Μηδίζω! THE WORLD OF ACHAEMENID HELLAS
CHAPTER 7: DRAYA or THALASSA
EXTRACT FROM HERODOTOS OF HALIKARNASSOS’ HISTORIA (c.440 BCE)
ARTEMISIA
There is no call for me to discuss any of the other commanders, except for Artemisia of Karia. I consider her to be a singular object of admiration because she was a woman who played a critical part in the successful campaign against Hellas. She gained a crown on the death of her husband, as she had a son who was still not come of age. Because of her courage and will she went to war although she had no need or requirement to do so. Her name was Artemisia; she was the daughter of Lygdamis, and was of Halikarnassian descent on her father's side and Kretan on her mother's. She led the forces of Halikarnassos, Kos, Nisyros and Kalyndos, and supplied five ships. The ships she brought had the highest reputation in the whole Persian fleet, besides the ones from Sidon, and of all the allies she gave the Persian king the best advice. I have listed the cities that she commanded; it is clear that they all belong to the Dorian group, as the people of Halicarnassos come from Troizen, and the rest from Epidauros.
EXTRACT FROM A COMMENTARY ON XENOKRITOS’ PERSIKA (c.448 BCE)
ON ARTEMISIA
It was Artemisia, Queen of Halikarnassos, that struck the critical blow by ramming and sinking the ship of Eurybiades unexpectedly, for as incompetent as he was he was still the commander of the fleet and his ship was still the heart of all commands, all remaining cohesion and order began to break down from this point forwards(1).
“Know that a mere woman sent the Spartan warrior to the bottom of the sea.” said Artemisia.
It has been claimed that this account of her valour is a false tale because she was a woman(2), but even those unfriendly to the Persians and those who served the Great King faithfully praise the skill and courage of this woman and the five ships that she brought(3), some have even said that it was four ships and the Hellenes simply could not believe that only four ships could perform so effectively(4). Xenokritos does not doubt the veracity of this story or the courage of Artemisia, greatest of all Hellenes in the service of the Great King(5).
Observations
1- Here Xenokritos must reconcile his characterisation of Eurybiades as incompetent and Themistokles as the admiral worthy of consideration with the fact that Themistokles’ death did not cause the final collapse, Eurybiades’ did. The attempt is not particularly convincing.
2- No contemporary literary source survives which actually questions the overall truth of Artemisia’s actions and presence at Salamis, but Xenokritos’ defensive posture and references in other contemporary sources to such doubts leaves us in no doubt that this was an accusation brought forth by some chroniclers of the period. Neither did these accusations follow the typical western/eastern division; it seems that the principal doubters were Athenians and non-Hellenes accounting the events of the Persian Wars. We have no particular reason to doubt her participation at Salamis. There have certainly been many in subsequent centuries who have doubted the existence of a historical Artemisia, for one reason or another, but there is little to no credibility in this, and all such denials have had an overtly partial basis rather than any particular strong evidence.
3- By which Xenokritos means Herodotos of Halikarnassos, who he once again refuses to name directly even as he relies upon his work for support. The Halikarnassian, it must be said, had rather obvious reasons for being agreeable to Artemisia, but at no point expresses support for any particularly outlandish story involving the Queen.
4- There are no other references to this belief outside of Xenokritos, and it is more than a little suggestive of invention that this is the case. But we must also highlight this exaggeration as historically significant, representing the beginning of Artemisia’s legendary existence by accumulation of tall tales and oneupmanship. One wonders what Xenokritos would have thought of the legendary Artemisia he helped create.
5- Once again there are attempts to show that it is not that Hellenes are bad at naval warfare, or warfare in general, it is that they were fighting for the wrong cause and poorly led. Xenokritos here uses Artemisia as another example of this, as a Hellene, and a woman no less, who had the ear of Xerxes and was considered an excellent naval commander.
EXTRACTS FROM THE CONQUEST, AUTHOR UNKNOWN (C.150 BCE)
THE GREAT PERSIAN WAR
Thus entered Artemisia of Karia onto the scene at last, fresh from her conquest of Lemnos as had been ordered by King Dareios. Being of the line of Amazones, through her mother’s side, and was entirely satisfied with a life of warfare and battle glory, so when she discovered that King Xerxes had need of her service one more in the conquest of Hellas she leapt at the chance, especially as the conquest of Hellas had been the dying wish of her husband King Dareios. Her ship Enyo, with its red sails and iron shields, set sail once more, leading Xerxes’ fleets against Hellas, bringing at last Dareios’ last will to the last horizon he had left to conquer. With a fleet of hundreds at her disposal no island could withstand her forces, and no fleet either, where she had been indomitable with a single ship she was now unstoppable.
...
Then suddenly came Enyo, crashing into the side of the Spartan flagship. After boarding, Artemisia personally cut off the head of both Eurybiades and Themistokles before sinking their ship. She had already sunk four ships that day, and would go on to sink another five as the Spartan fleet disintegrated following this disastrous loss. This was the turning point, as Xerxes watched from the shore he was most pleased as he saw the Battle of Salamis turn in his favour, and guarantee his eventual conquest of Hellas. Not long afterwards the battle was won, the Athenians surrendered and most of the others perished. For this Xerxes made his father’s love Queen of all the islands of the Sea of Aigeus, in addition to being the satrap of Ionia.
...
The rebellion of Argos had been predicted, their power hungry ways rivalling even that of the Spartans, and so soon after their declaration of overlordship over the Peloponessos came the red sails of Enyo, and a Persian fleet, Artemisia having realised the duplicity of the Argives would not have anticipated a swift and merciless naval landing. Artemisia and her picked band stormed the walls of the city, and gave over their treacherous leadership to slaughter. In all the years since, Argos had feared the name Artemisia.
...
Xerxes at length decided that Mardonios must be executed for his attempted rebellion, but declined a cruel execution as memory of his valiant and loyal service in the original conquest of Hellas. He therefore requested an executioner to do the deed, and up spoke Artemisia. She took up a great axe, and at the chosen moment relieved Mardonios of his head. Thereafter, no man would ever cross her again.
THE ARTEMISIAD BY NIKOMAKHE (319 CE)
THE ROCK OF LEUKAS
So it was that Artemisia and her crew came to rest at the island of Leukas, seeking to pleasurably while away some time after the rebellion of Hellas against the great Irani Basileos. The governor of Leukas, Telegon, was her friend of long years, and immediately threw the crew of the Enyo a great feast, including confections as fine as those found in Foinikia in great number. Artemisia reciprocated by giving Telegon a fine Egyptian carpet, for his ancestor Kirke had given birth to his line in that land, and she had saved him that gift especially. After eating and drinking and talking Artemisia felt a need to roam the island, and took leave of her companions for a time. Fearless she wandered, cast in splendour by Helios, moving through peaceful glades and watching the movement of the glad waters. All of a sudden she found herself captivated by the sight of a lovely woman, on a high cliff. Aphrodite moved within her at that moment, and compelled her to go to that woman.
When Artemisia approached this maiden she found that the girl was in deep distress, wailing and weeping and cursing.
“What drives you to such agony?” asked Artemisia, gently grasping the maiden’s hand.
“Phaon, the wretch! He has seduced me with his beauty, laid with me, and then rejected me as unsuitable. How can he do such things to me, when I had given over my body to him in love! I have been shamed and rejected, and I do not mean to carry on.” said the maiden, moving as though to throw herself off to the rocks below.
“Stay a while and talk to me, fair one.” said Artemisia, her voice sweet but strong. The maiden stopped.
“What is your name?” asked Artemisia.
“Sappho of Lesbos.” said Sappho.
“I am called Artemisia, of Halikarnassos.” said Artemisia, who sat down by Sappho and invited her to sit down.
“Why are you here?” said Sappho, who lowered herself with grace despite her state.
“I saw you standing in distress, lovely one, and felt moved to intervene.” said Artemisia.
And at that moment Sappho was struck by the dignity and strength of Artemisia. Captivated, Aphrodite had come to her also.
“Why are you on the island, if you are from Halikarnassos?” she asked, wanting to know more about this warrior of a woman sitting beside her.
“I am captain of a ship, anchored not far from here, I am come here from the late wars to calm the waters of my soul. And what is such a lovely woman from Lesbos doing here?” said Artemisia.
“I was here to escape Phaon, the places that reminded me of his voice and his face, rooms that even now lingered with the very smell of him. Even that did not help. Where does your ship carry you?” asked Sappho.
“Wherever I will it, save the will of the Irani King.” said Artemisia, running her fingers gently through Sappho’s hair.
“Will you take me with you?” asked Sappho.
“Before you ask me such things, know that I am a woman of war, and the sea. I have conquered cities, spoken to kings as their equal, and sailed across all the seas from India to Idonia. I have lain with many men and women, I have called Hermione daughter of Helen my sweet one and stood beside a king of Iran and called him my love. Knowing all this, maiden of Lesbos, will you still ask to come with me?” said Artemisia, who stood up and invited Sappho to stand with her.
“I am a poet, I am not a woman of war, my battlefield is the scroll and my weapon is my pen, and thus I cannot be considered mighty in your presence. My moods are deep and my memory is long, my mind is demanding, and I am easily moved by the motions of the world. Knowing all this, will you have me by your side?” saud Sappho, standing up.
“I will.” said Artemisia.
“Then I am yours.” said Sappho.
THE HISTORY OF ASIA BY IDILBARND OF OLIMBIRGIA (1481 CE)
THE AMAVADATID CONQUESTS
The Amavadatid revolt swiftly moved outside of its original hotbeds, betraying greater ambitions than simply forming a Kingdom of Hellas; Amavadatos wanted to move against the Akhaimenids and claim the throne of Asia, nothing more, nothing less. After all, as an Akhaimenid himself he considered it his birthright. To begin this conquest he took advantage of the situation in Hellenic Asia, whereby regional dynasts and local potentates had managed to carve substantial domains under the aegis of the large and unwieldy satrapy based out of Sardis. This situation, resulting naturally from the Akhaimenid frontier moving across the Aigean into Hellas, Makedonia, and Thrakia, proved immensely helpful to Amavadatos, who was able to turn powerful figures like Lygdamis III of Halikarnassos on his side, immediately causing anarchy amongst those Akhaimenid governors and officials who attempted to resist. With such powerful local forces alongside his own hardened Hellenic batallions Amavadatos swiftly took control of most of the Lydian littoral, including Ionia, the Dorian cities, and Aeolis. By the time King Ariabignes met him in battle at Sardis in *355 BCE a siege of that city was already underway, and the defeat of the Great King in that battle confirmed the loss of these Hellenic districts. Resistance, however, was more effective further into the mountainous parts of the satrapy where Amavadatos’ naval forces had no impact, despite the damage done to Ariabignes’ prestige, and Amavadatos’ progress was effectively halted by the Battle of Herakleia Pontike in *354 BCE. With an undeclared peace the situation in Amavadatos’ Asian territories was delicate. On the one hand, the confusing morass the Akhaimenid satrap had allowed was untenable and could not be tolerated, on the other hand the Akhaimenids continued to push and prod at Amavadatos’ possessions, and he could not afford to alienate any of the more powerful dynasts who might suddenly switch sides and allow an Akhaimenid army to gain a foothold, possibly even allowing them to cross the Great Sea and make an attempt to reconquer Hellas. This tenuous situation lasted for thirteen years, with the conquest of Lycia by Amavadatos in *346 BCE being the only successful expedition mounted by him in that time, but politic behaviour and the might of his army kept these nuisances at bay. Without the distractions of Thrakia and its tulultuums it’s possible more could have been achieved.
Amavadatos’ chance would come with the death of Ariabignes in *341 BCE and the usurpation of his chosen successor by Dareios II, which collapsed the organised resistance in Anatolia. Amavadatos’ armies, even larger than in *354 BCE with Asian gold and the benefit of more time to organise, crushed all before them. The only effective obstacle thrown in his path was the army of Kyrus, satrap of Kappadokia and Akhaimenid himself. Once this army was defeated at Pteria, Amavadatos swiftly took control of all of the satrapies that had once resisted his earlier campaigns. It helped that Dareios was not a popular ruler, and a number of Akhaimenid loyalists who had served his brother faithfully were motivated to instead swear loyalty to Amavadatos, distant Akhaimenid scion or not. Simultaneously, the rest of Akhaimenid controlled Lydia had effectively been ruled out of the Kappadokian satrap and its capital of Mazaka during this thirteen year lull, and such a large satrapy proved impossible to police in proper fashion by Kyrus, which is what allowed so many Akhaimenid loyalists to switch sides. The capture of Kappadokia gained Amavadatos control over the Royal Road as it entered Mesopotamia, placing him in an ideal position to strike there. Busy as he was with this campaign, and the possible move into Assyria and Babylonia, Amavadatos did take the time to start a reorganisation of his existing Asian territories, beginning with the appointment of his son Artaxerxes as ruler over Kilikia and Kappadokia, but this process was far from complete when he unexpectedly died in *340 BCE.
The Amavadatid state was in immediate jeopardy, as Amavadatos’ sons Artaxerxes and Tissadatos quarreled over the succession, despite the fact that Tissadatos was Amavadatos’ choice as successor and had been effectively king in Hellas since *352 BCE. However, this proved an opportunity for Tissadatos to remove his brother’s supporters from their positions of power in Anatolia, including a number of the more troublesome dynasts, and in this way reasserted total control over local appointments. In the Akhaimenid Empire it was plausible for small dynasties to form and expand without threatening royal power, given the sheer size of the Empire, but it was already clear by Tissadatos’ victory against Artaxerxes at Ephesos in *337 BCE that the Amavadatid Empire was not going to recover all of the Akhaimenid territories, not after the entrenchment of the Indians in Mesopotamia. Tissadatos’ campaigns of *332 BCE into Syria and *330 BCE into Phoinikia were the last significant expansions the Empire made in Asia. Given the reduced size of the state local magnates could therefore threaten the integrity of this new, smaller Empire, particularly as they were the largest overall contributor of warships to the Amavadatid fleet. Chief among these potential threats was his father’s prominent ally, Lygdamis III. Through the war against the Akhaimenids and the war against Artaxerxes he had expanded his dynasty’s control to dominate virtually the entirety of Karia, and as far east as Aphrodisias. His resources were considerable, and his wealth enormous. Tissadatos solved this problem by the abolition of the Akhaimenid satrapal system as it had existed; with the sole exception of the border satrapies of Kappadokia and Kilikia, the position of satrap was removed entirely, and a series of smaller provinces were carved in Anatolia, reducing the potency of any individual satrap or local governor to unite against the king, or even to stand alone against him. This enabled Tissadatos to neatly create the new province of Karia with Lygdamis as its new governor in competition with dozens of others. If Lygdamis proved content with this state of affairs then all to the good, if not then Tissadatos clearly felt confident that he could simply remove the man from his position now that he had been effectively isolated.
In the end Lygdamis had his gold, his palaces, his lands, and his prestige, and this proved enough consolation in the face of Tissadatos’ effective control over his Empire, but this did not prove true for everybody. Kosikas IV, the nominal governor of Lykia, decided to test the resolve of his king in *334 BCE, declaring independence and seeking the support of newly-risen Aigyptos to maintain his position. Aigyptos, however, under King Inaros, was in no position to conduct expeditions to Anatolia both with a view to his own security and his lack of a substantial fleet, or to alienate Tissadatos whilst Indian armies continued to threaten his newly refounded state. No help was forthcoming, the Amavadatid armies remained strong and numerous, and it was swiftly clear how events would resolve. In the end the Lykians surrendered after a few cursory skirmishes and Kosikas even retained his position, but the cities of Telmissos and Xanthos found themselves host to Amavadatid garrisons from that point onwards. Another problematic region in Asia was Phoinikia, where Sidon came to dominate the other city-states to a degree that caused unrest, and in a manner which arose the particular ire of Karkhedon, which naturally arose due to its enormously potent naval forces and importance to the Amavadatid naval dominance in the eastern Great Sea.. The delicate balance of power in the Great Sea was a cornerstone of early Amavadatid policy, and Karkhedon was at the apogee of her power.Tissadatos had no particular wish to encourage Karkhedon to turn her eyes eastward once more, being quite content with them expanding in Iberia far from anywhere relevant, or in Africa into the lands of savages. As it was, a simple royal visit to Phoinikia in *298 BCE was sufficient to restore a more proper balance of government, and the satrapy of Syria was retained as the third and final Asian satrapy of the Amavadatids. That did not prove a final settlement, as Sidon would prove a complication for multiple members of the dynasty, but for now the Lands Over the Sea were secure.
As it was, Amavadatid Asia had come to some kind of settlement by the death of Tissadatos in *295 BCE. Alliance with Aigyptos and the Kingdom of Ben-Hadad secured the southern flank of the kingdom’s Asian territories, the Agnimitrids were still reorganising after the death of Agnimitra in battle, and Anatolia continued to recover from its conquest. But the dynasty had not given up on its claim to the throne of Asia in its entirety, and with the Agnimitrid war machine halted it seemed perhaps an opportune time to finish what Amavadatos had begun; accordingly, the first thing newly crowned King Vivana began was preparing a great expedition against Mesopotamia. It had been quite one thing for Amavadatos to incorporate local forces into his royal army on the fly, or for Tissadatos to plant garrisons and create frontier forts in strategic locations in Asia. It was quite another to actually call upon Asia’s manpower as an equal part to that of Hellas’ for the first time, not to mention paying for a campaign army of considerable size, 120,000 strong. Despite his high military ambitions Vivana would therefore cut his teeth on improving the Empire’s trade, and this would have to be achieved in the face of hostility from the Agnimitrids, who had themselves not given up on furthering their progenitor’s mighty conquests. Vivana’s immense naval might would ultimately prove a mightier weapon in his arsenal than even the most feared of his battalions.
IMPORTANT LIVES BY D. MAGMARIO mp SAMODA (965 CE)
Aikaterine, daughter of Diodotos, was Queen of Elis, reigning between 1053-1069 AC, and considered one of the most extraordinary women to have been produced by the Hellenes. She is famed for first gaining the sole Queenship of an important territory in Hellas, usurping the sovereignty of her nominal overlord the Elean Hellenarkhos, and secondly for joining with the First Gothic Kingdom in their campaigns against the Middle Iranian Empire, personally leading the Elean armies in all affairs and against all opponents. She brought war to the Peloponnesos, which might otherwise have been kept safe from the ravages of conflict, but she defended her people’s rights and freedom with distinction, and was considered the second most formidable opponent of Iranian rule in Hellas after the Gothic Kings themselves. She is a study in dignified rulership against high adversity.
THE PROSOPOGRAPHY OF HELLAS (1698 CE)
Aikaterine of Walis, aka Aikaterin, aka Ikatrine: Aikaterine became Queen of Walis during the tumultuous *3rd century CE, and is one of the most well known warrior queens of Hellenic history. She was born daughter of Diodotos, Kosmos of Elis under the Hellenarkh of Walis, who was known for his indulgent love of his children. She was courageous, charismatic, and fierce from an early age, and was educated in the ways of war and kingship by her father. Practically speaking, she served as her father’s strategos. Whilst overlooked within Elis, this was seized upon by the Hellenarkh Eusebios in his preparations for war, who used it as a pretext to summon Diodotos to his court, where he had him executed. Aikaterine personally led Walis in revolt against Eusebios, and only grudgingly allowed the Koinon Hellenion to appoint a new Walean Hellenarkh over the territory. She was effectively left to rule Elis proper, however, given her level of popular support and the distraction of war against the Goths.
With the war against the Goths going poorly, the Koinon began its famous disintegration. The last of the Walean Hellenarkhs, Ptolemaios, was considered a ditherer and unqualified for his post, mostly chosen because of his loyalty to the state and inability to consider revolt. He was now effectively king of Walis, but was not organising a defence of the coastline against Gothic raids, which had become a constant menace for the people of the region’s coast. Aikaterine found this situation intolerable. She assembled an army of loyal Waleans and effectively deposed Ptolemaios by force in *253 CE. She did not officially declare herself Queen of Walis until *255 CE but spent the two intervening years leading Walis’ defence against Gothic raids, and had effectively been queen for two years before taking the fateful step of declaration. She was considered an effective ruler of her domains, and was left unmolested by her fellow Hellenes who instead turned on one another across the Peloponnesos, and by *259 BCE the Goths had learned to avoid Walis.
In *263 CE came the invasion of the Middle Iranian Empire. The majority of the Peloponnesos was swiftly overcome, with Walis considered an unknown quantity. Aikaterine was not herself filled with hate for Asians but she was by now used to rulership and given over to her pride. When she learned that she could not retain her title and domains under the satrap that had established himself in Korinthos, she took the radical step of aligning herself with the Gothic Basileos in Moisia, and invited him to campaign in the Peloponnesos in *264 CE. Goths or not, Aikaterine was now only interested in those who would leave her rulership intact. This action may well have prevented the Middle Iranian Empire from conquering all of Hellas at that time, as the satrap of Hellas was forced to deal with both the Goths in the north and the south as Gothic warbands and armies poured into the Peloponnesos. She campaigned relentlessly, conquering the western parts of Akhaia across *264-268 CE, and personally taking part in the invasion of Messenia in *269 CE. It was in this campaign that she met her death, dying to a stray arrow in the Battle of Kyparissia.
She has been a controversial figure in the centuries since for being a self declared Artemisia, openly loving women in her capacity as Queen and asserting all of the rights and behaviours of a male Hellenic ruler. Those historically favourable to her have often sought to excuse or ignore these aspects of her life. Her critics across history have associated these behaviours together with a perceived betrayal of Hellenes and declared her impious and immoral, particularly the scholars writing under the Middle Iranian Empire, but she has always remained popular in her homeland, and an icon for those who believe in the example of legendary Artemisia.
