BOIVIN: Election Day was a long day, and for the previous few days I had begun moving files out of my ministerial offices, knowing we would lose. I was at my riding office that night, thanking my volunteers for their hard work. Our [Quebec] caucus had an easy night, as we were in minimal danger. Once polls closed around the country, Canadians’ verdict was swift and decisive. The Grits swept Atlantic Canada, and were giving 2 of our MPs a very close fight despite Pierre’s efforts on our behalf. Ontario was a Liberal landslide, with dozens of seats toppling like dominoes. Sean cruised to victory in his Hamilton riding, while Flora was trailing for most of the night until late polls came in and she won by less than 150 votes. She would face a judicial recount. Many of her colleagues were not so lucky. Within an hour the CBC projected a Liberal majority government, and around 10 La Salle appeared at his riding headquarters in Joliette to concede. After thanking his colleagues and congratulating Campbell, Roch announced his resignation as leader. While he had already decided to resign as MP for Joliette, doing so on election night would leave a foul taste in constituents’ mouths. I did not believe Erik would face any opposition in being appointed interim leader, a thankless yet necessary job.
PAULSON: After a decade in opposition, the Liberals were eager to prove they could be trusted with government again, much like the Tories in 1972. On foreign affairs, there was considerable agreement if not quite the 1950s bipartisan consensus which Tories missed. Campbell would maintain more distance from the US while preserving the friendly relationship resurrected by Stanfield, while Commonwealth relations would remain unchanged. Defence spending would remain untouched, as Campbell had promised when he became leader. That commitment was part of Canada’s international obligations as a NATO member, and without fulfilling those commitments Canada could not argue for arms reduction. The commitment to eventual arms reduction was a sop to left-wing Liberals like Lloyd Axworthy, one that few people believed would be fulfilled. Campbell’s own view was succinctly expressed by incoming Foreign Minister Roy McLaren, who called it “pacifist horseshit.” After all, had not the Liberal Party been the party of Ogdensburg, NATO, NORAD and the Canadian Forces’ peacetime peak 25 years earlier? The Reagan administration was well-informed by their ambassador Karl Tipson, who reported that Campbell “is a moderately progressive Atlanticist like Pearson, strongly for NATO and likely to continue Conservative defence policy.” Britain’s High Commissioner reported in similar terms to the Foreign Office.
STEVENS: La Salle had resigned as Tory leader on election night, and even before the transition was complete the PC executive appointed Erik Nielsen as interim leader. No one wanted an immediate convention, partially because no one was particularly eager for the job. It would take some time for a field to form. The executive voted for a leadership convention in June 1983, a compromise between those who wanted a 6 month convention or a year-long rebuilding process. Nielsen had said he would not serve as interim leader for more than a year, partially because he wanted “not a word” about making it permanent, partially because he was leaning towards retirement. Flora MacDonald, stung by her razor-thin victory, would not run for leader. Mike McDonald decided to run for leader, as did Mike Wilson, John Crosbie. There was no Blue candidate, though Crosbie was seen as the friendliest to Blue interests. Some Blues wanted Marie Boivin to run, but she publicly and privately vowed never to run for leader. She was an economist at heart, feeling she was ill-suited to be leader and instead would serve the leadership as a trusted advisor. For their part, provincial leaders were far less interested than they had been a year earlier, much less in 1967 when 2 of them ran themselves.
Campbell Cabinet - 23rd Canadian Ministry
Deputy Prime Minister: Jean Chrétien
Finance: Jean Chrétien
Justice: Mark MacGuigan
Foreign Affairs: Roy McLaren
Defence: Gilles Lamontagne
Agriculture: Eugene Whelan
Fisheries: Roméo LeBlanc
Indian Affairs: Herb Grey
Labour: Charles Caccia
Industry: Don Johnston
Employment: Adam O'Toole
Environment: Paul Martin Jr.
Energy: Judy Erola
Health: Ed Lumley
Transport: Lloyd Axworthy
Treasury Board: Jim Peterson
International Trade: Ben Danforth
Revenue: David Dingwall
Public Works: Charles Dupont
Heritage: Serge Joyal
Veterans Affairs: Harold Herbert
BILL DAVIS: Towards the end of November I decided to not only reconfirm that I would not be a federal leadership candidate, but that I would never be a candidate for federal office. This was something I decided long before 1982, and certainly nothing that happened in the intervening years encouraged me to revisit that decision. My only desire was for an Ontarian leader. We had 2 Maritime prime ministers and a Quebecer. It was our time, and I decided to support Michael Wilson for leader. If the party was to regain its strength in this province, we needed to have one of our own as leader. Mike was well-respected by everyone for his work on the Finance Committee and had supporters from all party factions. I strongly encouraged my provincial colleagues to support Mike, and while none committed to support him outright, they all agreed he had fine leadership qualities. They would follow what I had done the previous year. Peter [Lougheed] briefly considered the federal leadership but decided he wanted to continue his work in Alberta. Moreover he lacked the requisite French and believed we would be in opposition for some time, which had no appeal to him. We were focused on economic recovery and insofar as federal issues were concerned, cooperating with the new government.
SAUVÉ: La Salle’s loss was another example of the lesson we learnt from Cardinal, Lesage and Diefenbaker: philosophical debates must be settled in opposition by the rank and file. Trying to resolve them in government leads to either open conflict, as happened to Lesage or a stalemate where both sides are bound by conflicting impulses to avoid decisive action. Tory philosophical differences could not be settled in a single term any more than ours could have. Popular history has our internal deliberations starting in 1976-7, but academic historians and those of us who participated know it was different. The choice of Cardinal as leader was for strategic and tactical reasons more than ideological ones. Bertrand would have wrecked the party by trying to impose a minority viewpoint on a vast majority. Regardless, I told whoever asked to vote for whoever they thought best. Since I was not premier, I did not attend Bill Davis’ Muskoka conference, but we did have a long conversation on this subject shortly after Remembrance Day. My focus was on preparing for the election which could come any time that spring.
PAULSON: After a decade in opposition, the Liberals were eager to prove they could be trusted with government again, much like the Tories in 1972. On foreign affairs, there was considerable agreement if not quite the 1950s bipartisan consensus which Tories missed. Campbell would maintain more distance from the US while preserving the friendly relationship resurrected by Stanfield, while Commonwealth relations would remain unchanged. Defence spending would remain untouched, as Campbell had promised when he became leader. That commitment was part of Canada’s international obligations as a NATO member, and without fulfilling those commitments Canada could not argue for arms reduction. The commitment to eventual arms reduction was a sop to left-wing Liberals like Lloyd Axworthy, one that few people believed would be fulfilled. Campbell’s own view was succinctly expressed by incoming Foreign Minister Roy McLaren, who called it “pacifist horseshit.” After all, had not the Liberal Party been the party of Ogdensburg, NATO, NORAD and the Canadian Forces’ peacetime peak 25 years earlier? The Reagan administration was well-informed by their ambassador Karl Tipson, who reported that Campbell “is a moderately progressive Atlanticist like Pearson, strongly for NATO and likely to continue Conservative defence policy.” Britain’s High Commissioner reported in similar terms to the Foreign Office.
STEVENS: La Salle had resigned as Tory leader on election night, and even before the transition was complete the PC executive appointed Erik Nielsen as interim leader. No one wanted an immediate convention, partially because no one was particularly eager for the job. It would take some time for a field to form. The executive voted for a leadership convention in June 1983, a compromise between those who wanted a 6 month convention or a year-long rebuilding process. Nielsen had said he would not serve as interim leader for more than a year, partially because he wanted “not a word” about making it permanent, partially because he was leaning towards retirement. Flora MacDonald, stung by her razor-thin victory, would not run for leader. Mike McDonald decided to run for leader, as did Mike Wilson, John Crosbie. There was no Blue candidate, though Crosbie was seen as the friendliest to Blue interests. Some Blues wanted Marie Boivin to run, but she publicly and privately vowed never to run for leader. She was an economist at heart, feeling she was ill-suited to be leader and instead would serve the leadership as a trusted advisor. For their part, provincial leaders were far less interested than they had been a year earlier, much less in 1967 when 2 of them ran themselves.
Campbell Cabinet - 23rd Canadian Ministry
Deputy Prime Minister: Jean Chrétien
Finance: Jean Chrétien
Justice: Mark MacGuigan
Foreign Affairs: Roy McLaren
Defence: Gilles Lamontagne
Agriculture: Eugene Whelan
Fisheries: Roméo LeBlanc
Indian Affairs: Herb Grey
Labour: Charles Caccia
Industry: Don Johnston
Employment: Adam O'Toole
Environment: Paul Martin Jr.
Energy: Judy Erola
Health: Ed Lumley
Transport: Lloyd Axworthy
Treasury Board: Jim Peterson
International Trade: Ben Danforth
Revenue: David Dingwall
Public Works: Charles Dupont
Heritage: Serge Joyal
Veterans Affairs: Harold Herbert
BILL DAVIS: Towards the end of November I decided to not only reconfirm that I would not be a federal leadership candidate, but that I would never be a candidate for federal office. This was something I decided long before 1982, and certainly nothing that happened in the intervening years encouraged me to revisit that decision. My only desire was for an Ontarian leader. We had 2 Maritime prime ministers and a Quebecer. It was our time, and I decided to support Michael Wilson for leader. If the party was to regain its strength in this province, we needed to have one of our own as leader. Mike was well-respected by everyone for his work on the Finance Committee and had supporters from all party factions. I strongly encouraged my provincial colleagues to support Mike, and while none committed to support him outright, they all agreed he had fine leadership qualities. They would follow what I had done the previous year. Peter [Lougheed] briefly considered the federal leadership but decided he wanted to continue his work in Alberta. Moreover he lacked the requisite French and believed we would be in opposition for some time, which had no appeal to him. We were focused on economic recovery and insofar as federal issues were concerned, cooperating with the new government.
SAUVÉ: La Salle’s loss was another example of the lesson we learnt from Cardinal, Lesage and Diefenbaker: philosophical debates must be settled in opposition by the rank and file. Trying to resolve them in government leads to either open conflict, as happened to Lesage or a stalemate where both sides are bound by conflicting impulses to avoid decisive action. Tory philosophical differences could not be settled in a single term any more than ours could have. Popular history has our internal deliberations starting in 1976-7, but academic historians and those of us who participated know it was different. The choice of Cardinal as leader was for strategic and tactical reasons more than ideological ones. Bertrand would have wrecked the party by trying to impose a minority viewpoint on a vast majority. Regardless, I told whoever asked to vote for whoever they thought best. Since I was not premier, I did not attend Bill Davis’ Muskoka conference, but we did have a long conversation on this subject shortly after Remembrance Day. My focus was on preparing for the election which could come any time that spring.
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