1. WI more territories went Free French earlier?

raharris1973

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In OTL, one of the Vichy regime’s greatest sources of bargaining leverage was its control over the French fleet and colonial empire. Initially, it controlled France’s entire colonial empire with the exception of Chad and then French Equatorial Africa in 1940. It took until the end of 1942 to bring over most French imperial territories to the Free French side and Vichy still held sway, under Japanese guidance, over Indochina as late as March 1945. Many allied campaigns were conducted between the autumn of 1940 and the autumn of 1942 to bring French imperial territories over to the allied side and a Free French loyalty, usually with very little German involvement until operation Torch. The Axis held on to parts of Tunisia as late as May 1945.
So what if we scramble this a bit and have more colonies additionally declare for the Free French movement.

I actually confess I am at my weakest in figuring out how to bring this about. Perhaps leadership of someone other than De Gaulle? Or better relations between De Gaulle or any other Free French leaders and key officers and officials in certain colonies.

Regardless, the way things worked out in OTL had an immense effect on both WWII and postwar French decolonization, which is explored below.
Some of the most consequential territories could include Indochina or Syria, if they were Free French from the beginning, and never loyal to Vichy.

A) If Indochina, this could complicate (or less likely, stymie) Japanese expansionist plans. Japan would be in the position of having to assume British and Dutch resistance to any moves against French Indochina, and in turn would have to assume American resistance to moves against the British and Dutch colonies near the Philippines. If the Japanese hesitate to ever occupy Indochina because of this, they could avoid embargo during the war years and end up not attacking the western powers, a huge potential change. French colonial rule ends up more secure for a much longer time, and the communists do not have an opportunity to get on the inside political track. Also, French Indochina will develop more commercially. If, as I believe is more likely, the Japanese end up attacking Indochina along with the rest of Southeast Asia and the western Pacific simultaneously, the Japanese may never extend their perimeter as far as OTL, Singapore ends up with a better chance of survival, and the survival of allied rule in Burma is much more likely because the Japanese start their fight for the territory from much further away. China’s situation would thereby be improved. Within Indochina, Ho Chi Minh’s communist forces would have much more time to make themselves the leading resistance group and could spread their influence more thoroughly throughout the countryside than they could in OTL for most of the war, when they were under the double surveillance and double suppression of both the Japanese and Vichy French authorities. Hardly any French taken prisoner would be surviving at the end of the war, much less be able to form into units that could exert any power or influence at the war’s end. On the other hand, a larger share of fighting Free French forces could retreat intact into China or Burma and stay in allied service and return in force at the end of the war.



B) If French forces and governors in Syria and Lebanon mandates are Free French instead of Vichy, which might seem like a reasonable choice from Damascus in 1940, at least as long as the British control Palestine and Egypt and Iraq, this would have some postwar consequences. The French would be able to delay departure after world war two, (in OTL, the US & USSR recognized Syrian sovereignty from 1944 and Britain joined them in encouraging the French forces to leave the country in 1945-46) probably lasting until after British evacuation of the Palestine Mandate in 1948.

France could play a more active role in the Israeli war of independence, leaning to one side or the other, or they could diligently keep their mandates out of the conflict, or they could more or less mirror actual Syrian and Lebanese policy of OTL.

One option might be for France to expand into Galilee, or to set up occupied buffer zones a few clicks into northeast Israel and the Galilee, making for refugee strips, like Gaza, but keeping refugees out of Lebanon and Syria. They might also implement resettlement in Syria, and keep palestinians out of Lebanon. The French could either be tolerant or intolerant of Arab irregulars crossing into Palestine. However, even if they let fighters leave, they probably would not let them cross back in to territory they patrol if they lose. If the French adopt a policy of strict two-way closure of the border to fighters, arms and refugees alike, most likely Israel has a much larger Palestinian population in the Galilee region than it did in OTL, even as many Galileeans may flee or be pushed across Jordanian or Iraqi lines into Samaria. A less likely possibility would be the Israelis leaving a small unoccupied rump territory in north-central Galilee to be ruled by whatever Palestinian faction can rule it, for the purposes of limiting the demographic weight of non-Jews within Israel, sort of like a northern version of the Gaza strip.

As for Syria itself, it is an open question how long it would take it to achieve independence, but since it was a French mandate and not an outright colony, it would strain all credulity for it to remain under French rule after Dien Bien Phu. Indeed, it would be highly improbable for the French to still be in Syria at any point after 1950.
Later independence would slow down development of a Syrian military, and its ability to play either in wars (in OTL the Syrians were able to occupy some fringes of the Palestine Mandate) or in internal politics (in OTL’s March 1948 COL Husni Zaim launched the first of many, many military coups in Syria).
This reduced military and political experience might ultimately make Syria more vulnerable to permanent confederation under the aegis of an Arab state achieving independence earlier, such as Egypt or Iraq or Jordan. Iraq, due to geography, would be in the best position of any foreign country to permanently control Syria.

C) If Madagascar, New Caledonia or Dakar or St. Pierre & Miquelon are Free French from the beginning, then the allies are saved from having to undertake several operations to secure control.

D) If Algeria is Free French, well then pretty much all the colonies are probably going to be Free French, and if Vichy exists at all, it would be a factor in parts of souther France, but not globally, and the Germans and Italians would probably just judge it best to completely occupy all of metropolitan France and Corsica.
 
One of the main problem with this is that the Roosevelt administration supported the Vichy Government. While de Gaulle is certainly not blameless, the US support for Vichy control in any of the colonies (a long-standing and very failed policy to get the Vichy into the war again, that not end until early 1943, when there were literally NONE other than de Gaulle left with even a shred of authority with the French).

So, get Roosevelt to align more with Churchill's policy towartds de Gaulle and his Free French (annoying bastard, but our annoying bastard that will fight) from late 1940 or so, and you will have the French colonies outside French North Africa all align with the Free French by summer 1941.
 
The Vichy governors in North Africa, Syria and Madagascar were really a rotten bunch of quasi-fascists, loyal to Petain. Likewise most of the naval and other military commanders in the colonies. The only way to have them cooperating with the Allies is through a "France Fights On" scenario; Paul Reynaud keeps control of the government throughout the German conquest of France in 1940, fires the incompetent generals early on, has the sense to assassinate Petain and Laval, and moves the government to North Africa, from whence it continues to meet its commitments to France's allies. Short of that, you can have only piecemeal advantages: for instance, let's say the assault on Dakar (Operation Menace) had been better planned, better secrecy had been maintained, Vichy French ships had been blocked from moving into the Atlantic and going to Dakar right before the assault, the Free French illusion that they had great support in Dakar was not bought into by the British, etc. If the Brits take Dakar this might have a significant effect on the submarine war in the Atlantic, especially for convoys going to and from the Cape.

I don't think the U.S. should be blamed for having a relationship with the Vichy regime. At the time, the U.S. was not in the war but one way it was helping the Brits indirectly was by exerting very strong pressure on Vichy not to join the Axis and not to allow Axis troops or ships to operate from its territories. This was successful and much appreciated by Churchill. As to the U.S. being overly sympathetic to the Vichy regime, certainly this was not true at the time of Operation Torch. (And even before, Roosevelt was much impressed by the British attack on the French fleet at Mers-el-Kébir after Vichy refused to go beyond empty promises to keep the fleet out of German hands.) And for the Torch period, read Ike's Crusade in Europe. The U.S. tried hard to find an alternative to dealing with "ex" Vichy types in North Africa. There wasn't any as of late 1942; the Free French simply did not have the necessary political base of support. Indeed, the French colonials in North Africa were to a great extent very hostile to the Free French, and ex-Vichy officers would not have followed orders from the supposed traitors to France. And Darlan, hardly the most desirable of leaders, did honor his commitments to the Allies.
 
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French North Africa (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia) is really its own case among the French colonies and will not go Free French easily, especially as the Americans supported Giraud and Darlan instead of de Gaulle. Remember that the US supported and propped up the same quasi-fascists you talk of.

Without US support, all Vichy colonies outside French North Africa would quickly and easily fall to the Free French, especially French Guyana, the Cod Islands and Martinique and Guadeloupe. A French carrier (rather old and slow) with decently modern US planes sat idle for most of the war at Guadeloupe due to this.

AFAIK, XIX. Corps declared for de Gaulle, which meant that there were no French at all except de Gaulle's men. Still the Roosevelt administration did not recognise de Gaulle's government as the legal government of France until 23rd of October, 1944.
 
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