Family Jewels
From James M. Gavin A Call to Duty: A Memoir
The question of what to do about 1976 loomed large on the horizon, and from where I sat I could see some very dark clouds building on that horizon. For various reasons I thought the election of either Senator Ted Kennedy, Senator Birch Bayh or Governor Ronald Reagan as my successor would not be in the best interests of the nation. I did not view any of their ideological inclinations, as expressed in the policy alternatives they were either promoting or allowing to be associated with their name, as the proper direction for our country to go in.
By the beginning of March 1975 we were noticing the first signs of hope on the economic horizon. Although the steep rise in the price of oil had crippled our economy through much of 1974 and early 1975, that same rise in the oil price had stimulated domestic production. Working with the Congressional leadership, I managed to push through some incentives for domestic producers. One of my goals was to build a strategic reserve for our country, both for military and economic purposes. The second was to get our domestic production to a level where we could create a permanent two-tiered system with cheaper domestic oil and more expensive imported oil (through tariffs on the imported crude if necessary mixed with incentives to domestic producers). The Administration economists I consulted (and the private economists I had secretly reviewing their work) assured me that our policies could re-direct domestic demand to domestic sources, especially if we kept imported oil at a higher cost. At the same time we included a basket of incentives for producers to develop cost-effective synthetic fuels and bio-fuels such as Ethanol, which would benefit by supplying the domestic market. The catch was we had to maintain a firm regulatory hand over all of this until domestic production reached the necessary levels to sustain a domestic market which could then be de-regulated in a strategic manner.
At the same time the Administration was encouraging coal production alongside the development of more nuclear power production. Environmentalists have long condemned these policies. Coal was a pollutant, the argument went, and my Administration traded a clean environment for quick, dirty energy development. At the same time our nuclear policy created new dangers from radioactive fallout for a quick fix.
I reject both views. Yes, coal is dirty and not the ideal fuel, but in 1975 it was still abundant in our country and relatively easy to get at. Nuclear energy has its hazards, but these alone didn’t rise to the point that we should abandon nuclear power as a source. My own review of the technology in 1974, and my experience in the Pentagon twenty years before, had shown me that it could be developed safely, and that the United States had some of the best nuclear engineers in the world whose dedication was to safe and affordable nuclear development. Personally, after my review, I felt safer building nuclear reactors than I did flying or driving down a freeway in any American city. Thus I put what political capital I had behind the Nuclear Energy Bill of 1975, and Bill Scranton, who was in full agreement, put his all into it as well. It wouldn’t have gone through had it not been for the Vice President’s constant lobbying for it on the Hill.
Here’s a point that was lost on many of our critics in the ecology movement, but which was an important benefit. Putting our efforts into coal extraction created employment in mining communities. The nuclear projects created jobs across the spectrum, from high-end research to subsidiary construction work. A further side benefit was in the Nuclear Energy Bill itself (I had wanted to dub it the Scranton Act, but Bill was too self-effacing to accept the credit in this manner) were the provisions which committed the Federal government to funding the development of alternate energy sources such as wind, tidal and solar power. Originally put in to win the support of the ecology lobby in the Democratic Party, this provision enabled us to put more resources behind the research and development of alternatives to oil, coal and nuclear power – thus, by an irony few in the ecology movement seemed prepared to accept, we were creating the circumstances where their demands might be met, if not by us, then by some Administration in the future.
All of this, I knew was a thin edge that would pry the economy open over time. As demand for materials increased, and manufacturers began to hire to meet demand, and their energy costs lowered, we could begin to see an increase in overall spending, which would bring the economy back. This may sound very close to trickle down to some, and it was a more conservative approach than those who wanted us to go on a spending orgy of stimulus to create a second New Deal (we had in fact been priming the pump in 1974, though with less drama than FDR had done in 1933). My approach may have been more incremental, but it had the merit of being sustainable without bankrupting the federal treasury.
Senator Edward Kennedy was a second New Deal champion; he wanted to spend, and print more money to spend, and borrow to the rafters (the failed policy of 1973, but coming from the left this time). Senator Kennedy’s approach might have had the virtue of fixing some short-term pain, but at the cost of long-term responsibility. I have long been an advocate of the old saying that if you teach a man to fish then he will eat for a lifetime. By addressing the energy problem, we were looking at a way to put the economy back on its feet which in the long-term would not require huge infusions of tax dollars in repeated stimulus spending binges. That was the only way the United States was going to have a sustained recovery. Senator Kennedy’s policy ideas were all about solving the short-term pain, which was why I felt that I had to oppose his election to the Presidency. Further, I felt if that if he had a chance to implement his agenda from the White House, what little we could achieve by January 1977 would be wiped out by four years of a Kennedy presidency; which was a shame because I had admired his brothers, who were much more responsible managers of the public purse. Senator Birch Bayh, the other probable Democratic nominee, was, in my estimation and that of a number of other insightful observers, cut from the same cloth as Kennedy on that question.
Both men would, I believed, abdicate our international responsibilities in the morass of liberal second-guessing and retrenchment that had been going on in the Democratic Party. At the time it was fashionable in liberal circles to espouse a school of thought that argued that the United States should regard the Vietnam War as the last act of our superpower status. While neither Senator Kennedy nor Senator Bayh were friendly to Soviet interests, I thought the articulated program of the left to “stand America down by standing Europe and Asia up,” whose supporters both men were courting, was an ill-informed strategy, designed less for the realities of international relations than for domestic political purposes.
The danger remained that we could stand down too quickly, and encourage others, especially the Soviets, to press an advantage. I had met Mikhail Suslov, the new Soviet Communist Party General Secretary, in Vladivostok in February 1975, and there was a cold-hearted calculator. The Soviet specialists from the State Department and the CIA had more-or-less agreed in their briefings that if Suslov wasn’t an unreformed Stalinist, then he was the next thing too it. Certainly the man I met in Vladivostok had not shared Leonid Brezhnev’s human traits: Brezhnev could, for instance crack a joke and enter into real discussions with you as a human being and not an ideologue; Suslov lacked both these traits. Like the stern preacher, Suslov seemed to regard humor as some sort of sin in its own right – at least that was the impression he gave me. Nor did he seem to have the practical turn of mind I observed in Gromyko, Kosygin and Gromyko’s replacement as Foreign Minister, Valerian Zorin. In fact, Suslov went out of his way to remark to me on the fact that Helmut Schmidt had been an officer in Hitler’s Army, and that Francois Mitterrand became a Socialist only after he had been a supporter of Petain (which was in fact disputed). Ted Heath, according to Suslov, had been an executioner in the British Army: Suslov seemed to approve of this*. I began to wonder what he was saying about me to other world leaders. What connection any of that had to their current roles I didn’t see, but it gave an indication of the man’s mind-set, which seemed permanently set on finding enemies everywhere.
Matching-up a President Ted Kennedy or a President Birch Bayh, both concerned that their foreign policy would meet approval with a vocal domestic constituency arguing for retrenchment, with Suslov would, I felt, have been playing into the Soviet leader’s hands at the expense of our national security.
There was as much to be wary of in Governor Ronald Reagan’s unabashed conservatism. While I agreed in principle with his assertion that a program of deregulation would be a boon for our economy, (I have no argument with the notion that a economy functions best when the market is as free as possible) I did not see the next two to three years as the right time for it. Specifically, I did not think that the next few years would be a good time to begin a radical experiment in free market economics, not with our economy in a fragile state. First we had to solidify a recovery before we began hackling away at the regulatory framework which allowed us to direct support to those areas of the economy that needed it. Reagan, if taken at this word, would have brought in a radical change at a time when the system didn’t need any more shocks.
Some Reagan supporters had pointed out that while Reagan talked a tough conservative game as Governor of California, he had worked with that State’s legislature to produce what were more moderate, centrist, policies. I did not doubt that Governor Reagan had a firm grasp on politics as the art of the possible, and that his record in California showed him to be a wily politician as much as a conservative ideologue. However, he attracted around him acolytes who were far more ideological and far less practical than Reagan himself. I had to note that Paul Weyrich and Pat Buchanan had managed to overcome the negative fall out from their 1973 stints in the White House and had managed to attach themselves to the – as yet – undeclared Reagan campaign. Buchanan was writing speeches for Representative Phil Crane, the conservative candidate many saw as Reagan’s canary in the mineshaft. Since Crane was picking-up money and endorsements, it seemed likely Reagan would follow him in.
There was also the lesson of California to build on that point. Governor Barry Goldwater jr., had set him self up as the protégé of Reagan, and as the continuing legacy of his father, and set out to use his Governorship to prove that point. In his first four months in office he managed to put the executive and the legislature into a position of virtual deadlock as he pursued an ideologically driven agenda. I came to regret not having leant my support to Pat Brown’s son; if I had convinced even one hundred California voters to switch their votes the other way, then this problem wouldn’t have occurred. On the other hand Governor Goldwater’s antics in Sacramento could serve as an object lesson as to why American voters might not want a conservative ideologue in the White House.
Beyond economics though, I also found Reagan’s aggressive talk on foreign policy to be no better than the Kennedy-Bayh liberal approach. Governor Reagan, picking-up a theme from Barry Goldwater senior, stated his opposition to détente and to arms control agreements he termed “one-sided” and “pro-Soviet.” His was a policy of strength and dictating terms to the Soviet Union in what almost sounded like a foreign policy based on ultimatums. I did not think this would work with Suslov, and I believed if Governor Reagan were to try it, Suslov would push back, thus setting off a new cycle of East-West tension that could plunge us back into the darkest hours of the Cold War.
I did not agree with bending to accommodate Mikhail Suslov either, but I saw nothing to be gained by deliberately poking him in the nose. What I wanted to represent was a sustained détente approach, one backed by force if necessary, but one which sought to engage the Soviets in world affairs in a way which would draw them further into the framework of international law and working within the system. I held no starry-eyed dreams that this would melt away the Communist dictatorship, or that somehow we could spontaneously convert the Soviet leadership to western thinking. That was a multi-generational task, if it was even possible. Rather, in an age when the failure of policy could easily lead to global annihilation, I did not see a policy of confrontation in the pursuit of a nebulous ideological agenda as either wise or responsible.
The next step then was to make myself available to the parties to see which might consider me as a candidate. On the Democratic side I could enter into discussions with Clark Clifford, and through him the DNC Chair Bob Strauss, who I knew had his own reservations about his party’s likely nominees.
On the Republican side former New Hampshire Governor Walter R. Peterson had taken over as RNC Chair after Bob Dole’s defeat. Governor Peterson had inherited a demoralized party with serious financial problems. I did not know Peterson personally, but my own sources indicated that he was not entirely happy with a potential Reagan candidacy, and that one of his goals was to mobilize that sixty percent of Republicans who did not support Reagan into a coalition which would nominate a more centrist candidate: Senators Howard Baker and Charles Percy were at the top of that list.
My concern now was with which position would best place me to defeat both the potential Democratic nominees and Governor Reagan, should I chose to run in 1976, or alternatively whom I could back who would continue our recovery agenda and press forward with détente.
*- I never found the right moment to mention this delicate issue to Ted Heath, although I did discuss Suslov’s peculiar bent on our pasts with Helmut Schmidt, who was well aware of what Suslov said about him. Apparently, Suslov had brought it up directly with Schmidt, who had been equally direct with Suslov about it at the time – he was drafted and made the best of a bad situation. Schmidt did tell me that Suslov referred to me as “General Gavin” not “President Gavin” in speaking to him, and continued to do so despite Schmidt’s diplomatic efforts to correct him. He told me that he had the impression that the Soviets seemed to think my coming to office had been as a result of some sort of coup d’etat against my predecessor. Years later I did learn from Douglas Hurd that Heath had been in charge of one firing squad at the end of the War. Suslov had magnified this into some sort of sinister career in Heath’s personal background.
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(from Henry Kissinger The October War and The Pursuit of Peace in the Middle East)
The Cypriot Crisis
Our intelligence over flights of Cyprus in the early spring of 1975 made it increasingly clear that we were facing a humanitarian crisis if the situation continued unabated. However, from a diplomatic standpoint, the United States along with much the rest of the western world was helpless because none of the parties involved were willing to enter into an honest dialogue with us over the issues.
Greece and Cyprus were both dominated by proto-fascist governments that clung to power by evoking nationalist zeal among their populations as a tool to fend-off their domestic political enemies. In Athens, the military junta had nearly been overthrown by student and worker protests in 1974, and only ferment over the Cyprus issue had given them a new lease on life, one they used to clamp down hard on dissent. On Cyprus itself the Samson lead junta was not recognized by any single country outside of Greece as a legitimate government, and it clung to the government in Athens for its lifeblood. Greece reciprocated with military support and by assisting the Cypriot leadership in bypassing the U.N. economic embargo that had been placed on the island.
Turkish nationalism was no less present on their side, along with a simmering frustration over what was happening to their ethnic brothers and sisters on the island. Turkey’s constitutional government had fallen over the failed Turkish invasion of 1974, which only increased the level of frustration among the population. To his credit President Fahri Koruturk tried to manage the growing tensions within his own country between the nationalist anti-Greek uproar and his nation’s commitment to the peacekeeping force in Syria. However, President Koruturk’s direct Presidential rule was not only questionable under the Turkish Constitution, but it had quickly progressed into an authoritarian regime. Koruturk came to increasingly rely on his military to keep order through martial law. This agitated his opponents further, leading to a volatile and explosive situation, one over which he eventually lost control.
The irony for Turkey was that having a controlling military presence in Syria, and thus being able to influence the outcome of the nation-building project on its southern border was an objective of Turkish foreign policy that would have been embraced by a Turkish government of just about any stripe. Under Secretary of State Joe Sisco, who had been given overall responsibility for the diplomatic side of the Syrian operation, and his staff of diplomats had noted Turkish foot dragging over the formation of a Syrian government, and their collusion with the Soviets in promoting what would be a weak, neutralist junta in Damascus. The Soviets, of course, wanted to reinstall a puppet state while the Turks wanted, at best, a weak, toothless Syria on their southern border.
Koruturk’s tragedy was that while he was making diplomatic gains for Turkey in its age-old rivalries with its Syrian and Soviet neighbours, the situation in Cyprus, over which he was powerless to act in a forceful manner because the military commitment to Syria precluded a new military action in Cyprus, was stirring-up the nationalist fires which would undermine him. His opponents and the Turkish public (largely propagandized by his nationalist opponents) seemed not to grasp this distinction (or disregarded it as unhelpful to their cause), and chose to interpret Koruturk’s lack of action over Cyprus as weakness.
Of our diplomatic efforts at mediation I can only say that not having any previous experience with ethnic conflict, we failed to understand that we had less influence on the parties in Cyprus than in the Middle East. The parties in the Middle East, though exploiting superpower rivalries, were at the same time constrained by them. In Cyprus, the adversaries accepted no such restraints. For each of them this was a local struggle, one rooted in a long history of strife between the two groups which predated the foundation of the United States, and which could only be resolved on their terms, not ours. The ethnic and religious nature of the conflict rendered it outside of the ordinary rules of give-and-take which are central to international crisis resolution: both Athens and Ankara insisted this was an internal matter into which the United States was meddling without appropriate cause or invitation. Compromise, or even the appearance of it, was a losing proposition politically for either side, so no compromise could be extracted from Greece or Turkey, and negotiations were a pointless exercise in frustration.
From our perspective, the outbreak of a conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean between Greece and Turkey would only complicate an already difficult strategic situation. To begin with, having Greece and Turkey on the verge of a war was a direct threat to the Eastern flank of NATO. We knew this was behind the Soviet support for the Turkish cause; Moscow’s policy was to tear Turkey out of NATO altogether and they saw this crisis as an opportunity to achieve just that.
The United States had three Army divisions plus support units in Syria which were in need of re-supply (along with the British, Spanish and French African troops), which was largely being accomplished from the Mediterranean, through the waters directly affected by the Cypriot crisis. The alternative was to have our supply line through Saudi Arabia and Jordan, which would entail a long land bridge through the desert, something that our generals found unappealing. The remaining alternative was to re-supply through Israel which while practical from a logistical point of view, and something we could expect the Israelis to co-operate with, was fraught with undesirable political consequences in the rest of the Middle East.
Added to this was the deteriorating situation in Lebanon, which was threatening to explode into a civil conflict on the doorstep of our peacekeeping force just across the border in Syria.
President Gavin, Secretary Symington and Joint Chiefs Chairman General Robert Cushman reviewed the option of a preventive armed intervention into Cyprus, preferably with UN sanction, in order to secure our flank and defuse the situation. Caspar Weinberger floated this idea with Congressional leaders, and received an extremely negative response. None of the Congressional leaders consulted felt that they could draw together a majority to support another military intervention, and some believed any attempt by the White House to push for it might re-open debate over a resolution for force the President to withdraw our forces from Syria, and possibly Vietnam and Cambodia as well. The matter was a domestic political tinderbox waiting for something to ignite it, and another proposed foreign engagement of our forces could well set it off.
With that message in mind we could only look on, and resort to our limited diplomatic tools. The British, who were the third party to the 1959 agreement between the UK, Greece and Turkey which had originally set-up an independent Cypriot State, and retained two airbases and a naval base on the island. They had been trying all through the crisis to get a serious dialogue started. Ted Heath had personally appealed to General Dimitrios Ioannidis in Athens and President Koruturk in Ankara to send their representatives to Geneva or London to meet with Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home in order to reach a settlement. Neither leader responded. General Ioannidis refused to receive any foreign envoys claiming in a show of legalistic circumstance that he held no official office in the government and therefore could not negotiate with foreign representatives. President Phaedon Gizikis, who was Ioannidis’ puppet, would only refer the matter to the General, thus trapping the question in a vicious circle of evasion and lack of accountability.
In Ankara President Koruturk was willing to negotiate, provided the Greeks gave a concession as a pre-condition to talks; that was the setting up of Turkish security zones in majority Turkish areas on the island, to be placed under the control of Turkish troops, a condition which Athens wouldn’t even consider, since it amounted to letting the Turks gain before talks what they couldn’t do with military force.
Archbishop Makarios, the overthrown President of Cyprus, meanwhile did his best to exploit our political difficulties for his cause. The son of shepherd, he had risen to become the highest-ranking priest on Cyprus as well as its President – a legacy of the Greek Orthodox clergy’s historic claim to both secular and religious leadership. Highly intelligent, unflappable, always well prepared, as complex in his tactics as he was single minded in the pursuit of his objectives, Makarios exuded authority. His ecclesiastical garb and utter self-assurance were somewhat vitiated by his shrewd, watchful eyes which seemed to be calculating the possibilities of gaining an edge over an interlocutor.
While in the United States Makarios engaged in a speaking tour during which he portrayed himself as the only democratically elected leader in the region (a point on which he was technically correct – President Koruturk had been legally elected by the Turkish parliament, but had suspended his parliament, so his rule was questionable; Makarios had been elected directly by the Greek population of Cyprus) and began to solicit aid from assorted interests groups to put pressure on the Administration to restore him to office. Makarios did not have much luck among the Greek-American community, which for some reason was divided over his appeal. Some more liberal members of the community such as Massachusetts Lieutenant Governor Michael Dukakis and Representative Paul Tsongas supported him, while millionaire Tom Pappas and Eugene Rossides of the American Hellenic Institute lead a more influential opposition to Makarios’ restoration in their community. Even Spiro Agnew got in on the act, supporting the AHI position on the question.
However, after the sacking of the Greek Orthodox Patriarch’s residence in Istanbul, and other anti-Christian acts in Turkey, the Archbishop was picking up a vocal following from many protestant religious organizations that focused on the twin themes of his being a democratically elected leader and a defender of the faith. Together with a surprising array of liberal interest groups – who focused exclusively on the Archbishop’s democratic legitimacy – they added to the pressure for the Gavin Administration to restore the Archbishop as the President of Cyprus.
I became interested in restoring Makarios as an interim step to cooling-off the immediate crisis. I thought that a military move on our part to place the Archbishop back in the presidential palace, together with a U.N. guarantee for Turkish safe havens, support for which I believed we could extract from Makarios at this point, would allow all sides to pull back. Our troop commitment wouldn’t be long; as I envisioned it we would turn the island over to a U.N. peacekeeping force which could act as a barrier between the two populations. With the immediate demands of the Turks for the security of their fellow nationals met, and Greek attempts to annex Cyprus thwarted by Makarios’ return to power (he opposed the Enosis – or union between Greece and Cyprus then being proposed by both the Athens and Greek Cypriot Juntas) we could set the stage for fostering a broader dialogue which could develop a more permanent solution.
The Director of Central Intelligence, General Daniel Graham, argued against this approach. According to the CIA, the junta in Greece informed us that a restoration of Makarios - who was becoming a nationalist hero on the mainland - would not be welcomed by Athens. From what we could tell General Ioannidis had determined that the archbishop might pose a danger to his regime’s grip on power as an alternate focus for the nationalist sentiment that was keeping them in power. We couldn’t tell if this was a legitimate concern or a case of paranoia.
I tried to counter that if we were to retain any credibility in the eyes of the Turks, we could not appear to be too solicitous to the demands of the Greek Generals. After all, I reminded the principals at various meetings, they were on very thin ice with their own people and at some point that regime would fall; placating them was a losing proposition. If we could offer something positive to President Koruturk, then we might be able to shore-up his position, which did affect our long-term interests and those of NATO.
I could see that that point intrigued President Gavin; until General Graham managed to persuade Joint Chiefs Chairman General Robert Cushman and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral James L. Holloway to stand with him against exercising our military in Cyprus.
From the meeting of March 12, 1975 when this was discussed with the President:
Graham: We can’t be sure that the U.N. will stand behind this can we?
Phillip Habib (U.N. Ambassador): Probably not. The Soviets will veto in the Security Council unless we give them a role.
Kissinger: I think they might in the initial state, but if we restore a democratically elected leader, and then call for U.N. troops, especially if we call on them to protect the Turkish enclaves and bring to a halt the ethnic violence, we can undercut Soviet opposition by making them look bad in with many of their Middle Eastern allies.
Admiral Holloway: It’s a logistical question. While this problem in the rear of our Syrian force is causing us a problem, we would need to find the assets to do both. We are spread pretty thin right now. A force on Cyprus will need a separate support hub to the one in Syria.
General Cushman: We would have to find the troops, perhaps call-up more reservists, or revert to the draft.
Graham: The Turks tried it last summer; it turned into a military debacle, Mr. President.
General Louis H. Williams (Marine Corps Commandant): With due respect, the Turkish force was under strength and lacking in the necessary expertise in amphibious warfare. Executed with sufficient force, this is in principle no harder than any of our island campaigns in the Pacific during World War II. The Marines could definitely light the way, Mr. President.
(From the looks he received, it became apparent that General Williams was not signing from the approved Pentagon songbook on this issue).
Cushman (himself a Marine General): I for one have absolute faith in our Marines to do the job, sir. That’s not what’s at question. Instead, we have to look at the long-term commitment.
Graham: (Under Secretary Joe) Sisco can’t get much from the Turks on this; there’s zero co-operation from their side. How do we know that if we land a force to restore the ethnic Greek President of Cyprus, the Turks won’t see that as the United States taking sides, no matter what we do? To be frank, Mr. President, we are already experiencing that problem in Syria. Do we want to take on the potential of a guerrilla war in Cyprus? That could be putting us back to Da Nang in 1965 all over again.
Secretary of Defense Stuart Symington: The Turks are not the North Vietnamese. Surely they can be made to see reason in all of this.
President Gavin: Phil, what do you think our chances are of selling this at the U.N.? Could we put together a U.N. force as part of a pro-Makarios move?
Habib: The Soviets will demand some part in it, as the price of not blocking the initiative.
Kissinger: That’s the short view, isn’t it Phil? I mean, the Soviets are busy trying to make nice with the Turks, and the Greek dictatorship has very little international support. On the other hand if we can get a number of the Islamic states to support in principle a move to protect a Muslim population, won’t the Soviets be under pressure to sign-on. I mean they aren’t going to support the Greek Junta, aren’t they?
Graham: Are we seriously going to allow the Soviets a foothold in Cyprus? We’ve already let them back into Syria, and they proven to be disruptive there? I’m sure, if the Russians see a way into Cyprus, they’ll line-up Iraq, South Yemen and Libya behind this, and they’ll use that to push their way in, directly or through surrogates. And how do we think Israel will react if Iraqi or Libyan agents can set-up shop in their rear in Cyprus? Aren’t we kicking over the anthill here?
Kissinger: The anthill has already been kicked over, Director Graham. The question is how do we put it right?
Symington: I think the real issue here, Mr. President, is that we have a democratically elected leader in an area where there isn’t much democracy, but to put him back in place we either act alone – which involves a higher level of military commitment to the project than we are presently willing to bear – or we open-up a U.N. mission to potential meddling by the Soviets.
President: As usual Stu, you’ve summed-up our dilemma and made me feel like I’m sitting on two very sharp horns. There’s a lot to consider here, so I want a study done on how we can do this, and what forces will be involved. Phil, sound out the major powers at the U.N.. See what’s possible, and where the Soviets will come down on this. I understand your reservations Dan, and each of yours (addressing the Joint Chiefs). But the fact is we can’t let this fester.
Within twenty-four hours the Junta in Athens denounced a restoration of Makarios, which reinforced in my mind that Graham had arranged for them to learn the substance of our meeting. Unhelpfully, the Turkish government announced that they too would oppose Makarios’ return. To the best of my knowledge, that was unsolicited by any of us.
While we were debating our options, the President decided there were measures short of a direct military intervention in Cyprus which he could take that would help to manage this situation, and which would leave us appearing even handed. He ordered our naval forces to enforce the U.N. embargo on Cyprus by obstructing, as much as was possible, the transit of goods and personnel between Cyprus and the Greek mainland. We didn’t use the word, but we were imposing a blockade on Cyprus.
Our intelligence over flights had noted the construction of large concentration camps on the island. Special Forces reconnaissance teams inserted on Cyprus confirmed their existence. Since the camps were in the building stage, we instructed our Special Forces teams to delay their construction by acts of sabotage. This proved to be a very dangerous task for the solders involved, as they were caught between the Cypriot and Greek Army on the one hand, and Turkish guerrillas on the other, who were trying to accomplish the same thing.
Meanwhile, our carrier based air combat control planes and Air Force AWACS control aircraft had detected regular flights going at night between the Turkish mainland and Cyprus. We knew this to be the way in which the Turks were inserting supplies and reinforcements to the Cypriot-Turkish guerrilla forces. President Gavin and Secretary Symington both reasoned that this was prolonging the conflict, as re-supply kept the guerrilla force in the fight. From Ankara’s perspective as long as they could keep the guerrillas equipped and re-supplied, there was a good chance they would wear down the Greek forces, enough to compel the Greeks to seek terms.
President Gavin ordered our combat aircraft to harass these nightly re-supply flights, without actually precipitating an incident by actually shooting one down. Rather, the President wanted the Turks to be in no doubt that we knew what they were doing, and that we had the capability to slow it down and stop it if necessary. If we could lessen the chance of a guerrilla victory, we thought that might make Ankara more pliable. It might have worked if President Koruturk, or another reasonable figure had remained in control of the Greek government.
However, Koruturk fell to a nationalist alliance junta formed between the nationalist fanatic Alparsan Turkes, who was himself a Turkish Cypriot and thus quite close to the conflict, and General Kenan Evren, who provided the military muscle behind Turkes’ government. From that point on compromise was impossible and the chances of a direct conflict between Turkey and Greece rose to near certainty.
The Church and Pike Committees
On December 22, 1974 Washington awoke to a new crisis when The New York Times headlined a story by its investigative reporter, Seymour “Sy” Hersh: “Huge CIA Operation Reported in U.S. Against Anti-War Forces, Other Dissidents in Nixon Years.” The White House had no warning. CIA Director Daniel Graham proclaimed ignorance of how Hersh got the story. Hersh claimed that he had “a high level source” who provided the information, but he refused to identify who that was. Though the headline implied otherwise, the substance of the article, in fact, related to events which had taken place in previous administrations, primarily that of Lyndon Johnson. The initial revelations concerned investigations Johnson had ordered into charges that American Vietnam dissidents were being funded from abroad. To the extent that the assignment involved domestic intelligence gathering, it would have been prohibited by the Central Intelligence Agency’s congressional charter.
The first I heard of it was when I read the article in The Times. President Gavin, then at Camp David for the Christmas holidays, learned of it the same way (his son-in-law reportedly pointed it out to the President) and he was livid over the revelation. After a tense phone call with Director Graham, he ordered the CIA Director to identify Hersh’s source, while at the same time he wanted Graham to investigate the substance of Hersh’s allegations to determine if there was any truth to them. We were all about to learn that there was.
As we began to piece the matter together we learned that in May 1973 then newly installed Director Graham had found himself blindsided by the revelation that the CIA had given some assistance to E. Howard Hunt, who was investigating the leak of the Pentagon Papers for President Nixon. On May 9 Graham requested from each CIA department a report of any of its activities even remotely related to Watergate. Graham turned the task of co-ordinating this exercise over to William Colby, who had recently been appointed Executive Director of the CIA, after several years of directing covert paramilitary programs in South Vietnam. On his own initiative Colby extended that request to include any activity that might be construed as outside the CIA charter or be otherwise questionable.
A grand total of 693 pages of alleged transgressions covering a quarter century were submitted to Colby’s office. They were distilled into a memorandum of some seventy pages labelled “the family jewels” by someone with a mordant sense of humor. The overwhelming majority referred to allegations prior to the Nixon Administration; Gavin, of course, was not even in office when the list was put together. Such a compilation was dynamite. There was no possibility that it would not leak; the only open question was when. That the “family jewels” did not become public for fifteen months is far more astonishing than that they finally did.
William Colby locked the report in his safe – claiming Director Graham ordered him to do so and sternly cautioned him against ever discussing its contents with anyone. Graham for his part claimed that he was never shown the “family jewels” and that instead he was given a report that focused mainly on Johnson era counter protest intelligence gathering activities. He flatly denied telling Colby to lock a report (which he claimed he never knew of) in his safe. Neither man would budge from their contradictory version of these events.
Apparently Hersh learned of the “family jewel” list from one of his sources and confronted Colby on the matter. In December 1974 Colby gave him a long anonymous source interview in which he confirmed the lists existence to the reporter, although he didn’t detail what was in it beyond the domestic counterintelligence activities of the CIA in the 1960’s, which formed the basis for Hersh’s first report.
In the post-Agnew, Nixon trial environment, the revelation that such a list existed was like the effect of a burning match in a gasoline depot. Very soon everyone wanted to know what the “family jewels” were, not least President Gavin.
Colby (who had yet to be revealed as Hersh’s source) briefed us at Camp David (to where I had been summoned from my own holiday retreat in Vail, Colorado). I listened to Colby’s account with a sinking feeling. Even in normal times a memorandum such as the “family jewels” would have led to an investigation. But early 1975 could not be considered normal times; two Presidents had been brought down over illegalities in the previous two years, and now a third – and is it turned out a fourth – was implicated in potentially even greater transgressions. President Gavin was the one left holding the bag by his predecessors when it all came out, just as I would become the whipping boy.
It soon became clear that the charge of domestic intelligence gathering had been merely the opening shot. The “family jewels” alleged as well assassination plots against foreign leaders during the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, and touched on every aspect of covert and paramilitary activities conducted by the American government over a twenty-five year period. An investigation would find it difficult to insulate covert intelligence activities undertaken in support of the nation’s foreign policy from transgressions in need of being remedied and punished.
More than anything, it was Colby’s revelation to Hersh that there was a compiled list of alleged misdeeds being kept secret which put the blood in the water; said water already having been stirred-up over another intelligence related investigation. Hersh’s article had capped an assault on the intelligence community that had been building for months. CIA covert activities in Chile had precipitated a congressional inquiry headed by Senator Frank Church. Four Administrations of both parties – Kennedy’s, Johnson’s, Nixon’s, and Agnew’s – convinced that Salvador Allende Gossens, the standard bearer of the combined Socialists and Communists in the 1964 and 1970 elections, would establish a Cuba-style Communist dictatorship if elected, had approved covert support for democratic Chilean parties. The impact of an Allende victory on surrounding countries, each of which was facing various forms of radical pressures of its own, was judged to be extremely inimical to American national interests. By a retroactive imposition of the mood of the 1970s on these Cold War perceptions of the 1960’s, these covert activities, designed to enable a democratic parties and a free press to survive, were interpreted as gratuitous interference in Chile’s domestic affairs.
Unfortunately two anti-Allende intrigues within the Chilean military, unprompted by the United States, had lead to two high profile murders – that of the Chief of the Chilean Armed Forces, General Rene Schneider in a botched kidnapping/coup attempt in 1970, and that of Allende himself in the 1973 coup which installed the Pinochet government. The fact that the United States government had no direct involvement in either of these deaths was a point lost on critics who were probing through the ashes seeking the elusive proof of our direct complicity: worse they assumed our denials of any such involvement, and claims of national security to protect our sources, were themselves proof that we covering something. When the “family jewels” were revealed, and it became known that Colby’s report contained information on assassination programs, those critics felt that their suspicions had been vindicated. Church quickly expanded his probe of Chilean matters to encompass all of our covert intelligence activities.
Though the charge at hand was the misuse of the CIA, the real target of the attack was the substance of American foreign policy. Assaulting the CIA turned into a surrogate for reducing the country’s international role. Senator Church described the Chilean operation, designed to preserve democracy in Chile, as a symbol of a runaway White House engaged in unnecessary foreign policy measures. That four Presidents – two Democrats and two Republicans – had agreed that an Allende victory threatened vital American interests was viewed as an aberration rather than an expression of bipartisan consensus. Now, “the family jewels”– by the very sinister sound of their nickname if for no other reason – gave further impetus to this runaway Congressional urge to poke into every corner of our intelligence history in search of scalps to hang from their committee dais like so many trophies.
The outcome was to be the formation of the Church Committee (the United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities) and the Pike Committee (the United States House of Representatives Select Committee on Intelligence), both of which sought to probe “the family jewels” and the intelligence community for all of the skeletons they could find. In the process they tried to wrestle control for the conduct of American foreign policy from the White House to the Congress, though luckily they failed in this objective, but not without causing a great deal of damage to our foreign policy and American prestige in the international community.
The President briefly considered forming a Presidential commission of inquiry as well; he was being lobbied to do so by some Congressional members, most notably Minority leader Gerald Ford, who urged Gavin to set-up an independent commission of inquiry on the model of the Warren Commission which had investigated President Kennedy’s assassination (and on which Ford had served). I believe Ford’s motivation was to provide political cover for himself. As a leading member of the House Appropriations and Government Oversight Committee, he had been briefed on some of these activities over the years (thus demolishing the critics charge that the “rouge CIA” had acted outside of Congressional oversight) and given his approval. There were others in Ford’s boat, notably Speaker Albert and Senator John Stennis, both of whom had also approved of various covert activities with the same reasoning as successive Administrations. Worried that their own political careers could be swept under in this tide, they hoped a Presidential commission could provide a measure of control to the process.
However, things had already gone too far. Gavin could see that with his four immediate predecessors all under the spotlight, he could not tie his Presidency to what might even remotely resemble an attempt at a cover-up or an attempt to manage the release of information. As with any pressure to pardon Nixon, Gavin felt that if he acted in a way that could be seen as trying to soft-peddle or hide his predecessors’ activities, then his own Administration – resting on a fragile legitimacy as it was – could just as quickly be swept under. The restriction frustrated the President, especially when the Pike Committee became reckless in its handling of secrets, but he had to walk a very fine line in all of this. For that reason he decided against a separate Presidential commission while the Church and Pike Committee hearings were going on.
Despite the proclamation of Senator Frank Church that his committee was going after “a rogue elephant CIA” and the reckless charges of committee member Senator Walter Mondale that the intelligence community were “those bastards in Washington” the Church Committee acted, on the whole, responsibly. It adopted a procedure for handling classified documents that gave the originating agency the right to excise particularly sensitive sentences or portions of documents. This eased, but did not solve, the problem of leaks of sensitive information, many times out of the context of the originating document or study. But at least, the Senators on the Church Committee acted like responsible leaders.
It was different with the investigation of the House of Representatives. Behind the label of “intelligence investigation” it undertook to second-guess foreign policy decisions by pretending to examine the extent to which intelligence affected them. The first act of the House committee was to depose its own chairman, Lucien Nedzi, because he had been briefed about “the family jewels” by Colby and never informed the committee. Nedzi was replaced by Representative Otis Pike for the purposes of the intelligence investigation.
The Pike Committee refused to abide by the very flexible rules worked out between the Church Committee and the executive branch. Staff members without experience in dealing with classified documents and with no background in security procedures were now handling some 75,000 classified documents made available to them by Colby and Graham. More than the Church Committee, which is often blamed for undermining our intelligence capability, it was the Pike Committee that represented the greatest danger to our intelligence security.
It was into this environment, with the intelligence investigations imposed upon the uncertainties of our Syrian policy, and with the Eastern Mediterranean on the verge of exploding into another conflict, that I faced my confirmation hearings for the office of Secretary of State. Unwittingly, I had stepped squarely into the bull’s eye for these competing tensions.
Before leaving the subject, I want to briefly reflect on why William Colby, a career CIA man with an impeccable professional record up until 1974, would endanger that, and the CIA, by talking to Hersh in the first place, and then being so open in his testimony with the investigating committees (something which vexed all of us at the time and lead Director Graham to fire him).
Two explanations for Colby’s conduct have been advanced. The first view has been put forth by General Vernon Walters, my trusted friend (and the President’s) and Graham’s deputy during this period. Walters argues that Colby came to believe that a fundamental shift in the Washington power balance had made Congress so dominant that the only way to preserve the CIA was to open its secrets to congressional committees. According to Walters’ theory, Colby in effect threw the CIA on the mercy of Congress.
The Second frequently heard explanation is that, somewhere along the way, Colby had developed second thoughts about his chosen profession. The way in which the Cold War was being pursued may have come to be seen by him as weakening the moral fabric of American society. If that was indeed his premise, it may well be that Colby was seeking to purify his country by cooperating with the strategies of the protest movement. In these terms, weakening his own service, which Colby had served loyally for much of his adult life, became a necessary sacrifice which he pursued with the same single-mindedness he had displayed as a combatant in World War II.
In his memoirs, Colby justified his conduct as a constitutional duty:
“My strategy quite simply had been guided by the Constitution and to apply its principles. That meant that I had to cooperate with the investigations and educate the Congress, press, and public as well as I could…”
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(From Dr. Newt Gingrich Patriot Soldier: General Daniel O. Graham and the Safeguarding of the CIA in the 1970’s)
Dr. Kissinger’s wordy analysis seeks to excuse Colby’s conduct on two mutually exclusive grounds. One has it that Colby acted as he did after much soul searching about the contamination of America’s moral clarity by covert operations, using the Church and Pike Committee’s as his confessors, before which he could purge himself and his agency of all the so-called sins of the previous quarter century. If that was the reason then, as any priest would point out, Colby’s confession, being selective (the “Family Jewels” left much out) and not a full purge of his and the agency’s collective sins, it could not have the intended absolving powers: Bill Colby, a practicing Roman Catholic would have understood that theological point.
The other argument has a hard-headed Colby (much more fitting to the kind of hard hitting, no nonsense CIA operator that Colby had been throughout his career) making a realpolitik decision to, as Kissinger puts it, “Colby in effect threw the CIA on the mercy of Congress.” This we are told was the result of some personal inner assessment that the Congress was getting the better of the Administration in a power struggle, and Colby wanted to place himself and the CIA on the winning team.
So which is it? Was Colby a penitent or a consummate navigator of the political winds?
Given the confession was incomplete, we can dismiss the former and could accept the latter, if we are to hold to the idea that Colby was an independent actor in all of it. Two decades of analysis have looked at the motives of Colby, James Gavin, Henry Kissinger, Frank Church and Otis Pike in all of this. Theories are advanced about how each might have been in cahoots with Colby. But the role of another figure remains unexamined in all this, and that is Colby’s immediate boss, then CIA Director Daniel Graham.
Certainly Director Graham would have seen the struggle between the Congressional Committees and the White House as a threat to the CIA. But would he have thrown the “family jewels” on the mercy of the Congress in order to feed some red meat to the lions? Wouldn’t this run counter to the covert ethos of the Agency, and the requirement that the Director keep its secrets at all costs?
A CIA Director would only have broken the silence if he saw that his agency’s survival was at risk, and if he thought his President couldn’t protect him. Instead he would act to preserve the long-term interests of his agency, even if that meant some short-term pain. And to be clear, if Frank Church, Otis Pike and Walter Mondale had had their way, the CIA would have been – in the terms of President’s Kennedy’s iconic threat which represented the true liberal attitude about the agency – “torn into a million pieces.” Director Daniel Graham knew President Gavin was in no political position to protect him, so he chose to manage the risks in a way which would prevented that.
To the end of his life Bill Colby maintained that in May 1973 General Daniel O. Graham, then newly appointed by President Agnew as the Director of Central Intelligence, ordered him to lock the so-called “family jewels” report in his safe and forget about it. Shortly before his death, Colby alleged that Graham had ordered him to confirm to Hersh that the file existed, and that what he had done in giving an interview to Hersh in December 1974 was exactly what Graham wanted him to do.
Director Graham has been equally as adamant that Colby never showed him the seventy-page report, or any abstract from it, and that since he knew of no such report, he could not have given Colby any order to talk to Hersh about it. Either Graham is lying or Colby is; it is not credible that Graham would have seen a report this explosive, even with its contents accurately summarized in an abstract, and not remembered it. If he did, then his very mental capability has to be called into question, and there is no evidence that he suffered from that sort of memory loss in 1975, or at any point in his life. To believe Graham at face value, we must assume Colby lied about what he said about these events, or prepared a misleading extract of the report, which amounts to the same thing.
If we accept the proposition that Graham ordered the report filed away in Colby’s safe in May 1973, that action entirely fits the political conditions of the time. In May 1973 the Agnew White House would not welcome the “family jewels” report,” mainly on ideological grounds, but also because President Agnew was then trying to distance himself from former President Nixon’s growing Watergate problem. At the time there was no congressional investigation or pressure on the CIA, and Director Graham had no motive to blacken his agency.
So, then we can ask why he ordered it released in 1974. What had changed? In fact a lot, not least of which was the political situation in Washington.
In early 1975 Senators Edward Kennedy and Hubert Humphrey were considered in the group of front-runners for the Democratic Party presidential nomination. The “family jewels” had the names of John and Robert Kennedy all over them, especially in respect to CIA operations to assassinate Fidel Castro, Patrice Lumumba, Rafael Trujillo and Ngo Dinh Diem between 1961 and 1963. These revelation coming about in 1975 had the effect of dragging the Kennedy name through the mud once more, just as Senator Edward Kennedy was rubbing-off the worst of the taint from his own Chappaquiddick scandal and rebuilding his political credibility.
The revelations about illegal CIA domestic activity during the Johnson Administration couldn’t help but focus in on Johnson’s Vice President, Hubert Humphrey, and what role, if any, he had played in the whole matter. (And if he didn’t, that point undermined Humphrey’s argument that he was seasoned and had executive experience – it showed him up as the ineffectual second banana that he was in that administration.)
But on the whole, and this is the critical point, the “family jewels” deflated the smugness of the Democratic investigators because the majority of the illegalities discussed had been ordered by Democrat presidents pursuing a liberal internationalist agenda. Neither Daniel Graham nor James Gavin had been in office when these occurred. Bill Colby was at the time a foot soldier and not a general in the CIA, and so not directly implicated either. But the men who were, from Allen Dulles to Richard Helms, the ones whom Presidents Kennedy and Johnson had charged with transforming their internationalist vision into covert policy. What the “jewels” exposed was the underlying rotten slipstream that exposed the truly duplicitous nature of the New Frontier and the Great Society, both of which had promised victory and prosperity, but had failed to deliver because of the inherent contradiction in fighting a war in secret for liberal, nation building objectives.
To be sure, Director Graham did not recklessly let the secrets out just to cast shadows on the Democratic Presidents who had ordered so much of the covert mayhem – there were other ways to achieve that. But he did so because showing-up their hypocrisies was the best way forward in purging the CIA of its dark past and re-shaping it for future struggles, and of holding it together during the Congressional onslaught. In short the liberals could hardly dismember the CIA if their own heroes were the ones responsible for the abuses they accused the agency of.
Liberals often condemn this argument on the grounds that Graham damaged Nixon as well, since the “family jewels” included unsavoury actions by that Republican Administration in Chile. It is true that Graham viewed Kissinger as an impediment, and the whole policy of détente as wrong headed. It is not clear that he specifically set out to damage Kissinger, rather that was just part of the package. But it what the revelations over Chile did help to point out was that, like the whole covert program through the sixties, attempting to achieve victory on the sly was a doomed policy. The revelations about the Chilean actions underlined that this was not just a Democrat failing; it was a failing of the entire internationalist détente oriented mindset and its approach to the Cold War.
By enduring short-term pain for the CIA, Director Graham cleared the way for a new policy of direct confrontation and opposition, no more skulking in the shadows, which should have been the policy that brought the rotten Soviet edifice crashing down.
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(From Dr. Barack H. Obama Reaping the Whirlwind: A Re-assessment of The Central Intelligence Agency in the Cold War)
In lauding Director Graham’s so-called patriotic and visionary impulse, Gingrich inadvertently highlights the nakedly partisan politics which actually lay behind Director Graham’s decision in ordering William Colby to make the contents of the “family jewels” report known.
In examining Daniel O. Graham’s associations thorough the 1970’s, we find that the former senior DIA officer and Director of Central Intelligence remained close to Paul Nitze, who at the time was out of government and running his Committee on the Present Danger lobby group, using it to mobilize conservative support for the presidential campaign of former Governor Ronald Reagan of California. Indeed, when Director Graham was finally relieved of his office, he too would become a Reagan campaign advisor, and an active member of Nitze’s lobby.
Seen in this light, whether Colby was directly ordered to reveal the report to Hersh, or whether he was manoeuvred into it (either through political or personal guilt factors) the timing of the release politically damaged Ted Kennedy, Humphrey, the Nixonites in the Republican Party, and threatened to damage the Gavin Administration as well.
By contrast Governor Reagan was left politically undamaged by all of this, as was Senator Birch Bayh, another leading contender with Ted Kennedy and Humphrey for the Democratic nomination. It can’t help but escape notice that among Reagan’s core supporters at the time, Birch Bayh was considered the softest target for Reagan to go up against in the 1976 Presidential election.
The sensation from the revelations did go a long way to forcing Henry Kissinger out of the Gavin Administration, a serious blow to President Gavin at a perilous time. Given that Kissinger was often a thorn in Graham’s side – and was seen in the same way by Colby – the two men had common ground in leaking this material at a time when it could undermine Kissinger’s nomination as Secretary of State.
In discussing the 1975 crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean, Kissinger quickly skips over the divisions within the Greek-American community over support for Makarios. He deliberately downplays the fact that many influential Greek-Americans, including Spiro Agnew, were in fact agents of the Greek Junta itself, and were, like the Junta, opposed to Makarios. Tom Pappas, a Greek American business magnate, political fixer and friend of the CIA, had raised considerable sums of money for the Nixon-Agnew ticket in 1968 and 1972, ostensibly from the Greek-American community. In fact, as subsequent investigation of the money trail would reveal, much of the money had come from offshore, laundered through the KYP, the Greek intelligence service.
On March 7, 1973, Pappas visited the White House where he had a private meeting with President Agnew, the exact nature of which has never been revealed. There has been some speculation that Pappas was arranging hush money for the Watergate burglars, although Spiro Agnew was indifferent to their fate. More than likely he was discussing aid to the Greek Junta – possibly in the context of fund raising for Agnew – and acting as a go between for the Greek junta and its most powerful Greek-American supporter.
For perspective we must keep in mind that the CIA as an institution had invested much of its stock in the Junta leadership in Athens. The CIA station chief there enjoyed better and more frequent access to the Junta leadership than the United States Ambassador, and his mansion rivalled that of the Ambassador. From 1967 through to 1975 it could be said that the CIA, and not the State Department, controlled U.S. relations with Greece, and these were all directed through the prism of the Cold War. The CIA came to equate any risk to the Greek Junta as an institutional challenge to its own role.
By March 1975 Archbishop Makarios was creating trouble for the Junta in the United States by trying to get himself re-instated as President of Cyprus. Kissinger added to that by broadly supporting this initiative as a way to defuse the crisis between Greece and Turkey; although he himself admitted it was an imperfect solution. The officers who ran the Greek Junta had an abiding hatred for Makarios, and under no circumstances did they wish to see him returned at the head of an independent Cypriot state. By this point they were promoting Enosis (union) between Cyprus and the Greek mainland, which they would then flaunt as a nationalist triumph. Makarios’ return would undermine that, and possibly undermine their shaky hold on power.
When Kissinger tried to sell President Gavin on a restoration of Makarios as “an interim step to cooling-off the immediate crisis,” Director Graham lead the charge against this policy, no doubt on behalf of his agency’s clients in Athens. Graham also mobilized the Joint Chiefs in blocking the plan by talking it down to an already sceptical President, who was more concerned with salvaging the situation with Turkey and how that nation related to Syria.
Daniel Graham may have had a number of political reasons to coax Colby into releasing the “family jewels,” but the damage they did to Kissinger, - as they related to the events in Chile during the Nixon administration – certainly helped the Director’s cause.
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Note: Text in blue are Henry Kissinger’s actual words from Years of Renewal (Simon & Schuster, 1999) pp. 192 – 242; 310 - 345
