Although I assume they're all interested in preventing the Kurdish emirates from coalescing into a sort of Kurdistan, and they'll club together to make sure the local rulers mind their place.
Well, the Russians are certainly interested in that. The British at some point will come to the conclusion that a buffer Kurdish state between British Mesopotamia and Russian Armenia may actually be a good idea indeed. The rules have changed but the great game continues.
Not that there are many Kurds thinking in national, as opposed to local/tribal terms yet.
It should also be clear that many Kurds live outside the semi-autonomous emirates. The Emirates are simply an indication of lack of direct Ottoman administrative control prior to the war and/or inability or disinterest of the European powers to expend resources on projecting authority into difficult regions, not of some recognition of any principle of self determination of nationhood.
That map's brutal - Treaty of Sèvres brutal, or maybe even worse. I can't see how the Sultan will keep any legitimacy after this, and I'd guess that Djemal's revolution is months away, not years. There's also no realistic way for the Ottomans to control Hejaz and central Arabia, so the only question (assuming that no European power is interested in controlling that region) is whether the Hashemites or the Najd tribes come out on top.
It's actually considerably better than Severes.
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:TreatyOfSevres.png
No Italian zone in southern Anatolia streatching from Brusa to Cilicia. All the rest is pretty much straight Severes. Of course, in a just world, Russian Armenia would be made up of 1 vilayet (erzerum) and bits of Van, Bitlis and maybe Trebizon instead of seven Vilayets... but in a just world the Hamidian masscares would never have taken place and non-muslims would have been treated the same of Muslims. And in any event this TL aims at realism, not justice.
The great powers are grabbing as much as they can for themselves, and western public opinion, if not informed individuals, assumes the Armenians are the majority in the six vilayets.
So the Turks got screwed. The Turkish nation took a hit but it can survive it- it's less harsh than what the Germans got after WWII. The part that is really hurting their future prospects is actually the most demographically just part- Izmir. That area is the economic heart of Western Anatolia and it sticks out like a sore thumb in the integrated state the Turks would like to have. It's sort of if the Rhineland, or even the Rhur had been alienated from Germany instead of the eastern marchlands. These map may make things clearer:
https://www.google.co.il/search?q=t...JAhWMaRQKHfjvAAwQsAQIGQ#imgrc=IhdfR1W5ypDjeM:
When you overlay the GDP per capita provincial map with the population density map
https://www.google.co.il/search?q=t...SUm8AzzWM:&usg=__BOeYvb0YtgXeWH55l2thKFwUpR8=
You can see why losing the Six Vilayets isn't going to hurt Turkey all that much, size on the map notwithstanding, while losing Izmir certainly will. What losing the Six vilayets does do for Turkey is deny it Strategic depth. Conquering the entirety of Anatolia from a starting point in Kars during WWI was unrealistic. But capturing Ankara from a starting point in Sivas? doable.
As for Djemal, he is still young and not quite at the point where he can launch a succesful coup. But the officer corps is certainly muttering and Djemal came out of the war looking like a hero. You can expect Abdul Hamid to be stepping very carefully when he leaves his new capital in Bursa. In fact, he might just choose to remove back to Istanbul to enjoy the shameful protection of the occupying powers.
There's also no realistic way for the Ottomans to control Hejaz and central Arabia, so the only question (assuming that no European power is interested in controlling that region) is whether the Hashemites or the Najd tribes come out on top.
Well, the situation in Arabia is interesting. Right now the Najd is a vassal region to Rashidi Halil with the Saudis in exile. In Hejaz there is a sizable Ottoman garrison and since the authority of Abdul-Hamid drives in large part from being Caliph he may be loathe to withdraw it if he can gain European permission or support.
But there are other players as well. The Idrisids in Assir may launch an early rebellion. And the Zaidi imams control the interior of North Yemen and may be assumed to be lusting for liberation of the Ottoman held red sea coast. So you have a number of conflicts brewing. Arab tribes/states Vs Ottoman garrison, Arab states against each other, and Europeans against other Europeans seeking to establish protectorates over the various parties.
how do they all mesh together? next post or two.
The problem is that seizing Greek Anatolia will be much more difficult than Crete.
The Greeks there were only not displaced thanks to an intervention of European powers and said powers prefer to be in control.
If they leave, the Turks are going to invade the Greek Anatolia and force the Greeks out.
The Greek military might be able to defend this territory, but it would require them to focus on defending it and de facto abandoning Greek claims on Macedonia.
Right.
The same railways could be used for an invasion of Russia.
Looks like Witte does not think that Alexander III. was not right about the Chinese and their long-term potential.
He didn't OTL. And the Chinese have done nothing to prove him wrong so far in spite of performing better than OTL Vs the Japanese.
How is going German Palestine to affect the Sinai?
Will the British occupy it as well?
Or maybe a neutral third party moves into this buffer zone.
Maybe... Zionist Sinai redux.
All I can say is that I'm aiming at a different dynamic and outcome ITTL than MOS or OTL.
I didn't mean just now, but in the future when the various states get independence. Or at least I assume so. And will the Russians demand to let their Jews emigrate to Palestine? And I look forward to someone making maps of this in the future, after more details on the autonomous areas are revealed.
Not at this point- simply because it does not occur to them. They and the other powers have insisted on equal access to the Holy land and to purchasing land in it, for pilgrims, priests, businessmen and religous settlers and Herzl and Nardau managed to push a "religous equality clause" into the Quasi-mandate which makes clear this applies to Jewish as well as Chrsitian persons.
