“Where the Valkyries Rode the Skies” Alternate Normandy Timeline
Part 1: The Fate of the Reich
On the night of March 20th, 1944, with the coming Allied invasion on his mind, Hitler delivered an address to the German Armed Forces in the West
“It is evident that an Anglo-American landing in the West will and must come. How and where it will come no one knows. Equally, no kind of speculation on the subject is possible. At no place along our front is a landing impossible, except perhaps where the coast is broken by cliffs. The most suitable and hence the most threatened areas are the two west coast peninsulas, Cherbourg and Brest, which are very tempting and offer the best possibilities for the formation of a bridgehead, which would then be enlarged systematically by the mass use of air forces and heavy weapons of all kinds.
By far the most important thing for the enemy will be to gain a port for landing on the largest possible scale. This alone gives a wholly special importance to the west coast ports and orders have therefore been issued designating them ‘fortresses’, in which the Commandant alone will be responsible for training and operations of all three services. He has the task of doing everything possible to make them impregnable. He is personally responsible for ensuring that the fortress is held to the last round of ammunition, the last tin of rations, until every last possibility of defence has been exhausted.”
The enemy’s entire landing operation must under no circumstances be allowed to last longer than a matter of hours or, at most a matter of days, with the Dieppe attempt as a model. Once the landing has been defeated it will under no circumstances be repeated by the enemy. Quite apart from the heavy casualties he would suffer, months would be needed to prepare for a renewed attempt. Nor is this the only factor which would deter the Anglo-Americans from trying again. There would be the crushing blow to their morale which a miscarried invasion would give. The destruction of the enemy landing attempt means more than a purely local decision on the Western front. It is the sole decisive factor in the whole conduct of the war and hence in its final result.
The 45 divisions which we now have in the West are needed in the East and will and must be transferred there so as to effect a fundamental change in that situation. Thus on every single man fighting on the Western front, as representing the decisive front of the war, depends the outcome of the war and with it the fate of the Reich. This realization of the decisive importance of each individual’s effort must at all costs become part and parcel of the thought process of every officer and man.”
The day, after Hitler’s address, a short conference was held to determine the plan of action. In attendance Gerd von Rundstedt, Commander in Chief West, Erwin Rommel, Commander of Army Group B , Geyr von Schweppenburg, Commander of Panzergruppe West, Alfred Jodl, the Chief of Military Operations for the OKW, and the Fuhrer himself.
Hitler began the meeting by declaring the impregnability of the Atlantic wall and titling himself “the greatest build of fortifications of all time.” He went on to give specific emphasis on a number of areas, the Fifteenth Army’s sector, Pas de Calais, he labeled as the most likely “focus of the enemy landing operation” and the fortress of Cherbourg as another. Cherbourg he said must be held to the end, “as Gneisenau held Kolberg.”
After the conclusion of the Fuhrer’s rant, Rommel made a detailed report on the Atlantic Wall’s defences. He cited the need for increased shore defences and that special emphasis should be place on the Cotentin peninsula.
“Since the end of January, the construction of foreshore obstacles has been in progress along the whole of the Atlantic coast and, at the important points, is now steadily approaching completion. The object of these new underwater obstructions is not only to halt enemy approaches to the beaches, but also to destroy his landing equipment and troops.
I therefore consider that an attempt must be made to beat off enemy landings on the coast and to fight the battle in the more or less fortified coastal strip. I regard it urgently necessary to have two reserve divisions held a short distance from the coastal defences, along the worst threatened stretch between Boulogne and the Somme, so that they can intervene in support of the coastal defence divisions as soon as possible.
I come now to the security against airborne troops. The important thing is that all territory which might conceivably be used for landing airborne troops is treated in such a manner that enemy aircraft and gliders will break up while landing. At the base of the Cotentin peninsula in particular construction is under way on a system of stakes, fitted with 13,000 shells, and interconnecting wires to break up any airborne operations. “
After the conclusion of Rommel’s report both von Rundstedt and von Schweppenburg stated there views. Von Rundstedt was against the Rommel’s idea of confronting the enemy solely on the beaches and preferred conducting a mobile battle against the enemy. He wanted resources diverted for a “Zweite Stellung”, a second line of defence further inland. General von Schweppenburg was focused on the danger any Allied airborne forces would have to Paris. It was his opinion the Panzer Divisions should be held back to form a strategic reserve further inland, which could then react to any landings.
For the rest of the meeting Rommel argued back and forth with von Rundstedt and von Schweppenburg over the deployment of the Panzer forces. Rommel said that any approach march from the interior would subject the Panzers to massive air attack; von Schweppenburg responded by saying that the forces could avoid this by moving primarily at night. At the conclusion of the meeting Hitler told Rommel that he would be given a free hand in the coming weeks, this however was not to be the case.
Part 1: The Fate of the Reich
On the night of March 20th, 1944, with the coming Allied invasion on his mind, Hitler delivered an address to the German Armed Forces in the West
“It is evident that an Anglo-American landing in the West will and must come. How and where it will come no one knows. Equally, no kind of speculation on the subject is possible. At no place along our front is a landing impossible, except perhaps where the coast is broken by cliffs. The most suitable and hence the most threatened areas are the two west coast peninsulas, Cherbourg and Brest, which are very tempting and offer the best possibilities for the formation of a bridgehead, which would then be enlarged systematically by the mass use of air forces and heavy weapons of all kinds.
By far the most important thing for the enemy will be to gain a port for landing on the largest possible scale. This alone gives a wholly special importance to the west coast ports and orders have therefore been issued designating them ‘fortresses’, in which the Commandant alone will be responsible for training and operations of all three services. He has the task of doing everything possible to make them impregnable. He is personally responsible for ensuring that the fortress is held to the last round of ammunition, the last tin of rations, until every last possibility of defence has been exhausted.”
The enemy’s entire landing operation must under no circumstances be allowed to last longer than a matter of hours or, at most a matter of days, with the Dieppe attempt as a model. Once the landing has been defeated it will under no circumstances be repeated by the enemy. Quite apart from the heavy casualties he would suffer, months would be needed to prepare for a renewed attempt. Nor is this the only factor which would deter the Anglo-Americans from trying again. There would be the crushing blow to their morale which a miscarried invasion would give. The destruction of the enemy landing attempt means more than a purely local decision on the Western front. It is the sole decisive factor in the whole conduct of the war and hence in its final result.
The 45 divisions which we now have in the West are needed in the East and will and must be transferred there so as to effect a fundamental change in that situation. Thus on every single man fighting on the Western front, as representing the decisive front of the war, depends the outcome of the war and with it the fate of the Reich. This realization of the decisive importance of each individual’s effort must at all costs become part and parcel of the thought process of every officer and man.”
The day, after Hitler’s address, a short conference was held to determine the plan of action. In attendance Gerd von Rundstedt, Commander in Chief West, Erwin Rommel, Commander of Army Group B , Geyr von Schweppenburg, Commander of Panzergruppe West, Alfred Jodl, the Chief of Military Operations for the OKW, and the Fuhrer himself.
Hitler began the meeting by declaring the impregnability of the Atlantic wall and titling himself “the greatest build of fortifications of all time.” He went on to give specific emphasis on a number of areas, the Fifteenth Army’s sector, Pas de Calais, he labeled as the most likely “focus of the enemy landing operation” and the fortress of Cherbourg as another. Cherbourg he said must be held to the end, “as Gneisenau held Kolberg.”
After the conclusion of the Fuhrer’s rant, Rommel made a detailed report on the Atlantic Wall’s defences. He cited the need for increased shore defences and that special emphasis should be place on the Cotentin peninsula.
“Since the end of January, the construction of foreshore obstacles has been in progress along the whole of the Atlantic coast and, at the important points, is now steadily approaching completion. The object of these new underwater obstructions is not only to halt enemy approaches to the beaches, but also to destroy his landing equipment and troops.
I therefore consider that an attempt must be made to beat off enemy landings on the coast and to fight the battle in the more or less fortified coastal strip. I regard it urgently necessary to have two reserve divisions held a short distance from the coastal defences, along the worst threatened stretch between Boulogne and the Somme, so that they can intervene in support of the coastal defence divisions as soon as possible.
I come now to the security against airborne troops. The important thing is that all territory which might conceivably be used for landing airborne troops is treated in such a manner that enemy aircraft and gliders will break up while landing. At the base of the Cotentin peninsula in particular construction is under way on a system of stakes, fitted with 13,000 shells, and interconnecting wires to break up any airborne operations. “
After the conclusion of Rommel’s report both von Rundstedt and von Schweppenburg stated there views. Von Rundstedt was against the Rommel’s idea of confronting the enemy solely on the beaches and preferred conducting a mobile battle against the enemy. He wanted resources diverted for a “Zweite Stellung”, a second line of defence further inland. General von Schweppenburg was focused on the danger any Allied airborne forces would have to Paris. It was his opinion the Panzer Divisions should be held back to form a strategic reserve further inland, which could then react to any landings.
For the rest of the meeting Rommel argued back and forth with von Rundstedt and von Schweppenburg over the deployment of the Panzer forces. Rommel said that any approach march from the interior would subject the Panzers to massive air attack; von Schweppenburg responded by saying that the forces could avoid this by moving primarily at night. At the conclusion of the meeting Hitler told Rommel that he would be given a free hand in the coming weeks, this however was not to be the case.
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