Égalité ou indépendance: a Canadian TL

BOIVIN: Election Day was a long day, and for the previous few days I had begun moving files out of my ministerial offices, knowing we would lose. I was at my riding office that night, thanking my volunteers for their hard work. Our [Quebec] caucus had an easy night, as we were in minimal danger. Once polls closed around the country, Canadians’ verdict was swift and decisive. The Grits swept Atlantic Canada, and were giving 2 of our MPs a very close fight despite Pierre’s efforts on our behalf. Ontario was a Liberal landslide, with dozens of seats toppling like dominoes. Sean cruised to victory in his Hamilton riding, while Flora was trailing for most of the night until late polls came in and she won by less than 150 votes. She would face a judicial recount. Many of her colleagues were not so lucky. Within an hour the CBC projected a Liberal majority government, and around 10 La Salle appeared at his riding headquarters in Joliette to concede. After thanking his colleagues and congratulating Campbell, Roch announced his resignation as leader. While he had already decided to resign as MP for Joliette, doing so on election night would leave a foul taste in constituents’ mouths. I did not believe Erik would face any opposition in being appointed interim leader, a thankless yet necessary job.

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PAULSON: After a decade in opposition, the Liberals were eager to prove they could be trusted with government again, much like the Tories in 1972. On foreign affairs, there was considerable agreement if not quite the 1950s bipartisan consensus which Tories missed. Campbell would maintain more distance from the US while preserving the friendly relationship resurrected by Stanfield, while Commonwealth relations would remain unchanged. Defence spending would remain untouched, as Campbell had promised when he became leader. That commitment was part of Canada’s international obligations as a NATO member, and without fulfilling those commitments Canada could not argue for arms reduction. The commitment to eventual arms reduction was a sop to left-wing Liberals like Lloyd Axworthy, one that few people believed would be fulfilled. Campbell’s own view was succinctly expressed by incoming Foreign Minister Roy McLaren, who called it “pacifist horseshit.” After all, had not the Liberal Party been the party of Ogdensburg, NATO, NORAD and the Canadian Forces’ peacetime peak 25 years earlier? The Reagan administration was well-informed by their ambassador Karl Tipson, who reported that Campbell “is a moderately progressive Atlanticist like Pearson, strongly for NATO and likely to continue Conservative defence policy.” Britain’s High Commissioner reported in similar terms to the Foreign Office.

STEVENS: La Salle had resigned as Tory leader on election night, and even before the transition was complete the PC executive appointed Erik Nielsen as interim leader. No one wanted an immediate convention, partially because no one was particularly eager for the job. It would take some time for a field to form. The executive voted for a leadership convention in June 1983, a compromise between those who wanted a 6 month convention or a year-long rebuilding process. Nielsen had said he would not serve as interim leader for more than a year, partially because he wanted “not a word” about making it permanent, partially because he was leaning towards retirement. Flora MacDonald, stung by her razor-thin victory, would not run for leader. Mike McDonald decided to run for leader, as did Mike Wilson, John Crosbie. There was no Blue candidate, though Crosbie was seen as the friendliest to Blue interests. Some Blues wanted Marie Boivin to run, but she publicly and privately vowed never to run for leader. She was an economist at heart, feeling she was ill-suited to be leader and instead would serve the leadership as a trusted advisor. For their part, provincial leaders were far less interested than they had been a year earlier, much less in 1967 when 2 of them ran themselves.

Campbell Cabinet - 23rd Canadian Ministry

Deputy Prime Minister: Jean Chrétien
Finance: Jean Chrétien
Justice: Mark MacGuigan
Foreign Affairs: Roy McLaren
Defence: Gilles Lamontagne
Agriculture: Eugene Whelan
Fisheries: Roméo LeBlanc
Indian Affairs: Herb Grey
Labour: Charles Caccia
Industry: Don Johnston
Employment: Adam O'Toole
Environment: Paul Martin Jr.
Energy: Judy Erola
Health: Ed Lumley
Transport: Lloyd Axworthy
Treasury Board: Jim Peterson
International Trade: Ben Danforth
Revenue: David Dingwall
Public Works: Charles Dupont
Heritage: Serge Joyal
Veterans Affairs: Harold Herbert




BILL DAVIS: Towards the end of November I decided to not only reconfirm that I would not be a federal leadership candidate, but that I would never be a candidate for federal office. This was something I decided long before 1982, and certainly nothing that happened in the intervening years encouraged me to revisit that decision. My only desire was for an Ontarian leader. We had 2 Maritime prime ministers and a Quebecer. It was our time, and I decided to support Michael Wilson for leader. If the party was to regain its strength in this province, we needed to have one of our own as leader. Mike was well-respected by everyone for his work on the Finance Committee and had supporters from all party factions. I strongly encouraged my provincial colleagues to support Mike, and while none committed to support him outright, they all agreed he had fine leadership qualities. They would follow what I had done the previous year. Peter [Lougheed] briefly considered the federal leadership but decided he wanted to continue his work in Alberta. Moreover he lacked the requisite French and believed we would be in opposition for some time, which had no appeal to him. We were focused on economic recovery and insofar as federal issues were concerned, cooperating with the new government.

SAUVÉ: La Salle’s loss was another example of the lesson we learnt from Cardinal, Lesage and Diefenbaker: philosophical debates must be settled in opposition by the rank and file. Trying to resolve them in government leads to either open conflict, as happened to Lesage or a stalemate where both sides are bound by conflicting impulses to avoid decisive action. Tory philosophical differences could not be settled in a single term any more than ours could have. Popular history has our internal deliberations starting in 1976-7, but academic historians and those of us who participated know it was different. The choice of Cardinal as leader was for strategic and tactical reasons more than ideological ones. Bertrand would have wrecked the party by trying to impose a minority viewpoint on a vast majority. Regardless, I told whoever asked to vote for whoever they thought best. Since I was not premier, I did not attend Bill Davis’ Muskoka conference, but we did have a long conversation on this subject shortly after Remembrance Day. My focus was on preparing for the election which could come any time that spring.
 
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GAGNON: Garneau had no particular plans for the winter session other than to wait and see. As usual, the Assembly would not convene until mid-January. He still held out hope for an economic recovery and refocus on the sharp contrast between the two parties. Not since another Sauvé led the Union Nationale had the two parties been so far apart politically, and some progressives argued since Duplessis. For his part, Sauvé was confident and probably the most relaxed he had been since becoming leader. Garneau was preparing an essentially status quo budget, rejecting his progressive advisors recommendation to include Medicare expansion and thereby corner Sauvé between his private convictions and public opinion. Both leaders, for different reasons, welcomed a new government in Ottawa led by a prime minister they both knew, liked and trusted. Garneau welcomed an ally in Ottawa, while Sauvé wanted an opportunity for what he called “friendly coexistence” after the wars between his party and successive Liberal government. Bill Davis was quietly relieved at Campbell’s victory, believing that Ontario would be much better served with a prime minister who was solicitous of the province’s needs. The Liberals had free reign while a rudderless opposition left them to their own devices throughout that session. Campbell planned a first ministers’ conference for June to discuss economic matters, having promised an annual conference in his election platform.

TIMMINS: The Tory leadership contest was a rather comatose affair compared to the previous years, much less 1967’s excitement. A major reason was the knowledge that the victor was likely to remain in Stornoway, another being that there were no major philosophical distinctions between the candidates. Wilson, Crosbie and Michael MacDonald were all Red Tories with varying feelings towards their Blue colleagues. Crosbie was the most Blue-friendly candidate, MacDonald ambivalent, and Wilson in the middle. There were no Red candidates openly hostile to Blue ideology, as MacDonald had been the previous year. There was no Blue candidate. Don Mazankowski and Paul Yewchuk, the two leading Albertan candidates, decided not to run. Jack Horner was too old and extremely divisive within the party. Despite Horner’s seniority, Mazankowski had been Alberta’s regional minister under La Salle. Peter Lougheed was annoyed that neither Mazankowski nor Yewchuk chose to run, but true to form he did not pressure them. Eventually BC’s Tom Siddon chose to run, who was closer to Wilson on intra-factional issues due to his strong environmentalism. Meanwhile Heritage Minister Serge Joyal and Industry Minister Jim Peterson announced the nationwide introduction of pay television, something which had been planned under La Salle but delayed. Included in that package was pay-per-view, which was making its national debut in Canada.


Alberta Premier Peter Lougheed in February 1983.

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GARNEAU: Our budget would be responsible yet progressive. We reduced income tax on the lowest bracket to its lowest level in many years, with an eye towards abolishing it if we were re-elected. While I was under no illusion about our political position, I believed that an improving economy would give us a fighting shot at a competitive race. Unemployment had inched downward in January and I hoped that the trend would continue through the winter. Traditionally winter has been the toughest political season, and 1983 was no exception to that rule. We were also negotiating a deal with the municipalities for property tax relief at that time, something which I knew Pierre was interested in as well. Given the fiscal situation, I felt it would be irresponsible to create a new social program which would not be properly funded. That is why I chose not to fully expand Medicare. I was at Lesage’s side when we instituted hospital insurance in ’61 and had never wavered on my commitment since then. I decided that we would have a late summer election, using almost every day of our mandate, and ignored those who reminded me that all fifth year elections were won by the opposition party. They did not have better prospects just around the corner.

SAUVÉ: February brought little clarity to the federal race, and at any rate I paid the Tory leadership contest almost no attention. We had our own budget debate and upcoming election to prepare for. If Raymond delayed it to the very end then in my opinion he was just being a sore loser. We did not do that in 1960, nor did any conservative government since 1897. Even in the Depression Taschereau held an election on the four year schedule. Economic performance in itself is not necessarily the deciding factor. A case in point would be 1960, where we had a fantastic economy and fundamentals but blew what should have been an easy election because of infighting over a weak leader. Similarly, part of the reason Bob won in ’78 was that voters trusted his economic performance and believed Liberal policies would be a rerun of the Trudeau era. That was despite a weakening economy on his watch. So I was as confident as ever about a big victory whenever Raymond decided to call an election, and told my team to run like we were behind. We did not want a comfortable majority like our previous government or even a Lesage ’62 landslide. I wanted to render the Liberal Party comatose.

PAULSON: Amid the budget debate, Campbell flew to Washington and London for his first foreign travel as Prime Minister. In Washington, he found that he and Reagan connected well personally even if they had very different politics. They would be, in one senior State official’s words, “friendly but never friends.” With Thatcher the story was somewhat different: despite their very different politics, they instantly connected. She had liked Stanfield despite being in British terms, a “wet”, if a principled and capable one. La Salle she found an insufferable and rather parochial bore despite their philosophical similarities. Apart from an introductory meeting, preparation for the upcoming Commonwealth Conference was on their agenda, something which Campbell had inherited from his predecessor. Like Stanfield and La Salle, Campbell shared the majority position on South African sanctions and saw it as a moral issue; though like them he was prepared to compromise for the Commonwealth’s sake. Also like Stanfield, while unschooled in foreign affairs, the new prime minister instinctively liked it and took a deep interest.
 
TIMMINS: The Tory leadership contest had turned into a battle between Wilson and Siddon by spring, leaving MacDonald well behind. There was rampant speculation that MacDonald would drop out, and on April 8 he announced he was quitting the race and endorsing Siddon. Unlike the previous year, there were no notable factional moves on either side. Siddon and Wilson almost entirely agreed on issues and had similar styles. Wilson was a Bay Streeter and Siddon a British Columbian, and beyond that little divided them. Blue Tories, as they were now almost officially called, had no clear favourite in this race. The convention would be a complete tossup, and there was little media coverage compared to the previous year, when at least a prime minister was being chosen. Campbell had not formally declared a “100 Days of Decision” like Pearson in 1963 but his pace was similar, with economic and environmental legislation being rammed through a complacent Senate. La Salle had rarely spoken with national media, only giving us rare interviews and preferring to address local media who he felt discussed issues rather than narratives. Campbell liked journalists and saw them as useful to his political ends, and like both Bill Davis and Pierre Sauvé was not shy about offering jobs.

RON MYERS, COMMUNICATIONS PROFESSOR, MCGILL UNIVERSITY: In the early 1980s political advertising in Quebec started to transition towards what we now call microtargeting and away from generalist issue ads you had seen a decade earlier. First person testimonials from voters, real or fictional, in both positive and negative ads were the standard for both parties. With virtually unlimited party budgets, there was plenty of leeway for experimentation. Garneau and Sauvé, corporate lawyers both, had taken their interest in market research from their previous jobs and worked closely with contracted firms to mold their image. These long-term contracts were a first in provincial, if not federal politics. Garneau’s guru was Luc Demers, Sauvé’s Serge Boyer. Both executives were very close to their respective principals personally and were more influential than all but the most senior staffers. They worked closely with party headquarters to avoid conflict, as had occurred sometimes in the 1970s when the private-sector admen – almost all men in those days – clashed with their party counterparts. Often Sauvé would muse to Boyer about how much had changed in their lifetimes. When both were teenagers, the Union Nationale’s political operations had been managed by J.D. Begin organizationally, Gérald Martineau financially, and the political Cabinet politically. Combined that was less than 10 people.

GAGNON: Garneau’s campaign strategy was essentially to run on his record, since his hoped-for economic improvement had not materialized. Sauvé, as he said numerous times in private, wanted to render the Liberal Party comatose. He had decided to promise a cultural accord with the federal government to enable UNESCO representation for Quebec, expand delegations abroad, and increase mandatory French-language instruction in the English school system. There would also be an expansion of immersion in both languages. The French Language Charter he had co-authored a decade earlier would be left alone, seeing no need for further restrictions. In contrast to an earlier generation of Liberals who promoted economic nationalism, Sauvé promised cultural nationalism. He saw it as perfectly compatible with his relationship to the Anglophone and Allophone communities whose interests he represented as a minister. One of his favourite words is “normalization”, in this context meaning a generation of Quebecers who came of age under the Language Charter and did not know the previous linguistic regime. Cultural mixing and political unanimity would produce linguistic peace, relegating language debates to secondary status. Moreover, Allophone immigration produced political benefits for his party, one of his calculations as immigration minister a decade earlier. For their part the Liberals promised to continue the linguistic status quo, ignoring pressure from their Anglophone members for relief on certain signage provisions.

AMANDA KNIGHT, HISTORIAN, AUTHOR “ALEX CAMPBELL: TRUE GRIT:” Campbell inherited the rationalized Cabinet system set up by Stanfield and Trudeau, modernizing it as he saw fit. With a much larger government than in PEI, he ran a very tight operation. Lengthy policy discussions were forbidden in full Cabinet, which met only once a month. Those would be taken up in committee, and anyone who defied this edict would be cut off before their first sentence was finished, usually by Chrétien. Chrétien functioned as a COO, much like Erik Nielsen had done for Stanfield and La Salle, while Campbell focused on the big picture. He had his policy interests and would pursue them with relevant ministers. Operations was chaired by Chrétien as deputy prime minister, and he was also vice-chair of Priorities and Planning. Parliamentary leaders did not attend Cabinet in Campbell’s government but met privately with Chrétien and Campbell on a regular basis. Campbell, like Stanfield, was very attentive to his caucus and generous with time for backbenchers. Efficiency was prized and dissensions from pet policy projects unwelcome, similar to both Quebec party leaders. Despite a couple of degrees separating them ideologically, in managerial style Campbell and Chrétien were essentially identical. Long-windedness, as Paul Martin repeatedly discovered early on, was abruptly shut down by the prime minister.

Deputy Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, c. 1983.

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PAULSON: Michael Wilson comfortably defeated Tom Siddon for the leadership, reflecting an Ontarian preference for one of their own and a divided Quebec. Nor had the Prairies been as loyal to Siddon as he had hoped. Apart from the requisite congratulations to the new winner, provincial leaders essentially ignored the Tory leadership contest. They would communicate with Wilson as necessary and no more, reflecting their trust in Campbell to protect the country from the Liberal left. For the first time since Diefenbaker, a federal Tory leader was almost completely detached from their provincial counterparts. A Unionist victory would leave Campbell as the sole non-Tory first minister, with his old colleague Bennett Campbell having lost to James Lee in late 1982. Wilson did not really mind provincial detachment, since he long felt that the federal party was too reliant on its provincial allies for assistance. Even those with longer-term intraparty agendas “downed tools”, as one Flora MacDonald aide told me, and settled in for a spell in opposition.

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Ming777

Monthly Donor
Looking at the initial appointments for Cabinet, I'm thinking DND may focus a bit more on the RCAF, due to their Defence Minister's background.
 
NEWMAN: After presiding over Dominion Day celebrations, the Campbells went up to Harrington Lake for the summer and MPs dispersed to their ridings. The Liberal government’s first months in power had been impressive if not spectacular like Diefenbaker in 1957. Campbell had passed a raft of environmental and economic legislation, with the Tories barely bothering to oppose him in either the House or Senate. Liberals respected Wilson on policy but did not think much of his political ability, a belief quietly shared by the Tory premiers. Campbell’s personal dominance in Charlottetown continued in Ottawa, with Wilson and Broadbent relegated to the sidelines in English Canadian news coverage. In Quebec coverage was somewhat easier for Wilson for two reasons: his French was better than the prime minister’s, and neither man had a notable personal connection to the province. Quebec federal Liberalism was Chretien’s personal preserve, even as he wrote off Raymond Garneau. Campbell and Chrétien liked both leaders personally, but anticipated a battle over UNESCO with Sauvé. Chrétien believed a Quebec seat at UNESCO unacceptable and persuaded Campbell to agree with him, which was not too difficult. In most Quebec political matters Campbell deferred to Chrétien’s judgment, and the PM instinctively believed that Canada should not be perceived as having multiple UN voices.

Prime Minister Alex Campbell on a fishing trip off Summerside, PEI, August 1983.

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CAMPBELL: Summer on Harrington Lake is the closest I’ve ever come outside my home province to bliss. We enjoyed ourselves so thoroughly that we decided to start weekend trips in May rather than waiting for adjournment roughly a month later. Considering the quantity of legislation planned, we could not adjourn early even if many members wanted to. I felt our vacation days were quite sufficient and made my wish known to caucus. We would adjourn when business was finished, in mid-June, and not one day before. In late July, I flew to Canberra for a working visit with Bob Hawke, who had been elected only a few months earlier. We connected personally and agreed on a common strategy for the Commonwealth Conference due in November. Most importantly, we agreed to begin free trade negotiations which had never been initiated due to Fraser’s refusal of FIPA. I wanted to continue the previous government’s trade agenda, and I also had an agreement with New Zealand in the back of my mind, pending a change in government there. We anticipated a change of government in Quebec, even if publicly I said that responding to Sauvé on UNESCO would depend on the election result. I already determined that Canada should speak with a single UN voice, and nothing would change my view on that.

GAGNON: The campaign was an anticlimax after the previous year’s events. Garneau waited until the Assembly had almost expired before calling a Sept. 12 election. There would be 2 debates as usual, and this time both leaders readily agreed to an English segment for the first time since 1962. Unlike 1978 there was not a semblance of competitiveness: the Union Nationale held a 15-20% lead throughout the campaign. At those levels even safe Liberal seats would flip and Sauvé would have a Duplessis-sized mandate. Even Garneau’s own seat of Jean-Talon in suburban Quebec was at risk, and he could not spare much time in his own riding. As for the debates, both leaders exchanged accusations of failure and extremism respectively, and I doubt anyone’s mind was changed. Within 2 weeks I was already hearing from Liberal sources about staffers looking for work after the election. Garneau did not betray a hint of anxiety, rather he felt liberated about having made the hard choices in government. He told me that he was entirely at peace with whatever Quebecers decided, and if he lost he would retire from politics. Sauvé did not discuss transition planning with his staff since he did not want to invite accusations of hubris, even if the subject was on their minds.

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ROY: Election Night was extremely early for everyone. Within 20 minutes of polls closing the networks projected a Union Nationale majority, the largest for either party since 1956. Previously safe Liberal seats even in 1970 and 1974 were lost, including Raymond Garneau himself in Jean-Talon. Garneau conceded about an hour after polls closed and announced his immediate resignation as Liberal leader. He was retiring from politics and had no regrets about his premiership. Pierre Sauvé was all smiles when he appeared onstage in his riding headquarters in St. Eustache with his family, thanking Quebecers for the mandate he had received and wishing Garneau well in future endeavours. Later studies would show His party had won 63% of Francophone voters and 27% of Anglophones. The new government would be sworn in 2 weeks hence, and Sauvé’s Cabinet-making would be simply a matter of transferring shadow ministers to their relevant departments. Mario Beaulieu would be deputy premier and finance minister, Pierre-Marc Johnson justice minister, Guy Ingres – the first non-white Cabinet minister – at Education, and Louise Ravary at Health, among others. He would recall the National Assembly in late October for an abbreviated session primarily for a fall economic update, in advance of a full budget in February. Sauvé wanted to reduce sitting times to the minimal required for legislation, in consultation with his parliamentary leaders.

BEAULIEU: The pace was set at our first Cabinet meeting: only our agenda would be covered, and policy discussions would go to committee. Full Cabinet would meet monthly, and the Assembly would be in session for an abbreviated fall session only. Winter session would last January to April. The government that governs best is that which governs least, in his view, and a lot of our ideas could be done either in budget bills or through executive action. There was also a political element in this: we wanted a durable government, and with shorter sittings, Liberals would be deprived of media oxygen. Pierre’s governing methods were the same in government as in opposition: inner Cabinet had full control over political matters, with backbench outreach as appropriate. Backbenchers would make patronage recommendations in their ridings, and were encouraged to spend as much time in their ridings as possible. This return to local patronage was something Pierre had wanted for over a decade, seeing it as essential to entrenching our government. Finally, he ended the ban on smoking in the Cabinet room by lighting up himself, as Saint-Laurent had done nearly 40 years earlier.

Pierre Sauvé Government
Deputy Premier: Mario Beaulieu
Finance: Mario Beaulieu
Justice: Pierre-Marc Johnson
Agriculture: Clément Vincent
Education: Guy Ingres
Cultural Affairs: Jean-Paul Beaudry
Immigration: Albert Rioux
Health : Louise Ravary
Environment : Pauline Thibault
Natural Resources : Paul-Émile Allard
Transport : Céline Grenier
Municipal Affairs : Robert Lussier
Intergovernmental Affairs : Marcel Masse
Industry : Paul Shooner


Government House Leader: Armand Russell
Chief Whip: Rémi Paul
 
SAUVÉ: My first priority was to produce a fall economic update in order to reassure the business community, which had been rather alarmed at the unstable situation and wanted relief. They also wanted protection from union militancy, while others were more hesitant about radical changes. I expected younger businesspeople to be more supportive of our measures, since those who had worked with us in the 1950s were either retired or nearly retired. My conversations with the Chamber of Commerce left me optimistic that enough businesses would use the opportunity to put a significant damper on the Rand formula. If we could get a critical mass to drop it, then that would be a great start. We have always had a significant number of rank-and-file trade unionists supporting us, and those I spoke to were happy with the compromise I had struck. On the broader economic front, I wanted a surplus in our first term and starting our first privatization – SIDBEC. The National Assembly would be convened in late October for the update, and our first full session would start in late January. We had to move quickly and overwhelmingly to crush opposition before it had a chance to metastasize. Always on offense, as I told Cabinet at our first meeting.


CAMPBELL: In late October 1983 I decided not to restore the capital punishment moratorium ended in 1981 by La Salle, because the judicial system could not function properly if we had executions under Tory governments and moratoria under Liberal ones. There would be another free vote in the New Year, and I would not encourage anyone to vote either way. This is an intensely personal decision, second only to abortion among our MPs. I personally oppose capital punishment but there were a number of Ontario and Quebec MPs who favoured it. When you looked at a Commons map, I believed there would be a small margin to preserve capital punishment. Nonetheless, you could never take anything for granted given attendance and other factors. We were going to have a proper debate and vote: you cannot treat moral issues as partisan footballs. Quebec’s change in government meant little, since the Liberals had also allowed executions while La Salle was prime minister. Nonetheless, among Eastern first ministers, Sauvé was the only outspoken supporter of capital punishment. Abortion, despite our slightly differing views, remained consensual: the hospital committee system suited both sides. Economic issues have always been my preferred policy area, whether in Charlottetown or Ottawa. In the last week of October I asked to commission an internal report on Medicare.

TIMMINS: The economic update in November was notable primary for the promise of a first-term surplus, and a slight economic improvement which had registered in the second quarter. Adjournment came only after a few days, a harbinger of things to come. Sauvé, though an able parliamentarian, essentially believed the Assembly should sit to approve legislation barring a significant upheaval in public opinion requiring emergency debate. That meant fall sessions lasting less than 8 weeks. It was part of his political strategy to “neuter” the Liberal opposition. Shorter sittings meant little exposure for his opponents, especially outside Montreal, where most media and civil society were pro-Unionist. One of his first decisions as leader had been to close Montreal-Matin and replace it with paid digital media. He had already heard from several business leaders who planned to follows his lead on the Rand formula, primarily American-based companies. If there was a strike like the previous years, Sauvé would happily use even stronger mechanisms than Garneau. He would not legislate any changes for police or firefighters, who among other things, were politically his strongest union supporters alongside resource workers. The Liberal plan to introduce affirmative action in the public sector was immediately discarded, which pleased both the police and firefighters’ unions.

O’SULLIVAN: I stayed with Pierre in late November mostly for a social visit, though we did get around to discussing the upcoming death penalty vote. There would be enough votes for retention after a quick head count among my Ontarian colleagues, while Jack Horner checked on potentially wavering Western MPs. We did not do persuasion, just identification. He and I also discussed his upcoming meeting with Bill [Davis], their first meeting in person since 1977. They had a good relationship, best characterized as friendly without being friends. Their views and personalities were too far apart for that. After Toronto, he planned to meet Hatfield to discuss a cultural entente which had stalled under Liberal government. Pierre took an interest in the Francophone diaspora and wanted to lobby his colleagues on that front, particularly Manitoba and Ontario. While we doubted Lyon was persuadable, we both believed Davis might eventually come around. He asked whether Davis would run again, and I said Bill had not decided about his political future. He planned to make that decision within a year. For his part, Pierre has always inclined towards longevity. When I asked which record he wanted, he only winked at me, and I could only laugh uproariously.


STEVENS: By the end of 1983, Campbell could look ahead to a political year with unlimited visibility. His approval ratings were in the 60s and almost every initiative he took got positive media coverage. With an economic recovery in full swing, the Liberals went to their Christmas party in a joyously optimistic mood. Not since the heady days of 1968 had such an atmosphere permeated the Liberal caucus room, and Campbell was determined to make it last. Controversial items such as Medicare and capital punishment were to be quickly disposed of and the focus returned to popular spending items. A childcare program which did not involve daycare per se was being studied by a Cabinet working group that would report by March. For once intraparty tension on the Tory side was hibernating rather than lurking or active, as both sides bided their time. Wilson’s request to meet with Sauvé was refused, and thereafter there was no direct contact between the leaders. For the first time since the early 1950s, detente bloomed between Liberal Ottawa and Unionist Quebec.
 
TIMMINS: The new year brought high hopes for a continued recovery after Finance reviewed the preliminary Q4 data in early January. Campbell and Chretien hoped to bring in a surplus, which would further bolster their credibility as agents of economic recovery. After the budget, they wanted to dispense with the capital punishment vote as quickly as possible to avoid a protracted controversy. Both Campbell and Chrétien are personally opposed to capital punishment, like all Liberal prime ministers since Pearson. Nonetheless, Campbell resisted lobbying efforts by his more passionate allies to apply pressure on his Cabinet. He would not attempt to impose his personal moral beliefs on colleagues. “I have never and will never do that” was his response when I interviewed him early that month. Medicare would be a controversial issue because the Liberal right did not want further restrictions on private insurance, as demanded by left-wing Liberals and even a handful of Red Tories. Campbell himself did not have a strong view either way, and he did not want a protracted confrontation with the provinces. Bennett, Devine, Lyon and Sauvé had both signalled they would strongly oppose any federal attempt to expand Medicare, leading Svend Robinson to label them the “Gang of Four.” Though intended pejoratively, the premiers happily adopted the moniker as their own.

GAGNON: Beaulieu’s first budget would contain a small deficit, a blip before surpluses in the following fiscal year. He cut income and payroll taxes back to the levels they had been at in 1977, while initiating the SIDBEC privatization process. Elimination of the mandatory Rand formula would be in a separate bill later that session rather than in the budget omnibus as had been floated earlier. Pre-existing tolls on Montreal bridges would be maintained for revenue purposes. Changes to royalties were postponed: the regime had not been substantially altered under Garneau, after the 1980 review found no need for adjustments. The Liberal Party did not hold a leadership contest, with Gérard D. Lévesque became acclaimed as leader. Lévesque was a stalwart who had been in the Assembly since 1956 and was universally respected for his ability and character. To a shattered Liberal Party looking towards at least two terms in opposition, he was an ideal leader. He and Sauvé got on well, sometimes meeting privately simply to reminisce about what both called the old days. On January 26th, Paul Gouin died at 85. He had been unwell for a number of years and had not made a public appearance since 1976. Gouin had befriended Sauvé in the early ‘70s, and invited the premier to his funeral days before his passing. With his passing, only Auréa Cloutier, Paul Beaulieu and Maurice Bellemare remained among Duplessis-era Unionists.

SAUVÉ: One of the most important lessons in politics, as in life, is pacing. In our first budget we implemented only a handful of promises, labour reform and SIDBEC privatization being the most important. Many items on my agenda could be accomplished via executive action, once we got past privatization and other economic issues. Even Lesage moved cautiously for his first two years, with the fundamentally transformative items being accomplished in his second term. I intended to do exactly the same thing: first economic recovery and then focus on our biggest items. Voters were looking for relief from a deep recession first and foremost, and we did not want to get ahead of our skis as some people did a decade earlier. Cardinal’s last years were the worst of both worlds: advancing neither his personal priorities nor the electorate’s, and they delivered their verdict on that in ’78. As for federal issues, I was not worried about Campbell expanding Medicaid because I knew Alex did not feel strongly either way. No one fights harder on principle than he does, as I experienced personally during the constitutional negotiations. That is also why I correctly predicted capital punishment would survive, as it did during the February vote.

PAULSON: Capital punishment was retained with 146 MPs in favour and 130 MPs opposed, which was a slightly larger margin than expected by the Liberal and Tory whip teams. Campbell immediately announced that insofar as his government was concerned, the issue was settled for the foreseeable future. Privately, he did not want to distract his government with social issues. In Ottawa as in Charlottetown, the economy was his top priority. His new BC MPs were all socially moderate and voted for retention, making abolition extremely difficult barring a snap vote relying on what Campbell called “hocus pocus.” With Sauvé now premier of Quebec, Campbell was the sole non-Tory first minister. On that note, Bill Davis and Pierre Sauvé met as premiers for the first time in early March, a mostly social occasion that left both men happy. While from polar opposite wings of the conservative movement, their respective political and personal identities were closely bound to the small towns they called home, which served them well as a compass. Sauvé admired how the Big Blue Machine melded an urban agenda with a rural ethos, even if he strongly disagreed with the resulting policies. Yet despite their personal cordiality, there was always a distance between them that both men never openly discussed.

Ontario Premier Bill Davis listens to Deputy Prime Minister Jean Chrétien at a plenary session of the First Ministers Conference, Mar. 23, 1984.

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GAGNON: Sauvé’s first 6 months in office were, if I had to describe them in a word, predictable. He did exactly what he said he would do and no more than that. In late March, a couple of weeks before the Assembly adjourned, he was quite optimistic about a continued economic recovery. Indeed recovery was going so well that he might be able to announce a surplus during the fall economic update, a few months earlier than planned. One word he constantly used was “joy” – he was thrilled to have achieved his ambition of becoming premier, and clearly relished the job. His father had encouraged him to pursue public service, yet they never a political career. He said that when the time came, he would tell his children the same thing. For the first time in at least a decade, an optimistic mood permeated the province thanks to the economic recovery and what Sauvé called a “return to normalcy” politically.
 
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Ming777

Monthly Donor
So it looks like Canada overall is doing rather well. I wonder if there are however more trouble around the world.
 
GAGNON: In early April the Labour Code amendments were enacted after a Liberal filibuster was prevented by immediate use of time allocation and cloture. As in the previous Unionist government, preemptive use of those two procedures on highly controversial legislation would become standard. After the budget received third reading, the Assembly adjourned until October. Sauvé was quite pleased with his first session as premier and immediately afterward flew to Calgary for the second session of the First Ministers Conference, this time hosted by Lougheed. Apart from the usual funding requests, the mood was quite upbeat thanks to the recovery and a calm federal political scene. Campbell too was pleased at the conference, having made it through with nary a controversy. It was far more notable for what happened behind the scenes, as Sauvé and Hatfield agreed on a provisional framework for a cultural accord between their respective provinces. Their goal was to sign an agreement by year’s end, which both men felt eminently achievable. Despite their ideological differences they became good friends and allies; indeed Sauvé was probably closer to Hatfield than anyone other colleague except his ideological soulmate Sterling Lyon. The Gang of Four mostly rebuffed Campbell on environmental entreaties, though they did sign a bland communiqué expression support for conservationism.

SAUVÉ: I knew most of them from the constitutional round, so it was more a get reacquainted than get acquainted session. Indeed ’84 was probably the quietest conference I’ve attended. Apart from a pro forma attempt by Alex to convince us of his environmental initiatives, there was little disagreement amongst us. Our first session had been completely successful and the strikes we expected to see did not materialize because the unions knew they would not have public support if they tried again. If they did try again, we would respond appropriately. After I returned from the conference I met with the miners’ union leaders to discuss planned projects up north and planned a meeting with the police union in early May. In between those meetings, I received a phone call from Auréa Cloutier’s daughter, telling me her mother had passed early that morning, and inviting me to the funeral. I was deeply saddened but not surprised, given our last conversation. Her importance to M. Duplessis and my father cannot be overstated, and she was one of the most selfless people I have known. After the funeral, I had a long dinner with Maurice Bellemare and Paul Petit [Daniel Johnson’s former secretary], sharing our memories of her.
STEVENS: The first major hiccup in Sauvé’s relationship with Ontario was his refusal to renew the high speed rail contract for Montreal-Windsor signed by Garneau in 1979. Quebec’s FY85 budget defunded that project entirely just after formal notice was given, considerably irritating both the federal and Ontario governments. Campbell and Davis were not surprised given Sauvé’s disdain for high speed rail and passenger rail more generally, and they recognized that legally there was nothing they could do. Both Davis and Campbell believed in high-speed rail in itself and as a major infrastructure project for Canada’s 125th birthday. Sauvé’s interest in rail was purely freight, which was a key element of his resource development strategy and one of his party’s most generous corporate donors. Ontario Tory MPs were divided along ideological lines and despite Wilson’s attempt to gag them, staffers on both sides leaked like a sieve. Campbell introduced a motion of support for the project in mid-May, a blatant hand grenade thrown into the Tory caucus. After an intense meeting of the Ontario caucus, Wilson secured a consensus that they would oppose the motion on the grounds that Quebec’s concerns had not been addressed. Of course, that was laughable, since Sauvé opposes high-speed rail on principle.

PAULSON: Campbell’s appointment of philanthropist Gordon Snyder to replace Denise Proulx as Governor-General was well-received as Parliament recessed for the summer, even as Campbell mulled an audacious project: demolishing and replacing Sussex, or at least massively upgrading it. He consulted Wilson and Broadbent but while receptive in theory, Broadbent was resistant and Wilson anxious about the funds required for a replacement. Campbell decided to delay a final decision, but that summer he leant against approving the project without consent from both leaders. Wilson’s MPs were not as concerned as he was about public outcry, while Broadbent’s caucus if anything was angrier than their leader at the idea. Ultimately Campbell decided to abandon any idea of a new residence and instead settled for an overhaul, for which he received all-party consent. Liberal fortunes could hardly be brighter that spring, as Campbell’s personal approval rating hovered around 60% and his Liberals led the PCs by 20% in polls. Just before Parliament rose for the summer, the Cabinet committee reported and recommended several administrative adjustments which could be enacted by order-in-council. The ministers had decided discretion was the better part of valour. Bill Davis and John Buchanan were the only Tory premiers to dissent from Lyon’s initiative, as was increasingly the case by 1984.


CAMPBELL: I was annoyed at Quebec’s cancellation of the HSR plan, because we had already begun construction and had to tear it up once there was a change in government. Any major infrastructure project in Central Canada would now be the subject of partisan political prognostication – will there be a change in government and will they honour the contract. Pierre had the legal right to cancel it and his position had been clear for 6 years, so I was not surprised. Just disappointed that his personal view on passenger rail ended what I think could have been a great initiative. Bill Davis did not comment publicly other than to express his disappointment, but he was far more annoyed than me. Mike Wilson had a difficult time with his fellow Ontarians because you had on one side Sean O’Sullivan and his gang, who saw HSR as a boondoggle with limited upside, and Reds led by Flora MacDonald who saw it as a needed investment in Ontario’s future. I decided to focus on Maritime infrastructure projects for the foreseeable future, where consensus was almost automatic.

Kingston PC MP Flora MacDonald in 1984.

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TIMMINS: Sauvé’s rejection of HSR did not poison relations with Ontario, which he was determined to prevent at all costs, but it did end any illusions he and Bill Davis could work particularly closely together. Their respective visions were just too far apart on many subjects, and Sauvé looked to the Western provinces for close allies. He was the first Quebec premier to do so, and not just with fellow Gang members but also Peter Lougheed, with whom he had a friendly relationship in their short time together as premiers. Western dynamism, both economic and cultural, greatly appealed to him, and he understood that region instinctively far better than Ontario. In July 1984 Sauvé addressed the Petroleum Club in Calgary and got a warm reception, discussing his own resource policies and plans for closer cooperation between Edmonton and Quebec City on energy files. He got the distinct impression after a long talk with Lougheed that “he doesn’t intend to stick around forever, but might have another round in him.” Such rumours were rife in both Edmonton and Toronto that summer, as Lougheed and Davis pondered whether or not to fight a final election before exiting stage right. More than a few Tory MPs had similar thoughts as the Diefenbaker generation edged towards retirement.

STEVENS: Davis told me that he would make a final decision on his political future that summer, so if he decided to leave his successor would have plenty of time to establish himself. On one hand he was as popular as ever and would crush any opponent for the foreseeable future, yet on the other he had accomplished all he set out to do in 1971. Similar to his good friend Bob Stanfield, Davis disdained leaders who stayed on merely for egotistical reasons. If he had no more policy offerings to make, then he should hand over to someone who could move the party forward. Finally, unlike in BC, Quebec and the Maritimes, the Big Blue Machine was an institutional rather than personal dynasty. Leaders were not supposed to serve indefinitely; though Frost and Davis could have had they wanted. On July 28, after a long conversation with his family, Davis decided to retire within 6 months and announce a leadership convention in September. It promised to be a showdown between right-wing Blues represented by Industry Minister Frank Miller and Reds by Larry Grossman and Roy McMurtry. The federal Ontario caucus split along ideological lines, with Flora MacDonald as an honorary co-chair for Grossman and Sean O’Sullivan for Miller. Wilson stayed neutral, since he knew and liked both leading candidates.

CAMPBELL: I was not surprised at Bill’s decision to retire given how long I’d been hearing speculation about his departure. He would be greatly missed from public life when he retired that January, and I was profoundly grateful for his help over the years. The Tory caucus was a hot mess on their provincial cousins’ leadership race, unlike our caucus which knew provincial involvement had to be personal and not interfere with government business. Being an opposition party that probably in their hearts knew they would be there for a while yet, they felt free to indulge themselves. It is not every day that the Big Blue Machine changes leaders, after all. I felt I could work with whoever won, and as a general rule I took little interest in provincial leadership elections outside my own provincial party. Mike Wilson was the same way: he had little interest in PCPO issues, once telling me that if he wanted to involve himself there he’d have run provincially. For Sean [O’Sullivan] and others who had worked at both levels, I could understand their personal commitment, having done so myself. Other first ministers who sent out ambiguous signals about their future were Lougheed and Bennett, and I was more certain about Lougheed than Bennett.


Bill and Kathleen Davis in September 1984.



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DAVIS: I made the announcement in early September in anticipation of an early December convention, so my successor could craft their own budget and Throne Speech while holding a summer or spring election. After 13 years I had accomplished everything I had wanted to do, and having served longer than anyone except Mowat, it was someone else’s turn. Whether Larry, Frank or Roy won the party would be in good hands. The federal caucus was far more involved than they had been when I was elected leader, and good friends of mine worked for all 4 major candidates. I told all campaigns that what concerned me the most was preserving party unity given the wide spectrum of opinion represented in this race. A leader of this party, in my opinion, should always remember that the party is bigger than any of us. My colleagues all phoned or sent farewell letters, and I had a long conversation with Alex [Campbell] in early September, where we mostly reminisced about all the great times we had together. In the last week of that month, I extended full funding to Catholic schools, for after long reflection I decided it was the right thing to do. Before doing so, I had secured agreement from the other party leaders and from all leadership candidates not to make it an issue.

O’SULLIVAN: The paradox was that many of Frank’s supporters were those most strongly opposed to funding Catholic schools, which was difficult for me as a Catholic supporter of his. Frank fully supported the decision, as did Mike [Wilson] and the federal caucus. Since Bill had secured essential unanimity- there were people who quietly dissented such as Dr. Stephenson – abstention was what worried me. Since there was not much going on in Parliament at that time, I was able to devote a lot of energy to organizing my own immediate area for Frank. We needed to hold onto our lead on the early ballots and corral enough centrists and floating delegates. A centrist candidate on the final ballot would be the end for us, but facing a Red candidate would probably give us enough floating votes for a win. What heartened Scott [Barton], Mike [Harris] and Dr. Stephenson was the number of young people who supported Frank’s campaign. The youth wing was increasingly Blue, a trend which heartened me as a former YPC president.
 
GAGNON: Sauvé’s goals for the fall session were threefold: economic update, nuclear expansion and passing legislation governing historic sites. As a minister Sauvé had been angered by Drapeau’s demolition of historic sites to make way for new developments, and his requests for legislation had been repeatedly denied by Cardinal. Now that he was premier there would be tighter restrictions on eminent domain, a plan which had originally been mooted by his Liberal predecessor. Drapeau’s annoyance meant little to Sauvé by that point, and he was bracing himself for a “communist” – a term he often used about the MCM privately- victory in 1986. Since both nuclear power and eminent domain restrictions were supported by the Liberals, the session would be a short one at just two months of nearly continuous sitting. It was a return of what Sauvé proudly called “executive government” in private. In Ottawa Alex Campbell faced a similar political scene, with a disengaged Conservative opposition and what he called a “yappy” NDP on his left criticizing him for sellouts to neoconservatism. When I interviewed Mario Beaulieu in early October, he gave me a budget exclusive: there would be a surplus for the upcoming fiscal year. With an economy in full recovery, he was all smiles. It was also a welcome sign for the Union Nationale, which had not presided over a booming economy in nearly 30 years.

BEAULIEU: The fall update was nothing special, even if the surplus gave us something to boast about. All of us were thrilled that after so many years of economic instability, prosperity was returning both in Quebec and nationally. A stable economy meant a stable political scene as inflation became a thing of the past and rapid growth unseen in 20 years returned. Our previous government had been defeated primarily due to economic conditions and intellectual paralysis about economic policy. We were busy pushing out the first SIDBEC tranche and enacting nuclear legislation while preparing the February budget. We were on track for a very successful first year, and Pierre encouraged us all to return in a “creative” mood after Christmas. On the 25th he signed the cultural accord with Hatfield, which committed our provinces to mutual assistance and marked a new interest in Francophones outside Quebec, a community neglected by Liberal governments. Ontario’s decision to fully fund Catholic schools was gratifying even if for obvious reasons we could not say so publicly. In the last conversation Pierre had with Davis before the latter’s retirement, he thanked him profusely for that. It was a happy ending to an otherwise distant relationship and overdue justice to the Franco-Ontarian community.

MICHAEL WILSON: No matter the outcome, I would work closely with our provincial cousins and was on good terms with Dennis [Cochrane], Frank {Miller] and Larry [Grossman] personally. All of them would make fine premiers and it was up to individual members if they wanted to involve themselves. Personally I had never taken much interest in provincial politics beyond coordinating with my counterpart and occasionally meeting the provincial Toronto caucus. Allan [Lawrence] and Flora [MacDonald] supported Grossman while Sean [O’Sullivan] was a co-chair of the Miller campaign. I expected Allan and Sean to participate given their personal ties to the provincial party, while Flora was something of a surprise. She had never indicated much of an interest in provincial politics before, though of course I was not surprised that Grossman was her choice for premier. Only a handful of Ontario MPs decided to involve themselves beyond endorsements and working their ridings for their respective candidates. I told caucus that under no circumstances were they to discuss the Catholic schools issue unless directly asked by a journalist, and only to say they supported the decision. Unlike the provincial caucus, there was almost no dissent on this question to begin with. As the race entered its final month, no one could get a handle on the final outcome.

PAULSON: In the final weeks before the Ontario PC convention, it was obvious that Miller would lead on the first ballot due to a united Blue wing behind him, and to win he needed floating voters. If he faced the centrist Cochrane on a final ballot, he would lose as Reds and many centrists would unite against him. Facing off against the progressive Grossman, Miller could find enough centrists to win. Once installed in power, he could continually build the Blue wing until it could build a centrist-Blue coalition. The eventual goal, of course, was to build a Blue majority. Sean O’Sullivan was Miller’s lead federal supporter, and he was one of those who urged Miller to hold some delegates in reserve if necessary to vote for Grossman and ensure a final ballot showdown. Miller accepted this strategy without hesitation, as it was the only way to win a purplish-Red party. Both he and Allan Lawrence would have high profiles at the convention and would gain significant stature if their respective candidates won. It did not take much imagination to see that this race, regardless of outcome, would have important lessons for federal politics. As the only two Ontario MPs who had worked at both levels of government, Lawrence and O’Sullivan understood this perfectly well.

STEVENS: On December 2, Frank Miller was narrowly elected PCPO leader on the final ballot after successfully eliminating Dennis Cochrane from the final ballot. It had been a close-run thing, with only a dozen votes separating the second and third place candidates after the mandatory recount. Miller would be the first Blue to lead the Big Blue Machine, even if his differences at that point were more in style and ethos. There would be no abrupt rightward turn, for even more than Roch La Salle federally a few years earlier, Blues were a minority in the Big Blue Machine. One initiative Miller’s backers would push him for was SUNCOR privatization, modelled after what Lyon and Sauvé had done with their respective provinces’ energy crown corporations. Those two premiers, particularly Sauvé, were role models for Blues around the country. Miller wanted to delay any policy changes until after an election which he had already determined would be held in the spring, on schedule. He put thoughts of the very obvious federal consequences out of his mind.

Premier-designate Frank Miller and outgoing Premier Bill Davis meet the press after a transition meeting, Dec. 7, 1984.

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GAGNON: Beaulieu’s budget would show a healthy surplus, Quebec’s first since 1973 thanks to a booming economy, rising revenues and heavy spending cuts beginning to bite. SIDBEC privatization was proceeding well, and Beaulieu was preparing to float the IPO of another resource company within months as part of their pre-agreed schedule. Sauvé liked to remind me that the first privatization was of Hydro-Quebec’s natural gas division in 1957, and privatization was a key element of his economic strategy. This was a welcome change for both men, who had seen their previous government undone by a poor economy and the Duplessis government soar on its economic performance. Moreover, with Frank Miller’s victory in Ontario, the Gang of Four could now become a Gang of Five. Sauvé’s goals for 1985 were almost all economic in nature, the sole exception to that rule being an expansion of the Montreal and Quebec ports. There would be many small regional projects instead of overarching province-wide ones as preferred by Liberals. That is where the expanded backbencher role in patronage and infrastructure came in. Sauvé’s own Deux-Montagnes riding had benefited from hundreds of millions in infrastructure funding over the 66 years his family had represented it. Daniel Johnson had eliminated this sort of old-fashioned pork in the 1960s, an era long forgotten by this generation of Unionists.


STEVENS: Chretien’s budget was a bland document which nonetheless contained a healthy surplus, something which Campbell considered important to recoup the Liberal economic halo which had sustained their party for so long. On budgetary issues, the prime minister was a pragmatist, though he clearly preferred expansionary budgets whenever possible. His habitual laconic demeanour concealed an inner intensity that revealed itself when he felt particularly passionate, occasions that were rarer in public than in private. Campbell’s fervent ideological commitments were just as deeply felt as his conservative opponents, a side often expressed by Adam O’Toole. The employment minister was a Labrador native and an economist by profession, having worked with the fishing industry before winning his seat at 34 in 1972. O’Toole’s other role was as political minister for his home province, since Campbell personally oversaw Maritime operations as a whole. In late January, Chretien sent letters to his provincial counterparts informing them that infrastructure would be centre stage at the next First Ministers Conference, which was due to be held sometime that spring. He wanted in particular a commitment to the proposed Confederation Bridge from the PEI government, as demanded by Campbell. Infrastructure was a prime ministerial passion in Ottawa as it had been in Charlottetown, and eventually the provinces would find themselves a little weary of Campbell’s enthusiasm.

TIMMINS : In the second year of his leadership, Mike Wilson had, if nothing else, managed to re-establish a cold peace between the Tory factions. Given the past decade’s internal tensions, that was a notable accomplishment seeing as intraparty tension had started to boil in the Ontario party. Frank Miller was doing his best to conciliate the factions, and appointed Lawrence and Cochrane to senior Cabinet posts. Any lingering feelings of distrust soon dissipated as the Big Blue Machine circled its wagons once again, and Cochrane later became one of Miller’s most important Cabinet allies. Scott Barton’s loyalty was rewarded with the Natural Resources portfolio, a major promotion from the Tourism ministry he’d held under Davis. Miller had already decided to call an April election immediately after the budget, capitalizing on the government’s popularity and his own emerging image as an avuncular, bland technocrat.His Liberal opponent were prepared for this campaign, hugging the centre-left and promising generational renewal. Since the previous campaign, Peterson had retooled his personal image and recruited younger candidates to create a sharper generational contrast with the Tory dynasty. The Big Blue Machine was not old per se: Miller was 58 and most of his ministers were in their 40s and 50s.


O’SULLIVAN: School funding was a difficult issue politically because those most opposed to it were often our most loyal supporters, especially in rural and exurban ridings which the Liberals were targeting. We had to persuade our own base, while hoping the clergy would not reopen the issue in mid-campaign. The Anglicans in particular were quite upset, and just before dissolution Frank and Scott [Barton, a pro-funding Anglican) had visited Garnsworthy to assure him that there would be complete consultation at each stage of implementation. After a 4-hour meeting, they only agreed to meet again after the election and refrain from public comment until then. The Archbishop was quietly furious, and he never forgave any of us for that. Even the federal Liberal Ontarian ministers were worried about what Campbell – a Protestant – called the “sectarian ogre” in private. Frank was also reluctant to debate, and with some difficulty his advisors persuaded him that to avoid a debate would look arrogant and feed into the opposition’s narrative. Besides, he was a comfortable debater who knew the files inside-out. If anything, he would help himself by debating and showing the likeable, authentic man he was. My argument was that we should be open to the media and generally relax a bit; letting the opposition yap away while we reminded voters why they trusted us to govern.

Sean O'Sullivan, c. 1971.

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HUGH SEGAL, ONTARIO SENATOR: As the campaign entered its final weeks, we all felt a sense of relief that the schools issue had not reared its head, since it could have been severely damaging to our campaign. Frank performed well at the debates and Peterson was unable to provide a rationale for significant opposition gains, much less winning government. We expected between 75 and 80 seats when all was said and done. It had been a good campaign, if not quite as joyful as 1981 because we were tinkering somewhat with the model. We were running Frank as himself while preserving the party brand that formed the core of our appeal. The platform was essentially centre-right, promising green-eyeshade budgeting without dismantling the Robarts-Davis legacy. Any notable downsizing would be through attrition. Frank was first and foremost a political realist, even if he left little doubt where his true leanings were.

Premier Frank Miller and Deputy Premier Bette Stephenson at a press conference, Mar. 29, 1985.

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ENVIRONICS ONTARIO, MAR. 29-31, 1985

IF AN ELECTION WERE HELD TODAY, WHICH PARTY WOULD YOU FAVOUR?

PC: 48.3%
LIBERAL: 31.4%
NDP: 19.1%
 
Roughly similar to OTL. The Campbell government has been increasing immigration quotas while rejecting childcare tax credits because they don't want to Swiss-cheese the tax code. Daycare is still kicking around on paper. Quebec City has been considering their own version of a baby bonus.
 
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STEVENS: Miller’s big win heartened the federal Tories, who had been somewhat worried that his accession would disturb the delicate intraparty balance among their provincial cousins. Now the Big Blue Machine was set to become the longest-serving government in Canadian history, edging towards a half-century in office. In Ottawa as in Toronto, centrist Tories increasingly sided with the Blues rather than Reds, even as Blues now held a caucus plurality in Ottawa. This alliance was personified by Sean O’Sullivan and Allan Lawrence, their factions’ respective leaders, who worked closely and were friendly despite significant ideological differences. At a convention, a Prairie-Quebec alliance was formidable, and Miller’s ascension meant a chunk of Ontario could be up for grabs. O’Sullivan and Lawrence agreed to push for zero-based budgeting, a move supported by the Gang of Five. For his part, Wilson happily accepted zero-based budgeting, something he thought relatively inconsequential. It was a small Blue policy victory which would not involve a direct confrontation with the leader, since in all likelihood it would have passed even over Wilson’s disapproval. After the Ontario election, David Peterson resigned as Liberal leader and a leadership convention would be held in November. It would be a showdown between progressive Sheila Copps and centrist Murray Elston.

GAGNON: During the last week of April, First Ministers gathered in Fredericton for their annual conference. Campbell was ill and sent Chrétien in his place, with a tribute being paid to Peter Lougheed after his announcement that he would retire at year’s end and close his 14-year premiership. With a booming economy and quiet interprovincial front, the gathering was mostly a social occasion. Hatfield, Sauvé and Buchanan had begun to discuss holding biannual conferences instead rather than meeting for its own sake. They did not succeed at that time but resolved to introduce a resolution at subsequent meetings. Hatfield and Sauvé had negotiated a cultural accord, and the Gang of Four had always met separately from their counterparts to consider strategy. Campbell and Chrétien would eventually come around to biannual conferences, but in 1985 their agnosticism had not yet turned to opposition. Sauvé ran his Cabinet that way, usually meeting his ministers in small groups or individually and rarely holding full Cabinet meetings. In his view, those conferences were necessary during the constitutional round which had ended 9 years earlier, but were now superfluous. Negotiations could be handled in small groups or individually, with a full meeting only if absolutely necessary. Moreover, his real interest was in the Gang of Five.

TIMMINS: Campbell’s first policy conference as Prime Minister was a low-key success, with delegates giving him a 98% on the leadership review and passing resolutions calling for a national daycare program. He had effortlessly maintained the intraparty balance which had so bedeviled MacEachen and Turner, pleasing both progressives and centrists with his domestic and foreign policies. In truth the prime minister was an ideological potpourri: on domestic issues he was closer to the progressives, and centrists on foreign and defence policy. He did not care much about the intraparty ideological balance, since as he once told me, “I’ll be gone when that becomes an issue again.” Nor did most of his ministers: you could barely drop a nickel between O’Toole and Chrétien, and people like Caccia were too left-wing to ever be acceptable as leader. He told me that Wilson was a good man, but a “minister, not a leader” and a technocrat incapable of connecting with ordinary voters. Even though Campbell is 4 years Wilson’s senior, he looked, acted and sounded a decade younger. Frank Miller in Ontario was a different story: his avuncular, populist image proved successful, and Wilson was the polar opposite of that. He wanted Wilson to remain Tory leader as long as possible, since he was an almost perfect foil.


GAGNON: The National Assembly adjourned in early May after a productive session focused mainly on privatization and a revision of the education curriculum. Next would be the UN policy convention, Sauvé’s first as premier. After giving him a 99% score on the leadership review, delegates voted to approve the Platform Committee’s manifesto. On most questions, the party was ideologically homogenous, and even nationalism had dissipated as a dividing line between factions over time. Much the same was true for the Liberal Party, which under Levesque retained the bland centrism of Garneau’s time. All the ministers I interviewed told me mentioned the same word: “stability.” After the Quiet Revolution and economic malaise, Quebec politics had finally settled down. The PQ was on the verge of deregistration by Elections Quebec, which Pierre-Marc Johnson told me he only wished his father could have seen. Mario Beaulieu was considering retirement because at 53, he wanted to do something different, and also because he was not a confidant of the premier’s. Their relations were cordial but not friendly, and Beaulieu was not entirely comfortable with the extent of privatization Sauvé had planned. Nonetheless, it would be a serious exaggeration to suggest there was passive or active hostility between them. Their relationship was simply reaching the end of its road.

SAUVÉ: Mario had not yet made his decision to leave, but I knew it was coming within a year. In addition to being my finance minister, he was my deputy. He was the right choice in 1978 because we had worked well together in government, and he had helped teach me the ropes as a junior minister when I first entered politics. There have never been any personal issues between us, and if a minister was inclined to retire I usually let them. If you’re not 100% committed, then you should leave, and there’s no point in trying to convince someone otherwise. Besides, generational renewal was important. We needed more people who were not members of our previous government, with a goal of eventually retiring all of them. That is what happened in the ‘70s – except for Maurice Bellemare, all the Duplessis-era ministers retired by ’74. The truth is that holding the government’s two most important ministerial posts, after a long career in public service tired him out and he wanted to move on. No more, no less.
 
Forgot to mention this in the last update, but here's the Tory frontbench.

Official Opposition Shadow Cabinet in the 32nd Canadian Parliament

Leader of the Opposition: Michael Wilson
Deputy Leader of the Opposition: Erik Nielsen
Opposition House Leader: Ged Baldwin
Chief Opposition Whip: Tom Bell
Opposition Senate Leader: Jacques Flynn

Finance/ACOA: John Crosbie
Justice: Robert Laviolette
Foreign Affairs: Pat Nowlan
Defence: Michael Forrestal
Agriculture: Harold Danforth
Public Works: Ray Hnatyshyn
Environment: Frank Oberle
Energy: Jake Epp
Transport: Sean O'Sullivan
Veterans Affairs: William Knowles
Immigration: Claire Malraux
Intergovernmental Affairs: Allan Lawrence
Indian and Northern Affairs: Erik Nielsen
Solicitor General: Elmer MacKay
Heritage: Flora MacDonald
Health: Paul Yewchuk
Treasury Board: Don Mazankowski
Labour: Jim McGrath
International Trade: Marie Boivin
Revenue: William Ritchie
 
STEVENS: Since his retirement 4 years earlier, Bob Stanfield had left politics behind him to spend time with his family and on community work in Halifax. While happily retired from politics, he had become increasingly concerned about the Gang of Four [Bennett, Lyon, Devine and Sauvé] influence on the party. It was not about ideology or personnel, but rather Stanfield’s personal belief that the premiers had too much influence on a federal party. In essence, the separation of powers was being erased. He quietly made his views known, only speaking to selected confidantes personally to avoid leaks. What hurt moderates was their lack of a visible factional leader at either the federal or provincial level. The Atlantic premiers were uninterested in such a role, and Flora MacDonald’s near-defeat in 1982 had rendered her the top Ontarian target for Team Campbell. In a pre-election year, all these considerations remained hypothetical as the party braced for a snap election. With a 20% lead in the polls and a 3-1 lead as preferred prime minister, Alex Campbell was increasingly receptive to an election early the following year. The business community, spooked by Walter Gordon and Pierre Trudeau, felt Campbell was a “reasonable” Liberal with whom they could deal. While they preferred Wilson as one of their own, there were no strong objections to continued Liberal rule.


ADAM O’TOOLE: At that point the question was not if but when we would call an early election. I mean, why wouldn’t we? A Balkanized opposition, popular government and leader, booming economy – if you don’t call a snap election in those circumstances, you’ll never call one. I favoured one immediately after the budget, while Alex was considering March or April due to the warmer weather. Despite the Tory spin about Wilson restoring party unity, in reality that unity only existed because both sides agreed he would be a fall guy for an unwinnable election. The real battle would come after we went to the polls and it would be as ugly as 1967, if for different reasons. In 1967 their battles, Quebec aside, were mostly about personality and image. This time it would be about ideology: did you want the hard right or moderates running the party? We could only be spectators to that battle, as the Tories had been to us a decade earlier. At the time, I was busy studying unemployment insurance reform, done in a way that would be scrupulously fair to my constituents. I have never believed the cliché that you need to introduce economic reforms in tough times, indeed I believe the contrary: implementation in good times is how to properly acclimatize those affected.

Prime Minister Alex Campbell and Employment Minister Adam O'Toole leave Parliament Hill after a Liberal caucus meeting, June 11, 1985.

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SAUVÉ: ’85 was another quiet summer for me after the policy convention, spent on family vacation after a highly productive session. At all levels of government things were quiet, the quietest they had been in many years. We were preparing another privatization tranche for the fall session starting in October and still trying to find a successor for Drapeau, who would shortly announce his retirement after 29 years as mayor. I did not find anyone who wanted to run given the widespread fatigue with his regime, his personal popularity being non-transferable. We prepared for a red wave, which Drapeau was resigned to. Given his poor health, he refused to accept job offers from the prime minister or myself, insisting that he would become a simple citizen again. Alex mulled the idea of awarding Drapeau the Order of Canada, a decision he would not make until after Drapeau left office the following December. With the party’s 50th anniversary celebrations starting in November and culminating in June, there were also festivities to think about. For obvious reasons we could not celebrate our silver anniversary in good spirits, so I wanted this celebration to be twice as good as that one would have been.

STEVENS: On August 26th, Flora MacDonald delivered a stemwinder in Kingston directly attacking the so-called Gang of Four premiers – led by Manitoba’s Lyon and Quebec’s Sauvé – by name. She accused them of hijacking the PC Party and attempting to transform it into a “hard right populist movement”, that is a federal analogue to the populist conservatism practiced by its provincial leaders. To that the Gang of Four would happily plead guilty, especially against an opponent who was no match for them. In a phone call with Bennett, Devine agreed that the premiers would not respond publicly. MacDonald would be isolated as disloyal and be pilloried by outlets normally loyal to her. Mike Wilson was furious and harshly rebuked her in the pre-session caucus meeting later that week, saying that disagreements should be kept within the caucus family. The Atlantic caucus largely agreed, for despite their visceral distaste for their rivals’ policies and hardball style, the premiers were valuable allies who could not be ignored. It was not so much as an attack on the premiers as an attack on their Blue caucus colleagues that Wilson found unconscionable. MacDonald was unapologetic then and later, though she was forced to apologize in front of caucus by Wilson. For their part, the premiers could not care less: “We’re winning, aren’t we?” was Devine’s reported comment to Miller.

Kingston MP Flora MacDonald in 1985.

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GAGNON: The government’s next privatization targets were SOQUEM and REXFOR, the public companies responsible for mining and forestry respectively. SOQUIP, their counterpart for petroleum, would complete the sale. Combined with a looser foreign investment regime, Quebec’s resource industry would be almost entirely private again. Paul-Émile Allard shared his colleagues’ conviction, backed up by party polling, which showed that Quebecers were not emotionally attached to these rather obscure companies. The Quiet Revolution’s economic pillars such as Hydro-Quebec, SGF and the Caisse remained untouched. While Sauvé and his ministers did not adapt Margaret Thatcher’s phrase “popular capitalism”, they hoped for a similar phenomenon in Quebec. Their plans for SAQ privatization would be saved for another term, as Beaulieu told me in a late September interview. What I found appalling was their defence of the asbestos industry, a defence they rarely publicly provided. In private, the ministers would say that the industry’s future was in its own hands. They could close up shop without interference or continue so long as they were in compliance. It was a lawyerly evasion, something Sauvé has always done very well. That’s why his statements on those subjects are couched in the blandest possible legalese.

CANADIAN GALLUP POLL, SEPT. 28-30, 1985

IF A FEDERAL ELECTION WERE HELD TOMORROW, WHICH PARTY'S CANDIDATE WOULD YOU VOTE FOR?

LIBERAL: 49.1%
PC: 30.7%
NDP: 17.8%

DO YOU APPROVE OR DISAPPROVE OF THE WAY ALEX CAMPBELL IS HANDLING HIS JOB AS PRIME MINISTER?

APPROVE: 62.3%
DISAPPROVE: 32.1%
 
PAULSON: Flora MacDonald’s speech was a cri de Coeur rather than a rallying cry for Red Tories. Organizationally, Blues controlled the Western provinces, partially excepting Alberta, and Quebec had always been Unionist turf. Ontario was the last remaining major battleground, with the federal rivals battling it out due to the complicated ideological structure of Frank Miller’s party. Miller himself was a Gang member but was not personally interested in federal politics, and lacked the organizational and personal dominance required to impose his wishes in such a way. All this was hypothetical for now, because he had to protect Ontario Tory MPs from a Liberal wave which threatened seemingly entrenched incumbents. The Big Blue Machine would rise to the challenge, especially as core Tory voters were nudged back home to the natural habitat. In truth the Grits were running into their Western wall, which prevented them from scoring another dynastic-era landslide, and were nosing their ceiling. Campbell reluctantly acknowledged this in private, which is why he wanted an even sharper leadership contrast than in 1982. Despite the impossible task ahead of them, the PC Party was well-financed from both Bay Street and Main Street donors, more so than they had been previously in opposition under Stanfield.

CAMPBELL: Our final decision on daycare was made Oct. 26 after a marathon P&P [Planning & Priorities] meeting that lasted for most of the day. We would not go ahead for three major reasons: research showed potential educational gains were mixed at best, a protracted political fight with the provinces over jurisdiction, and cost. Marginal benefits were the major reason why we did not go ahead: had the research shown a different result then we would have gone ahead despite the other two issues. After debriefing the full cabinet and caucus I sensed that while there was some disappointment, they were prepared to move on. It was not an issue we had campaigned on or even mentioned much publicly, so there was no commitment at stake. What I decided to do instead was offer federal matching funds to provinces that did have such programs, which was only my own in 1985, plus the Northwest Territories. Caucus was happy with that compromise, and I returned to the more intractable issue of employment insurance. Earlier that month I had been busy on a European tour which was quite productive on trade files, particularly in Germany and France, and I had left the working group to make a preliminary decision before I returned.

CAPLAN: Progressive Liberals were happy with Campbell, in my opinion, more for what he did than did not do. Apart from expanding Medicare’s reach to low-income Canadians and a top-off of the GIS [Guaranteed Income Supplement] he had done little for progressives beyond more housing spending. To me his inaction was more telling: holding back on daycare or imposing much stricter conditions on healthcare user fees. Without deep financial consequences, the provinces run by hard-right conservatives happily allowed user fees to pile up, while not testing the MCA so blatantly as to compel federal intervention. It was a back door to privatization, and one vehemently opposed by the NDP. Campbell’s response was always that provinces would face legal consequences if they violated the Act. He obviously did not see health care as something worth a major political battle over. For a man who had been one of his province’s most progressive premiers, to see him essentially adopt a Tory healthcare policy should have enraged progressive Liberals. They did not care because he had brought them back to government and some of their leaders into their inner circle. Pierre Sauvé, as a minister, had joined his far-right colleagues in fiercely resisted his own party’s desire for provincial Medicare. None of the progressive Liberals had that kind of conviction.

TIMMINS: In early November, Pierre Trudeau spoke out at a reunion of his government’s alumni to condemn Campbell’s decision not to create a childcare program and expand Medicare as sops to conservatives in both parties. His language was so provocative that one reporter who had agreed to the confidentiality understanding broke the story 2 days later. The media and opposition parties pounced on Trudeau’s comment, while Campbell said his comments were those of a private citizen. He had wanted to directly engage with Trudeau but been dissuaded by his senior ministers and staff who did not want a blood feud between the sitting and former prime ministers. Privately, he was cutting and profane about his predecessor’s character flaws, among other things, almost as much as the Tory right. From that point onwards there was no contact whatsoever between the two men. That was just about the only time Campbell’s blood boiled over an intraparty issue, for much like Wilson he did not pay much attention to those issues. The fall economic update continued the 2-year stream of good economic news, with a growing surplus and Australian free trade negotiations approaching their conclusion. Campbell and his economic ministers wanted a deal before the election, a goal which temporarily receded as negotiations stalled for 2 weeks.

Pierre Trudeau and Alex Campbell in happier times, May 2, 1971.

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STEVENS: When Parliament went on Christmas break, Campbell held the year’s final Cabinet meeting, where the ministers agreed to an early April election. It would be the shortest majority government term in Canadian history apart from Laurier’s ill-fated 1911 election call, running on Campbell’s leadership, a strong economy and proven progressive record. Only 3 ministers initially disagreed with the prime minister’s decision, but they were eventually won over. All the members of Operations were gung-ho about an early election, hoping for a deeper Ontarian and Atlantic penetration which would knock off prominent Tories. The Atlantic provincial Tories could only support their friends organizationally, since their warchests have always been miniscule compared to allies further west. Given low operating costs in their region, they believed that organization and local contact was more important than saturation advertising. To hear other premiers talk casually about dropping 7 or 8 digit sums on single electoral tasks grated heavily on Maritime ears. In New Brunswick Tory MPs worried about Hatfield’s radioactivity rubbing off on them.
 
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