers p.32
[6] S. Crispin to General J.W. Ripley, 26 January 1862; ibid, pp.33-4
[7] Stuart Mowbray (ed.), Civil War Arms Purchases and Deliveries (Lincoln, RI, 2000), p.919
[8] Samuel B. Smith to Hon. J. Holt, Hon. Robert Dale Owen, 18 March 1862 and 27 March 1862, in Mowbray and Heroux, Arms Makers, pp.201-2
[9] Mowbray, Purchases and Deliveries p.942
[10] John Hoey to Hon. George Ashman, 3 January 1862, in Mowbray and Heroux, Arms Makers p.53
[11] Mowbray, Purchases and Deliveries p.761
[12] Howland and Aspinwall to Brigadier General JW Ripley, 13 January 1862, in Mowbray and Heroux, Arms Makers p.244; Howland and Aspinwall to Major PV Hagner, 26 March 1862, in Mowbray and Heroux, Arms Makers p.245
[13] Mowbray, Purchases and Deliveries p.756
[14] United States War Department, The war of the rebellion: a compilation of the official records of the Union and Confederate armies, Series 3 Vol. 2 (1899), p. 855 [link]
[15] This leaves one unclassified gun, purchased from Howland and Aspinwall and listed as ‘Whitney rifle’: Mowbray, Purchases and Deliveries p.756
[16] Evidence of Major P.V. Hagner, 10 June 1862, in Mowbray and Heroux, Arms Makers p.91
[17] Major P.V. Hagner to General JW Ripley, 13 November 1861; ibid, p.73
[18] Captain S. Crispin to General J.W. Ripley, 13 February 1862; ibid, p.76
[19] Major P.V. Hagner to Hon. E Stanton, 14 March 1862; ibid, p.80
[20] Thomas A. Scott to George L. Schuyler, 21 October 1861, War of the Rebellion series 3 vol. 1 p.581 [link]; Thomas A. Scott to Brig. Gen. James W. Ripley 18 November 1861, War of the Rebellion series 3 vol. 1 p.656 [link]
[21] Thomas A. Scott to Brig. Gen. James W. Ripley 18 November 1861, War of the Rebellion series 3 vol. 1 p.656 [link]
[22] Simon Cameron, to Hon. Salmon P. Chase, 24 October 1861, War of the Rebellion series 3 vol. 1 p.595 [link]
[23] George L. Schuyler to Hon. Edwin M Stanton, 30 March 1862, War of the Rebellion series 3 vol. 1 p.955 [link]
[24] H.S. Sanford to Hon. William H. Seward, 12 November 1861, War of the Rebellion Series 3 vol. 1 p.631 [link]
[25] Francis Balance, La Belgique et la guerre de sécession, 1861-1865: étude diplomatique (Paris, 1979), vol. 1 p.162
[26] Balance, Belgique vol. 1 pp. 248-9. The Melita was a former Cunarder, part-exchanged with P. Denny of Greenock; it sailed from Greenock to Antwerp on 3 January 1862 (Morning Post, 6 January 1862 p.7)
[27] John Hoey to Hon. George Ashman, 3 January 1862, in Mowbray and Heroux, Arms Makers p.53
[28] Felicia Johnson Deyrup, Arms makers of the Connecticut Valley: A regional study of the economic development of the small arms industry, 1798-1870, (Northampton MA, 1948) p.182; War of the rebellion, series 3 vol. 2, p.855 [link]
[29] Memorandum of Brigadier General James W. Ripley, War of the rebellion, series 3 vol. 2, p.852 [link]
[30] Davis, Arming the Union pp.69-70
[31] L Thomas, Adjutant General, General Order No. 105, 3 December 1861: War of the rebellion, series 3 vol. 1 p. 418 [link]
[32] James W. Ripley to Hon. E.M. Stanton, 21 November 1862, War of the rebellion, series 3 vol. 2 p.858 [link]
[33] They may choose simultaneously to take the more probable scenario for Sanford's purchases by removing them entirely.
[34] James W. Ripley to Hon. E.M. Stanton, 7 June 1862, War of the rebellion, series 3 vol. 2 p.113 [link]
 
a broader view can be found here as well

http://www.learnnc.org/lp/editions/nchist-civilwar/4594

it should be noted with a primitive industrial base Gorgas working for the Confederacy produced 350,000 rifles during the war for the Confederate Army

So the big question is why can't the Union overcome its deficits faster and on a far larger scale than the Confederacy did? Nearly 4 million small arms (carbines, rifles and muskets) were produced during the war for the Union. While important (at nearly 1 million weapons) imports are still the relative small percentage of weapons used and most of the foreign weapons (aside from Enfields imported) were phased out East of the Mississippi by 1864

Another possible result of any shortages in small arms initially is to raise large numbers of heavy artillery regiments, as there are plenty of guns available from both the Army and Navy, and as they would be needed for coastal defense missions in any event. They wouldn't need large numbers of rifles or muskets as most would be heavy artillery crews. This option has not so far been discussed.

Later in the war they can be converted into line infantry (as happened in OTL)

My own view has consistently been that the Union would remain on the strategic defensive in the East and vs the British for 1862, taking only such measures as necessary to secure Missouri, Kentucky (both of those campaigns were won in Jan-Feb 1862 with existing troops and weapons) and send some of the troops planned to California (Glorietta Pass and the defeat of the Confederate forces in New Mexico is also from existing already armed forces and in the case of the Union, required only troops already present in November 1861)

Once production hits its stride, and it would, even if barrel issue is correct (adequate with occasional problems is still better that no weapons at all) the Union will have the weapons it needs.

My one question is whether the British steel alleged to be required for Springfield weapons was required for any other weapons.. certainly the Confederacy was not importing steel in much quantity during the war and it managed to produce about a third of its requirements of small arms
 
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Saphroneth

Banned
At the beginning of the Civil War, firearms of all types were in short supply. Many early volunteers were issued antiquated, imported, and nearly obsolete weapons as both sides strained to meet the demand for arms.

Yes, that looks pretty much correct. Note that the next word is "eventually" - over-all production, after all, is production including the whole of the 1861-5 period and early 1862 is by all available evidence well before either side had had a chance to step up their production... and if the Union does not have a chance to import weapons, it's stuck fighting armies with forces that were barely able to fight one.
To use production figures going to 1865 to talk about early 1862 when we have the OTL 1862 production figures is like using all-war production figures to show the Germans could outproduce the British in the Battle of Britain.


My one question is whether the British steel alleged to be required for Springfield weapons was required for any other weapons.. certainly the Confederacy was not importing steel in much quantity during the war and it managed to produce about a third of its requirements of small arms
The simple answer is that they were not importing steel because they were using the older methods of production - which Springfield Armoury could do, but which would require them to expensively retool back to the older system and result in further delay.


Another possible result of any shortages in small arms initially is to raise large numbers of heavy artillery regiments, as there are plenty of guns available from both the Army and Navy, and as they would be needed for coastal defense missions in any event. They wouldn't need large numbers of rifles or muskets as most would be heavy artillery crews. This option has not so far been discussed.

But those guns are generally required where they are, the Union did not have a large gun surplus in 1862. My own assumption has tended to be that they find the guns and gunners to completely arm their coastal forts within a few weeks, despite the way most of the prewar gun surplus is actually in the forts around Washington.

My own view has consistently been that the Union would remain on the strategic defensive in the East and vs the British for 1862, taking only such measures as necessary to secure Missouri, Kentucky (both of those campaigns were won in Jan-Feb 1862 with existing troops and weapons) and send some of the troops planned to California (Glorietta Pass and the defeat of the Confederate forces in New Mexico is also from existing already armed forces and in the case of the Union, required only troops already present in November 1861)
But the problem with this approach is that leaving the existing armed troops in Missouri and Kentucky means that you need to draw from other sources of infantry to defend on the northern frontier - and if you wish to deploy 150,000 troops to face Canada, say, then you're using the entire Army of the Potomac (much of which was OTL not equipped with weapons fit for the field at this time) and leaving Washington all but undefended (as in, with ~33,000 defenders against a Confederate army of ~76,000), while still leaving no infantry at all to defend the coast.
I do not credit the Union with being that foolish.




What this all serves to demonstrate, of course, is that an army with large prewar stocks of modern weapons is in a much better position to handle the ramping-up period of their own industry than one without those large prewar stocks.
 
Yes, that looks pretty much correct. Note that the next word is "eventually" - over-all production, after all, is production including the whole of the 1861-5 period and early 1862 is by all available evidence well before either side had had a chance to step up their production... and if the Union does not have a chance to import weapons, it's stuck fighting armies with forces that were barely able to fight one.
To use production figures going to 1865 to talk about early 1862 when we have the OTL 1862 production figures is like using all-war production figures to show the Germans could outproduce the British in the Battle of Britain.



The simple answer is that they were not importing steel because they were using the older methods of production - which Springfield Armoury could do, but which would require them to expensively retool back to the older system and result in further delay.




But those guns are generally required where they are, the Union did not have a large gun surplus in 1862. My own assumption has tended to be that they find the guns and gunners to completely arm their coastal forts within a few weeks, despite the way most of the prewar gun surplus is actually in the forts around Washington.


But the problem with this approach is that leaving the existing armed troops in Missouri and Kentucky means that you need to draw from other sources of infantry to defend on the northern frontier - and if you wish to deploy 150,000 troops to face Canada, say, then you're using the entire Army of the Potomac (much of which was OTL not equipped with weapons fit for the field at this time) and leaving Washington all but undefended (as in, with ~33,000 defenders against a Confederate army of ~76,000), while still leaving no infantry at all to defend the coast.
I do not credit the Union with being that foolish.




What this all serves to demonstrate, of course, is that an army with large prewar stocks of modern weapons is in a much better position to handle the ramping-up period of their own industry than one without those large prewar stocks.

you only need 150,000 or so troops if you plan to attack.. the chokepoints (which I have described elsewhere when I talked about the geography) allows for half that number plus fortifications to defend, and you can get by with a militia for part of that. Plus the Union has central lines, with a superb rail system, so moving reserves is not a big challenge.
 
Yes, that looks pretty much correct. Note that the next word is "eventually" - over-all production, after all, is production including the whole of the 1861-5 period and early 1862 is by all available evidence well before either side had had a chance to step up their production... and if the Union does not have a chance to import weapons, it's stuck fighting armies with forces that were barely able to fight one.
To use production figures going to 1865 to talk about early 1862 when we have the OTL 1862 production figures is like using all-war production figures to show the Germans could outproduce the British in the Battle of Britain.



The simple answer is that they were not importing steel because they were using the older methods of production - which Springfield Armoury could do, but which would require them to expensively retool back to the older system and result in further delay.




But those guns are generally required where they are, the Union did not have a large gun surplus in 1862. My own assumption has tended to be that they find the guns and gunners to completely arm their coastal forts within a few weeks, despite the way most of the prewar gun surplus is actually in the forts around Washington.


But the problem with this approach is that leaving the existing armed troops in Missouri and Kentucky means that you need to draw from other sources of infantry to defend on the northern frontier - and if you wish to deploy 150,000 troops to face Canada, say, then you're using the entire Army of the Potomac (much of which was OTL not equipped with weapons fit for the field at this time) and leaving Washington all but undefended (as in, with ~33,000 defenders against a Confederate army of ~76,000), while still leaving no infantry at all to defend the coast.
I do not credit the Union with being that foolish.




What this all serves to demonstrate, of course, is that an army with large prewar stocks of modern weapons is in a much better position to handle the ramping-up period of their own industry than one without those large prewar stocks.

addressing your points
1. You have a single poster (Robcrauford) who has provided his work with some sources. While a good start, that is a lot of assumption to base of what is essentially one source.
2. Exactly, inferior steel is an option. The Ak47 is an inferior product to the M16 in all respects save one... it can be made cheap and in huge quantities and both are perfectly adequate means of killing people. The Soviet PPsH was inferior to the Schmeiser, the Mauser better than the Enfield, the Brown Bess superior to most of its competition in its useful life etc. But adequate weapons in large numbers are perfectly fine ways for mass armies to fight.

By 1863 the US is building large numbers of excellent weapons but it could just as easily built similar qualities of adequate ones.. Your assumption is always that it will be short war. Short Wars are rarely that as history is littered with examples. So if your wrong, and a reasonable person can look at your arguments and those from the other side and make their own mind up, the British will find themselves fighting the same war of attrition everyone else is during the Civil War. Which seems hardly worth it

3. The existing armies in Kentucky and Missouri are not especially large, being roughly about 3 corps worth of troops combined. The relative importance to both is far more critical than even northern Maine or inroads into far northern New York State. The Union has plenty of space to trade against the British and rotten terrain for them to deal with to go with it. It will take months for the British to assemble their field armies and their logistical supply trains. First because its winter in Canada when the Trent situation reaches its diplomatic climax (the ultimatum) and secondly because assembling all the needed troops and support for field forces doesn't happen overnight when only one railroad and two ports are available and only one of those ports is initially available due to ice.
Meanwhile winter in Missouri and Kentucky are positively balmy in comparison

4. The Confederacy never had more than 300,000 troops in the field at one time. The Union never more than 600,000 (which it had at this point, mediocre or inferior weapons not withstanding) and you have posted a figure of about 200,000 for the British Canadians. That is basically parity. The Confederates are as badly armed as the Union at this point and unless you are suggesting that the Confederacy is going to be armed at a higher priority than the Canadians, they are still going to be armed the same way for most of 1862, perhaps longer, as British enfield production has to tool up just as it did in OTL. Even McClellen was capable of seeing the importance of economy of force in this situation and as he has typhoid for much of the winter of 1862 anyway, odds are excellent he is replaced by someone else in any event. Someone like Sumner, or Franklin who are just as likely to be able to read maps and all of whom know the various geographical issues.

The US has interior lines, an impressive rail net, and only has to hold Maryland, West Virginia, Kentucky, Missouri, Colorado, New Mexico (both the latter held by local forces mind you, already armed), and send some reinforcements to California, which will likely arrive about the same time as a dispatch ship from England reaches Vancouver. After all, the Union troops only have to march along existing and known trails from railheads are far west as Rolla MO and Des Moines Iowa, or can use steamboats all the way to the Montana / Wyoming border in the Spring, or simply take the Santa Fe Trail to New Mexico and march east. (the California column reached El Paso from Los Angeles (900 miles) starting in April and reaching it in August. It will take a similar amount of time for troops to be assembled, board transports and steam from India to Vancouver (the nearest forward base). In short the race to reinforce the West Coast has about the same time frames.

CalColumnMap.jpg
 
just as aside... the history in this forum of the Trent War discussions always strikes me as the most likely historical result.... a battle of attrition (in terms of posts) that ultimately just leads to a draw and some casualties along the way .. some of whom are missed by one side or the other

I am convinced that the Trent War would be the same, or any other 19th Century War between Britain and the United States
 
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