Orange Tempest

Da update!

From Forever War: Afghanistan 1973-Present, by Audrey Sinclair:

...Although turmoil had been endemic in Afghanistan ever since Mohammed Zahir Shah was overthrown in 1973, and had worsened sharply following the Saur Revolution and subsequent Soviet invasion, Afghanistan remained a single, whole nation-state, albeit a dysfunctional one, until the Soviet Army's withdrawal from the country in 1989, whereupon the country fractured into warring militias, with the Communist government of Mohammed Najibullah controlling only the major cities and the ring-shaped Highway 1 connecting them...

...Until April 1992, the various militias were at least nominally united in fighting to destroy the Communist regime, but after the fall of Najibullah and the establishment of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, the country split apart once again, with the Pakistani-supported Hezb-i Islami under Gulbuddin Hekmatyar fighting against the other mujihadeen forces in an attempt to seize power for himself. In January 1994, Hekmatyar was joined by the Uzbek Abdul Rashid Dostum, and their allied forces came close to capturing Kabul before being pushed back, but that fall a new faction, the Taliban, captured Pakistan's eye, usurping the support which had previously gone to Hekmatyar, and quickly captured much of southern Afghanistan; although initially repulsed by forces loyal to Ahmad Shah Massoud, an ethnic Tajik, they regrouped and captured Kabul in September 1996...

...By late 2001, the only remaining anti-Taliban forces remaining in Afghanistan belonged to Massoud's Shura-e Nazar, Dostum having been forced to flee to Turkey following the fall of Mazar-i Sharif to the Taliban; since then, Massoud's forces had slowly been forced back into far northeastern Afghanistan, populated primarily by Tajiks. The worst blow came on 9 September 2001, when Massoud was assassinated by a pair of Taliban suicide bombers, an event that could very well have led to the final collapse of the Northern Alliance; however, the Alliance's battered and exhausted forces got their reprieve on 7 October, when US-led NATO forces attacked Taliban-held Afghanistan, which rapidly crumbled in the face of a joint Alliance-NATO offensive...

...The government set up after the fall of the Taliban rapidly proved to be both badly ineffectual and rife with corruption; this provided the Taliban with their chance to re-form a shadow government, which quickly regained much of the Taliban's former popular support and, though it never managed to wrest control of the major cities back from the occupying Coalition forces, could and did assert effective control over large areas of the countryside and proved a massive thorn in the side of the Coalition forces...

...Although the initial plan had been for a gradual, phased withdrawal over the 2012-2014 period as Coalition forces gradually handed over various tasks and responsibilities to the Afghan national government, this was thrown ass over teakettle by Hurricane Igor's devastation of the northeastern United States and Atlantic Canada and the consequent immediate and loud demands for the end of the moneysink that many now saw Afghanistan as; in addition, several U.S. and Coalition commanders believed that a fatal blow had been dealt to the Taliban by the massive, sweeping raids carried out after Ahmad Shuja Pasha's escape into Afghanistan at the end of the Pakistani Civil War and the successful discovery and defusing of the nuclear truck bomb intended for Bagram AFB...

...Unfortunately, the Taliban was still very much a force to be reckoned with, having been considerably strengthened by the ex-Pakistani forces under Pasha's command, and receiving an additional influx of new manpower in the form of Pashtun refugees fleeing into Afghanistan in the face of the genocidal Pakistani campaign against the Pakistani Taliban following the nuclear attack on Islamabad, a campaign noted among other things for making liberal use of chemical agents, especially sulfur and nitrogen mustards and several different kinds of nerve gas...

...It should not, therefore, be surprising that, following the withdrawal of Coalition forces from Afghanistan in November 2011, the nation almost immediately collapsed back into open civil war, breaking apart once again into numerous fiefdoms controlled by squabbling warlords; of these, the Taliban managed to regain control of a considerable portion of southern Afghanistan, including their old power base of Qandahar, although in the far south they were outcompeted by Baloch militias who proclaimed the unification of the Baloch-majority portions of southernmost Afghanistan with Balochistan, newly independent as a result of the Pakistani Civil War...

...In the north, the United Front, newly reformed in July 2011 in response to the impending Coalition withdrawal, managed to hold onto much of the northeast and north, including all of the territory previously held by the old Northern Alliance as well as Kabul and a considerable chunk of territory to the south and east, including the major cities of Gardez and Jalalabad, but they met with difficulty in their attempts to take portions of central and western Afghanistan; although United Front forces managed to successfully secure most of Bamiyan Province, as well as parts of Ghur and Badghis Provinces, their offensive then stalled, and a Taliban counterattack forced United Front forces to retreat from Nili on 15 June 2012, just three weeks after the city's capture by the United Front...

...Meanwhile, in response to defeats in Northwest Pakistan, the Pakistani Taliban began meeting with its namesake, the Afghan Taliban, in the hope of negotiating an alliance; the end result, however, was even better than they had dared hope for, merging both organizations into a Unified Taliban Front covering both Afghanistan and Pakistan and allowing unrestricted communication and flow of money, weapons, and men across the Afghan-Pakistani border. Afghanistan has never recognized the current border between the two countries, known as the Durand Line after the British diplomat who demarcated it in 1893, Sir Mortimer Durand, and one of the first actions of the Taliban's reborn Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan was to reassert its territorial claims to Pakistan's northwestern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province as well as to all of Balochistan, including not only the areas held by the breakaway Baloch Republic but also those fragments in the northeast still under the authority of the Pakistani Balochistan Province as well as the large western portion under Iranian control...

...The Taliban unification also provided a boost to al-Qaeda's operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as, to a lesser degree, those outside this area; it is likely this which allowed the organisation to carry out its first successful major attack on Western home soil in years, a 19 October 2012 truck bombing in Nuremburg which killed nearly 300 people...
 
Last edited:
This timeline is still completely ASB from the death toll (somewhat lower,) the Pilgrim meltdown (probably would have been shut down in the run up to Igor, if even damaged enough in the first place,) the level of devastation in Boston and Providence (by this logic, downtown New Orleans should have been completely destroyed,) the Dem wank (Weather is probably not going to affect voting patterns south and west of Newark, and a 70 seat supermajority is just not going to happen, neither would the GOP shy away from disaster response, nor would most voters associate it as big government,) and the smallpox outbreak is just pure Tom Clancy.

That being said, it is a well written timeline, especially the NOAA sections, which definitely took some research and planning.
 
This timeline is still completely ASB from the death toll (somewhat lower,) the Pilgrim meltdown (probably would have been shut down in the run up to Igor, if even damaged enough in the first place,)

Igor did not turn towards New England until just a few hours before it made landfall, and it made landfall as a Category 5 hurricane. Hence the vast death toll.

The Pilgrim Plymouth operators both did not expect Igor to be that strong at landfall and did not expect it to damage the plant sufficiently to cause a meltdown (they were wrong on both counts).


the level of devastation in Boston and Providence (by this logic, downtown New Orleans should have been completely destroyed,)

Igor made landfall as a Category 5 hurricane, whereas Katrina was a paltry 3. Igor was also a much larger storm when it made landfall than Katrina was. Finally, New England is not generally known as an extremely hurricane-prone area, unlike say Florida or the Gulf Coast, so the architecture was often less hurricane-worthy than that in New Orléans.

and the smallpox outbreak is just pure Tom Clancy.

It's completely plausible that an unsecured vial or four of smallpox which went AWOL during or after the collapse of the Soviet Union without anyone noticing its absence could be used in a bioterrorism attack. And given that a) smallpox is highly contagious, b) the vast majority of people are no longer protected against it, c) in people who do still have partial immunity, it closely resembles the common and generally mild chickenpox, and d) some people will inevitably wait to go to the hospital until they're very sick, by which time they'll have been contagious for several days.

That being said, it is a well written timeline, especially the NOAA sections, which definitely took some research and planning.

Why, thank you!:D
 
From The Rise and Fall of the Baghdadid Caliphate, by Lolo Long:

...From the moment Iraq was carved out of the corpse of the Ottoman Empire, it was a country divided along both religious and ethnic lines. Shi'ite Arabs made up approximately 60% of the population, concentrated in the southern half of the country, followed by Sunni Arabs (19%), who made up the majority of the population in the Baghdad region and the upper Euphrates and (to a lesser extent) Tigris valleys; Kurds made up 15%, mainly along the country's north and northwest borders as well as much of the northeast (most Iraqi Kurds were Sunni, though significant populations also existed who followed Shi'ite Islam or the syncretic Yazidi religion), while Turkmen and Assyrians comprised 3% and 2% respectively, mainly concentrated in scattered pockets in northern Iraq, with other ethnic groups making up the remaining 1%...

...Syria was a similar story to Iraq, but even more complex. Here, the Sunni Arabs were the majority, but only barely, making up 51% of the country's population, while the remaining 49% was a hodgepodge of several different minority groups; of these, the Alawites, a divergent sect of Shi'ite Arabs, were the largest, comprising 18% of the Syrian population (almost exclusively in the coastal regions of Syria), followed by the Kurds, at 9% (mostly in the northeastern part of the country, but also in two smaller pockets along Syria's northern border to the west), and Christian Arabs, at 8%. Non-Alawite Shi'ite Arabs made up a paltry 4%, and the Druze and Turkmen peoples each accounted for 3% (the former concentrated in the far south of the country, the latter scattered throughout Syria), followed by the Assyrians, with 2%; all other ethnic groups accounted for the final 2%...

...Despite the country's strong Shi'ite Arab majority, Iraq was historically ruled by the minority Sunni Arabs, with both the Shi'ite Arab majority and the various non-Arab minorities being sidelined and persecuted; the worst-hit were the Kurds, who had no state to call their own despite being nearly 30 million strong and forming the majority ethnic group in a large area known to the Kurds as Kurdistan, sprawling over large parts of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria. The Iraqi Kurds rebelled against the central Iraqi government nine times in all, in 1919, 1922-24, 1931-32, 1935, 1961-70, 1974-75, 1975-79, 1983-85, and 1991. After the 1961-70 uprising, which saw at times up to 80% of the Iraqi Army tied down fighting the Kurds, the Iraqi portion of Kurdistan was promised autonomy, but the central government never delivered on this promise, leading to the 1974-75 uprising in which the Kurds were decisively defeated and their autonomy abolished; a Kurdish insurgency continued to simmer after this, but fighting had mostly died down by 1979. The Kurds rose up again in 1983, during the Iran-Iraq War, prompting harsh retribution by Saddam Hussein, who attempted to wipe out the Kurds through methods including, most infamously, the use of nerve gas against the Kurdish town of Halabja. Finally, in 1991, following Iraq's crushing defeat in the Persian Gulf War, both the Kurds and the Shi'ite Arabs rose up against Saddam Hussein's government, very nearly succeeding in toppling it; although the Shi'ite Arab uprising was crushed, and Saddam exacted revenge through, amongst other actions, almost completely draining the Mesopotamian marshes, the Kurds managed to defeat the Iraqi Army with U.S. aid, finally winning true autonomy and proceeding to defend it, bolstered by U.S. air support, when Saddam's army attempted to invade in 1998...

...In Syria, though the majority Sunni Arabs ruled the country up until the 1970s, they were then supplanted, with the rise to power of Hafez al-Assad, by an Alawite ruling class, making Syria another Arab country subject to minority rule. Assad died in 2000 and was succeeded by his third son, Bashar, ensuring that power stayed in the hands of the Alawite Assad family, although the Assads did make some efforts to pressure Syria's Alawites to dress and act like the country's non-Alawite Arabs...

...In 2003, U.S., U.K., Australian, and Polish forces invaded Iraq with the help of Kurdish Peshmerga forces in the north, toppling Saddam Hussein's dictatorial Ba'ath Party regime and replacing it with an obstensibly democratic, federal structure, with Iraq being composed of a Shi'ite Arab, a Sunni Arab, and a Kurdish area, in the hope of reducing the sectarian tensions that would eventually tear Iraq apart; however, this did not go as planned, merely making the government slow to act and ineffectual. The simmering insurgency by a variety of Ba'ath and Islamist groups did not help matters, which started to come to a head as early as 2006 with the accession of Nouri al-Maliki as Prime Minister; Maliki's rule was characterized by the gradual domination of the Iraqi government by Shi'ite Arabs and the marginalization of Sunnis, as well as, though through no fault of his own (one of the few events of his time in power for which Maliki is in fact totally blameless), the final departure of all foreign troops from Iraq with the exceptions of military advisors and special-forces units; Maliki immediately took the opportunity to, over the strenuous protests of the foreign advisors attached to his military units, sack nearly the entire high-level leadership of the Iraqi military, replacing them with political yes men, a move that would have disastrous implications later on...

...Also in 2011, Syria finally collapsed into civil war, with pro-Assad forces battling pro-democracy rebels battling Kurdish separatists; the conflict quickly started to spill across the border into Iraq's Anbar Governorate, with the embattled remnants of al-Qaeda in Iraq (now terming itself the "Islamic State in Iraq") taking the opportunity to feed off the chaos of the Syrian conflict in order to grow and rebuild its strength, a move that proved indisputably successful, as the organization, having renamed itself once again, this time to the "Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant", quickly routed the divided democratic opposition from the upper Euphrates valley before launching an offensive against the remaining pro-Assad strongholds in the area; although a few fell quickly, most of these held out under siege until early 2013, thanks to the airpower at the Syrian government's disposal, but could not last forever, and fell like dominoes in the spring and summer of 2013 when several other large things appeared on Assad's plate...

...As the Syrian Army, even with considerable Russian and Iranian support, could not hold down the various rebel groups on its own, especially not with the recurrent smallpox outbreaks that had been a fact of life in the region ever since shortly after the 2011 Ashdod smallpox rocket attacks and the much less common and invariably smaller in spread but far more frightening pop-ups of Ebola (mainly arising via importation from the Indian subcontinent or the Horn of Africa), Assad increasingly relied on militia forces of all stripes to supplement his army's fighting capability; of these, the most infamous is almost certainly Hezbollah, originally from Lebanon and best-known for fighting multiple wars against Israel during the latter's long-running military campaigns in its northern neighbor's territory. Hezbollah forces proved valuable assets in Assad's campaigns against the various rebel groups, but they also eventually proved to be his Achilles' heel due to their enmity with Israel; due to the many wars between the two, Israel soon adopted a policy of bombing supply convoys destined for Hezbollah and originating from outside Syria or Lebanon. This infuriated Hezbollah, and soon Assad was starting to have considerable trouble keeping them on a leash and keeping them pointed at the rebels instead of at Israel...

...The final straw came on 23 March 2013. Although Syria possessed considerable stockpiles of chemical weapons, mainly blister and nerve agents, Assad had been loath to use them so far for fear of Western, Israeli, or joint retaliation; however, in February and March, Islamist forces went on the offensive in southern Syria, seizing a number of towns south of Damascus, and, out of desperation, Assad finally gave the order to use chemical weapons against the Islamist forces spearheading the attack. Due to a strange series of events, however, they were never used against the Islamists...

...Early in the morning of 23 March, Syrian government forces prepared to launch their chemical attack and follow-up advance against the Islamist forces, bolstered by a considerable number of Hezbollah fighters. In a terrible coincidence, just minutes before the attack was due to be launched, a supply convoy snaked its way through the desert towards the Hezbollah positions. It carried weapons, originating from Russian sources, and it had almost reached the positions of Assad's Hezbollah auxiliaries when Israeli planes attacked, bombing the convoy but also hitting, as collateral damage, some of the Hezbollah and Syrian Army forces supporting the impending offensive. The Hezbollah auxiliaries went berserk and, hell-bent on revenge, immediately attempted to seize the chemical-tipped rockets to use against Israel; the government forces offered little opposition, and in some cases even joined in the seizure of the rockets, with the only serious opposition coming from the forces assigned to guard the rockets, who, massively outnumbered, were quickly cut down...

...With the chemical rockets seized, they were driven a short distance to the southwest, from where they could fire into the Golan Heights, and where, as an added bonus, the territory in front of the border was controlled by pro-democracy Free Syrian Army forces, so even if some or all of the rockets landed short, they would still do a considerable amount of good in the eyes of those launching them. Just before noon, they roared off their launchers, streaked over the border into Israeli-controlled territory, and plummeted to Earth; although one of the new Iron Dome ABM batteries had been placed in the Golan Heights in an attempt to ward off rocket attacks from Lebanon or Syria, several of the rockets went unintercepted and impacted, each with a loud crash, spreading their deadly payload of sulfur mustard and the nerve gases tabun, sarin, cyclosarin, and VX throughout the Israeli settlements in the Heights...

...Israel was enraged by the chemical attack on the Golan Heights, which ended up killing 372 Israelis and injuring over 2,000 more, and retaliation was immediately authorized. Israel's first response arrived at 1:02:57 Syrian time; at that moment, a second sun rose barely 1,000 feet above the jubilant Hezbollah and Syrian Army troops who had launched the attack, vaporizing them in an instant and proving once and for all, without a doubt, Israel's possession of nuclear weapons. A ground invasion soon followed, with Israeli troops rolling across the de facto Syrian-Israeli border into the Syrian portion of the Golan Heights and beyond and smashing through any pro-government troops standing in their way; the F.S.A. forces in the area soon found themselves acting as Israeli co-belligerents, a role which the Israelis were only too happy to allow them, and Assad fled from Damascus to the Alawite Coast on April Fools' Day. Following the capture and execution of several Hezbollah commanders and the fall of Damascus to Israeli armor, the Israeli forces stopped their advance, satisfied with the results they had achieved, and handed over control to the F.S.A.. This would prove to be a mixed blessing, however, as the blow dealt Assad's forces, including the destruction of the greater part of his air force, led directly to the fall of his remaining strongholds in the Euphrates valley and Syrian Kurdistan, and to the loss of his remaining territory to the east and south of the Homs-Hama-Idlib line; with the exception of the Syrian Kurdistan pockets, which fell to Kurdish forces, and Aleppo and points west and southwest, which fell under Free Syrian Army control, this territory was conquered by the forces of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant...

...In Iraq, Maliki's anti-Sunni policies sparked considerable discontent among the country's non-Shi'ites and non-Arabs, with the Sunnis of Anbar in particular being angered at the way the Iraqi government was casting them aside with barely a thought after they had bled and died in great numbers back in 2006 fighting alongside American troops to liberate Fallujah from the ISIL's predecessor, al-Qaeda in Iraq. The Kurds, meanwhile, continued to drift away from the central government, but also kept alive the long-standing dispute over a considerable amount of Kurdish-inhabited territory in three areas (Kirkuk Governorate, northern Nineveh Governorate, and all but the southwestern portion of Diyala Governorate) claimed by Iraqi Kurdistan but not included by the Iraqi government in the Kurdish autonomous area...

...Given that sectarian tensions in Iraq were rapidly approaching the breaking point, urged along by Maliki's incompetence, it was inevitable that something had to give. Unfortunately, it did so in quite possibly the worst way possible, as after the Israeli South Syria offensive, the collapse of Assad's frontline, and the capture by ISIL forces of large portions of Syria, the group's pool of manpower and resources increased immensely, to the point where, in the fall of 2013, they were finally ready to launch a major offensive to regain Iraq, their birthplace and original stronghold...

...The attack, launched at midnight precisely Syrian time on the night of 12-13 October 2013, was sudden and deadly; two columns forced their way down the Euphrates, capturing al-Qa'im before reaching and capturing Haditha and its dam, one column swept through the desert to sweep up the small, scattered settlements in the desert of western and southwestern Anbar, and three columns attacked the cities of Hit, Ramadi, and Fallujah on the middle Euphrates. Of these, the worst blow was without question the capture of the Haditha dam, as having captured it, ISIL fighters were able to destroy the dam's turbines, cutting off all electricity to Baghdad and unleashing chaos in the Iraqi capital, a process only aided by attacks on the great city itself from the west, south, and east which both severed communications between Baghdad and southern Iraq and fanned the flames of an orgy of brother-against-brother, no-quarter sectarian war in the city...

...Maliki fled to Samarra, and the Iraqi Army managed to cobble together a "stop line" south of the city, but they were unable to break the siege of Baghdad, and the attempts of Shi'ite Arab militias to that end ended up bogging down south of the city in a bona fide bloodbath; to make matters worse, Muqdadiyah fell on 9 December, cutting almost all communications lines running through Diyala Governorate. The Kurdish Peshmerga, in contrast, acquitted itself beautifully, ambushing and almost completely wiping out two ISIL columns bound for the northern city of Mosul as they passed through western Nineveh Governorate, and propping up the Iraqi Army forces in Mosul and the upper Tigris valley, which would surely have folded were it not for the Peshmerga; finally, and perhaps most importantly, they stopped in its tracks an attack aimed at reaching the Iranian border at al-Munthuriyah and severing the last lines of communication between northern and southern Iraq...

...On the morning of 18 December, with their positions in central and western Iraq secure for the moment, the ISIL made an announcement: they would henceforth be known no longer as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, but rather the Islamic Caliphate in Iraq and the Levant, better known in the West as either ICIL (pronounced "eye-kill" or "ick-ill") or the Baghdadid Caliphate (after its "Caliph", Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi). This announcement was accompanied by a surge in suicide bombings in Baghdad, Samarra, and Karbala, among other cities, an occurrence that would lead to much greater ruin when, in a coordinated series of attacks on 30 December, the al-Askari Shrine in Samarra was heavily damaged and the Imam Husayn Shrine in Karbala destroyed by suicide bombers...

...On New Years' Eve, in direct response to the Samarra and Karbala shrine bombings, Grand Ayatollahs Ali al-Sistani in Iraq and Ali Khamenei in Iran declared jihad against the Caliphate, and five Iranian divisions crossed the border into southern Iraq to bolster the Iraqi forces there in their war against the forces of the so-called Caliph...
 
Last edited:
Top