YELLOW RIVER INCIDENT Nov 1937 - Mar 1939 PART III
Spring and Summer Counteroffensives
While the CPA contended with the internal guerrilla threat and a hesitant Beiyang High Command, the deployed federal army had begun to look increasingly like the 600,000-man force promised by Wang Jingwei the last year. Instead of attacking the by now well-fortified cities of Wuchang and Hankou, Wang’s generals decided to clear up the peripheries of the theatre. Generals Li Zongren and Li Hengti’s forces, designated the Nanjing Area Army, were now 350,000 strong and in good supply. In the west, a new force under the command of Zhu De had been created to assist the PPP guerillas (and, Wang hoped, bring them into his federal control) and retake their base area of Xi’an, which had been overrun early in the war by the troops of Liao Yaoxiang. Roughly 150,000 troops were made available to General Zhu for this purpose.
This two-fold strategy, calling first for the consolidation of southern Shaanxi and then a decisive battle to destroy the bulk of the CPA-Beiyang forces on the Central Plain, was initiated in March. For the next three months, Zhu De’s men advanced through Sichuan and fought bitterly against He Yingqin’s troops. In May He was finally forced to withdraw from Xi’an, whereupon he retreated to regroup at Zhengzhou. The Federal army was now in control of major mountains ranges, the PPP had regained their base area, and the CPA force holding Wuchang was now in peril.
Second Battle of Nanjing, Autumn 1938
The recapture of the Shaanxi area by Zhu De had begun to turn the war to the Federation’s favor, but it startled Fengtian. Yuan Kewen had assumed that the Federal forces constituted a paper tiger weighed down by warlordism and corruption and did not expect them to hold up to, let alone prevail against the “crack troops” of the CPA, as he termed them. Now, while Zhu’s success prompted him to reconsider, what happened in late summer forced him to act.
While Yuan, far away from the battle, took his time pondering his options, the CPA was at its breaking point. In July, Jia Deyao and Liu Zhennian held a meeting in Xuzhou. The atmosphere was icy. Jia accused Liu openly, regarding his promise of full Beiyang support as “empty words”. Liu responded that the Grand Marshal would soon be compelled to “personally inspect” the Nanjing front. He then presented a plan to Jia and his staff that would be undertaken in the following months, and, if successful, would “create something out of nothing”.
In August 1938, CPA and Nationalist forces had a combined 300,000 men occupying the area around the Grand Canal just north of Nanjing which, Liu proposed, could be sent to force an encirclement of the city. Though there was no way of actually achieving success with just that number of troops, more than 100,000 of which were second-rate Republican Guardsmen, the move would force Yuan’s hand, forcing him to deploy the full force of the professional Beiyang Army. Only in this way could Nanjing be taken and the initiative regained. The longer the CPA waited to make a move, the more men and weapons the Federalists could build up for an overwhelming assault, similar to that which had happened in Shaanxi. Jia, though reluctant to throw his personal army into what could well be a death trap, ultimately agreed to the plan.
Jia’s suspicions were proven correct when the Second Battle of Nanjing began in mid-August. This time, rather than try to enter the city, CPA troops under Jia forced a wedge between Nanjing and the railways leading to Shanghai. Liu Zhennian’s divisions (now bolstered by Republican Guards and various Shandong militias) handled the western face of the Southern Capital. No less than two days into the operation there was already full-on direct engagement between the two armies. However, after ten days the encirclement seemed to be succeeding as the attackers sacrificed everything for speed of advance. It was later determined that Li Zongren had anticipated the attack, but decided that the assault would again aim to take the city head-on and furthermore that it would not take place before sufficient preparations had been made.
Indeed, by September it was clear that the attackers were badly overstretched. However, the other half of the plan had worked. In late August, Yuan relented and authorized full deployment of the Beiyang Army with himself as its commander. Approximately 200,000 troops were allotted to the so-called “Jiangsu Route Army”, the first divisions of which hurried by rail to the front from Beijing.
Now that the Grand Marshall had thrown in his lot with the CPA, the ongoing battle for Nanjing was now officially more than a large fight between warlords, but rather an all-out war involving the two main contenders for dominance over the nation. The struggle for the city was a symbol for the struggle to unify China, from which neither side could easily back down. In Guangdong and elsewhere throughout the Federation, newspapers began publishing articles highlighting a statement from Wang Jingwei that Nanjing was to be made the official capital in 1940; in Beijing and Manchuria, the city was termed the “pass to China south of the Yangtze”.
Meeting Yuan’s Jiangsu Route Army were, in addition to the over 300,000 men of the Nanjing Area Army, an additional 200,000 new troops diverted from Zhu De’s forces as well as former PPP guerillas and newly-recruited men. It was the latter group that was to break the encirclement and protect the capital-to-be.
The “encirclement” planned by Liu and Jia, being largely a political move to force Yuan into the fight, quickly crumbled and the forces involved regrouped with the Jiangsu Route Army. The western approach to Nanjing was thus abandoned, though a major salient occupied by over 200,000 men still existed between Nanjing and Shanghai. In addition to the Beiyang, men and boys of the Republican Guard were being shipped into the Yellow River region by the thousands to support the ongoing operations. By October 1938, as Yuan led his armies into Nanjing, 900,000 men of the Blue Sky, White Sun emblem were active in the war effort or awaiting deployment. Their Federal counterparts similarly boasted of one million men under arms by the end of September.
Despite the ample enthusiasm with the Nationalists and their Grand Marshall afforded the battle, however, the battle soon became a bloody tragedy of proportions not seen since the Taiping Rebellion. Yuan Kewen was not an experienced general, and his immediate staff he had selected for the operation were, by and large, his cronies who had gotten their positions because of loyalty rather than merit. Experienced and senior officers tended to find themselves in command of minor units or worse, Republican Guard details. The troops of the Beiyang fought fiercely to capture the city, and in many cases enjoyed success, but at huge prices. Majors and colonels trying to outshine one another in the presence of the Grand Marshal often sent their men into ambitious assaults, or failed to support their comrades lest the chance at quick glory escape them. Moreover, the defenders, having defended the town successfully almost a year before, were well-prepared for the fighting. Especially vulnerable were the hot-headed youths of the Republican Guards, who died by the thousands in pointless human wave charges against fortified positions.
By the general cessation of urban combat in early December 1938, nearly 200,000 soldiers of the CPA and Nationalist armies had been killed since August. Most of these were militia fighters and Republican Guardsmen. The Beiyang troops fared drastically better, comprising only about one tenth of the dead. The Federal Nanjing Area Army, by contrast, had lost about half that of the invaders. And though the city’s residents had largely evacuated or braced themselves for the fighting, it is estimated that between 50,000 and 100,000 noncombatants lost their lives.
Next: Yellow River Incident Nov 1937 - Mar 1939 Part IV: The Aftermath of Nanjing and the Federal Offensive