'1859 Pig War' leads to an Actual War Between the British Empire and United States?

The idea of the British occupying centers of American production is just silly. The British Army isn't going to capture the greater NYC region, or Boston, or Philadelphia, or Pittsburg, or Springfield, or Harpers Ferry, or Norfolk, or Richmond. Their not capturing, Charleston, Mobile, New Orleans, Detroit, Albany, Baltimore, or Washington.

Why? Their defences are generally pretty poor, and they're mostly located near to the sea or along navigable rivers, making them vulnerable to attack from an enemy with naval superiority. And it's not like the British would have to occupy them long-term -- just long enough to destroy all the factories and smash every piece of industrial equipment they can find.

So the British are going to be trying to support a Southern Succession movement, while at the same time supporting a slave rebellion?

I never said the British would do everything on the list; it was just a selection of things they could do.

In 1860 California had 380,000 people, Oregon over 52,000, Washington territory over 11,000.

Yes, and contemporary wars regularly saw areas with far larger populations occupied by enemy armies.

The British Army is also very large, but it has global commitments, and can't all be used in North America. Canada has limited resources of it's own.

This is the kind of thing I meant when I said that people were assuming the British would just sit back while the Americans raise massive armies. Yes, the British army had global commitments, but so what? It's quite capable of increasing the size of its army so that it can send more troops to North America. In fact, given that it has a bigger population, more industry, access to world markets, and a pre-existing army which is actually big enough to act as a proper training cadre, I'd say that the British will find it far easier to expand their army than the Americans will.
 
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10 years earlier and the Pro-American side would be far more right about commitments and 10 years later they'd be far more right about the American industrial capacity and it's ability.

This particular period, the only commitment beyond garrisons Britain has is something like 10k troops in an allied effort into China the next year. While there would be some brutal wars coming up in a few decades, Britain would not fight an equal power until WW1. And it's not like that timeline could be advanced by much, Europe is too busy going at each other's throats to turn around to go after Britain. Austria and Prussia are going to be viewing each other as a major threat for a good few years, France is going to start turning against "Prussia" in a few years and is currently busy preparing for Italy or actively fighting Austria there. If Austria does as bad as they did OTL they'll end up facing secessionism from the Hungarian's which will keep them occupied until the 66 Prussian war, and that's on top of Austria and Prussia completely lacking any real/major fleets to threaten Britain at this time.

The only major threat to Britain in the time period theoretically is France, but during said time period they were either about to enter a war, in a war or about to enter a period of unstableness if said Britain/US war were to drag on a few years due to the French beginning to turn against the Second Empire in the 60s.

Russia definitely isn't getting involved, not only did it just get humiliated 4 years prior, but at this point the new Tsar in charge was an actual reformist, for a Tsar, who wanted to get rid of serfdom and would spend the next few years doing that. Getting involved in another war would not aid that, especially another war against an enemy who had defeated them only a few years prior. So there's no threat of Russian troops invading Canada through Russian Alaska.
 
Personally I think modern campaigns of occupation show very much how "different technological and ideological circumstances" don't change that the deciding variables are number of occupying soldiers per person and number of occupying soldiers per area.
Right: the mobile phone, the internet, encrypted email, the IED, the car bomb, high explosives, and an Islamic fundamentalism that positions the US as a 'great Satan' and promises eternal paradise to those who die fighting it had had no effect whatsoever on the difficulty of conducting campaigns of occupation in Iraq and Afghanistan. After all, when the British occupied large sections of Maine in the War of 1812, the inhabitants carried out a long-running and vicious campaign of guerrilla warfare against them, including suicide bombers driving carts filled with gunpowder into British checkpoints.

Iron, which is a very common mineral can be found in some supply anywhere that isn't a volcanic island.
And yet various US companies tried and failed to produce domestic gun-barrels, despite contracts for nearly a million barrels being available for the company that could deliver them; even after the foremost ironfounder in the United States had to personally go to Britain and plead with ironworkers in a Staffordshire pub to tell him the secret of making iron that wouldn't immediately fail under proof, the US still couldn't manage to replicate the process without serious drawbacks. Unless you presume you know more about iron than people who make their living from it, it seems that your claim is wrong.

Various kinds of nitrates can come from mineral sources or organic ones, so likewise is fairly widely distributed, at least for this era's uses.
And yet when the US government offers a lucrative contract for domestic sources of gunpowder, it gets two bids - both of which rely on importing nitre from a country other than Britain. Again, unless you're telling us you know more about nineteenth-century nitre production than people who made their livings from it, it seems like your claim is wrong.

Countries can, and have, survived and effectively fought in situations much worse than losing 50% of their exports.
Any liberal democracies, with the same protections of freedom of expression and lack of welfare provision as the United States, that had less than a year to go until a presidential election?

You can't make Canada impervious to invasion. It's not a WWI, or WWII type of war with continuous fronts.
OK: and if it's a war like the Civil War? It took the US four years to cover the 100 miles (as the crow flies) between Washington and Richmond, against a smaller, less industrialised opponent with worse weapons that was being blockaded. Generously allowing them the same rate of progress by the needlessly circuitous route you propose should mean they're in London, Ontario by 1863, Toronto by 1867, Kingston by approximately 1874, Montreal by 1879, and Quebec by 1885.

Please explain how the British can capture, or destroy New York, or Boston?
They don't have to: all they have to be able to do is to convince the US that they can. The US has to decide whether to sue for peace, or risk those coastal cities being destroyed for the sake of capturing Toronto. We know that at this very time, members of the US army were writing pamphlets to politicians explaining that the British could demolish cities like New York (including J.G. Barnard, later to be the US Chief Engineer). As such, the odds are that the US decides the trade-off isn't worth it.

The confusion about how many troops the United States can put in the field is the number of men who served between 1861-65. That's not all at one time, and some enlistments might be for the same person serving more then one tour of duty. Saying that the actual number is enormous.
Yes, and completely meaningless- perpetuated only because it allows US advocates to inflate the size of their military. A sports team that trades 50% of its membership every year still only puts the same number of players on the field as its opponent; after five years, a company with a thousand employees that hires and fires 20% of its workforce every year has a thousand employees, not two thousand; the British army in the First World War had a peak strength of 3,820,000, not the 5,704,416 men it recruited in total.

The British Army is also very large, but it has global commitments, and can't all be used in North America.
On 1 June 1860 the British army has 68,778 men of the regular army stationed in the UK (not including 33,302 men in depots). How many of those are you suggesting would be unavailable for service in Canada?
 
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Right: the mobile phone, the internet, encrypted email, the IED, the car bomb, high explosives, and an Islamic fundamentalism that positions the US as a 'great Satan' and promises eternal paradise to those who die fighting it had had no effect whatsoever on the difficulty of conducting campaigns of occupation in Iraq and Afghanistan. After all, when the British occupied large sections of Maine in the War of 1812, the inhabitants carried out a long-running and vicious campaign of guerrilla warfare against them, including suicide bombers driving carts filled with gunpowder into British checkpoints.


And yet various US companies tried and failed to produce domestic gun-barrels, despite contracts for nearly a million barrels being available for the company that could deliver them; even after the foremost ironfounder in the United States had to personally go to Britain and plead with ironworkers in a Staffordshire pub to tell him the secret of making iron that wouldn't immediately fail under proof, the US still couldn't manage to replicate the process without serious drawbacks. Unless you presume you know more about iron than people who make their living from it, it seems that your claim is wrong.


And yet when the US government offers a lucrative contract for domestic sources of gunpowder, it gets two bids - both of which rely on importing nitre from a country other than Britain. Again, unless you're telling us you know more about nineteenth-century nitre production than people who made their livings from it, it seems like your claim is wrong.


Any liberal democracies, with the same protections of freedom of expression and lack of welfare provision as the United States, that had less than a year to go until a presidential election?


OK: and if it's a war like the Civil War? It took the US four years to cover the 100 miles (as the crow flies) between Washington and Richmond, against a smaller, less industrialised opponent with worse weapons that was being blockaded. Generously allowing them the same rate of progress by the needlessly circuitous route you propose should mean they're in London, Ontario by 1863, Toronto by 1867, Kingston by approximately 1874, Montreal by 1879, and Quebec by 1885.


They don't have to: all they have to be able to do is to convince the US that they can. The US has to decide whether to sue for peace, or risk those coastal cities being destroyed for the sake of capturing Toronto. We know that at this very time, members of the US army were writing pamphlets to politicians explaining that the British could demolish cities like New York (including J.G. Barnard, later to be the US Chief Engineer). As such, the odds are that the US decides the trade-off isn't worth it.


Yes, and completely meaningless- perpetuated only because it allows US advocates to inflate the size of their military. A sports team that trades 50% of its membership every year still only puts the same number of players on the field as its opponent; after five years, a company with a thousand employees that hires and fires 20% of its workforce every year has a thousand employees, not two thousand; the British army in the First World War had a peak strength of 3,820,000, not the 5,704,416 men it recruited in total.


On 1 June 1860 the British army has 68,778 men of the regular army stationed in the UK (not including 33,302 men in depots). How many of those are you suggesting would be unavailable for service in Canada?
Re: the link... dammit I knew it should have been Cockburn sent to New Orleans rather than Cochrane! There was a man who could get things done :p

Not that I think things would be likely to go back to that in 1859-60, even with Palmerston as PM. Seeing a substantial part of the British Fleet parked just off the mouths of the Chesapeake, the Delaware, the Hudson, off Cape Cod, etc should be enough to get the point across before any shots are actually fired outside of the Oregon/Columbia District...
 
If the only way for the US to clearly win is to take, and hold, Canada first, and one wants to show the US clearly winning, then anything that shows that that won't or can't happen must be ignored.

(edited to be clear it's the idea I'm arguing against)

I mean, I can personally come up with a few scenarios where the US can win against the British in this period. Some of them are just about better timing and British commitments being elsewhere. It's difficult but not impossible and you can write some believable scenarios. The problem is it also tends to involve both sides getting pretty bloodied and doing things which we would probably define as stupid.
 
I believe the fact that this thread has gone on for 8 pages does, in fact, prove that a disagreement over a pig can escalate out of control :p
 

AZrailwhale

Banned
I understand that the situation isn't the same but how can the United States be in a state to beat the United Kingdom? This war is set in 1859 and the Trent Affair is in 1861 what could have changed that makes it so they can win here but not just a few years later? Because I fail to see how the US is able to beat them here.
The US isn’t already fighting a war. The UK would be trying to fight a war literally on the far side of the world. The RN has no bases closer than Australia in the Pacific and only a small base in British Columbia. The US had SF Bay, probably the finest harbor in the world as well as San Diego Bay which is nearly as good. SF would be safe from attack because both Fort Point and Fort Alcatraz were complete and dominated the Golden Gate. British Columbia had no similar fortifications. The RN would lose its Puget Sound base in short order and the British would be forced to attempt to fight a war on the far side of a wild and hostile continent. The only British base on the East Coast would be Halifax which was wide open to a US invasion from Maine. There was even a railroad to support the attack. Halifax would fall quickly leaving a Britain no way to get troops into Canada. Any troops would have to come from India which since the Sepoy Revolt only ended two years before wouldn’t be likely to release reliable troops, or all the way from the UK. I believe that the British would lose a land war badly especially since they would be up against The varsity of a united American army. The British might have one or two generals in the league of Lee, Grant, Sheridan, Forest, and the other West Point alumni But that’s it. The British also weren’t used to campaigning on the geographical scale of North America and I don’t think they had the logistics skill to support such a war. The British army still was selling officers commissions, so I doubt the quality of the field grade officers would approach the American professional West Point graduates.
Yes the RN could probably blockade the East Coast at least for a while, but blockades don’t win land wars.
 
The US isn’t already fighting a war. The UK would be trying to fight a war literally on the far side of the world. The RN has no bases closer than Australia in the Pacific and only a small base in British Columbia. The US had SF Bay, probably the finest harbor in the world as well as San Diego Bay which is nearly as good. SF would be safe from attack because both Fort Point and Fort Alcatraz were complete and dominated the Golden Gate. British Columbia had no similar fortifications. The RN would lose its Puget Sound base in short order and the British would be forced to attempt to fight a war on the far side of a wild and hostile continent. The only British base on the East Coast would be Halifax which was wide open to a US invasion from Maine. There was even a railroad to support the attack. Halifax would fall quickly leaving a Britain no way to get troops into Canada. Any troops would have to come from India which since the Sepoy Revolt only ended two years before wouldn’t be likely to release reliable troops, or all the way from the UK. I believe that the British would lose a land war badly especially since they would be up against The varsity of a united American army. The British might have one or two generals in the league of Lee, Grant, Sheridan, Forest, and the other West Point alumni But that’s it. The British also weren’t used to campaigning on the geographical scale of North America and I don’t think they had the logistics skill to support such a war. The British army still was selling officers commissions, so I doubt the quality of the field grade officers would approach the American professional West Point graduates.
Yes the RN could probably blockade the East Coast at least for a while, but blockades don’t win land wars.

While this may all be true we are talking a US that has about 29,000 troops tops in 1859. In contrast to this in 1854, the East India Company's armies numbered 280,000. I'm sure the UK had way more in other parts of the world.

Sure in the civil war the US formed a fairly good size army but didn't they get alot for their materials to make those weapons from the United Kingdom. In a war, this stops cold. This means the US needs to retool everything and that takes time likely half a year or more. A war over the killing of a pig is unlikely to last that long so a few wins and a blockade should see the war to an end.

The US could maybe win such a win. But you're talking about a second rate power at best beating a world power. This is the United Kingdom the 19th century equivalent of the United States. They can block us off. We however likely can't do the same to them. They can hit us from the west, the north, the east, and maybe even the south if they had anything in the Caribbean.

So the way I see it is that the US fights a guerrilla war. Hitting them and fleeing only to hit them again sometime later. The UK doesn't need to win a land war. They need only keep us from getting anything into our ports. With an empire that spans the world, I'm sure they have the ships to block off most of the east coast.

I'm not saying the UK wins a war with the United States but I'm saying they should be able to not lose a war to us. At worst we lose some land at best the US returns to the status quo.
 
Right: the mobile phone, the internet, encrypted email, the IED, the car bomb, high explosives, and an Islamic fundamentalism that positions the US as a 'great Satan' and promises eternal paradise to those who die fighting it had had no effect whatsoever on the difficulty of conducting campaigns of occupation in Iraq and Afghanistan. After all, when the British occupied large sections of Maine in the War of 1812, the inhabitants carried out a long-running and vicious campaign of guerrilla warfare against them, including suicide bombers driving carts filled with gunpowder into British checkpoints.


And yet various US companies tried and failed to produce domestic gun-barrels, despite contracts for nearly a million barrels being available for the company that could deliver them; even after the foremost ironfounder in the United States had to personally go to Britain and plead with ironworkers in a Staffordshire pub to tell him the secret of making iron that wouldn't immediately fail under proof, the US still couldn't manage to replicate the process without serious drawbacks. Unless you presume you know more about iron than people who make their living from it, it seems that your claim is wrong.


And yet when the US government offers a lucrative contract for domestic sources of gunpowder, it gets two bids - both of which rely on importing nitre from a country other than Britain. Again, unless you're telling us you know more about nineteenth-century nitre production than people who made their livings from it, it seems like your claim is wrong.


Any liberal democracies, with the same protections of freedom of expression and lack of welfare provision as the United States, that had less than a year to go until a presidential election?


OK: and if it's a war like the Civil War? It took the US four years to cover the 100 miles (as the crow flies) between Washington and Richmond, against a smaller, less industrialised opponent with worse weapons that was being blockaded. Generously allowing them the same rate of progress by the needlessly circuitous route you propose should mean they're in London, Ontario by 1863, Toronto by 1867, Kingston by approximately 1874, Montreal by 1879, and Quebec by 1885.


They don't have to: all they have to be able to do is to convince the US that they can. The US has to decide whether to sue for peace, or risk those coastal cities being destroyed for the sake of capturing Toronto. We know that at this very time, members of the US army were writing pamphlets to politicians explaining that the British could demolish cities like New York (including J.G. Barnard, later to be the US Chief Engineer). As such, the odds are that the US decides the trade-off isn't worth it.


Yes, and completely meaningless- perpetuated only because it allows US advocates to inflate the size of their military. A sports team that trades 50% of its membership every year still only puts the same number of players on the field as its opponent; after five years, a company with a thousand employees that hires and fires 20% of its workforce every year has a thousand employees, not two thousand; the British army in the First World War had a peak strength of 3,820,000, not the 5,704,416 men it recruited in total.


On 1 June 1860 the British army has 68,778 men of the regular army stationed in the UK (not including 33,302 men in depots). How many of those are you suggesting would be unavailable for service in Canada?

Once more the nitrate issue has been dealt with, you just won't accept the answer. It's just amazing that anyone in the world could make gunpowder without British help. It's also amazing that anyone could make gun barrels ether. Nobody in the 19th Century had much in the way of welfare provisions. Wide areas of mid Victorian England were horrible places to live even in peace time, which is why so many people immigrated to find a better life. If your analysis of the ACW is based on the war in Virginia alone you need to broaden your reading. A war in Canada would be one of maneuver, only the area between Lake Champlain, and Montreal would be a head on clash.

The pamphlets your referenced don't exactly say that. There talking about an Anglo/French invasion of American, similar to the Crimean War, and contrasting it with the War of 1812. They also talked about an American invasion of Cuba, and quite a few other subjects. Defending NYC from a British naval attack is a separate subject. These pamphlets seem to have missed the most important naval development of the Crimean War, that shell guns can quickly reduce wooden warships to burning wreaks. New York City was defended by forts mounting hundreds of guns, and chain ship barriers. A fleet trying to enter NY Harbor has to pass easily defended narrows. If it survived getting into the Harbor they'd be in a shooting gallery, with batteries in Manhattan, Brooklyn, Staten Island, and City Island blasting them from every direction. Then there's the fleet in the Brooklyn Navy yard.

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipe...r_-_Geographicus_-_NewYorkCity3-uscs-1866.jpg

Boston is also easily covered by forts, and batteries. The British were forced to evacuate the City in 1776 because the Continental Army captured, and placed a gun battery on Dorchester Heights. Boston was well protected by forts, and batteries as well. You have to sail around islands, and nearby points of land to get near Boston, you can't just shell it from a distance.

As for the British having over 68,000 troops in Great Britain, they did in 1854 as well.

When the war broke out, there were nominally 70,000 soldiers stationed in Britain, but this included units at sea proceeding to or from overseas postings, some recruits not yet trained, and large numbers of soldiers too infirm to serve in the field. To furnish a field army of 25,000 for the expedition, almost the entire effective establishment in Britain was dispatched and the garrison in India was dangerously weakened.[25] The army that took part in the Siege of Sebastopol was badly led, but won some victories at high cost. The system of sale of commissions came under scrutiny during the war, especially in connection with the Battle of Balaclava, which was notable for the ill-fated Charge of the Light Brigade.

The staff work of the Commissariat Department, responsible for supplies and transport, proved unequal to the demands of the campaign. Supplies often arrived late, and were not distributed until they rotted. Commissariat officers adhered to arbitrary peacetime regulations, for example, refusing to issue nails in quantities less than one ton. The result was the death of many soldiers through disease (exacerbated by dietary deficiencies) and exposure during the winter of 1854–1855.[26]

Units in the British Isles weren't a huge reserve of soldiers, available for rapid deployment. They were on garrison duty. They were used to suppress civil disturbances, and occupy Ireland. The health, and wellbeing of the army was worse then the civilian population. The army resisted all efforts at reform, and the army of 1859 wasn't much different then in 1854. The British Army didn't significantly change till the reforms of 1868. The army of 1859 wasn't a massive juggernaut, just waiting to be unleashed against the hapless Americans.
 
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The US isn’t already fighting a war.

As already mentioned, they kinda were. A good chunk of the pre-crisis army is stuck in Utah and has to march either overland to Oregon or back overland towards the East Coast if they want to do anything meaningful, while the mainstay of the army is largely scattered in penny packet garrisons around the continent.

The UK would be trying to fight a war literally on the far side of the world. The RN has no bases closer than Australia in the Pacific and only a small base in British Columbia. The US had SF Bay, probably the finest harbor in the world as well as San Diego Bay which is nearly as good. SF would be safe from attack because both Fort Point and Fort Alcatraz were complete and dominated the Golden Gate. British Columbia had no similar fortifications. The RN would lose its Puget Sound base in short order and the British would be forced to attempt to fight a war on the far side of a wild and hostile continent.

They have docking facilities at Valparaiso, and the facilities at Esquimalt you mentioned. That being said, they don't really have anything to fear from the forts near SF. A mere three years later than the time we're discussing, the commander of the American naval forces on the Pacific dismissed them as useless and said that half the squadron at Esquimalt could command possession of San Francisco. The forts were not fully finished and their armaments were, even for the period, not particularly impressive.

As for fortifications in British Columbia, true, but the Royal Navy commands the waters around it, and any American force would have to march over a thousand miles through largely wilderness towards an underdeveloped region which might not sustain more than a battalion. They aren't going by sea because of the aforementioned Royal Navy.

The only British base on the East Coast would be Halifax which was wide open to a US invasion from Maine. There was even a railroad to support the attack. Halifax would fall quickly leaving a Britain no way to get troops into Canada. Any troops would have to come from India which since the Sepoy Revolt only ended two years before wouldn’t be likely to release reliable troops, or all the way from the UK.

I don't think so unfortunately. Not only is there not a railroad connecting Maine to Nova Scotia, but the railroads in Maine only go as far as Bangor, and no farther. Any attempt at Halifax would have to first slog it overland through Maine towards the New Brunswick frontier, invade New Brunswick, march overland to the Isthmus of Chignecto, and fight it's way through a constricted choke point which would be a nightmare, trying to hold off naval attacks the whole way, then it would have to march overland again to try and put Halifax under siege. I don't believe this is a viable strategy.

I believe that the British would lose a land war badly especially since they would be up against The varsity of a united American army. The British might have one or two generals in the league of Lee, Grant, Sheridan, Forest, and the other West Point alumni But that’s it. The British also weren’t used to campaigning on the geographical scale of North America and I don’t think they had the logistics skill to support such a war. The British army still was selling officers commissions, so I doubt the quality of the field grade officers would approach the American professional West Point graduates.

I'm genuinely confused how a man educated at West Point is supposed to be superior to someone educated at Sandhurst or Woolwich. West Point produced some genuine duds, and so did Sandhurst and Woolwish, but enough competent and well trained men that the main difference in this war might come down to that the British have more recent experience in the Crimea and India commanding larger formations while the US only put large formations in the field a decade earlier in Mexico.

I don't give the idea that the British don't have the experience campaigning on the scale of North America when they've just been campaigning on the Indian subcontinent any credence however.
 
Once more the nitrate issue has been dealt with, you just would accept the answer.
I don't get the impression that it's our side refusing to accept the truth, to be perfectly honest.

It's just amazing that anyone in the world could make gunpowder with British help. It's also amazing that anyone could make gun barrels ether.
Frankly, I was actually amazed when I saw the evidence that the US was so dependent on key British strategic imports. Having seen it, however, I accepted it rather than spending my time trying to argue it away because it was inconvenient to me.

Nobody in the 19th Century had much in the way of welfare provisions.
No, but Germany in WWI did, and they're the only power off the top of my head that I can think of which lost 50% of their exports and still fought on for a while. I notice you have nothing to say about the political factors which mean the US will be brought to the table far quicker than other comparable states.

If your analysis of the ACW is based on the war in Virginia alone you need to broaden your reading.
The reason I picked it was because the Confederate industrial and economic inferiority wasn't as marked in the east as the west, which gave us a bit of a better indication of how successful the US might be against a power that is its economic and industrial superior. However, if you insist, let's base it off the war in the west. It took until September 1863 (30 months) for the US to secure Chattanooga, and September 1864 (42 months) to secure Atlanta. They're 280 and 365 miles respectively from Cincinnati, and 260 and 350 miles respectively from Cairo. At the best case scenario of just over nine miles per month, the US should be in Montreal in four years, eight months. Certainly better than 1885, but hardly the blistering war of movement represented by, say, the Franco-Prussian war (210 miles from Saarbrucken to Paris in two months).

The pamphlets your referenced don't exactly say that. There talking about an Anglo/French invasion of American, similar to the Crimean War, and contrasting it with the War of 1812.
To be honest, when I already gave you first-hand testimony that "the conditions of defence of the city [New York] were very faulty", I shouldn't really be surprised that I can give you something else saying "the security of New York requires a vast addition to what now exists" and still find you arguing the following:

New York City was defended by forts mounting hundreds of guns... Boston is also easily covered by forts, and batteries
You ducked this question before when I asked it, and I just want a straight answer before I lay out some primary evidence: Are you 100% certain that these forts have guns in them?

As for the British having over 68,000 troops in Great Britain, they did in 1854 as well.
Your quote says that "there were nominally 70,000 soldiers stationed in Britain, but this included... some recruits not yet trained", and that the British despatched 25,000 troops. Including depots ("recruits not trained," even though some men in depots were trained) in the 1860 figure, the British have 102,080 men in the UK. As such, if they despatched 25,000 men to the Crimea in 1854, they could despatch 25,000 + (102,000 - 70,000) = 57,080 to Canada in 1859 - 7,000 more than the number I suggested. And that doesn't include the fact that the British militia didn't exist in 1854, but as the war went on took on both the responsibility for garrisoning the UK, and foreign garrisons in areas such as the Ionian Islands, thereby providing a manpower reserve available in 1859 but not in 1854.

The British might have one or two generals in the league of Lee, Grant, Sheridan, Forest, and the other West Point alumni But that’s it.
I'm genuinely confused how a man educated at West Point is supposed to be superior to someone educated at Sandhurst or Woolwich. West Point produced some genuine duds, and so did Sandhurst and Woolwish, but enough competent and well trained men that the main difference in this war might come down to that the British have more recent experience in the Crimea and India commanding larger formations while the US only put large formations in the field a decade earlier in Mexico.
Yes, interesting that none of the people actually named as top potential US generals were actually put in command of either side at the start of the Civil War. Instead, they had time to hone their skills in minor theatres while others who had the responsibility of command thrust upon them crashed and burned. Name the actual people entrusted with the conduct of the war at its start - McDowell, McClellan, Fremont, Halleck, Wool, Banks, Dix, Butler, Mansfield, Garnett, Beauregard, Polk, Johnston, etc. - and the talent pool starts to look a lot worse.
 
The US isn’t already fighting a war. The UK would be trying to fight a war literally on the far side of the world. The RN has no bases closer than Australia in the Pacific and only a small base in British Columbia. The US had SF Bay, probably the finest harbor in the world as well as San Diego Bay which is nearly as good. SF would be safe from attack because both Fort Point and Fort Alcatraz were complete and dominated the Golden Gate. British Columbia had no similar fortifications. The RN would lose its Puget Sound base in short order and the British would be forced to attempt to fight a war on the far side of a wild and hostile continent. The only British base on the East Coast would be Halifax which was wide open to a US invasion from Maine. There was even a railroad to support the attack. Halifax would fall quickly leaving a Britain no way to get troops into Canada. Any troops would have to come from India which since the Sepoy Revolt only ended two years before wouldn’t be likely to release reliable troops, or all the way from the UK. I believe that the British would lose a land war badly especially since they would be up against The varsity of a united American army. The British might have one or two generals in the league of Lee, Grant, Sheridan, Forest, and the other West Point alumni But that’s it. The British also weren’t used to campaigning on the geographical scale of North America and I don’t think they had the logistics skill to support such a war. The British army still was selling officers commissions, so I doubt the quality of the field grade officers would approach the American professional West Point graduates.
Yes the RN could probably blockade the East Coast at least for a while, but blockades don’t win land wars.
Excuse me, the quality of the faculty at the Royal Military Academy Woolwich was exceptional. When Charles "Chinese" Gordon "of Khartoum" was a gentleman cadet the Professor of Chemistry was Michael Faraday. His successor, Frederick Abel, was the man who came up with the safe way of producing Guncotton after people had just stopped making it for 15 years. Faraday's contemporary as Professor of Mathematics was Peter Barlow the man who literally wrote the book of mathematical tables that everyone used before the invention of the electronic calculator. In 1859 the Professor of Mathematics was James Sylvester, who later became the inaugural Professor of Mathematic at John Hopkins University, and founded the American Journal of Mathematics*, and the man who invented the term "graph".
"The Shop" was graduating classes over 3 times the size of West Point's.

Arguably the most brilliant minds in the world were teaching the Officers of the British Army.

[For one campaign, Garnet Wolseley, conducted a topographical survey, though he was not officially a Royal Engineer he was just that good, and had a pre-fabricated bridge constructed and shipped to Africa, in a less than two months. (Incidentally he was one of the Officers sent to Canada during the Trent Incident) So lets have a little less of the British Officers lacking in the logistical skills to conduct a campaign on another continent shall we.]

The British Army in 1859 also had a Staff College**, at the time referred to as the Senior Division of the Royal Military College Sandhurst, older than West Point itself, something the US Army lacked entirely.

(*He moved to the United States for work, as compulsory retirement for the staff was 55. He later returned to Britain to take up the post of Savilian Professor of Geometry at Oxford)
(** Admittedly barely a dozen graduates a year, but that's still better than none at all!)
 
The staff work of the Commissariat Department, responsible for supplies and transport, proved unequal to the demands of the campaign.

I mean, the British force remained battle-worthy throughout the war, so for all its shortcomings it looks like the Commissariat Department was actually equal to the demands of the campaign.

Plus, of course, supplying an army in British-controlled land (Canada) would be far easier than supplying an army camped on a beachhead in the Crimea, hundreds of miles away from friendly territory.
 
I don't get the impression that it's our side refusing to accept the truth, to be perfectly honest.


Frankly, I was actually amazed when I saw the evidence that the US was so dependent on key British strategic imports. Having seen it, however, I accepted it rather than spending my time trying to argue it away because it was inconvenient to me.


No, but Germany in WWI did, and they're the only power off the top of my head that I can think of which lost 50% of their exports and still fought on for a while. I notice you have nothing to say about the political factors which mean the US will be brought to the table far quicker than other comparable states.


The reason I picked it was because the Confederate industrial and economic inferiority wasn't as marked in the east as the west, which gave us a bit of a better indication of how successful the US might be against a power that is its economic and industrial superior. However, if you insist, let's base it off the war in the west. It took until September 1863 (30 months) for the US to secure Chattanooga, and September 1864 (42 months) to secure Atlanta. They're 280 and 365 miles respectively from Cincinnati, and 260 and 350 miles respectively from Cairo. At the best case scenario of just over nine miles per month, the US should be in Montreal in four years, eight months. Certainly better than 1885, but hardly the blistering war of movement represented by, say, the Franco-Prussian war (210 miles from Saarbrucken to Paris in two months).


To be honest, when I already gave you first-hand testimony that "the conditions of defence of the city [New York] were very faulty", I shouldn't really be surprised that I can give you something else saying "the security of New York requires a vast addition to what now exists" and still find you arguing the following:


You ducked this question before when I asked it, and I just want a straight answer before I lay out some primary evidence: Are you 100% certain that these forts have guns in them?


Your quote says that "there were nominally 70,000 soldiers stationed in Britain, but this included... some recruits not yet trained", and that the British despatched 25,000 troops. Including depots ("recruits not trained," even though some men in depots were trained) in the 1860 figure, the British have 102,080 men in the UK. As such, if they despatched 25,000 men to the Crimea in 1854, they could despatch 25,000 + (102,000 - 70,000) = 57,080 to Canada in 1859 - 7,000 more than the number I suggested. And that doesn't include the fact that the British militia didn't exist in 1854, but as the war went on took on both the responsibility for garrisoning the UK, and foreign garrisons in areas such as the Ionian Islands, thereby providing a manpower reserve available in 1859 but not in 1854.


Yes, interesting that none of the people actually named as top potential US generals were actually put in command of either side at the start of the Civil War. Instead, they had time to hone their skills in minor theatres while others who had the responsibility of command thrust upon them crashed and burned. Name the actual people entrusted with the conduct of the war at its start - McDowell, McClellan, Fremont, Halleck, Wool, Banks, Dix, Butler, Mansfield, Garnett, Beauregard, Polk, Johnston, etc. - and the talent pool starts to look a lot worse.

The endless argument about gun barrels is based on a technical argument that the U.S. armories were using British Steel. Logically you have to ask some follow on questions. What stocks of British Steel did the American have? How did they make rifle barrels before they used British Steel? what alternatives did they have? The, lets call it pro British side is saying there was no short term solution, that some type of retooling would be needed that would greatly reduce American production, crippling their war effort. On the other side, call it the pro American side say they would manage.

Since this war didn't happen we can't say for sure what would happen, but we do have some clues. The Confederates had no access to British Steel yet they used the machinery from Harpers Ferry, and Norfolk to make rifles, with no apparent problem. Other Southern contractors also produced rifles. The CSA even tried to standardize their rifle caliber to .577 Enfield standard, which means they retooled some of their equipment. Confederate rifles didn't have a reputation for bursting. It would seem to be a reasonable assumption that if the Confederacy managed without British Steel so could the United States.

The same arguments are made for gunpowder production. The Confederates lacked regular accesses to British nitrates, but they built the Confederate Powder Works in Augusta GA.

The Confederate Powderworks was the second largest gunpowder factory in the world at that time, 1862-1865, during the 19th century, producing 3.5 tons a day. More than 2.75 million pounds of first-quality gunpowder (a majority of the powder used by the Confederacy), was produced here before its closure on April 18, 1865.[5] By comparison, Union gunpowder manufacture was distributed among many mills, with the larger Hazard Powder Company of Connecticut producing forty percent of the annual production of 8.4 million pounds.[6]

It has been said the Confederacy never lost a battle for lack of powder.

Again if the Confederates could do that so could the United States.

What happened with Germany in WWI isn't a helpful analogy, Germany was running out of food, the U.S. wasn't. Napoleonic France, or the U.S. in the War of 1812 would be more to the point. Both were able to maintain wartime economies for years, in the case of France decades.

Please lay out some primary evidence that the Forts of NY had no guns in them, or the booms had no chains. I'm sure you can provide sources that will say many of the forts lacked their full compliment of guns, that would be true of most of the forts in the world. Some guns were never mounted, others replaced with more modern guns, others moved to batteries in earthen works, some were being repaired. Some forts were never, or only partly compete. In times of crisis the state of defenses was improved, more guns mounted, and men mobilized.

No commander ever thinks his forces are fully adequate for the job, and would always recommend improving them. The bottom line is shell guns made wooden warship highly vulnerable. At The Battle of Kinburn ships of the line were unable to deliver effective fire from 1,200 yards, and the defenders were armed with nothing heavier then 24 pounders. The American forts mounted.

Smoothbore weapons:[19]
32-pounder (6.4-inch or 163 mm) and 42-pounder (7-inch or 178 mm) seacoast guns
8-inch (203 mm) and 10-inch (254 mm) columbiads
8-inch, 10-inch, 15-inch (381 mm) and 20-inch (508 mm) Rodman guns (a type of columbiad)
Rifled weapons:[20]
Rifled and sometimes banded variants of smoothbore guns ranging from 24-pounder (5.82-inch) to 10-inch caliber; one Union rifling system was called the James rifle
6.4-inch (100-pdr), 8-inch (200-pdr), and 10-inch (300-pdr) Parrott rifles
6.4-inch and 7-inch (178 mm) Brooke rifles (Confederate made)

The mason forts were proven vulnerable to bombardment from rifled guns, but that was from a sustained bombardment from a land battery. A wooden warship couldn't survive that kind of duel. Standing in the Lower New York Bay, and slugging it out with the Brooklyn, and Staten Island forts, or running up the Verrazano Narrows would be suicide. Running up a fleet would have to hope they could break the boom across the river. If they couldn't, or were just forced to slow, and bunch up under the American guns the slaughter would be terrible. Even the Union Ironclad fleet that attacked Charleston in April 1863 had to withdrew, under fire, a wooden fleet would've burned.

On invading Canada vs. the South, they are very different conditions.

The 1861 Census marked the third collection of statistics for the Province of Canada. In 1841, the Act of Union created the Province of Canada, consisting of Canada West (present-day Ontario) and Canada East (present-day Quebec). Information on population was also collected for New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island.

The census officially began on:

  • January 14, 1861 for Canada East and for Canada West;
  • March 30, 1861 for Nova Scotia;
  • August 15, 1861 for New Brunswick.
The precise date of collection of data is unknown for Prince Edward Island.

The enumerators collected information for 3,112,269 individuals distributed as follows:

  • Canada East (1,110,664)
  • Canada West (1,396,091)
  • New Brunswick (193,800)
  • Nova Scotia (330,857)
  • Prince Edward Island (80,857)
The region west of Montreal was very lightly populated, and most of the country is more open. An American army moving around Lakes Erie, and Ontario is just crossing a lot of space, with less trouble securing it's lines of communication then they did moving along the populated river routes into the South, with heavy forests, swamps, partisans, raiding cavalry, and Confederate strong points.

re-Confederation Ontario was a mainly agricultural society. In 1860, over 80% of the population lived in rural areas. Subsistence farming was the predominant activity, even though farmers were increasingly able to sell part of their crops on the commercial market.

The few existing industries at the time were small and employed only a handful of workers. Industry was based in logging and mills, in canal and railway construction, and in the manufacture of farm implements, shoes and clothes.

The end of the British preferential system had a serious negative impact on Ontario's economy. Ontario's exports of wheat and wood through Montreal lost their preferred status. To offset this loss, the Canadian government negotiated the Reciprocity Treaty with the United States. It would be in effect from 1854 to 1866.

Population and Urban Development
At the time of Confederation in 1867, about 3.5 million people had settled in the British North American colonies. Seventy-five percent of these people lived in Ontario and Quebec.

The 1871 census indicates that the population of Ontario was over 1.6 million. Of these, 1.3 million were British (42% Irish, 32% English, 24% Scottish, and 3% Welsh), 159,000 were German, and 75,000 were French. The most popular religious affiliations among the populace broke down as follows: 29% Methodist; 22% Presbyterian; 20% Anglican; 17% Catholic; and 5% Baptist.

From 1840 to 1861, the population of Canada West grew substantially, from 432,000 inhabitants in 1840 to 952,000 in 1851, and 1,396,000 in 1861. In 1861, Toronto (pop. 45,000), Hamilton (pop. 19,000), Ottawa (pop. 15,000) and Kingston (pop. 14,000) were the largest cities in Ontario. These centres experienced strong urban, commercial and industrial growth. Montreal, however, remained the metropolis of United Canada, with a population of 90,000 in 1861.

Toronto (pop. 45,000) Ottawa (pop. 15,000) Kingston (pop. 14,000)

The British army resisted the new militia, wanting nothing to do with them. They were accepted for service in later years. In 1859 they were basically a home guard. Your figures are a misunderstanding the manpower flows of the army. The numbers are similar to what they were in 1854, your counting the number of recruits as if there were none in 1854. In the 2 years of the Crimean War Britain committed over 100,000 men for the conflict. That not all at one time, it's men who were feed into the conflict, like the 3,000,000 figure for men serving in the ACW. It might take a year to build an Army of 57,000 men for Canada, and that's not for one field army, it's for the whole country.

Leaders work themselves out, and the Americans produced first rate leaders within months. Who were the outstanding British war leaders of the Crimean War? Many brave soldiers yes, but who were the best generals commanding Divisions, and Corps? Who were the daring cavalry leaders, who were the eyes, and ears of the army, who screened movements, and raided enemy rear areas? Were their Henry Hunt's, or Porter Alexander's in the British army? Maybe but did they get their chance in a war on such a large scale as they would be fighting? I don't think you can claim the British leadership would be superior.
 
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