Soviet air force did militarily intervene in 1950. They sent the 324th IAD, the best fighter regiment in the entire VVS to Antung and for many months afterwards, the only MiGs that engaged UN aircraft in the skies over North Korea were flown by 324th IAD pilots.
Chinese pilots flew separate training flights that rarely engaged UN aircraft and often broke off and headed for safety of Antung when they sighted enemy aircraft.
Only Soviet flights had the proficiency and experience to safely engage UN fighters and bombers for the first two years of the war while the PLAAF acquired the necessary training in Manchuria.
The Western myth of Communist MiG flights consisting of 1-2 Soviet instructors and 20 Chinese/North Korean pilots is just a myth. Flights were exclusively Chinese and exclusively Soviet. They didn't fly mixed flights, though in the early days Chinese flights would observe Soviet flights in combat to gain second hand experience.
And Soviet air involvement IOTL was already extremely extensive as is. The 324th IAD was the only Soviet MiG unit that could hold its own against the USAF's 4th FIW and attain an acceptable kill-loss ratio. All subsequent Soviet air units funneled through Korea were second rate and suffered appalling losses in comparison to the 324th. Even then the 324th didn't fight in the last two years of the conflict because its pilots were so heavily fatigued by having to carry the entire weight of the air war on its shoulders for the duration of its deployment.
One change I recommend to Soviet air strategy: instead of rotating out entire air regiments through Korea like IOTL (veteran regiments replaced by newly raised regiments with zero combat experience), they should adopt the American system of keeping entire air regiments deployed for the duration of the conflict, but instead rotate out individual pilots with new replacements. That way you have a mix of experienced veterans and new guys instead of all veterans or all novices. You have a more steady level of expertise, experience, and thus more effective combat performance.
UN pilots noted that Communist pilots' skill level varied in cycles that matched the rotation schedule of Soviet air regiments. At the start of the cycle, Soviet pilots would be timid, make elementary tactical mistakes, and be easy targets. As the cycle progressed, the Soviet pilots of that unit would gain skill and experience until they could challenge the UN pilots in direct combat. But as soon as they reached that skill threshold, the now blooded Soviet air regiment would be withdrawn and replaced with a completely novice one and the cycle would begin again.
The reason the Soviets rotated out entire units IOTL was they viewed Korea as a training ground for VVS and PVO units that would be deployed to Europe after the war. They wanted entire regiments, from ground crews, to pilots, to staff officers, to gain experience in and be blooded in a real world combat environment. Whereas the Americans came out of the conflict with lots of experienced pilots, but organizationally, only 2 fighter wings were blooded by combat.
This benefited the Americans when it came to the short term goal of winning the air war over Korea.
Easy change in Soviet strategy to similarly focus on the short term here will pay dividends for the Chinese.
Chinese pilots flew separate training flights that rarely engaged UN aircraft and often broke off and headed for safety of Antung when they sighted enemy aircraft.
Only Soviet flights had the proficiency and experience to safely engage UN fighters and bombers for the first two years of the war while the PLAAF acquired the necessary training in Manchuria.
The Western myth of Communist MiG flights consisting of 1-2 Soviet instructors and 20 Chinese/North Korean pilots is just a myth. Flights were exclusively Chinese and exclusively Soviet. They didn't fly mixed flights, though in the early days Chinese flights would observe Soviet flights in combat to gain second hand experience.
And Soviet air involvement IOTL was already extremely extensive as is. The 324th IAD was the only Soviet MiG unit that could hold its own against the USAF's 4th FIW and attain an acceptable kill-loss ratio. All subsequent Soviet air units funneled through Korea were second rate and suffered appalling losses in comparison to the 324th. Even then the 324th didn't fight in the last two years of the conflict because its pilots were so heavily fatigued by having to carry the entire weight of the air war on its shoulders for the duration of its deployment.
One change I recommend to Soviet air strategy: instead of rotating out entire air regiments through Korea like IOTL (veteran regiments replaced by newly raised regiments with zero combat experience), they should adopt the American system of keeping entire air regiments deployed for the duration of the conflict, but instead rotate out individual pilots with new replacements. That way you have a mix of experienced veterans and new guys instead of all veterans or all novices. You have a more steady level of expertise, experience, and thus more effective combat performance.
UN pilots noted that Communist pilots' skill level varied in cycles that matched the rotation schedule of Soviet air regiments. At the start of the cycle, Soviet pilots would be timid, make elementary tactical mistakes, and be easy targets. As the cycle progressed, the Soviet pilots of that unit would gain skill and experience until they could challenge the UN pilots in direct combat. But as soon as they reached that skill threshold, the now blooded Soviet air regiment would be withdrawn and replaced with a completely novice one and the cycle would begin again.
The reason the Soviets rotated out entire units IOTL was they viewed Korea as a training ground for VVS and PVO units that would be deployed to Europe after the war. They wanted entire regiments, from ground crews, to pilots, to staff officers, to gain experience in and be blooded in a real world combat environment. Whereas the Americans came out of the conflict with lots of experienced pilots, but organizationally, only 2 fighter wings were blooded by combat.
This benefited the Americans when it came to the short term goal of winning the air war over Korea.
Easy change in Soviet strategy to similarly focus on the short term here will pay dividends for the Chinese.
