Égalité ou indépendance: a Canadian TL

TIMMINS: The new year’s first political news was Drapeau’s announcement that he would retire in November after nearly 30 years as mayor. He still enjoyed the job but age and deteriorating health – he had suffered a mini-stroke two years earlier – meant he could no longer function as effectively as even a few years earlier. Drapeau had won a plurality in 1982 and while he would have won narrowly, probably by about 8-10%, council would have been far dicier. Claude Dupras had been chosen as his successor despite a decade of Unionist attempts to find an alternative. Quebec City wanted a pliable conservative, or at least a flexible progressive, as Drapeau’s successor. Yet the dynamic of municipal politics had produced opponents who ranged from ultra-liberals like Dore to the hard left, and Municipal Affairs anticipated constant battles with the city. Quebec City itself and most small towns had UN-sympathizing mayors, reflecting the governing party’s dominance at every level of administration outside Montreal. Unionist MNAs were careful to avoid direct interference in municipal politics, but it was common knowledge if a municipal politician – usually entrenched incumbents or promising young talent - had their MNA’s backing. This sort of indirect arrangement dated to Duplessis’ day and had been disbanded by Daniel Johnson in the early 1960s as part of his campaign to purge old-style pork.

PIERRE-MARC JOHNSON: Our rule for municipal politics is that incumbents who do a good job and are at least within the realm of reason should be left alone, dating to Duplessis’ day. Anyone who disobeyed was severely punished. The case in point was Maurice Bellemare, who became so annoyed at his city’s mayor that he decided to run against him in violation of Duplessis’ direct order. Duplessis sent Mlle Cloutier across the river with campaign cash and the incumbent handily won. He himself never interfered with Trois-Rivieres municipal elections – if he had [future Liberal MP J.A.] Mongrain would never have been elected. Centrist Liberals were usually helpful allies, as Lucien Borne had been to us for his entire 27-year tenure. In January our focus was on the budget that would be delivered in weeks, which would contain a small family tax cut and continue the privatization process for natural resource companies. The final resource privatization would start later that year, since we wanted them all completely sold off by 1990. SAQ privatization was for the next term and we had already planned out the process a few months previously. Public housing ownership was next on our agenda, and our program would be based on the highly successful British model.

Finance Minister Jean Chrétien shows off his budget shoes before delivering the budget speech, Feb. 10, 1986.

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STEVENS: Chrétien’s third budget was well-received, with a surplus being used for middle-class tax cuts and job training that were popular with swing voters. There was no real budget debate as such, since it interfered with Campbell’s election timing. It would be enacted after the election that had been pencilled in for Apr. 7, with dissolution in just 2 weeks’ time. Final preparations were underway for all sides, and there were no last-minute retirements to contend with, unlike 1978 and 1982. Erik Nielsen told Wilson that he would run one last time out of party loyalty, but would prefer the Speakership or appointment in lieu of the deputy’s position. By that time, Nielsen had become exasperated with his party’s leadership and felt underappreciated despite Wilson’s attention to him. Indeed, Wilson had listened to Nielsen far more often than the more experienced Stanfield and La Salle had done. Relations between the two men were cordial but never friendly. The Tory and Liberal platforms were safe, bland documents that had almost no sharp differences between them. One idea internally floated, yet ultimately shelved idea was replacing the inefficient and cumbersome manufacturing tax with a GST, advocated by the economic teams in both parties. Neither Campbell nor Wilson wanted to run on a new tax.

GAGNON: The 1986 campaign was not really a contest at all, with Campbell’s popularity and a booming economy guaranteeing him another comfortable majority. Tories and New Democrats had to protect themselves from cresting Liberal popularity in Ontario and Atlantic Canada. They could take comfort in the fact that despite Campbell’s ardent wooing, conservative BC remained highly resistant to Campbell’s flashy brand of centre-left Liberalism. No Liberal leader since King worked so hard to woo the Prairies, but Campbell and the Liberal Party were too progressive to make serious inroads in the area they lost permanently nearly 30 years earlier. Quebec remained a stalemate, with Wilson unable to make serious inroads and the heavily entrenched Tory MPs untouchable by their Liberal opponents. Campbell himself focused on Atlantic pickups and targeted Tory frontbenchers in what was internally known as a decapitation operation. Wilson himself, Flora MacDonald, Sean O’Sullivan and less established Tories such as St. Paul’s Barbara MacDougall, running for her second term, were heavily targeted. Not since 1949 had a Tory leader been personally targeted for defeat, yet Wilson was not in serious danger. His personal connection with voters was too strong to replace him with a Liberal backbencher. Much the same applied to MacDonald and O’Sullivan, like Wilson members of the Class of 1972.


TIMMINS: The 1986 debates were seen as a win for Campbell in English and somewhat surprisingly, Wilson in French. Wilson made a strong pitch to Quebec voters against federal overreach and was universally seen as the winner by Francophone commentators. In English it was a different story, where Campbell dominated completely and the fieriest exchanges were between he and Broadbent over progressive values. Wilson tried to ignore questions and pitch swing voters on his platform, but swing voters were enraptured by Campbell in a way that they had not been since Trudeaumania in 1968. Economic and government performance combined with Tory disunity to cement a double-digit Grit lead throughout that campaign. Wilson remained upbeat, since in his heart he knew he could only play defence barring a massive scandal of a sort which had always eluded the straight-arrow prime minister. Whatever you think about all three leaders, their personal integrity was always of the highest order.

Liberal Leader Alex Campbell at a breakfast photo-op in St. John's, Mar. 31, 1986.


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GALLUP CANADA, MAR. 28-30, 1986


IF A FEDERAL ELECTION WERE HELD TOMORROW, WHICH PARTY’S CANDIDATE WOULD YOU VOTE FOR?


LIBERAL: 46.6%
PC: 33.1%
NDP: 20.7%
 
This is just fantastic. Early 1970s Canadian provincial history I'm weaker on (particularly Quebec) and so following up on everything raised has been a fun learning experience. As always Stanfield is the best in all alternate Canada timelines that include him because he is the best :) and I'm bummed he's a little too early to save in mine, fascinating evolution and survival of the UN in Quebec and their effect on federal politics. Terrible news about HSR though, so close to getting something off the ground. (The alternate winners, e.g. Campbell, are also great fun.)
 
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GAGNON: Election night saw a Liberal majority projected within an hour of polls closing, but the real story was in high-profile Tory seats. Wilson and MacDonald had close battles in their respective ridings, and MacDonald trailed for much of the evening before finally pulling ahead by 467 votes. Wilson won by a more comfortable 5% in Etobicoke Centre, the closest race of his career. Sean O’Sullivan, who had built a formidable hybrid machine drawing personnel from provincial and municipal government, crushed his Liberal opponent by nearly 15 points. Barbara MacDougall went down in St. Paul’s to her Liberal rival, the highest-profile Tory casualty that night despite the provincial party’s attempts to save her. Unlike his predecessor, Frank Miller was not personally popular in downtown Toronto and his attempts to help her might have backfired. The NDP did not make any net gains since swing progressives overwhelmingly supported Campbell. On election night, Wilson and Broadbent did not say anything directly about their future, but within days Wilson found the premiers and caucus wanted him gone. He did not have the popular appeal to beat Campbell, in their estimation. Before the month was out he would announce his resignation as Conservative leader. For his part, Broadbent’s timetable was longer, and he was unenthused about fighting a fourth election as leader.


PAULSON: Wilson could not have held on had he wanted to. The caucus liked him personally but did not believe he could beat Campbell. Some Wilson loyalists said that four years later he would get his due, like Stanfield. Yet Campbell had resolutely kept expectations manageable, as he had in PEI, and swing voters were very happy with his pragmatically progressive Liberalism. Wilson resigned on April 30th, and Erik Nielsen was once again appointed interim leader in advance of a December convention. It would be a final showdown between Sean O’Sullivan and Flora MacDonald, and the party planned multiple leadership debates across the country to generate interest. Very quickly the battle became a definitional one. MacDonald wanted to overhaul the party as it was. O’Sullivan wanted essentially to create a new party, transforming what he called a “centrist party ideologically subordinate to the Grits” into a populist conservative one similar to the UN or Manitoba Tories. It was what he and Sauvé, between themselves, referred to as “killing the P.” O’Sullivan started out as a heavy favourite, being supported by all the provincial parties except Buchanan and Peckford. Hatfield was ideologically predisposed to MacDonald but believed O’Sullivan was much more skillful politically, with a winsome personality. This was vaguely reminiscent of how Campbell had attracted Liberal centrists 7 years earlier.


ROY: With only one privatization yet to begin, the government was very happy with their spring session. May was spent preparing for the June policy convention which would produce the platform’s final draft, as both parties slowly ramped up preparations for the following year’s election. Sauvé did not publicly endorse O’Sullivan, but did say that he trusted the PC Party to make the right choice. Behind the scenes, Quebec Tories needed no prodding from their leader to enthusiastically support O’Sullivan, who had gradually become reasonably fluent in French after intensive study. Combined with a chunk of his native Ontario and strong Western support, O’Sullivan was unquestionably the frontrunner. At 34 he was a generation younger than MacDonald and Campbell, and his young family appeared with him on the campaign trail whenever possible. Don Getty was in a tough spot: his supporters and federal delegation preferred O’Sulllvan, whom he distrusted personally and ideologically. He would stay neutral throughout that contest. Bill Bennett, like Sauvé, strongly supported his fellow right-winger but could not publicly do so for coalitional reasons. In June Grant Devine had narrowly lost after just a single term to his nemesis Allan Blakeney, and Bill Bennett prepared to retire after 11 years as premier.



STEVENS: Devine’s loss in Saskatchewan did not surprise his fellow conservatives, who had long foreseen his electoral demise. Bill Bennett compared Devine to his own predecessor Dave Barrett, who had also been a “kamikaze” premier. Joe Ghiz’s election later that month brought a Liberal premier back to the first ministers’ table, and Ghiz quickly forged relationships with the other first ministers. Bad blood existed between Getty, Sauvé and Peckford for different reasons. In one case it was the Churchill Falls dispute, which Quebec flatly refused to even discuss. With Getty, the clash was almost entirely personality and ego. While their feud would not crest until a couple of years later, their visceral mutual disdain was quite obvious. After the federal election, Campbell finally agreed to change the first ministers’ meetings to a biannual schedule as had been requested by Hatfield and Davis 2 years earlier. He had quickly left on an Expo 86 visit with Prince Charles and then the G7 summit, leaving a government which at that point was running almost on autopilot. Campbell had promised an ambitious agenda which included CPP expansion, closure of all remaining residential schools, a revamped national effort on aboriginal education, and stronger environmental protections. He anticipated strong provincial opposition on CPP expansion, but was determined to forge ahead.

Manitoba Premier Sterling Lyon, 1986.

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STERLING LYON: I did not object to an environmental review as such. What my colleagues and I objected to was federal unilateralism which did not fully consider efforts made by the provinces to reconcile environmental protection and resource development. We, Manitoba and Quebec all had framework agreements with stakeholders that had been quite successful for some years, in our case about 5 years. BC was in the midst of negotiating their own. In my opinion, the prime minister was indulging himself in a pet project that dated to his Charlottetown days and forgot that there were other voices this time. He wanted to impose standards that would have hurt our industries at a time when Alberta’s oil sector in particular was going through a very tough recession. There was no miscommunication between us, he knew our concerns and just did not care. I do not doubt Alex’s sincerity on environmental issues, nor do I doubt his desire to reward his environmentalist supports and throw some red meat at his party’s hyper-centralists. In my lifetime, the Liberal Party has never seen a jurisdictional boundary it did not attempt to move or erase by any legal means.
 
AARON WOODRUFF, FINANCIAL POST POLITICAL EDITOR: Sauvé’s relationship with big business was generally very friendly whether they were Quebecers, English Canadians, Americans or Europeans. Nonetheless, he was intensely suspicious of the older CEO generation’s milquetoast approach to politics. They would support him but be wary of his brashest initiatives such as the Rand formula and later decertifying wildcat striking unions, which deeply annoyed the premier. As in politics, he preferred surrounding himself with younger, combative entrepreneurs who were just starting to arrive on the scene. ENERGEO CEO Pete Gallagher was a contemporary and Army friend of Sauvé’s, while Justin Jenkins was a senior advertising executive who became a devoted follower of the premier’s. From his father, the Unionist leader knew well how Duplessis had dealt with a similar dynamic. He wanted them at the frontline with him during politically difficult circumstances, and usually it was non-Quebecers who were more willing to do that. Paul Desmarais is a good friend of his, and they talked fairly often, sometimes just when Sauvé wanted to sound him out. That is not to say the broader relationship was always peaches and roses – it was most certainly not – but the rough patches did not occur in Sauvé’s first term.

GAGNON: For both parties, summer was a time to think of future battles. For the government it was how to deal with federal environmental regulations and devise a strategy to oppose pension expansion. For the opposition, trying to find a populist line in opposition to resource privatization and general pre-writ positioning were their concerns. The government was ready to attack the Liberals as federal stooges for supporting Campbell’s environmental policies and pension expansion, which they wanted to portray as a tax. In this the premier hoped for his own miniature version of Duplessis’ income tax victory. Education was a priority for his next term, especially refocusing the provincial curriculum on core competencies and expanding vocational training. Another priority was creating the Ministry of International Relations and expanding foreign delegations, as promised in 1983. Sauvé had a very close relationship with the American, British, French and Algerian consuls and often shared political intelligence with them. Quebec cultivated contacts within both major French and American parties, reflecting Sauvé’s personal interests. He has always been a devout follower of both countries’ politics and liked to exchange political gossip with the consuls. For their part, they were grateful for his attention to their respective commercial and cultural files, especially on education where Sauvé was planning to introduce in-province tuition for French students.

PATRICK BOYER, PC MP FOR ETOBICOKE-LAKESHORE: I supported Flora because her views were closer to mine, though my good relations with Sean were unaffected. What worried me was both ideology and culture: what was left of the PC Party I had grown up with would be a hollow shell if Sean won and was able to fully implement his vision. His allies had been very explicit on this point, and what they had done to their own parties was a case in point. Manitoba was more ominous because provincial input into federal issues was quite recent, unlike Quebec where the UN had taken control of federal operations in 1958 and never really relinquished it. Ontario was a mess because of Miller’s weak hold on the provincial party, and Sean was very well organized despite Blue Tories being a minority in both Ontario parties. The race was not personal per se but because basic ideological premises were at stake, beneath the policy papers and personality contest, it became the most intense Tory leadership race of my lifetime. I organized my own riding for Flora and that was about it. Both she and Sean offered me Shadow Cabinet slots if they won, without specifying what that slot might be.

Flora MacDonald campaigns in Cape Breton, July 11.

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PAULSON: O’Sullivan had numerous advantages on his side, leaving aside his preternatural political talent and winsome personality. He had fundraising, institutional support and a younger grassroots support network than MacDonald. The Young PCs were heavily Blue and pro-O’Sullivan, reflecting a growing trend outside the Maritimes. Even in parts of the Maritimes, right-wing pockets were beginning to emerge. The age gap between factions mirrored their respective leaders. O’Sullivan was 34 in 1986, MacDonald 60. A decade earlier, Pierre Sauvé and his right-wing colleagues had been among Cardinal’s youngest ministers. Moreover, there was an enthusiasm gap that heavily favoured “Team SOS” as they came to be known. Bay Street was somewhat reluctant given their hesitancy about what one executive called “ideological enthusiasm” in the Blue camp, so remained essentially even-handed. The Western and Quebec business communities had no such qualms and were more than generous to O’Sullivan. Immigrant communities were heavily recruited by both candidates, but went largely to the man who had assiduously courted them for years. The stakes were probably the highest they’d been since 1956, if not the party’s founding, yet the outcome was essentially preordained. On Aug. 26, Brian Mulroney was forced to deny a report that he had called Flora MacDonald’s Quebec campaign “dead as a doorknob.”

TIMMINS: When Parliament resumed in late September for the first full post-election sitting, Campbell’s first priority was environmental regulations, which would be imposed over provincial objections in the West and Quebec. The Tory leadership race considerably amused him, and he expected serious discord across the aisle. Jean Chrétien had encouraged Campbell to sound out disgruntled progressive Tories on potential floor-crossings that would be unveiled before Christmas. Campbell refused because he did not want to sound an alarm and was skeptical of the names suggested by his deputy. If there were floor-crossers, he would let caucus decide whether to accept them. In general he was disdainful of floor-crossing except in the rarest circumstance, believing that they brought almost no value beyond a single news cycle. Nor were there any Tory MPs considering defecting at that time, since the diehards preferred to retire rather than cross the floor. Campbell would eventually decide that floor-crossers would have to resign and run in a by-election if they wanted to run under a Liberal banner.
 
TIMMINS: The new federal environmental standards were imposed by ministerial decree, not through legislation, thus avoiding a showdown with the Tory-controlled Senate. O’Sullivan opposed them while MacDonald supported them, while Nielsen said the Tories wished for more provincial consultation before implementation. That was a frequent dodge when he was interim leader, seeing as the provinces had been consulted and divided on predictable lines. As both sides knew, the real battle to come was on pensions, one that Campbell wanted done within 2 or 3 years. In fall 1986 a small working group among the economic ministries was already drafting lengthy memos for their respective ministers. O’Toole, a labour economist, worked on some of the technical drafts himself, even if it was not a pet project of his like EI reform. EI reform would require the premiers who were opposed to pension reform, and vice-versa. The employment minister was one of the few progressive Liberals who liked those premiers known as the Gang of Five – BC, though Grace McCarthy was more demanding than Bill Bennett - , Alberta, Manitoba, Ontario and Quebec. Campbell believed that pensions would be a major boon with progressive and swing voters, though he was under no illusion about it being a cure-all.

BC Premier Grace McCarthy, October 1986.

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CAPLAN: Campbell had two impulses. He was committed to pension reform but did not want to intrude in provincial jurisdiction, particularly since he was pursuing a simultaneous project against progressive wishes. Premiers who were inclined to back him on one were those who would oppose him on the other. The Tory Senate meant he would have to put it in a budget bill if he wanted passage, particularly if Sean O’Sullivan was elected leader. It was very clever to put Adam O’Toole in Employment, because he was of the same mind as Campbell on this issue. There had to be an open confrontation, which the premiers would love for their own political reasons. Ed Broadbent was very encouraging on pension reform and urged the prime minister to go ahead unilaterally, and if the Senate defeated it, well we could have an election on reactionary Tories opposing higher retirement incomes. I got the distinct impression that progressive Liberals favoured that path, while moderates wanted a deal with dissenting provinces. If I had to guess, they knew that they could not back down, as on Medicare expansion, without enraging progressive voters who felt underwhelmed during Campbell’s first term. That autumn, it was clear that no action would be taken until the new year, potentially until 1988.

GAGNON: In Quebec City, the government had initiated the final resource privatization process, which would not be complete until after the next election. No decision had yet been taken on election timing, but I knew Sauvé wanted to restore the Unionist summer electoral calendar after disruptions in 1978 and 1983. Most of the parties’ platforms had already been hammered out at their respective policy conventions, which in the UN’s case had moved to even-numbered years to avoid electoral overlap. Both parties had unveiled new recruits to replace retiring veterans, while Mario Beaulieu was the only notable Unionist retirement. While they had worked effectively for many years as allies, they had never been close personally and it was mutually convenient that he leave. Sauvé had already promised Pierre-Marc Johnson, his close friend and ally despite their policy differences, the deputy premiership. Jean Doré won a landslide victory in Montreal’s municipal election, giving the MCM a supermajority on council and closing the seemingly eternal Drapeau era. Robert Lussier proposed a minimum of contact with City Hall and found no objections within Cabinet. Neither side had a natural intermediary, nor were they interested. Doré’s outspoken progressivism made him a rallying point for progressives who disdained the hapless, centrist Liberals. Or as Sauvé put it, “all that’s old is new again.”

Montreal Mayor Jean Doré at his first press conference, Dec. 4, 1986.

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ROY: More than any Unionist leader since his father, Pierre Sauvé emphasized his personal image. Whenever possible, he liked to be photographed in casual or at least semi-formal settings. As a junior minister 15 years earlier, the gunslinger pose had been his favourite semi-official photograph. So it was in 1986 as premier, which made him a photographer’s dream to cover. Hunting or volleyball was not just something he enjoyed, but emphasized his youthful appearance and fitness in sharp contrast to his older, staid Liberal rival. In that respect personal style became a political weapon similar to Pierre Trudeau, though Sauvé lacked the personal magnetism of his father. While some older ministers were somewhat skeptical about their leader’s style sense, they could not argue with its political or media results. Like his father, Sauvé was friendly with most journalists and saw many corners of the private media as allies in his quest for political supremacy. For a select few, hiring opportunities beckoned. Journalistic enemies were frozen out or if deemed particularly egregious, complaints were lodged with publishers. The premier’s vindictiveness was something that younger progressive journalists had to learn about when they arrived in Quebec City. If they showed an open mind, he would tell said journalist stories about Pierre Laporte.


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PAULSON: On Dec. 6, Sean O’Sullivan won a landslide victory in the PC leadership election and became the youngest-ever major party leader at just 34. Despite never having held a Cabinet portfolio, he was now Leader of the Opposition. Flora MacDonald joined him onstage and called for unity. Her own political future was up in the air, and O’Sullivan told her she could take as much time to decide as she wanted. MacDonald thought it was too early to decide whether she would seek another term, even as her supporters believed she would have a Cabinet portfolio. In the Shadow Cabinet she would keep Heritage. Erik Nielsen had already decided to retire at the next election, and urged O’Sullivan, whom he was fond of, to replace his as deputy. Don Mazankowski would replace Nielsen as deputy leader. Marie Boivin would become Quebec lieutenant, and Allan Lawrence Ontario lieutenant while John Crosbie retained his Maritime fiefdom. Since Nielsen had never occupied Stornoway, the O’Sullivan family was able to move in before Christmas.

PC Leader Sean O'Sullivan at home in Hamilton, Oct. 11, 1986.

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OOC: Much thanks and full credit to Noravea for the Sean O'Sullivan Photoshop.
 
GAGNON: With an election year dawning, the premier decided to make a pre-session media splash that would complement his opening message. He allowed select reporters to follow him on a deer hunt, with all the attendant pictures splashed over multiple newspapers, only one of those reporters came from a Montreal paper. It was a way to renew his connection with rural voters, while to use one of his favourite English expressions, “tweaking the beak” of journalists and liberals. Underneath the considerable publicity, there was a method to this photo-op: a prelude to his party’s push for a massive increase in vocational education. Indeed, vocational training in public schools would once again become mandatory after being removed by the Liberals in 1979. This would not be formally unveiled until the Assembly resumed in February, yet the political impact was diluted when Levesque announced his party would support that measure. As a Gaspésien, Lévesque’s instincts on said issues were close to Sauvé’s, and it was important if the premier was not to succeed in his attempt to brand the Liberals as a party by and for urban progressives. One issue which the Liberals had not yet formulated a position on was CPP expansion. Nor, for that matter, had the government formulated a strategy yet.


TIMMINS: Sean O’Sullivan’s victory relieved the premiers of their lead opposition role, having blithely ignored Wilson during Campbell’s first term. In late January 1987 he called all the conservative premiers, inviting them for a spring strategy meeting. Sterling Lyon, the group’s dean and informal leader, agreed and offered to host the meeting in Winnipeg, far away from prying national media eyes. More broadly, In tactical terms, O’Sullivan turned the tables: he was now the change agent, and he told me in an interview shortly after becoming leader “you won’t recognize this party when I’m through with it.” At the provincial level, because they realized the potential consequences of right-wing grassroots organizing, Grace McCarthy and especially Don Getty were less than happy about O’Sullivan’s exhortations to become more involved in provincial politics. For their part, Lyon, Sauvé and to a lesser degree Miller all encouraged such organizing, alongside conservative intellectual infrastructure in their respective provinces. Quebec had the most infrastructure followed by BC and later Alberta, and bilingual, aspiring academic conservatives from all across Canada were encouraged to spend some time at a Quebec think tank. Since the Union Nationale was wary of outside policy advisors – as opposed to advertising or logistics – they had to return to their home provinces. Among their more famous visitors was a young economist named Stephen Harper.


ROY: The government’s only priority that winter was their budget, with everything else being delayed till after the election. It was a standard pre-election budget, with a sizeable surplus partially diverted towards tax cuts, debt reduction or infrastructure spending. It was also Mario Beaulieu’s last budget, since he would retire at the election. Ministers I interviewed talked of a positive contrast campaign to come, running on their record of reform and prosperity while painting the Liberals as federal stooges. Sauvé had not forgotten the federal plans for CPP expansion but wanted to keep his strategic plans, which were only in their early stages, under wraps until Ottawa unveiled their precise proposal. He was more interested in discussing education and international relations, reforms that appealed to a wide coalition of voters, both swing and core nationalists, especially after an economic-oriented first term. Privatization of the resource companies was nearing completion, and Sauvé promised that the SAQ would be his flagship privatization in a second term. This had considerable potency since it allowed him to portray the Liberals as statist defenders of an unpopular, Depression-era monopoly. Lévesque opposed privatization, arguing that the status quo was fine and his rival wanted to “demolish the public sector” after the resource privatizations. Grassroots progressives who had demanded a more ideologically aggressive opposition were happy with Lévesque’s statement, though they knew he was not and would never be one of them.

Opposition Leader Gérard D. Lévesque in 1987.

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PAYETTE: Lévesque’s opposition to SAQ privatization was somewhat insincere, but no more insincere than his opposition to privatizing resource companies. Deep down he knew this election was all about positioning for the next one, since all indications were an essential repeat of 1983’s results. It showed clearly in both leaders’ behaviour, as Sauvé’s announcements for what would be done after the election multiplied and Levesque appeared as if he was going through the motions. Liberal activists were not unhappy since in their heart of hearts they knew their leader was right. At least, for the time being they believed he was right. The budget debate was fairly subdued as both parties prepared for the coming contest, which would likely be held in July or possibly late June depending on the premier’s whim. Grassroots progressives were more concerned about the conservative infrastructure mushrooming in Montreal and Quebec City that was strongly encouraged, though not funded – Sauvé has always hated “corporate welfare” except for his resource companies – by the government. There was no comparable energy on the left as there had been 20 years earlier, and without such progressive energy, the Unionist path to their old dominance became much easier. It was just not something which concerned senior Liberals.

PAULSON: Generally speaking, O’Sullivan brought a far more aggressive critique if not always tone to Opposition than his predecessors had done, which was first showcased in his inaugural budget critique. The volleys between O’Sullivan and Campbell or Chretien and Crosbie were heavily laced with barbed humour, a marked change from the more sedate duels between Campbell and Wilson earlier that decade, or the Stanfield era. As spring arrived, the Tories were preparing for their policy convention, where O’Sullivan planned to make his leadership platform the Tory manifesto and swing the heretofore centrist PC Party towards the unambiguous right. In a symbolic gesture, O’Sullivan named Allan Lawrence convention chairman instead of Baker or Bell, further cementing the centrist-Blue alliance that had been vital to O’Sullivan’s victory. Unlike his 2 closest allies, the federal Tory leader did not yet command an explicitly right-wing party.
 
TIMMINS: The Tories convened in Winnipeg over the first weekend in April, determined to hash out a CPP strategy that threatened to seriously rupture their coalition. O’Sullivan, the Western premiers and Sauvé argued for a payroll tax increase argument which would be defensible among a broad swath of voters. After some discussion, the group agreed on this proposal. What was much more contentious was how to block it: a money bill could not be blocked in the Senate by longstanding convention. Defeating a budget would force an election on Campbell’s terms, while PC coffers were drained by 3 leadership races in 5 years and heavy expenditures on infrastructure upgrades which O’Sullivan had ordered begun before Christmas. Instead they decided that whatever the proposal was, they would use all parliamentary tools at their disposal to delay it while relying on their corporate allies to run ads attacking the proposal. The fallback proposal was individual deal making, which none of them except Alberta and Quebec – for once Getty and Sauvé were in hearty agreement – were especially keen on. Frank Miller was in a tougher position since his moderates supported expansion; the centrists were somewhat ambivalent while his own Blues were vehemently opposed. Nonetheless, he strongly opposed expansion and signed onto his colleagues’ plan.

ROY: With the federal government proposal for pension expansion and his closest federal ally now Tory leader, Sauvé switched to a position of overt hostility towards Ottawa – something he was eager to do. It had been his idea to enlist corporate allies in the CPP fight, while the parties led in ground warfare. The premier was strongly considering attacking Liberal MPs, especially rural ones, in their own ridings, as part of his strategy. Not since 1958 had the UN attacked more than a handful of Liberal MPs, except this time the battle would be a policy rather than electoral one. Privately, Sauvé spoke of a combined arms assault to swing public opinion and force concessions from the federal government. Since CPP expansion would be through a budget bill rather than regular legislation or a proposed constitutional amendment, it required a different strategy than Duplessis’ income tax one in 1954. He remembered that fight well, including his father’s initial hesitancy at the idea. Yet like Duplessis, he was supremely confident in the electorate’s allegiance to him. What concerned him more was the possibility of their coalition rupturing, especially Ontario with all its attendant consequences. For their part, the federal government was equally eager to join battle.

Ontario Premier Frank Miller in 1987.

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GAGNON: I wrote the exclusive on election timing after a phone call from a trusted staff source: the election would be July 13 and the National Assembly dissolved on May 20. It promised to be a more positive campaign than 1983, with the Unionist running on their record and the Liberals essentially positioning for the next round. Neither side expected the government to lose more than a handful of seats, if that, given Sauvé’s immense popularity and a booming economy. Nor would there be overt attacks on the federal government, at least not yet. “This time we’re going to give them heaven” he joked in a pre-election conversation with me. More seriously, he spoke to me about the impending Steinberg’s bankruptcy. He would not block a bid from outside Quebec, though he preferred a Quebec-based company buy it. The grocery chain’s demise was eminently predictable in his view, and he regretted what was happening to a company which had been so excellent for so long. “Never get complacent, never stop thinking about the future, and always plan for succession” was as good a plan in business as in politics. To him, the upcoming campaign was a welcome distraction from the pension battle that would be joined within 18 months.

ASHLEY ADAMSON, MONTREAL STAR QUEBEC CITY REPORTER: The debate over debates had long been settled: there would be two French debates and both leaders would do their rounds with English media. Neither had much new to add for Anglophones specifically but instead touted their record on bread and butter issues, with Sauvé promising more aid for private schools. He did not, however, promise anything on improving non-Francophone representation in the civil service because he was a staunch opponent of affirmative action. The premier also sensed that this was not a terribly important issue to Anglophone leaders, much less the rank and file. When asked about an Anglophone in his Cabinet, he said “a cabinet-maker must work with the wood he’s provided”, an echo of Duplessis’ retort on that issue decades earlier. Like his father, minority issues would be among his personal policy files, yet in practice it was devolved to Guy Ingres, one of his closest confidants. He did not take the Anglophone community for granted, but in conversation it seemed obvious his confidence about his command of these issues was blurring with arrogance. Running through private school performance data and anecdotes he’d picked up from parents, he smirked and said “the Grits have nothing, as usual.”

PIERRE-MARC JOHNSON: As we entered the final 2 weeks, enthusiasm was still building, and I felt we would finish with a low-90s seat count, a hunch confirmed by our polling team. The debates had not made an impact, despite Levesque’s best efforts to ding us on privatization and “obnoxious belligerence” towards the federal government, as if that was a vice rather than a virtue. As the campaign wound down, Pierre told me that he would not make any major Cabinet changes, and that he would be meeting Frank Miller privately for a pension discussion. When I asked whether he would speak to the prime minister or Chrétien, he said “not till we’re all at the table or they contact me directly.” Our autumn agenda had been planned before the election, so there was no need for a late-August caucus retreat as in regular years. SAQ privatization and the Ministry of International Relations would top our legislative calendar. On June 28th Jean Lesage published an op-ed in La Presse venomously attacking us and encouraging progressive voters to defeat a government implacably hostile to the Quiet Revolution. This was Lesage’s first major political intervention since leaving politics in 1970, which landed with a whimper rather than a bang.
 
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TIMMINS: Election night came very early on July 13th, as Radio-Canada projected a UN majority within 30 minutes of the polls closing, with hardly any changes from 1983, as Levesque conceded around 9PM. He would lead the “progressive opposition”, the first time I heard him use this phrase, which I took as a sign he had been listening to the grassroots that wished a sharper break from the government, as in the 1970s. Indeed Pierre Laporte and even Jean Lesage had been privately urging Lévesque in such a direction. When he took the stage, Pierre Sauvé was gleeful if gracious in victory, thanking Quebecers for reposing their trust in his government but without any overtures to the opposition except a brief personal reference to Lévesque. As usual, he thanked his electors in French and English before departing, refusing all questions from journalists in favour of a press conference the following day. At that press conference, he announced the new Cabinet would be sworn in July 28th and that he had not decided on when the Assembly would reconvene. Nor did he reflect on the election, only saying that he was eager to get back to work and he would leave punditry to the pundits.



Pierre Sauvé II Cabinet

Deputy Premier: Pierre-Marc Johnson
Finance: Raymond Bachand
Justice: Pierre-Marc Johnson
Agriculture: Clément Vincent
Education: Guy Ingres
Cultural Affairs: Jean-Paul Beaudry
Immigration: Albert Rioux
Health : Louise Ravary
Environment : Pauline Thibault
Natural Resources : Paul-Émile Allard
Transport : Céline Grenier
Municipal Affairs : Robert Lussier
Intergovernmental Affairs : Marcel Masse
International Relations: Alain Rioux
Treasury Board: Bernard Gagnon
Employment: Charles Bellemare
Aboriginal Affairs: Viviane Ravary
Industry : Paul Shooner


ROY: Sauvé’s new Cabinet looked similar to the previous one, with only a couple of new faces. He believed in generational change to be sure, but a gradualist sort which kept his 1970s colleagues in place for as long as possible given their competence and personal closeness to him. Indeed Robert Lussier, among his closest Cardinal-era friends, even had the same portfolio of Municipal Affairs he had held under Johnson and Cardinal. Lussier was a warhorse and highly competent minister, who loved his portfolio and served his premier well over many years. Pierre-Marc Johnson, another close friend of the premier’s, inherited Justice and the deputy premiership, which also became second in the precedence order. Johnson was a nationalist centre-rightist, neither wholly moderate nor a doctrinaire New Rightist like his boss. After the Cabinet shuffle, there would be silence until October as everyone went on vacation and Sauvé thought ahead to the upcoming pension battle. He expected Campbell to introduce the legislation within 6 months and had already ordered the secretive interdepartmental working group known as HOGG to being their draft work. It would be supervised by Intergovernmental Affairs Minister, since Finance Minister Raymond Bachand was a political newcomer – much as Sauvé had been junior as the newly appointed justice minister in 1974.

PAULSON: In Hamilton, Sean O’Sullivan was enjoying his summer vacation and had told his staff to ignore all non-urgent requests outside his own constituency. Apart from a conversation with Sauvé about the latter’s upcoming meeting with Miller, politics was far from the Tory leader’s agenda that summer. His counterparts felt similarly, though all 3 men had scheduled early September pre-sitting caucus briefings to plan their respective fall agendas. O’Sullivan was also anticipating the loss of his closest Maritime ally, Richard Hatfield, that autumn, which would leave Sterling Lyon as dean of the first ministers. While unlike Grant Devine, they would genuinely miss Hatfield, the Gang of Five also knew that McKenna was a pragmatic Liberal like Ghiz and Campbell himself – a small comfort if there ever was one. In the meantime, there would be regional first ministers meetings: Westerners in Calgary, Maritimers in St. John’s would be held the same week as Sauvé’s meeting with Miller in Toronto. As of early August, Campbell had not yet decided when exactly he would introduce CPP amendments. He could only urge Quebec to follow suit due to the QPP, with no illusions about what Sauvé’s response would be.


CAPLAN: Pierre Sauvé led a fight which would not affect his province directly because it was part and parcel of his claim to national conservative leadership. He also wanted to provide support to his fellow Gang members, or so he said. Any opportunity to wreck progressive goals was one he would eagerly take, particularly since everyone knew that a federal retreat would severely damage Campbell’s image among progressives, which would boost his friend O’Sullivan towards 24 Sussex. It would also, he thought, help unify conservatives nationally and end perceptions that Quebec was a self-interested player in federal-provincial negotiations. Of course, Sauvé himself had helped create those perceptions as justice minister during patriation, but that didn’t matter to him. He wanted to humiliate his federal opponents and revel in being the bête noire of progressives nationwide. To quote FDR, he welcomed our hatred, indeed positively revelled in it. Some mistaken journalists translated that as to mean Sauvé might have national ambitions, which was nonsense. He was utterly confident in O’Sullivan and like his father, instinctively preferred provincial politics despite an interest in federal issues. We [NDP] would strongly support CPP expansion even if Campbell didn’t, something which Ed [Broadbent] was really eager to take on.

GAGNON: Sauvé’s meeting with Miller was, as usual, friendly and productive. Miller told him that after much discussion within his government, he had secured approval for a payroll tax argument in opposition and the Senate would be their battleground. Since the CPP was separate legislation, it would require standalone amendments rather than just budget provisions. This would make it much easier for the Tory Senate to defeat, and O’Sullivan had already begun working the moderates in that 58-member caucus. This was largely for show, but a necessary one in his view. As Sauvé liked to say privately, “there’s a difference between hearing and listening.” Miller, with a much more fragile hold on his party than his friends, could not be so cavalier, nor was he the sort of personality to do so. The two men delighted in that a potentially dangerous tool – Section 26 of the Constitution – was now a dead letter. While Campbell could still appoint additional senators, they would have to be from the provincial lists. After the meeting, Sauvé met the Globe and Mail’s editorial board for a long-scheduled interview, where pensions were almost an afterthought and he got a cool reception.”I must be doing something right” was his reported comment afterward.
 
PAULSON: In a statement to the House on October 6, Campbell announced that CPP negotiations would begin at month’s end, with legislation to come in the New Year. Predictably, the Tories strongly opposed Campbell’s initiative while the NDP strongly supported him. Campbell, Chretien and O’Toole had devised this dual-track approach to try and divide the premiers, believing the Atlantic premiers would fold with an outside chance of BC accepting compensation. Miller’s hold over his party was relatively soft, while Manitoba, Quebec – of course not subject to CPP jurisdiction - and Alberta would be isolated. All he needed was a handful of Tories to break ranks, which would be difficult given the ironclad discipline imposed on the Tory caucus by O’Sullivan. Frank McKenna’s sweep in New Brunswick did not change their calculus much, since the Gang expected Peckford and Buchanan to waver anyways. Pierre Sauvé, who had a busy legislative session planned that fall, would take a more hands-off approach than he initially planned. He had a strategy to portray this battle as Quebec’s, but was still sensitive to devoting excessive attention from an issue away from home. Instead, he would let his fellow Gang members lead while staying out of the public spotlight as best he could.

ROY: The new Assembly’s first few weeks were consumed with SAQ privatization legislation and the fall fiscal update, which would comprise most of the sitting’s agenda, with other issues being delayed till January, after pension negotiations were over. Liberal opposition was even more pronounced than it had been in the spring, given their determination to live up to campaign expectations of a vigorous opposition. For his part, Sauvé focused mostly on pensions while letting his ministers stick-handle legislation through the Assembly. Industry Minister Paul Shooner and Johnson would assist the rookie Bachand, focused on his upcoming fiscal update. The stock market’s brief swoon did not rattle Ottawa, where Finance correctly pegged it as a temporary blip and Chretien recommended that the prime minister take a wait-and-see attitude. They were wholly consumed with the pension battle and in Chretien’s case, the fall update which would be tabled weeks later. Campbell wanted CPP expansion as a legacy item but not as the central item. He told me that no Liberal prime minister had a single piece of legislation regarded as such and he was not about to be the first one. Besides, he had affirmative action on the books already and was planning a Court Challenges Program.

LINDA VAUGHAN, TORONTO STAR: At the inaugural pensions meeting, the first ministers resolved nothing, as the federal negotiators had only 2 allies: fellow Liberals Joe Ghiz and Frank McKenna. John Buchanan and Sterling Lyon led the conservative premiers, who steadfastly stonewalled Campbell throughout that long weekend, one that somehow passed without anyone losing their temper. Yet the sessions were so acrimonious that few were eager for another round, and Campbell assented to his economic team’s request that legislation be tabled immediately. Another conference would be held in the new year, probably sometime in January. Sean O’Sullivan was considering whether to filibuster the expansion, since he did not want excessive pressure on his moderate provincial allies causing a major breach in the front. He would ultimately decide to filibuster but without using all the tools at his disposal, expecting Senate consideration sometime in March. Provincially, there were no elections due to be held in 1988, though Sterling Lyon expected to retire after 11 years as premier and hand over to his protégé Gary Filmon. With his retirement, Nova Scotia’s Buchanan would become dean of the first ministers, followed by Newfoundland’s Brian Peckford. The Atlantic premiers’ commitment was underestimated by their counterparts, even if they desired a quick end to this battle.


Prime Minister Alex Campbell listens to PEI Premier Joe Ghiz during a plenary session of the First Ministers Conference, Nov. 4, 1987.

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TIMMINS: SAQ privatization would be the final and most complex privatization on Sauvé’s list, but one whose popularity he intuitively sensed. It had no real defenders and unlike resource companies, did not have an anti-privatization case easily marketable to swing voters. Education reform would be another big priority for 1988, when he would celebrate 5 years as premier and a decade as Unionist leader. The fall fiscal update would contain no surprises, with Bachand sharing his federal counterparts’ confidence that the October plunge was just a blip. For their part the Liberals had been keeping their promise of a progressive opposition, opposing SAQ privatization and the education reform while supporting the Ministry of International Relations. Sauvé wanted to be involved in the AACT, which he could not do so long as a Liberal was premier, Campbell being a staunch adherent of Trudeau’s AACT doctrine. Instead, he talked often with the Francophone consuls in Quebec City and Montreal. He never failed to remind me that it had originally been Duplessis’ idea to open a Paris delegation and Johnson had pushed the boundaries further than anyone had thought possible. Sauvé had always resented Stanfield’s continuation of Trudeau’s policy, one which O’Sullivan promised to permanently reverse with a bilateral accord.

GAGNON: I revealed that the first ministers meeting would be held Jan. 14-16, with the Assembly sitting starting on Feb. 4. The premier had steadfastly refused to adopt a fixed calendar as demanded by parliamentary reformers for years, wanting to retain flexibility as needed for the government. While both parties had agreed to upgrade the Assembly into a full-time institution in the 1960s and early 70s, reform had stalled since then. Sauvé was a traditionalist who disdained such reformers on principle and refused all entreaties to strengthen the committee system adopted in 1973, which he believed just fine as is. The Liberals had seized on parliamentary reform as a good-government plank and constantly harassed the government for committee reform, an elected Speaker and an ombudsman. To Unionists, all this sounded self-interested and unctuous. Or as Sauvé often said, “they want to get attention inside that they can’t get outside”, which had been his party’s attitude before 1960. Not all members of his Cabinet shared that view, but they gradually came around to his position that the parliamentary status quo was necessary to marginalize the Liberals. As the session wound down in Ottawa and Quebec City, one got the distinct impression that the future would be quieter than expected.
 
TIMMINS: In their hesitance to accept a second first ministers conference on pensions, McCarthy and Getty had been correct given how acrimonious the sessions were. At one point Campbell and Sauvé got in an incredibly heated exchange that left a mark on those who witnessed it, even if both men themselves brushed it off by saying they never took court battles personally. Sauvé’s personally friendly relationship with Campbell lost its earlier lustre and was never the same, something which had been coming for at least a year. With O’Sullivan as Tory leader, Sauvé no longer needed the Liberals and embraced the Tories as close as was politically possible. In the House too, the Tories became notably more aggressive, sensing impending victory in the pension battle. Campbell returned to the upcoming budget and delegated most pension work to Adam O’Toole, who took up the cudgels with relish and began wooing moderate Tory senators. O’Toole focused on Maritime senators and Ontarian Red Tories who were ideologically suspicious of their leader, if loyal to him. In Ontario, for weeks corporate allies of the PC Party had aired ads attacking CPP expansion as costly, unnecessary and an Ottawa power grab. One noteworthy ad, entitled “Tom and Judy” showed a small business-owning couple agonizing over what a higher payroll tax would mean for their bottom line.

PAULSON: Both federal leaders began the winter sitting on a far more aggressive note than they had ended the fall one, ending whatever pretense of comity had previously existed between the two men. Unlike in Quebec City, where the two leaders were bound by a longstanding relationship and a shared parliamentary traditionalism, O’Sullivan and Campbell were natural antagonists who each found the other ideologically abhorrent. Given the parliamentary calendar, both expected a Senate vote on pension expansion before spring, and Campbell wanted substantial progress on the budget front before the pension vote was taken. On this the two men agreed, since the Court Challenges Program was not yet ready for tabling and would be delayed until later that spring or perhaps the autumn. A substantial surplus was forecasted for that fiscal year, as had been the case throughout Campbell’s premiership thanks to a booming economy and rising revenues, and Chretien delivered a small round of tax cuts for middle-class earners. Meanwhile on the NDP side, Ed Broadbent was still deciding whether to contest another election, and at that moment was leaning towards running a final time before retirement. He wanted to hold Campbell accountable for what Broadbent saw as the prime minister’s insufficient devotion to the progressive cause.

NDP Leader Ed Broadbent at an Ottawa press conference, Jan. 26, 1988.

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GAGNON: Raymond Bachand’s first budget contained a healthy surplus but unlike Jean Chretien’s, no tax cut, Sauvé having ordered a moratorium on tax-cutting immediately after the election. He would allow nothing to detract from his GDP goal, one which his finance minister wholeheartedly shared. For now the pension battle was out of mind, at least for a few more weeks, even as the opposition hammered Sauvé for involving Quebec in a battle which would not affect it. In Levesque’s words, the premier was helping to lead a fight which only by the grace of a government he despised – Jean Lesage’s Liberals – he was exempted from. While the Liberal leader did not receive a direct response, he knew what his foe’s response would be: he would have happily taken that tradeoff. Both the premier and prime minister took a very long view of politics, rarely seeing any one battle as decisive, and pensions were not one of them. Progressives had been heartened by several government moves in 1987 and if a Court Challenges Program were enacted, that would be another point for the Liberals, even if the Tories vowed to dismantle it if elected. In Quebec City, the talk was of Jean Lesage’s recent cancer diagnosis, which if rumours were to be believed was terminal.

ROY: One side priority of Campbell’s was apologizing for the wartime internment of Japanese, Italian and German-Canadians, something that Stanfield and La Salle had benignly neglected during the Tory decade in government. To the prime minister it was long overdue and the least that could be done in correcting a historic injustice, and one that received instant all-party support in Parliament. On Feb. 25 he stood in the Commons to deliver the apology and promised a lump sum in compensation to survivors, with emotions high on all sides of the Commons. It was a moving moment in a Parliament where partisanship and acrimony were seemingly increasing daily. At the same time, Campbell was considering further deregulation of private telecoms, specifically opening up the sector to further foreign competition, something to which the NDP was vociferously opposed and his own left wing uneasy about. They would have been even more uneasy had they known of a top-secret study in Finance to replace the highly inefficient Manufacturers Sales Tax (MST), which was in its preliminary stages and temporarily frozen in order to prevent leaks. Revenue and Employment took a different view, wanting any replacement to either be implemented or released to the public before the next election.

ADAMSON: The crucial pension vote took place in the Senate on March 31, with 5 moderate Tories absenting themselves from the Chamber on that day, defeating the proposal 53-50. Campbell had almost succeeded, making this defeat all the more embarrassing for his government. Nonetheless, Campbell announced that he would be considering his position and blamed two people in particular: Sean O’Sullivan and Pierre Sauvé, who had put “ideological zealousness above the common good” in Ed Broadbent’s words. For their part, the PC and Unionist leaders revelled in their victory, seeing their coordination strategy vindicated and having successfully mobilized public opinion against what was a very modest proposal, at least in comparison to what the Liberal left wanted. Nonetheless, because Campbell had not oversold his pension proposal, he did not suffer as great a political hit as the Tories had desired – one which would have hopefully marked the beginning of his premiership’s end. It was widely rumoured that Campbell would not revisit CPP expansion, at least until there was a change in government in either BC or Ontario, where incumbent governments were not as strong as they seemed.
 
GAGNON: Sauvé had little time to savour his pension triumph, as controversy erupted over allegations of contract favouritism at Environment and Health, with the opposition demanding he censure or fire the ministers. While retaining his cool, Sauvé was irritated at the attacks on sole-sourcing, which as he incessantly pointed out was perfectly legal under certain criteria – in this case the public interest, as decided by the relevant ministers. Nor was it a practice confined to the UN, but Levesque was eager for any opening to attack the old-fashioned Unionist patronage system, which he saw as neo-Duplessist in its pervasiveness outside Montreal. No rules had been broken but both ministers had skirted very close to the line, and Sauvé privately warned them that a further transgression would result in dismissal. Naturally he was enraged when this leaked to the press, making him seem far more defensive than he actually was. It was a bad April for the government, even as their SAQ legislation was about to clear third reading and the budget had already passed. After a busy spring, Unionists were eager to end the session and start their vacation, hoping that political calm would return when they came back in October. In Ottawa, Alex Campbell was also hoping for a quick end to a bitterly disappointing spring sitting.

SAUVÉ: One of the worst things you can do in politics is blow the expectations game, because that can make something relatively insignificant cause you significant damage for no reason. Pensions were an overhyped battle from the beginning which, in my opinion, became blown out of proportion partially from the Liberals but also media bias. We were being portrayed not as opponents with legitimate financial or social concerns but grinches who had the utter nerve to oppose a noble progressive initiative. I don’t think Alex [Campbell] played that game, but his allies did and as a result he took a bigger hit than he should have. In politics as in everything else, you win and lose some battles while keeping an eye on the war. To me the pension battle was just another battle against federal overreach, one of umpteen my party has waged against whichever party has ruled Ottawa over the decades, and it had nothing personal to do with Alex or anyone else on his team. As for sole-sourcing - any assertion that sole-sourcing angered me is to be polite, completely and utterly false – a routine practice is not a scandal, no matter what the media likes to claim about such things. I do not recall them complaining when a Liberal government did the same.

PAULSON: Campbell was on an Asian tour in early May, visiting India, China, the Philippines, Thailand and Australia in a whirlwind that left him thrilled and his travelling media exhausted. In all countries he received a good reception, particularly in Australia from his good friend Bob Hawke. It was a welcome respite from his domestic troubles and revitalized the elixir that had made his first term such a success and proven so frustrating to his opponents. Jean Chrétien persuaded his colleagues that the Court Challenges Program should be advanced to the autumn instead of waiting another year as originally planned, citing an internal Justice study and a need to recapture progressive enthusiasm that had badly deflated with their pension defeat. Ed Broadbent had lambasted Chrétien in the Commons as a quitter, provoking heated exchanges with the combative finance minister who would brook no lectures on his progressive bona fides from any Dipper. The Cabinet also agreed to request domestic policy proposals from the civil service, in search of policy ideas which could be implemented unilaterally and not attract significant Senate resistance. More than ever, Campbell regretted his refusal to insist on the prime minister alone naming Section 26 Senate appointees. Had he done so, he ruefully muttered to aides, they would have won on pensions and much else.

Finance Minister Jean Chrétien delivers a speech in Quebec City, June 21, 1988.

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ADAMSON: At Queen’s Park, the Tories prepared to celebrate 45 years in power and begin looking ahead to the election which though not required for another 2 years, would likely be held the following autumn. Frank Miller had been on the winning pension team, but his fragile health meant he had to carefully husband his limited energy. He had already been hospitalized once for a mild heart attack over a decade earlier and was worried that he might not survive another one, and his family urged him to retire as soon as possible after the next election. Miller thought he would fight a final election before retiring in 1991 and handing over to a much younger successor. He now faced 36-year-old Sheila Copps as Liberal leader, a much more effective opponent than Peterson had latterly been, but one not taken entirely seriously by the Tory grandees who found her obnoxious in every way. Sean O’Sullivan was privately deeply concerned about his “cousins” but did not intervene in any way, leaving Blue machinations to his provincial allies, who remained steadfastly loyal to Miller. While the grandees respected their federal leader, they abhorred the idea of someone like him becoming provincial leader, which would end the PC Party as they knew it.


ROY: With a successful session behind them, the Unionists looked forward to a fresh start that fall, putting the focus squarely back on provincial issues after months of federal distraction and harassment from their Liberal foes. Cabinet ministers had asked the public service to devise a list of “projects for the 1990s” to help refresh their party’s manifesto, having passed key planks in the previous year’s manifesto and set a timetable for the remainder. One idea being considered was enhanced maternity leave payments, something which appealed to many ministers since it would not be a new entitlement program like the state-run daycare proposed by the Liberals. Any thought of maternity leave was put on hold while the bureaucracy prepared education bills for the fall sitting and MNAs fanned out to the barbeque circuit. On June 23, news broke that Jean Lesage had died that night at 76 from lung cancer after a long illness, closing a chapter in Quebec history. Now Raymond Garneau was the sole living former premier, and Corinne Lesage declined a state funeral for her husband, saying he would be buried privately in accordance with his wishes. Levesque himself, Paul Gérin-Lajoie and Maurice Bellemare were now the most prominent surviving officeholders from that era.
 
PAULSON: The federal Liberals had 2 important projects in development: a Heraldic Authority that would a non-British first in the Commonwealth, which quickly gathered enthusiastic Tory support and tepid NDP support, giving Campbell a useful bipartisan PR victory. Another was their plan for telecom deregulation, which like SAQ privatization in Quebec they sensed would be immensely popular with swing voters. The NDP strongly opposed this plan on protectionist grounds while the Tories happily welcomed “Telecom 2000” as the deregulation agenda quickly became known. Both would be autumn projects and gave Campbell good fodder for the barbeque circuit as he fanned out across the country with his ministers. After a humiliating setback on pensions, he had quickly rebounded and held comfortable 8-10% leads over the Tories, reflecting swing voters’ increased satisfaction with his job performance while O’Sullivan planned a counterattack. He was not worried about prime ministerial popularity, recalling that in 1980 Stanfield had also been popular, as had Trudeau in 1970 and St. Laurent in 1955. The Tory leader took solace in his good personal approval and job performance numbers, which his predecessor never had during Campbell’s first term. The prime minister also had a decision to make closer to home that would disappoint his native region, one which did not involve fisheries.

TIMMINS: Despite Campbell’s successful update of the Stanfield-era Atlantic Accord to include Newfoundland oil in 1985, he faced impending closure of rail operations in the province due to their heavy debt burden. Employment Minister Adam O’Toole, the regional minister for Newfoundland and a close ally of provincial Liberal leader Clyde Wells, wanted freight rail phased out, arguing that trucking could do the same job for a far cheaper price. While he liked rail, there was no practical reason to keep freight operations going. Herb Gray argued for keeping subsidies, saying that O’Toole’s logic would inevitably lead to a rapid decline in Atlantic rail, to which O’Toole replied that Gray was arguing with math. He wanted that money invested in social programs and tax cuts rather than “pissing it away in corporate subsidies” to CN, and won that argument in Cabinet. All were well aware that CN was also on the brink in Campbell’s home province, but being a less dire situation that issue could be delayed into the new year. Both men were correct: subsidies were needed for flagging Maritime rail if it was to survive much longer. O’Toole and Chretien were open to the idea of privatization, but knew that would never happen while Campbell was prime minister.



CAPLAN: Campbell’s concessions to progressives were in our view simply a series of bait-and-switches. He gave up after a single round on pensions and then proceeded to deepen our monarchical ties with heraldry and closed down freight rail in Newfoundland and Labrador while privatizing the telecom system. How could a supposedly progressive prime minister be so successful with conservative policies yet so half-hearted on progressive issues like pensions and Medicare? He refused to even seriously consider expanding Medicare or imposing strict restrictions on private medicine, allowing wealthier provinces like Alberta, BC, Ontario and Quebec to privatize through the back door. Charlottetown’s Alex Campbell was not Ottawa’s, as he made clear even before he formally won the Liberal leadership back in 1979. He had quickly adopted the federal party’s colours instead of making it adopt his, as O’Sullivan had so successfully done for his party. To be sure, we were happy with many of his policy accomplishments at both levels of government, but as time passed the ratio of centrism to progressivism seemed to rapidly tilt centrist, especially after he gave up on pensions. Yet of course this has been the Liberal Party’s way since time immemorial: campaign left, govern right after a few big baubles for progressives, except during the Pearson era.

GAGNON: The Unionist policy convention in early September was rather anticlimactic, with resolutions supporting maternity leave increases and expansion of the private healthcare sector easily passed. Much mirth was heard at the news of Newfoundland freight rail in light of high speed rail’s demise 4 years earlier, and many delegates were in a brainstorming rather than policymaking mindset . In said respect, there was little difference from their Liberal counterparts who had convened in Montreal 2 weeks earlier, both parties not being in an innovative mood so long as the political status quo was in force. When the Assembly resumed in mid-October, it was bound to be among Sauvé’s quietest sittings thus far as premier, without any contentious legislation on the order paper. He was visiting his old mentor Maurice Bellemare that week, well away from prying media eyes, in the Magdalene Islands, and the old warhorse was as politically attuned as ever. Bellemare would be among the guests of honour at the upcoming Unionist galas that fall. For his part, Levesque was meeting environmentalists and women’s rights activists in a quest to broaden the Liberal tent. He wanted a socially progressive tint to the next Liberal platform, and those issues would form part of the Liberal wedge.


GALLUP CANADA, SEPT. 21-23, 1988

IF A FEDERAL ELECTION WERE HELD TODAY, WHICH PARTY'S CANDIDATE WOULD YOU FAVOUR?

LIBERAL: 42.9%
PC: 35.0%
NDP: 21.8%


ADAMSON: Parliament resumed in late September with Telecom 2000 and the Heraldic Authority atop the Order Paper, with a calmer atmosphere than had been seen earlier that year, as the NDP vowed to use all the tools at their disposal to slow passage of Telecom 2000. Time allocation and cloture, as usual, made that an empty threat, yet the NDP was determined to put up a good show for their base. Campbell and O’Sullivan’s parliamentary lieutenants would strategize about how best to marginalize the NDP, which was a mutual goal of theirs despite some misgivings on both sides. Campbell was long irritated by the NDP’s unctuous sanctimony and managed to overcome his mutual dislike of his Tory counterpart in order to collaborate on this issue. Both men were clear it was a one-time deal on telecoms and not a path towards Stanfield-era detente, for which there was almost zero appetite in either party. Ironically, Stanfield himself was disappointed that O’Sullivan did not pursue better relations with the Liberals, though he was not surprised at his successor’s attitude. Indeed, Stanfield and O’Sullivan always had a respectful but distant relationship, and the former prime minister was deeply distrustful of his successor, to say nothing of Sauvé, Lyon and the Gang.

Prime Minister Robert Stanfield with Hamilton-Wentworth MP Sean O'Sullivan in 1973.

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TIMMINS: Telecom privatization did not harm Campbell’s standing with progressives, who were willing to tolerate such policies if they would keep Sean O’Sullivan out of 24 Sussex, and still trusted the prime minister. Swing voters were still happy with the government but crucially, did not fault the Tories for their rightward turn. Speculation about Ed Broadbent’s future ended at that time, when he announced he would lead the NDP into a final election, denouncing Campbell’s telecom move as a corporate sellout which would harm Canadian companies. Under Broadbent’s leadership the NDP had performed well but been able to break their 35-seat ceiling, thanks to Campbell’s skillful ideological direction of the Liberal Party and urban skepticism about the NDP. On Oct. 11, Sterling Lyon announced his impending resignation after 11 years as Manitoba premier and was likely to be succeeded by Gary FIlmon, his fellow Blue Tory. Filmon quickly made clear his allegiance to the Gang, now about to be led by Pierre Sauvé as their senior member. Due to serious scandals on his watch, it was also an open question whether Brian Peckford would remain Newfoundland’s premier for much longer, and a Liberal victory would leave John Buchanan as the sole Maritime Tory premier.

GAGNON: In late October, the government announced that immigration quotas from Francophone countries would be increased, whose secondary objective was to limit application of the Language Charter’s “Canada Clause” inserted at Sauvé’s insistence back in 1973. Furthermore, second-language instruction would be increased in English schools, a belated gesture after a controversial English-language increase for Francophone students in 1985. In this way he pleased nationalists, who had reluctantly accepted his argument that a “Quebec Clause” would be invalidated by the Supreme Court, and tweaked unilingual Anglophones. The Liberals strongly supported the government despite muffled protests from a minority of Anglophones, and the premier’s alliance with Anglophone elites was as strong as ever. Privately, he was optimistic about his kids’ generation, who had grown up with the language regime, disdaining language wars and facilitating a serene acceptance of the status quo. On Oct. 31, Steinberg’s declared bankruptcy, and the government quietly nudged local companies to bid for the storied grocery chain, a wish that would eventually be granted. Sauvé refused requests for a Caisse bid, flatly declaring that the Caisse would not reward failure, remarks that angered many Anglophones as much for their tone as substance. He could not have cared less, for beyond ideological and nationalist considerations he also did not want a precedent set.

ROY: Steinberg’s and schools were just about the only notable issues to crop up during the fall sitting, a quiet one that went well for the government without demoralizing the opposition. To progressive nationalists, neither party looked very promising even as the PQ was perilously close to deregistration by Elections Quebec. They decided that extraparliamentary action, as in the Duplessis era, was the best way to promote their cause given Liberal torpor and minimal Unionist action on nationalist issues. Swing nationalists and even right-wing ultranationalists remained highly satisfied with the government, noting nods to their causes and stricter enforcement of the Language Charter. Paul Bouchard remained a guest of honour at Unionist functions, still spry in his 80s, and lauded Sauvé for his pension battle as an excellent defence of Quebec’s interests and provincial jurisdiction. Moderate federalists were few and far between in the Union Nationale by that point, and the premier personally preferred moderate nationalists for coalitional balancing reasons. His experience with Bertrand had permanently soured him on moderate federalists, and the time had long past when people tried to convince him otherwise. It was often noted that the ministers closest to him were Pierre-Marc Johnson, a moderate nationalist, and Guy Ingres, a conservative federalist.

CHARLIE WALTERS, GLOBE AND MAIL: November ended with royal assent granted to the telecom and heraldry bills, and the NDP refused to grant unanimous consent for an early end to the session in protest at their passage. As the session petered out, all 3 parties believed they were in a good position heading into the New Year. Campbell retained his polling lead and had already secured a promise from President-elect Bush to visit Canada as soon as practicable, O’Sullivan believed voters would welcome a change, and Broadbent felt progressive anger towards Campbell would metastasize. While Chrétien delivered an optimistic economic update, he was worried at signs of a possible slowdown after a nearly 6-year-long boom. He also had received the MST replacement study commissioned 6 months earlier, which recommended a GST to replace what Adam O’Toole called a “leaky, cumbersome contraption.” Yet a GST would be politically explosive and deeply anathema to many progressives, and there was no guarantee of Tory support. While Sean O’Sullivan was known to support a shift to indirect taxation, he was also rarely one to miss a partisan opportunity, and talks between the leaders would inevitably lead to press leaks. All the economic ministers except Ben Danforth opposed a GST, which they saw as regressive and administratively complex.

Revenue Minister David Dingwall appears before the House Finance Committee, Dec. 2, 1988.

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MARIE BOIVIN: To me a GST was just common sense, as even progressive critics had to admit the MST [Manufacturers Sales Tax]’s many faults, as Adam [O’Toole] did privately. Its design and rate were what we debated amongst ourselves, and we resolved to have a caucus retreat before Christmas to avoid press leaks of our internal deliberations. If we tipped our hand too early, we could give the anti-GST ministers ammunition to decide against one and weaponize it against us. John [Crosbie] would lead our negotiating team if talks were initiated, and we decided to quietly sound out friendly economic journalists to see if they would be interested in promoting a GST. While Sean and the prime minister didn’t get on well, John and Adam were good friends who often worked together on Newfoundland issues, and I got on well with Jean Chrétien. At that time, John was occupied with a political crisis in his home province, since Brian Peckford had abruptly announced his imminent retirement and the provincial Tories were on the path to a crushing defeat. Fortunately we had a very merry Christmas party as a distraction from what awaited us in the new year, which we all sensed would bring some nasty surprises.
 
PAULSON: At a meeting of the Cabinet’s Economic Policy (“E”) Committee in early January, Campbell decided that he would not impose a GST, saying the economic arguments against it were convincing. Instead he would ask Finance to further study a revenue replacement which was neither a GST nor a VAT, and report back before the policy convention. It was the first major issue that Campbell punted on, which hurt his heretofore squeaky-clean image as a bold truth teller, especially since he had an excellent track record on budgetary issues back in his Charlottetown days. Jean Chretien revealed the Committee’s decision to a full Cabinet meeting on January 20, just a week before Parliament was to resume for its winter sitting. Foreign Minister Roy McLaren, a leading moderate, said he supported a GST and apart from a VAT, which no one in the room supported, there was no alternative that would raise the required revenue. Unusually for him, Campbell sharply declared the discussion closed and that there would be no GST so long as he was prime minister, all the more notable because McLaren was a close confidant of the prime minister’s. The remainder of that Cabinet meeting was devoted to Chrétien’s preview of the budget he would present in 2 weeks’ time.


GAGNON: The upcoming Quebec budget would contain no surprises, being dubbed a continuation budget for largely being an update of the previous year’s, as previewed in the fall update. Like their federal counterparts, Sauvé and Bachand were concerned about a potential downturn but believed it was best to take a wait-and-see attitude for the time being. While he staunchly supported a federal GST, Sauvé planned to remain completely aloof from the debate and federal politics generally for the foreseeable future. His memory of the highly controversial 1976 QST hike, generally acknowledged as a reason for Cardinal’s loss in 1978, coloured his perception of the federal tax debate, but like O’Sullivan he believed it a necessary revenue tool. There was nothing major planned for the upcoming session, with both SAQ privatization and education reform having been enacted the previous month, a situation which suited the government perfectly fine. Brian Peckford and Sterling Lyon were gone and Frank Miller’s political position looked increasingly shaky in Ontario, while Don Getty had never fully earned Albertans’ confidence. By contrast, Unionist Quebec was an island of stability, as was Tory Manitoba and to a lesser extent, Socred BC. Stability was among their favourite themes, and ministers I spoke to believed that an unstable economic situation would further expose their Liberal foes as unfit to govern.


TIMMINS: Campbell’s meeting with President Bush in early February was mainly a introductory one, and they got on quite well, indeed better than had been the case with Reagan. Environmental and border issues topped their agenda, with Bush promising to continue the discussion at some point later that year. It would be easier for bilateral relations with the more moderate Bush as president, if not quite as ideal as a Democrat in the White House for domestic public consumption. Bush invited Campbell to visit him in Maine before the G7 meeting, a strictly personal visit whose closest counterpart was the Kennedy-Pearson Hyannis Port meeting in 1963. Campbell valued the US relationship but neither he nor Roy McLaren was particularly interested in US domestic politics, though McLaren was a devout follower of British politics. By contrast, Sean O’Sullivan was deeply interested in both countries and had once written to Richard Nixon when just a parliamentary secretary in 1975. Foreign policy was not a deeply contentious issue under Campbell, with differences more of emphasis than anything else. With the budget debate and President Bush’s visit occupying the national agenda, O’Sullivan quietly resolved to commit to a GST plank at the upcoming policy convention, convinced he could make it electorally neutral or even beneficial.


ADAMSON: The Tories got a needed morale boost when they won the Yukon territorial election, and O’Sullivan’s budget performance received plaudits from pundits and higher personal approval ratings for him personally. If he could gain an economic advantage on Campbell, then “that’s the ball game”, as he confided to me in a late February interview – the GST would be part of that, since Campbell had sullied his truth-telling brand. Additionally, Campbell’s PEI record showed he was quite capable of solving a revenue crisis, but had simply chosen not to do so in this instance. The Tory leader was not worried about his own anti-tax bona fides, saying that he was merely replacing a “useless” indirect tax with an effective one. All that remained was for his economic team to craft a formula that would be adopted at the convention and be as broad-based as possible. There was also unanimous agreement that it be done as quickly as possible, as advised by Grace McCarthy and Pierre Sauvé, both of whom had dealt with provincial sales tax increases earlier in their careers. O’Sullivan also planned to enact a constitutional amendment switching the party’s leadership election mechanism from a delegated convention to a weighted direct election, a compromise which kept both wings happy while cementing the Blue advantage.


Alberta Premier Don Getty declares victory in the provincial election, Mar. 20, 1989.



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WALTERS: Don Getty won another landslide majority, but PC performance continued deteriorating and humiliatingly, he lost his own Edmonton seat to a Liberal, if very narrowly. Sean O’Sullivan and Pierre Sauvé, both of whom disliked Getty – an entirely mutual feeling – privately took pleasure in Getty’s personal defeat, a feeling shared by the almost unanimously Blue Albertan federal caucus. Brian Peckford’s replacement by Tom Rideout, a more congenial figure than the abrasive Peckford or vainglorious Wells, also pleased the federal leader. In Manitoba, Gary Filmon was preparing to call an election and capitalize on a divided opposition and strong approval ratings, while Frank Miller had still not decided whether to call a spring or fall election. For the time being, all 3 federal parties were squarely focused on their upcoming policy conventions, with O’Sullivan having the most ambitious plans of all 3 leaders, since he wanted an unambiguous contrast with his Liberal nemesis.
 
TIMMINS: At their April policy convention, New Democrats adopted planks calling for a national infrastructure fund, a national daycare program and an investment fund alongside repeal of the Free Trade Agreement. Free trade in particular was bound to be a leading NDP bugbear given the impending start of negotiating for a North American free trade deal which included Mexico, as proposed by Bush to Campbell at their February meeting. While both major parties now supported free trade, there was still a sizeable protectionist bloc in the Liberal Party and a smaller PC one which in both cases were almost completely marginalized. Campbell believed a successful negotiation would build on CUSFTA’s success and hoped it would be the signature item in a third term, though negotiations would take years to complete and Ontario would be leery of another trade deal amidst a slowly deteriorating economy. Indeed Finance and the Bank of Canada had already warned the government of an impending slowdown, though they did not yet project a recession. Campbell decided to defer any possible action until the fall, when the First Ministers Conference would be held in Quebec City, and in the interim he decided he would renew the appointment of Bank of Canada Governor John Crow.

ADAMSON: At Queen’s Park, Frank Miller decided that the election would be held in September rather than May in order to further prepare his party for the writ period. Throughout Miller’s premiership, his tenuous hold on the party made renewal extremely difficult and tension persisted among Big Blue Machine strategists, whose roster had not changed since the 1970s. Young right-wing staffers were unable to advance and as a consequence fled to Ottawa, where they prospered and took lead roles at party headquarters. Miller’s succession looked to be a battle between Health Minister Dennis Timbrell, Municipal Affairs Minister Larry Grossman and Natural Resources Minister Scott Barton, representing the centrist, Red and Blue wings of the party respectively. O’Sullivan and the Ontario caucus promised to campaign for Miller, and Campbell similarly pledged his federal caucus for Sheila Copps, but there would be no Quebec-style proxy war. Bay Street found the progressive Copps anathema, though her choice of former leader Bob Nixon for Finance calmed some doubts that she would lead a quasi-NDP government. Campbell left Ontario in the hands of his regional lieutenant Herb Gray, who helped Copps modernize the provincial party’s organization over the previous 4 years and was deeply invested in her success.

GAGNON: Sauvé was happy to see the back of Brian Peckford, given their well-known lack of rapport, but foresaw little change with Clyde Wells’ victory in the Newfoundland election. He told me privately that at best, he expected no more pestering about Churchill Falls, which would never be reopened so long as he was premier. By contrast, he had quickly bonded with New Brunswick’s rookie Liberal premier Frank McKenna and later they would become good friends. McKenna was a centrist who continued his predecessor’s close working relationship with Quebec, and soon they would agree to visit each other’s provinces as soon as possible. Meanwhile, federally, Sean O’Sullivan had obtained everything he wanted from his party’s policy convention. Liberalization, privatization, deregulation, an optional Rand formula for federal employees were all included, as was the promise of a GST. The latter was deeply controversial but ultimately passed easily, as did direct leadership elections. Foreign and defence policy were identical to Michael Wilson’s 1986 manifesto, while Red Tories were mollified through infrastructure and the promise of maintaining the status quo on social issues. It was the most conservative postwar Tory manifesto, indeed probably since 1930, and drew inspiration from O’Sullivan’s BC, Quebec and Manitoban allies, as the Tory leader acknowledged in his introduction.

Newfoundland Premier Clyde Wells.

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ROY: When the Assembly adjourned in late May, one of the least contentious sittings of Pierre Sauvé’s premiership came to a close, as both government and opposition awaited further economic indicators. Both parties had presided over recessionary conditions a decade earlier, yet the Unionist brand was highly identified with stability, an emerging theme promoted by many ministers in interviews and speeches. With economic turbulence on the horizon, Quebecers could trust the proven team. At a Board of Trade speech that month, “L’équipe qui a fait ses preuves”, was Bachand’s watchword to the business community. Lévesque’s counterargument was that the government had neglected kitchen-table economic concerns for ideological reasons, but he did not take this argument as far as he could have because of his centrist ideology. Both leaders remembered their 1950s campaign finance history very well, and Lévesque warned his left wing that it could recur if they were not careful. On May 31, the PQ was formally deregistered by Elections Quebec after all appeals had been exhausted, thus ending a brief chapter in Quebec history. Its few remaining progressive nationalist supporters defected to the Liberal Party, where nationalists had greater influence under Lévesque than they had under Garneau, a staunch federalist, and were made to feel welcome.

PAULSON: At the end of June, John Crosbie and Flora MacDonald informed their leader that they would retire from politics, as did Jack Horner. O’Sullivan was unhappy about losing Crosbie, whom he saw, an anchor of stability in caucus, but pleased to see his old rival MacDonald gone. Horner he recognized as a pioneer for Blue policies and a fellow Diefenbaker loyalist who had done much for his native province, and who would also be missed. As in Quebec City, generational renewal was the order of the day, as both parties looked to recruit younger faces for the new decade. O’Sullivan’s first major recruiting success was Quebec batonnier Paul Vaillancourt, a leading corporate lawyer and close confidant of Pierre Sauvé’s. If O’Sullivan formed government, Vaillancourt was a lock for the Justice Ministry, a post he deeply coveted. John Crosbie would lead an effort to recruit young Atlantic talent, which had been difficult due to Campbell’s high popularity in his native region and lingering doubts about O’Sullivan’s right-wing philosophy in the Red Tory heartland. In Nova Scotia, John Buchanan did his best to help the federal party, while in PEI ambitious Tories were intimidated by the stratospheric popularity of Liberal Premier Joe Ghiz and the native-son Prime Minister.
 
God I feel bad for my Atlantic Tory brethren. A Liberal Prime Minister who has a home field advantage, and a federal opposition leader who doesn't seem completely comfortable around Red Tories, a group you'll always need if you want to win power.
 
TIMMINS: Campbell’s appointment of New Brunswick constitutional lawyer Cédric Gaumont to replace Gordon Lockhart as Governor-General was widely applauded, and Gaumont would make history as the first Acadian Governor-General. On that happy note, Campbell flew to Kennebunkport for a meeting with Bush to discuss trade and generally become personally acquainted. They got on very well personally and even made progress on longstanding fisheries disputes which had been a low-level if constant irritant in bilateral relations for many years. Campbell promised Bush that he would be fully committed to NAFTA, as the emerging outline of a deal was called, but so long as environmental and labour issues were addressed in the treaty. Otherwise it was a quiet summer month in politics, where all 3 leaders hit the barbeque and fundraising circuits in anticipation of the coming election. Campbell’s personal popularity remained high, yet declining numbers in Quebec and BC meant he was in a highly competitive race with his Tory rival. For his part, Sean O’Sullivan promoted Allan Lawrence from Intergovernmental Affairs to Defence and Vanessa Redmond, a diplomat by profession and prominent Ontarian moderate, to Foreign Affairs. Both were very popular in caucus and had excellent personal relationships with their leader, even if they had limited influence on domestic policy.

GAGNON: Pierre Sauvé’s peaceful summer vacation was shattered on July 26, when he learned that his eldest daughter Gabrielle, a 22-year-old Laval undergraduate, had died in a scuba accident in Mexico, where she had been vacationing with friends. Her funeral was held a week later in St. Eustache, a private event where her father delivered the eulogy for “Gaby”, a light to all who knew her and a vivacious, highly conscientious young woman. For an ailing Luce Sauvé, who had lost her husband nearly 30 years previously and now her beloved granddaughter, this was too much. Though she lived a couple of more years, she never fully recovered from Gaby’s death. The family remained out of public view throughout that summer as they mourned their loss, and all pending political projects were put on hold. At a federal level, Liberals and Tories prepared for the upcoming Ontario election, where polls showed a dead heat between Frank Miller’s Tories and Sheila Copps’ Liberals. Both sides were confident of victory, and Miller seized on a declaration by the NDP that they would not support a Tory minority government as a reason to preserve the “strong, stable Conservative majority government.” Miller called the election on July 31 for September 11.

ROY: Campbell’s Liberals had gradually lost popularity in Quebec during his second term, due to a mixture of factors including the pension battle, a sense he was becoming disconnected from the province’s concerns, and his refusal to make any cultural concessions. Additionally, Sean O’Sullivan was ardently wooing Quebec and had put aside his own well-known 1970s doubts about a distinct society and official bilingualism. While his French was far from perfect, he was more fluent than Campbell and his close association with the popular provincial government helped considerably. Unlike previous elections, the Union Nationale was unambiguous in its Tory support and decided to advise the Tories to target most of the Liberal caucus, as in 1958. Organizational assistance was not only impractical given the possibility of overlapping elections but also because Tory organization in Quebec had substantially improved since the 1970s, when the UN had done almost all the heavy lifting themselves. Since the Unionists needed to maintain distance from federal politics, this suited Sauvé and O’Sullivan just fine. Jean Chretien had heard reports from backbenchers about mailers and local radio ads attacking them from third party groups, which were almost certainly Tory or Unionist in origin, and quickly organized counterattacks at the riding level against “unaccountable debasers of democracy.”

PAULSON: In the final two weeks of Ontario’s election campaign, Sheila Copps began to gain momentum after a deadlocked race between an elderly dynasty and a Liberal Party which tilted decidedly more progressive than in previous years. Miller was unable to articulate a reason for extending the Big Blue Machine’s longevity to a full half-century in government, and his position was quite like Jean-Guy Cardinal’s in 1978. Like Cardinal, Miller was a weak leader presiding over a fractured party whose ideological deadlock made major initiatives very difficult, while confronting a sluggish economy and dynamic opposition after a long incumbency. That dilemma could only be resolved in the same way their federal and provincial allies did, with a much higher potential for ugly intraparty divisions as each faction battled for ascendancy. Miller did not lose the final debate so much as Copps won it with her impassioned cries for change, limiting her spending promises and casting herself as a pragmatic progressive like Campbell, naturally omitting that Campbell had been far more activist as premier than as prime minister. Even before the ballots were cast, her Hamiltonian rival Sean O’Sullivan privately predicted that Miller’s loss would be cathartic for the party, liberating it to have long-overdue ideological debates.

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ADAMSON: Campbell was elated at the Big Blue Machine’s astonishing fall, especially that a progressive like Sheila Copps had accomplished what decades of centrist leaders had failed to – topple the only government 2 generations of Ontarians had ever known. In his view, this was an excellent omen for the upcoming federal election, whose timing he had not yet decided. Yet Campbell was wary of calling an election too quickly given a deteriorating economy, fearing that voters would blame him in such a situation. For his part, O’Sullivan believed that his ally needed to lose that election and at any rate, a sluggish economy was Campbell’s problem. The federal Tory leader believed he could repeat Stanfield’s 1972 campaign, with the added twist of winning enough Central Canadian seats for a majority, even if many of his colleagues were to say the least, skeptical. Once again, the NDP was crushed between the two major parties as progressive voters flocked to Copps to ensure a Liberal majority. Miller immediately announced his resignation as Tory leader, and before the year was out he would quit politics entirely, leaving the 3 “Young Turks” – Grossman, Timbrell and Barton – to battle for his crown.
 
SAUVÉ: 1989 was a tragic one for our family, and when I came back to the Assembly in October I was still in mourning for Gaby. Yet I was also determined to continue, as I had been 29 years earlier when I lost my father, and not a day goes by when I don’t think of them and all the great times we had together. That is how I was taught to deal with tragedy and what I taught my children, who have taught their children the same thing. Gaby was always optimistic and died doing something she loved with friends she adored, and as when my father died we could only soldier on. Politically, we were of course keeping our eye on the economy, which seemed at that stage to be heading towards a standard recession, but it was not something we could do much about. In 1974 we were able to win easily because despite the economy’s state, voters still trusted us and more importantly, did not trust the Liberals to do anything notably different. In such a scenario voters may stick with the devil they know if the downturn is relatively contained, which that recession was, and of course you have to strike a balance between looking stable without looking inert.

ROY: Outside the National Assembly, grassroots progressives had settled on campaign finance reform as one of their major causes, believing that corporate donations eroded “what was left”, in Lise Payette’s words, of their progressive spirit. They saw the government stockpiles sums unheard of outside federal politics, indeed quite close to what the federal parties raised. In today’s terms the Union Nationale’s warchest had returned to 9-digit levels by 1989, almost as wealthy as they had been in the Duplessis era. There was increased transparency following bipartisan disclosure agreements in 1973 and 1980, an excellent example of what the progressive groups were trying to solve. Campaign finance negotiations were handled by a handful of people in both parties, with the leaders themselves finalizing those arrangements behind closed doors. The Union Nationale had more easily transitioned towards a grassroots fundraising model than their Liberal foe, even if elements of the business community found Sauvé’s stance on certain subsidies deeply distasteful. Since the premier wanted to asphyxiate his Liberal foes and not ruffle too many financial feathers, he only reduced subsidies on agribusiness and to a lesser extent, on firms such as Bombardier. Like father, like son: going farther in rhetoric than substance to allow themselves manoeuvring room.

TIMMINS: Sean O’Sullivan issued strict instructions that while individual MPs could endorse provincial candidates, campaign activity must necessarily be restricted due to the impending federal election. Indeed this was something of a misnomer because my sources told me Campbell was actively considering going into a fifth year, which had not been done in peacetime since 1935. He was uncertain whether to go before the economy got worse, or wait longer in hopes things might improve, and was leaning towards the first option in November. There was no consensus in Cabinet on this question, which unusually for him deepened Campbell’s uncertainty, since visceral confidence had always been a part of his persona as much as for his political nemeses Sauvé and O’Sullivan. He decided that a decision would be made after the budget, and in the meantime writ preparations would be ramped up to prepare for a possible spring or summer election. O’Sullivan and Broadbent also put their parties into pre-writ mode, ramping up their nomination schedule and organizational tempo even before Campbell had issued his orders following the Nov. 7 Cabinet meeting. For the time being, public attention was on foreign affairs as the Berlin Wall fell and Campbell reoriented to overseas ventures that increasingly appealed to him as his incumbency lengthened.

Ontario Premier Sheila Copps.

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ADAMSON: Frank Miller resigned on the sitting’s last day after tributes from all sides of the aisle, telling me that while he had enjoyed public service he had never liked the political side of politics, nor been especially suited to it. While his party was not quite shattered, it was badly damaged and regardless of ideological stripes, all 3 candidates agreed a major overhaul was needed. Scott Barton was the strongest advocate of radical change, even if like his friend Sean O’Sullivan he kept his most controversial proposal to himself for the time being. Barton wanted to fire the entire Big Blue Machine team and promote younger cadres, switch to direct elections, allow activists a greater organizational role, publicly denouncing “factionalist poison” and advocating a culture of transparency. While he had quietly advocated renewal in government, Barton deeply angered swathes of the party establishment and older Red Tories who were not used to the party’s dirty laundry being aired in public. Bill Davis was quietly furious at his former protégé and even Frank Miller harboured doubts. Nonetheless, younger centrists and even some Red Tories who otherwise disagreed with Barton’s ideology or disliked his personality found his calls for change refreshing. As one Kingston Young PC told me, “we need a catharsis, and that’s what Barton’s offering more than anyone else.”

GAGNON: Lévesque’s major accomplishment in 1989 was renewing his party’s sense of purpose, which had been badly damaged in opposition and started to flag given the government’s high popularity. He had mended fences with progressives and though ex-Péquistes would never be happy with him, he was the lesser of 2 evils. The Liberal leader never pledged to renationalize the companies which had been privatized, much like Maurice Duplessis had never fully privatized Hydro despite returning to power only months later. Environmentalism, kitchen-table economics and healthcare would be his planks for the upcoming year, issues where the Liberal establishment and progressive base could largely find common ground. A fight over resource companies would be counterproductive to Lévesque’s kitchen-table narrative and at any rate; the Liberal Party’s financiers were none too keen on anything resembling renationalization. Both men were in a contemplative mood in year-end interviews, determined not to make any news or say much beyond cautiously optimistic platitudes, a change in demeanour for both leaders.
 
DEREK KEATON, LIBERAL CHIEF WHIP, 1985-1995: 1990’s first caucus meeting started with the announcement that there would be a fall election, either in October or November. While a fifth year had been considered, Cabinet decided that it was wiser to stay with a regular schedule rather than risk further economic deterioration. Like Stanfield, Alex was loath to use a fifth year in peacetime, seeing it as an open admission of guaranteed defeat, which aroused his competitive instincts. Frank Miller’s fall was a sclerotic regime unable to renew itself, with economic malaise only being part of the backdrop. Gary Filmon had won his election in Manitoba a few months earlier, as had Allan Blakeney in Saskatchewan. What interested us was severe political turbulence in BC and Alberta, as their respective governing coalitions began to visibly crack under the strain. In Alberta, right-wingers were mounting a concerted effort to organize within the PC Party, while in BC there were divisions between religious conservatives and secular fiscal conservatives that McCarthy was working assiduously to heal. Alex also decided to hold a First Ministers Conference in May to discuss interprovincial issues, especially solutions to the taxing problem that was not just incessant pro-GST propaganda from the Gang of Five.

GAGNON: A new year did not change the government’s outlook, with no major new initiatives on their priority list, and their most noteworthy proposal reinstatement of mandatory vocational training that had been abolished in 1978 by the Liberals. To Unionists, this was an example of Liberal disdain for the trades, while the Liberals saw it as outdated in the CEGEP era. Ingres told me that his first legislative initiative would include a curriculum modification to reinstate vocational training, which would also be included in the private school funding formula. No Liberal reconsideration was forthcoming, for Levesque had supported the move as a minister and shared his urban colleagues’ views on that subject. More broadly, no one was concerned about a possible recession, or as one minister told me, a “regular” recession, which I used in a column and caused a mild stir. To them there was no need to be overly concerned about troughs and peaks in the business cycle. In Sauvé’s mind, far more concerning was generational renewal to replace many older ministers he had served in the previous Unionist government. Robert Lussier, Clement Vincent and others would be retiring, and the premier’s generation would now dominate senior ranks. Their other priority was a long pre-writ offensive with a heavy nationalist flavour.

PAULSON: Jean Chretien’s first budget of the new decade contained a tiny surplus, a product of revenue increases rather than economic activity, which continued deteriorating despite his best attempts to promote greater consumer demand. Campbell had decided to shutter rail operations in his native province due to inefficiency and pledge a Confederation Bridge despite considerable reservations from his erstwhile ally Joe Ghiz. Indeed he had decided that a mainland link would go ahead no matter what the provincial government said, confident his personal popularity trumped all. In that Campbell was probably correct, and Ghiz would eventually agree with his prime minister on a bridge. In Charlottetown too, Campbell had compromised on means but never on ends, which contributed to some erosion in his personal popularity over time. Nonetheless, as an election year dawned, the Tories still had difficulty recruiting candidates in PEI. O’Sullivan was half-tempted to write off the province, but found more fertile ground in other Atlantic provinces, especially Nova Scotia, where John Buchanan and very covertly, Robert Stanfield, helped him recruit local candidates tied closely to the popular provincial PCs. Despite this assistance, Stanfield still had doubts about his successor, uncertain that his local success in Hamilton could translate nationally. They had never been close personally, and Stanfield would never change his view of O’Sullivan.

TIMMINS: In foreign policy, Campbell kept his eyes firmly trained on NAFTA negotiations and Europe, with Yugoslavia being a particular concern during an official visit to Washington in early March. While certainly more interested in foreign policy issues than at the outset of his premiership and a seasoned summit veteran, Campbell was always at heart a domestic policy prime minister. Foreign policy was never remotely close to his political narrative, but it was a useful diversion from economic woes. Roy McLaren was one of Campbell’s most trusted ministers and along with Chretien, co-leader of the party’s right. Since he disclaimed any leadership ambitions for himself, McLaren was usually one who took what he called a bird’s eye view, smoothly reassuring his colleagues that they should take a long view. While McLaren and Gilles Lamontagne urged Campbell and Chretien to minimize Defence’s share of the budget axe if possible, they were overruled and told that Defence would shoulder its fair share. Campbell had not changed his mind on the broad defence consensus, but he felt the international situation allowed for “proportionate” defence cuts. Sean O’Sullivan, the most hawkish Tory leader since George Drew, subscribed to the doctrine of what would later be called “fence-ringing” on both defence and healthcare.

Prime Minister Alex Campbell in an interview with Barbara Frum, Mar. 20, 1990.

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ROY: No consensus emerged from the First Ministers Conference on taxation, with the Gang urging Campbell to consider a GST while the Liberal premiers floated a HST, even as all rejected a VAT due to fear of a severe political backlash. Had they managed to agree amongst themselves, the premiers might have heavily diluted such a backlash. Instead the stalemate endured despite Campbell’s economic team harboring some private doubts about their leader’s stance. Chretien thought about debating between a VAT and GST as part of an overall tax reform, as did O’Toole and the ministers brought Jim Peterson into the mix as well. That was a mistake, because a Peterson aide’s loose lips meant it reached the PMO. Needless to say, the prime minister was furious and harshly reprimanded them in language not appropriate for family television. Ministerial dialogue was always encouraged but not when it was a transparent attempt to change policy without even so much as giving him a heads-up. If they wanted to discuss tax policy there were ample committee opportunities to do so. There was more than ideology or a well-concealed – from the public – authoritarian streak at work here, namely Campbell’s desire to avoid overtly angering progressives to whom he was offering little new.
 
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