GAGNON: Robert Lussier was frustrated by his inability to find a suitable candidate to oppose Jean Doré in the November municipal election, with a wrecked Civic Party at sea in opposition. Drapeau had never found a suitable successor, and the Unionists were convinced that a new party, perhaps headed by a non-politician, was needed. Doré was still broadly popular even as progressive dissatisfaction had already begun to set in, as Quebec City happily encouraged developers in their fight against environmentalists for influence over zoning policy. Sauvé did not take direct part in these battles, leaving them to his Montreal ministers, while taking a greater interest in the small-town web that formed his party’s regional backbone. Outside Lévesque’s native Gaspe, Liberal power had been steadily waning despite persistent attempts to strengthen their rural support. Sauvé and his regional ministers had explicitly designed this system as a modernized version of Duplessis’ old one, whose closest English Canadian equivalent was the Albertan Tory network. For his part, Doré hoped to mobilize progressive voters behind Lévesque, even if there was little ideological or personal love lost between them. Fore Not since Drapeau’s first term had there been such visceral hostility between Quebec City and Montreal City Hall, even if it was mostly conducted behind closed doors.
TIMMINS: 1990 saw a mild resurgence in Anglophone language activism, albeit not of the sort that would disturb the long linguistic peace nor cozy relations between Pierre Sauvé and the Anglophone establishment. These were mostly professional activists campaigning to loosen sign restrictions and promote a more flexible immigration system, rather than challenge any fundamentals. Insofar as the government were concerned, these questions had been settled 15 years earlier and did not even merit acknowledgement. Sauvé’s generational theory, which he had first expressed to Charles Bronfman in 1976, was being born out in public and private polling data. All Unionists had to do was wait, and like his friend Alex Campbell, Sauvé would brook not the faintest hint of dissent on such a key issue. Besides, Guy Ingres told me, Anglophone dissent was nothing they hadn’t heard nearly 20 years earlier. Moreover, Anglophone positioning was much weaker demographically than they had been then. Not a single Anglophone was in the government caucus, and even in the Liberal Party Anglophones had limited influence. Jean-Paul Beaudry did not even mention the sign protests except when asked directly by journalists, and the Liberals did not since they had a division between Francophone and Anglophone members as 20 years earlier.
ROY: Both parties were pleased with how the session unfolded, and were a bit more confident than they had been a few months earlier. While the Liberals had voted against restoring vocational training and pledged to abolish it again if they won government, it would not be a central issue in the upcoming campaign. Lévesque wanted to focus on the economy, healthcare, environment and open governance. In healthcare, Sauvé had pushed Medicare’s outer limits similarly to Don Getty, though their nonexistent relationship prevented formal collaboration on the issue. Lévesque had agreed to a more progressive platform than 1987 not only to please progressives but also to deflect Unionist attacks that he was offering another dose of the Garneau government’s failures. Another big vulnerability was on federal ties, for despite a bipartisan pension stance and cultural space, Lévesque agreed with Campbell on environmental regulations loathed in rural Quebec. On cultural issues he expected “the usual” Unionist scorched-earth strategies that had been a key component of their electoral arsenal throughout their party’s history. Being more nationalist and less liberal than his colleagues on cultural issues, Lévesque was planning to label culture wars a distraction from the poor economy which Sauvé was doing nothing to ameliorate.
LEE JACKSON, MONTREAL STAR OTTAWA BUREAU CHIEF: Spring 1990 was a rather calm time for the federal Liberals, preparing for a battle which would be joined October 22. Campbell had made this decision at a May 4 meeting of the Cabinet’s Planning & Priorities Committee and said he planned a 6-week campaign, as was now becoming increasingly the norm. Cabinet was cautiously optimistic about their chances, even with polls showing a slight Tory lead and a stagnant NDP vote. Chretien and other senior ministers wanted a bold new agenda that would energize their base and please swing voters, but none had been forthcoming. Campbell had been rejected on pensions and was reluctant to wage another Medicare battle with the provinces. Daycare had already been rejected due to cost concerns, so he decided that an infrastructure program would be their platform centrepiece. It would entail deficits, but at an acceptable debt-to-GDP ratio that satisfied his economic team. Not all were convinced, including Solicitor General Bob Rae and Environment Minister Paul Martin, but they had faith in their leader. In his quarter-century in politics, Campbell had never lost an election and he was seen as more prime ministerial than his Tory rival, as evidenced by his continued lead in leadership preference polls. Moreover, while personable, O’Sullivan lacked his Liberal rival’s charisma.
Campbell, 2nd from left, poses with his aides on a golfing trip.
PAULSON: Ontario Tories decisively broke with their past on June 22 when they picked Scott Barton as their new leader over Dennis Cochrane, proving that Miller’s election was not a fluke. Flamboyant, charismatic and mercurial, “Scotty” Barton was often likened by his enemies to Mitch Hepburn. That was far from the entire story. Barton was the son of Bob Barton, a leading Bay Street investment broker, a product of Upper Canada College and University of Toronto Law School. Raised in Simcoe County’s tiny Georgina, he was first elected in 1977 as a rookie real estate lawyer and entered Cabinet 6 years later. Promoted to Natural Resources under Frank Miller, the right wing’s natural leader made a name for himself as an industrious but publicity-hungry minister, which sometimes strained his relationship with the low-key premier. Barton was also an old friend of Sean O’Sullivan’s – the men were the same age and had first met at Young PC events in the early 1970s – and wanted to work closely with his federal counterpart. Among his first decisions w to fire Norm Atkins and other Big Blue Machine stalwarts, believing they were factionalist and had undermined Miller. Cochrane pledged his loyalty, but was still undecided whether to run in the next election.
TIMMINS: 1990 saw a mild resurgence in Anglophone language activism, albeit not of the sort that would disturb the long linguistic peace nor cozy relations between Pierre Sauvé and the Anglophone establishment. These were mostly professional activists campaigning to loosen sign restrictions and promote a more flexible immigration system, rather than challenge any fundamentals. Insofar as the government were concerned, these questions had been settled 15 years earlier and did not even merit acknowledgement. Sauvé’s generational theory, which he had first expressed to Charles Bronfman in 1976, was being born out in public and private polling data. All Unionists had to do was wait, and like his friend Alex Campbell, Sauvé would brook not the faintest hint of dissent on such a key issue. Besides, Guy Ingres told me, Anglophone dissent was nothing they hadn’t heard nearly 20 years earlier. Moreover, Anglophone positioning was much weaker demographically than they had been then. Not a single Anglophone was in the government caucus, and even in the Liberal Party Anglophones had limited influence. Jean-Paul Beaudry did not even mention the sign protests except when asked directly by journalists, and the Liberals did not since they had a division between Francophone and Anglophone members as 20 years earlier.
ROY: Both parties were pleased with how the session unfolded, and were a bit more confident than they had been a few months earlier. While the Liberals had voted against restoring vocational training and pledged to abolish it again if they won government, it would not be a central issue in the upcoming campaign. Lévesque wanted to focus on the economy, healthcare, environment and open governance. In healthcare, Sauvé had pushed Medicare’s outer limits similarly to Don Getty, though their nonexistent relationship prevented formal collaboration on the issue. Lévesque had agreed to a more progressive platform than 1987 not only to please progressives but also to deflect Unionist attacks that he was offering another dose of the Garneau government’s failures. Another big vulnerability was on federal ties, for despite a bipartisan pension stance and cultural space, Lévesque agreed with Campbell on environmental regulations loathed in rural Quebec. On cultural issues he expected “the usual” Unionist scorched-earth strategies that had been a key component of their electoral arsenal throughout their party’s history. Being more nationalist and less liberal than his colleagues on cultural issues, Lévesque was planning to label culture wars a distraction from the poor economy which Sauvé was doing nothing to ameliorate.
LEE JACKSON, MONTREAL STAR OTTAWA BUREAU CHIEF: Spring 1990 was a rather calm time for the federal Liberals, preparing for a battle which would be joined October 22. Campbell had made this decision at a May 4 meeting of the Cabinet’s Planning & Priorities Committee and said he planned a 6-week campaign, as was now becoming increasingly the norm. Cabinet was cautiously optimistic about their chances, even with polls showing a slight Tory lead and a stagnant NDP vote. Chretien and other senior ministers wanted a bold new agenda that would energize their base and please swing voters, but none had been forthcoming. Campbell had been rejected on pensions and was reluctant to wage another Medicare battle with the provinces. Daycare had already been rejected due to cost concerns, so he decided that an infrastructure program would be their platform centrepiece. It would entail deficits, but at an acceptable debt-to-GDP ratio that satisfied his economic team. Not all were convinced, including Solicitor General Bob Rae and Environment Minister Paul Martin, but they had faith in their leader. In his quarter-century in politics, Campbell had never lost an election and he was seen as more prime ministerial than his Tory rival, as evidenced by his continued lead in leadership preference polls. Moreover, while personable, O’Sullivan lacked his Liberal rival’s charisma.
Campbell, 2nd from left, poses with his aides on a golfing trip.
PAULSON: Ontario Tories decisively broke with their past on June 22 when they picked Scott Barton as their new leader over Dennis Cochrane, proving that Miller’s election was not a fluke. Flamboyant, charismatic and mercurial, “Scotty” Barton was often likened by his enemies to Mitch Hepburn. That was far from the entire story. Barton was the son of Bob Barton, a leading Bay Street investment broker, a product of Upper Canada College and University of Toronto Law School. Raised in Simcoe County’s tiny Georgina, he was first elected in 1977 as a rookie real estate lawyer and entered Cabinet 6 years later. Promoted to Natural Resources under Frank Miller, the right wing’s natural leader made a name for himself as an industrious but publicity-hungry minister, which sometimes strained his relationship with the low-key premier. Barton was also an old friend of Sean O’Sullivan’s – the men were the same age and had first met at Young PC events in the early 1970s – and wanted to work closely with his federal counterpart. Among his first decisions w to fire Norm Atkins and other Big Blue Machine stalwarts, believing they were factionalist and had undermined Miller. Cochrane pledged his loyalty, but was still undecided whether to run in the next election.