Mississippi theatre, part 3 : January 1843
Next installment. Gah... this took forever to write. Sorry.
Mississippi theatre, part 3 : January 1843
[FONT=Arial, sans-serif]The morning after the main battle, the British look around and see what a disaster they have. They have on hand 11k troops who are still effective, and they need many more than that. The first priority has to be to deal with the battle ground on the west bank of the river. There are 4k surrendered troops, and 6k American wounded. Those almost outnumber the effective British troops on hand. Sure, they're 'surrendered', but what if they decide to 'unsurrender'? Moreover, there are still the 3k US troops dug into Baton Rouge (the 'invalid camp'), the 4k who fled the battlefield (mostly northwards), the 'wounded/sick' camp up by Rojo, and thousands of US soldiers in penny-packets up the river stranded in various places.[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, sans-serif]Moreover, trying to give proper care to the thousands of seriously wounded on this battlefield is a huge problem. There are some 6k US wounded and 2k+ British.[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, sans-serif]The dead are slightly less of a problem. While digging any kind of graves for thousands of bodies quickly is a major task, it is a task the the PoWs can legitimately be put to – and they don't mind so much, as most of the dead are their own. While the captured PoWs are depressed because they're captured and their attack failed, they do get some solace from the following facts: 1) they are finally being fed (their food had pretty much run out before the attack), 2) their wounded were being treated better than they could have done (medical supplies were a lower priority in the hellish trip south than food and ammunition were), and 3) their dead were being buried respectfully.[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, sans-serif]General Quincy made several arrangements on the morning of the 4th. He sent a small party under flag of truce to the US force dug into Baton Rouge, and made them a proposition; he sent messages both south (to New Orleans) north (to Winchester) screaming for help, both for more troops, and for instructions on how to deal with such a massive number of prisoners; he sent a message north under white flag to Memphis warning them of the outcome and asking that prisoner exchange negotiations be considered. He also started to deal with the military mop up operation.[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, sans-serif]However, his current force of 11k is woefully inadequate to deal with the various calls on his forces. He could cheerfully use all 11k to retake Baton Rouge, to deal with the battlefield mess, to deal with the invalid camp or to sweep the banks of the Mississippi for stragglers. Unfortunately, he doesn't HAVE 4 forces that size, he has one.[/FONT]
Baton Rouge
[FONT=Arial, sans-serif]The proposition for the US forces in Baton Rouge was basically a ceasefire for several days, with no fighting to be resumed until the truce was called off by one side or the other. In the meantime, Quincy expects the US forces to treat the civilians in Baton Rouge with honour and the soldiers are to maintain discipline. The battle on the western bank was an overwhelming British victory, and the US forces were in a pretty hopeless position there. OTOH, dealing with the aftermath of the battle meant that taking them out now would be expensive, and do serious damage to the town. And, again, they might reasonably not believe the scale of the British victory. He offers a small party of US officers to come across and visit the battlefield to see for themselves. [/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, sans-serif]On the American side, they are running low on ammunition, especially for their Hall Rifles, they're currently safe, they can't take on the rest of Louisiana all by themselves, so waiting for the situation to jell makes a lot of sense. They can't actively accomplish anything now. And in the meantime, they are of some military use to the US, simply by tieing down some of Quincy's forces. So they're prepared to wait. On the other hand, if the US should win (probably by the attack through Tejas, but possibly by another attack south), then they can still be on the winning side. And even if they should have to eventually surrender, they're a big enough force they should be able to negotiate reasonable terms. So, these soldiers are in no hurry to surrender for now.[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, sans-serif]Actually, Quincy's first offer, which he thought was entirely reasonable, was for the Baton Rouge force to surrender their arms and be transported north out of British territory. However, Brigadier Albert Green [1] the commanding officer felt that staying a thorn in the British side in town and waiting reinforcements was more appropriate. Once that offer was refused, Quincy considered retaking Baton Rouge before dealing with the 'invalid' camp, but decided that the Baton Rouge force was 'safe' for the moment, and stable for now, the only task at hand where he could say that.[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, sans-serif]Unstated, but understood by both sides is that this time gives the US forces there the opportunity to dig in and make a military assault very expensive. [/FONT]
Southern help
[FONT=Arial, sans-serif]The appeal for help south to New Orleans was ineffectual. While the message travelled fairly quickly, being able to go downstream on the river, the governor had his hands full and could spare no men and little consideration for the northern defence force. He still had to deal with the attack out of Tejas, which was yet to come, and deal with unrest in New Orleans and the south. While the US plans of uprisings came to nought, he couldn't really trust the American community and had to keep a close watch on them. Moreover, he was rather annoyed at being subordinated to overall command in a single North American theatre – so his response was essentially 'ask Winchester for help, I have none to spare'. In fact, the governor strongly hints that Quincy should be supplying HIM with troops, at least until the promised reinforcements arrived.[/FONT]
Northern help
[FONT=Arial, sans-serif]The appeal for help north to Missouri and Winchester is also ineffectual for the moment, although will bear fruit later. Missouri is swamped with their own problems, and the communication lags are such that Winchester simply can't reply before the end of the month. Then, too, the Indiana theatre is taking precedence, and logistics are awful. Once reinforcements arrive, well, we'll see then. [/FONT]
Military mop up on the West Bank near Baton Rouge
[FONT=Arial, sans-serif]Quincy organized several small operations with relatively small numbers of men. The largest group was a handful of regiments to head north, to block off the retreat of the fleeing US soldiers. A smaller group (just some scouts) was sent to check out the 'invalid' camp near the Rojo. He also formally organizes a brown-water naval patrol of the Mississippi to keep the US from trying to reinforce or resupply or reorganize their forces. The bulk of his men are still tied down at the site of the battle, caring for the wounded (from both sides) and guarding prisoners.[/FONT]
blocking force
[FONT=Arial, sans-serif]While some 4k Americans had fled (mostly back north), they fled as individuals and small bands, and Quincy figured (correctly, as it later turned out), that 2-3k disciplined soldiers across their retreat path could deal with most of them and get them to surrender. The biggest problem was moving them south under guard, without draining the blocking force too much. Over the next week or so, this force rounds up some 2.5k of the 4 retreating soldiers, some 500 made it to the 'invalid' camp and a thousand were unaccounted for.[2][/FONT]
Riverine patrols
[FONT=Arial, sans-serif]As long as the Brits have total control over the lower Mississippi, the thousands of lost and separated US forces can be dealt with in detail. If the 'invalid camp' and Baton Rouge get no reinforcements nor resupply, they can not become a serious threat. (Well, not a serious military threat. They could be a serious brigand threat if they dispersed.) Similarly, there are some 10k troops who disappeared from the US force as it came down the river. At this point, no one knows how many of them were killed (in battle or drowned), and how many made it to one shore or the other. The British suspect that those men are mostly alive and could be a major threat if they were allowed to regroup and join an effective US force (whether it be the 'invalid camp' at the Rojo, the smaller group at Baton Rouge, or even enough of them banded together to be a threat.) If they are denied use of the river, they are much less of a threat.[/FONT]
Rojo/invalid camp
[FONT=Arial, sans-serif]The 'invalid camp', augmented by stragglers who landed north of the Rojo and made it across, or were otherwise separated from the main force, is Quincy's biggest worry at the moment. It has the largest grouping of US soldiers who haven't surrendered, approximately 5k[3]. While it is true that the group in Baton Rouge is likely a more effective force militarily, that group is in a stable situation, whereas the 'invalid' group up by the Rojo/Red is much more volatile. Moreover, he has little idea of what their capabilities are, and how well they are supplied, so if he doesn't deal with them on his timetable, they may make another lunge south to Baton Rouge, or turn bandit, or most anything.[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, sans-serif]As it happens, most of them had been too injured or sick to make the march south, and most of those are still not in any shape to fight. Moreover, many of the stragglers who joined them later were rather dispirited, and thus not eager to fight. In addition, many of the previously healthy soldiers came down with dysentery or other illnesses. The morale of this group was low to start with and dropped further as time progressed without news of the invasion force. Worse, once news did come with the few scattered remnants who ran away from the west bank battle and who managed to elude the blocking force. The tales they tell of that battle are truly gruesome tales, and massively exaggerate the British strength. So, when Quincy started to move against their position, a couple of weeks later, landing more and more soldiers to their south, the General commanding, Thomas A Smith[4], was willing to surrender and have his wounded properly cared for. Not only was he worried about his sick, but he knew he didn't have full control of his troops, so if he HAD ordered an attack or move in some direction, he might not have been obeyed.[/FONT]
Discussions with Memphis
[FONT=Arial, sans-serif]Messages are carried up river on boat to Memphis where fast couriers can carry messages to Louisville, at which point the optical semaphore net can carry the news east.[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, sans-serif]The news of the disaster causes consternation in Washington when it arrives in mid-January. The 3 pronged plan (2 invasions and an insurrection at the same time) was supposed to have been a 'cunning plan that cannot fail', but so far one wheel has come off (2 wheels actually, but they haven't found out that the insurrection failed yet). They still hold hope that the Tejas hook of the 1-2 punch will knock out the British in Louisiana, but in the mean time, any soldiers that manage to make their way back are placed in defence.… As word of the failed (prevented, actually) insurrection and the failure of the invasion from Tejas arrive by the end of the month, worries mount. Note that the original US plan was to make a sharp attack and take Louisiana with a concentrated blow. If this succeeded, which they thought was guaranteed, then the US would have a friendly neighbour to the west (Mexico in charge of Texas), their hostile frontier would have been massively diminished, and most of the invasion troops could then be used in Florida or Canada. Now, however, they've just lost a significant chunk of their best trained military, and they are suddenly faced with defending the entire length of the Mississippi from the Red River to the Ohio. Moreover, the British have overwhelming superiority on the Mississippi now, so that that major supply route is closed to the US even for e.g. moving supplies between cities on the American side. [/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, sans-serif]Quincy starts trying to negotiate prisoner exchanges (preferably under parole), but most of the prisoner exchange will have to wait for a general agreement and a more settled outcome for the war. Or at least higher level negotiations between e.g. Winchester (or London) and Washington. In the meantime, however, triages the wounded US soldiers and transports to Memphis all the the sickest prisoners, the amputees, and basically anyone that he figures won't be able to fight for at least a year. Since they won't be able to get back in the fight, he feels it safe, and he has been having some problems supplying his own men. While he can bill this as a 'humanitarian gesture', 'returning poor wounded soldiers home', it also decreases his supply problems and increases the US's. [/FONT]
–
[FONT=Arial, sans-serif]1 ATL character, born after the PoD[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, sans-serif]2 to this day, it's not clear just what happened to all these men. A few turned themselves in later or were caught and a few made it across the Mississippi back to the US eventually. The best guesses of modern scholars is that many died in the swamps while others submerged themselves into the civilian population, often changing their names and inventing a new past for themselves. However, how many died in the swamps (either from their wounds, from natural hazards (e.g. drowning), or killed by local militia) and how many settled (in Louisiana, Arkansas, Tejas or back in the US) is very much debated, let alone what percentage died of which cause or settled where. The large numbers of refugees fleeing in various directions probably provided cover to many who wished to hide their past.[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, sans-serif]3 [FONT=Arial, sans-serif]invalid camp calculations. 3k 'lost', too sick/injured to move south. 1k from north of the Rojo. 1k stragglers (500 from further up (or down) the Mississippi, 500 the retreaters from the west bank battle). Total 5k.[/FONT][/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, sans-serif][FONT=Arial, sans-serif]4 Thomas A Smith is a War of 1812 general (ATL and OTL). OTL, he died in 1844. Here his health is such that, combined with injuries suffered during the battle on the river and landing, he is in no position to take part in a strenuous slog through mud south. Thus he is left in charge of camp. [/FONT][/FONT]