Égalité ou indépendance: a Canadian TL

NEWMAN: Before embarking on a barbeque-filled summer tour, Campbell had lengthy meetings with both his former rivals to determine whether they were fully committed. With Turner, the meeting was cordial but cool: Turner was not prepared to commit to running in the next election, but promised a decision within a year. He bluntly told Campbell he did not know whether he could remain finance critic if a sizeable element of the parliamentary party maintained its hostility towards him. Campbell said Turner could take as much time as he wanted, but that he wanted “100% commitment from every member of this team.” Both men emerged wary from that meeting for fairly similar reasons. With Chretien the meeting was upbeat and humorous: he was definitely running again and would serve in any capacity the leader wanted. Campbell decided not to shuffle the Shadow Cabinet until the new year. In the interim he enrolled for French lessons, much as Stanfield had done a dozen years earlier after becoming PC leader. He told me he rather enjoyed the intellectual challenge of learning a new language in middle age. I asked whether both his rivals would stay on his team and his only response was that everyone must make their decision in their own time.

TURNER: There was no tension between Alex and I, either at that meeting or later on. We got on perfectly well and he understood my concerns about the parliamentary party. He simply encouraged me to make a decision on my own time and get back to him. There were similar meetings with other members of the shadow cabinet, including Jean [Chretien]. He was sympathetic to my concerns about caucus tensions lingering from the constitutional fight and promised he would address them when the caucus strategy session was held in August. Indeed he promised me considerable policy autonomy, along with our other economic shadows, in preparing for the following year’s policy convention. He would not have done that had he wanted to push me out the door. It was far more than Allan had ever offered me, and I was made a member of his inner circle. What he wanted was advice on the West, territory he was unfamiliar with and he was unwilling to totally rely on Lloyd [Axworthy] for a primer. I agreed to accompany him and Lloyd on a Western tour in August, before we returned to Ottawa for the strategy session on the 20th. I wanted to spend July on vacation, having gone through 2 national campaigns in less than a year.

SAUVÉ: Despite all the noise over our policy convention, the controversy passed quickly once everyone went home for the summer. My family and I were vacationing in Morocco, well away from any domestic political controversy. Staffers were told not to disturb me unless there was a truly urgent matter, and the message was passed to reporters as well. The government was still in their honeymoon period and anything I said would be lost, as caucus understood perfectly well. In politics you always have to take the long view: not how does this look now but how things will be judged closer to crunch time. There would undoubtedly be moderate voters turned off by our policies, but more attracted to a principled, populist conservative party which would address everyday concerns. If we wanted to have a lasting government rather than a tentative one then we had to set the agenda and force our opponents onto our intellectual terrain, not vice-versa. We lost policy discipline in our third term and therefore government since our opponents had a plan while we held our collective breath. This time there would be a detailed plan which left nothing to ambiguity or subtlety, given the depth of our planned reforms. My model was quite consciously Mackenzie King’s Green Book.

MULRONEY: Bob told me shortly before the pre-session caucus strategy session that he would announce the commissioning of more CANDU reactors as part of an effort to diversify our power sources. He thought nuclear expansion would enhance our environmental bona fides, alongside an expansion of hydro. Before making the announcement we extensively consulted with our provincial allies, all of whom favoured expansion. The most enthusiastic were BC’s Bennett and Pierre in Quebec, both of whom included nuclear expansion in their party platforms. Even our opponents hesitated to oppose our initiative outright. Bob wanted one of his legacies to be environmental stewardship, as it had been in Nova Scotia. There was great enthusiasm in caucus for it, especially given the energy crisis which was being hammered home to Canadians every day. Bob also would end the Anti-Inflation Board, which had proved a dismal failure and become scandalous due to outrageous expense abuse by certain employees. That was the first major scandal on Bob’s watch, and we got hammered by the media and opposition for months about it. For Bob, it was painful to have scandal blemish what to that point had been an exemplary career. Meanwhile Marie Boivin was having increasing difficulty concluding the Australian FIPA, mainly due to reluctance on their end rather than ours.


Prime Minister Robert Stanfield, c. 1979.

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PAULSON: Stanfield’s scrapping of the Anti-Inflation Board, though spurred by scandal, was long overdue. Even before the scandal broke in July Stanfield had concluded that AIB had been a dismal failure. The Chateau group was emboldened by Stanfield’s decision even as they worried about FIPA’s impending failure. Marie Boivin told her confidants that the deal was being held back by both principals, and on the Australian side the “wet” Coalition caucus majority opposed to liberalization. Fortunately for all concerned, her musings were not publicized. She was loyal to Stanfield while remaining focused on her long-term agenda, like O’Sullivan and other Chateau members. Chateau followers looked to Bill Bennett’s Socreds, Sterling Lyon’s Tories and Pierre Sauvé’s Unionists for policy inspiration. All 3 leaders did not want their followers making unnecessary waves at the October policy convention in Vancouver and directed them towards foreign and defence policy instead. This was less about Stanfield and far more about not jeopardizing their long-term goals, as was recognized on both sides. Even in 1979 the signs were obvious that the federal PC Party was quietly simmering, unlike their humming Ontarian counterpart where intraparty harmony reigned.
 
Since the Iranian Revolution is coming up, Stanfield should purchase the Kidd-class destroyers as an addition to the RCN.

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TIMMINS: After the Iranian Revolution, Iran cancelled all the pending Western military contracts concluded by the Shah. Among them was the contract for F-14 Tomcats. After quiet negotiations between Canada and Iran, Canada would receive 33 F-14s destined for Iran. They would be labelled CF-118 in Canadian service. Their first shipment from the US was due to arrive in October 1979, shortly before the restoration of traditional ranks and service names. On January 1, 1980, Land Command, Sea Command and Air Command would be renamed Canadian Army, Royal Canadian Navy and Royal Canadian Air Force respectively. Under Stanfield, defence spending was its highest since the St. Laurent era, a consensus tacitly supported by opposition parties due to international obligations and the jobs created by those contracts. At the same time, Stanfield had begun preliminary discussions with the Carter administration about a free trade agreement, an announcement which was due in the new year. Vancouver’s Tory policy convention passed without incident, as did the NDP one a month later in Winnipeg. Stanfield believed that once his royal commission reported in April 1980, he would have political cover for free trade talks. Predictable NDP opposition could be dismissed, while Campbell could be counted on to lend his party’s support.

An IRIAF F-14 before delivery to Canada, 14/09/1979.

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GAGNON: Raymond Garneau’s first year in power was marked by budgetary quiet alongside tense public sector negotiations with transit workers. His case was not helped by Jean Drapeau, who took a tougher line than Garneau thought appropriate at a time when the government was trying to promote shared sacrifice. As always, Sauvé sided with his friend and ally in City Hall, but in this case mostly ignored the transit strike. Garneau’s government was popular, with his smooth candour a welcome change after years of circumlocution by Cardinal and political hesitancy. Both men were personally popular, more so than their battered party brands. After a week, the transit strike was settled closer to Garneau’s terms than Drapeau’s, which did the premier no favours with City Hall. Drapeau was annoyed that Garneau had, in his view, followed the left rather than his. In truth Drapeau misjudged Garneau’s intentions: he wanted to conciliate labour whenever possible, and this time was no exception. For his part, Garneau believed public opinion was with him and was appalled at the attitude of his conservative foes. That year would close on an optimistic note for both leaders: Garneau because of his extended honeymoon, Sauvé because of his successful convention. For both men, the real tests were yet to come.

PAULSON: That fall, Newfoundland and Labrador launched a court challenge to the Churchill Falls contract signed in 1969, something which had been delayed under Frank Moores but pursued by Brian Peckford. Both sides expected it to reach the Supreme Court, and Quebec believed Newfoundland had little chance of winning. While somewhat sympathetic to Newfoundland’s plight, Garneau agreed with Sauvé that the contract could not be reopened simply because Newfoundland changed their mind. Moreover there would be an intense nationalist blowback if Garneau tried to reopen the contract, or so he believed. After consultation with his innermost ministerial circle, Garneau decided to wait for a Supreme Court decision and ignore Peckford’s overtures. In provincial terms, he found himself 1 of 2 Liberal first ministers alongside PEI's Bennett Campbell. Garneau was far more active on the first ministers’ circuit than Cardinal, often calling colleagues simply to catch up. There was little interprovincial discussion in 1979 after patriation’s success and a permanent hiatus on interprovincial trade barriers, despite tacit support from both Stanfield and Campbell. It seemed a quiet end to a banal year in Canadian politics, until leaks began that Australian trade talks were not going well at all. Even whispers threatened Stanfield’s American dream, for if an Australian agreement could not be concluded, American opponents would be emboldened.

Newfoundland and Labrador Premier Brian Peckford in 1979.

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BOIVIN: If it had been between our respective ministerial teams, an agreement could have been reached relatively easily. It was Fraser and the protectionist majority in his party which were opposed to significant liberalization measures, and not just on trade. Being a longtime student of Australian politics, none of this was new to me. Fraser was not worried about our potential deal, rather what would come afterwards. A failure would be embarrassing to us and harm our efforts on the US file. I told Bob and P&P [Planning and Priorities Cabinet committee] that we should begin discussing suspension of the talks at this rate. Talks could be resumed at a future date, in other words when another Australian government was in office. Bob, Don [Mazankowski], John [Crosbie] did not oppose on principle but after 3 hours we agreed that the subject would be revisited after Christmas. Most important was ensuring that a likely failure did not devolve into finger-pointing creating lasting damage in the bilateral relationship. Bob said he would speak with Fraser personally later that week, and that ended the meeting. On Thursday, Bob told me that he and Fraser would make a joint decision on suspension before Christmas, and we would be informed of its outcome immediately thereafter.

CHARLIE ROBERTSON, GLOBE AND MAIL FINANCIAL EDITOR: On December 2 the news broke that FIPA negotiations with Australia had been suspended until further notice, given current economic circumstances. The real reasons were political, as I wrote in my exclusive that day. It was because neither side wanted to damage the bilateral relationship with an outright collapse and more importantly, Australian domestic politics. I got many angry calls from Foreign Affairs, PMO and the Australian High Commission. None disputed my story’s central premise, except to be outraged that I had the audacity to print it. We had strongly supported the deal, as we did all free trade agreements. I thought potential effects on a US deal were overrated, since Carter wanted a deal and Fraser didn’t. Stanfield could hardly be blamed for Australian domestic politics, nor would the details resonate among Canadian voters. With a subdued Liberal reaction, Stanfield’s annoyance at us seemed rather bizarre. All I could do is hope that Stanfield would not use this as an excuse to slow-walk an American deal, which was absolutely vital to our economic future.
 
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JOHN CROSBIE: Our 1980 budget was going to be tougher than any previous one, including some fee hikes and moderate spending cuts. Bob was adamantly opposed to any program reform, seeing them as essentially a sacred trust. Cuts were fine but not injecting private elements into public programs like the Chateau group favoured. We planned for a mid-February budget as usual, with the usual opposition criticisms that our tax hikes were not appropriately targeted. At the same time we were preparing for free trade negotiations with the US come April. Given the domestic and international situation, it was obvious that political calm would not be with us much longer. I wanted to get the toughest budgetary measures in this budget, before we had to start thinking about campaigns again. Our gas tax increase would engender fierce opposition from many of our supporters, yet given the options I had no choice but to raise it. We all agreed that the theme would be shared sacrifice, seeing as this increase would hit all Canadians in their pockets. There was hardly a murmur of dissent either in committee or full Cabinet, even as backbench warnings multiplied. Bob ignored them, as he often did in this period. He told us that he was doing what was right for the country, not the party.

PAT NOWLAN, FOREIGN MINISTER: At the end of January, I received notice that our hostage rescue operation in Iran had been successful, with the 6 diplomats returning to the US through Switzerland. I was not the only one who received notice: the story was about to break in the Montreal Star, and we had to lean on them heavily for a bit longer until the hostage situation was resolved. Ultimately we would not succeed, the story broke about 2 weeks later and the embassy had to be closed. Nonetheless, that rescue was one of my proudest moments as foreign minister and for Bob as PM too. Despite the extremely tense situation, Tehran later decided not to formally sever relations. Canadians began to feel a little less pessimistic about the future despite economic conditions precluded another halo as during patriation and the Jubilee. Politically, the numbers showed we were in a decent position without the budget. With the budget measures implemented, well, let’s just say that the backbenchers had reason for anxiety. I was just anxious to begin free trade talks, which we intended to be our crowning policy achievement after the Constitution. Bob felt we should tread slowly given the US election year dynamic and the likelihood of a Republican White House.

Finance Minister John Crosbie speaks during the budget debate, Feb. 19, 1980.

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GAGNON: The provincial budget was broadly similar to the federal one: a mixture of spending cuts and tax hikes, albeit with a higher dose of the former in Quebec City’s case. As in Ottawa, the opposition bemoaned tax increases on ordinary citizens, though needless to say from different ideological perspectives. Sauvé and his finance critic Mario Beaulieu, opposed to tax increases in principle, were not totally displeased to see indirect rather than direct taxes be raised by their Liberal opponents. Quebec City’s budget debate was much more sedate than Ottawa’s, where Campbell and Broadbent fired populist broadsides at the Tories every waking hour Parliament was in session. Both provincial leaders were fighting media attacks on the new residence as a profligate waste of taxpayer money and were equally dismissive of their critics. Garneau felt it was long overdue for premiers who did not live in the capital; however he had hesitated somewhat in the negotiation due to cost. The pool in particular became a target of media criticism. For his part, Sauvé bristled when one interviewer asked what his father would have thought about a taxpayer-funded residence. Nothing enraged him more than having his filial loyalty questioned, especially by journalists. For my part, I wrote that while a residence was necessary, a smaller one would have sufficed.

TIMMINS: The PQ’s virtual disappearance prompted progressives to organize within the PLQ and especially at the municipal level, where Drapeau’s personal popularity remained high even as dissatisfaction with his system rose. Garneau focused on improving public housing, expanding the CLSC network and promoting clean energy initiatives. One clean energy initiative which was opposed by environmentalists but supported by the UN was expanding the Gentilly-series of nuclear reactors first built in 1972. Municipally, the MCM had moderated somewhat and looked to reclaim their spot as Drapeau’s major opponent. Knowing that Drapeau’s next election was likely to be his last, and given the personalist nature of Montreal parties, both Garneau and Sauvé began casting for a successor. This annoyed Drapeau, who had his own succession candidate in city councillor and PC fundraiser Claude Dupras. Both men brushed off Drapeau’s complaints, fearful that the metropolis would fall into “socialist” hands under Doré. In their minds such a person would need to be an outsider, perhaps a progressive amenable to playing ball with Quebec City regardless of which party held office. They would search long and hard for some time, but ultimately would be unsuccessful. To the MCM, mere rumours of provincial interference were “another 1957”, in reference to Duplessis’ successful backing of Liberal Sarto Fournier.

SAUVÉ: Apart from the CCC [Concerned Citizens Council], a legitimate watchdog, our media critics were a bunch of hypocritical whiners in my opinion. It was a mutually agreed expense which would be forgotten soon enough, like what happened in Ottawa when they followed our lead. In any polity there are always professional whiners who think any sort of accommodation upgrade which doesn’t involve safety is cause for hysteria. It was one thing for premiers who were bachelors or had adult kids: Raymond and I had 6 preteens between us in 1980, so the question of accommodation was hardly a hypothetical exercise. As for Montreal, it was an open secret that Drapeau’s next election would be his last. It was incumbent upon all of us who wanted responsible, not necessarily even conservative, governance to find such a candidate. My focus that winter was on persuading voters that we deserved a better budget and economic performance than we were getting from the government.

CANADIAN GALLUP POLL, MAR. 15-17, 1980

IF A FEDERAL ELECTION TODAY, WHICH PARTY’S CANDIDATE DO YOU THINK YOU WOULD FAVOUR?

PC: 42.5%
LIBERAL: 38.1%
NDP: 19.0%
 
PAULSON: On Apr. 4, 1980, the Cullen Commission submitted its report to Parliament recommending a free trade agreement with the United States after a 3-year study. Long expected, the report sent shockwaves which would reverberate for many years throughout Canadian politics. Stanfield immediately accepted the report’s recommendations and announced that preliminary negotiations about talks would begin shortly. In fact, as was revealed shortly thereafter, those preliminary talks had been ongoing since the previous winter. The NDP immediately announced its flat opposition to any trade deal with the US, while the Liberals decided to support talks in principle while waiting before making a final decision. Campbell, like Davis, favoured free trade with the US but wanted cultural protections in place before signing onto an agreement. He united his caucus around the wait-and-see posture, hoping the final agreement was one he could support. Privately, he vowed that an existing agreement would be honoured by a Liberal government, with only minor modifications if any. To do otherwise would seriously damage bilateral relations and Canada’s international reputation. “We can’t have a transitory signature” was how he characterized his stance to his innermost circle. Campbell was optimistic that the left would agree with him, even as he worried about leaving the NDP an Ontarian opening.

GARNEAU: As with Australia, I decided not to offer a resolution supporting free trade out of deference to Alex’s wishes. Privately I was crystal-clear about the fact that if he wanted to gain this province’s trust, he had to support free trade with the US. We had always favoured it, instead we were held back by Southern Ontario dictating national economic policy. For his part, Pierre strongly encouraged Stanfield to pursue free trade when he visited Montreal later that month. I told Alex he had to put the left in their place, where frankly they belonged, on this issue and others if he wanted to win the election. We had learned our lesson after 3 defeats, listened to voters and won big in 1978. Alex had already taken some steps in that regard by keeping Chrétien and appointing an economic team from the centrist wing. It was an open secret that Turner would retire at the next election and return to business, and Jean would be his successor as finance critic. He needed another Quebec business voice, and I was skeptical about the Martin rumours. For one thing, Martin was very ambitious and only 5 years younger than Alex, there would inevitably be media-created intrigue almost instantly. Secondly, I doubted whether he’d be the man for that job.

BOIVIN: Bob decided to begin negotiations immediately even though he knew it was a presidential election year, reasoning that we’d get the deal regardless of who won and Reagan was much better for us anyways. Once negotiations inevitably paused in the fall, they could be taken up in January. Everyone on “E” felt that way, as did all of Cabinet and just about everyone in caucus. I wanted to expunge the ghosts of our Australian failure and set a precedent for trade talks with other countries. We had blown 3 opportunities and now had a golden chance for redemption on the 4th try. Whether the Liberals supported us for the moment was not something any of us cared about, since we were confident they would not cripple bilateral and allied relations by tearing up an agreement. We estimated that negotiation would take 2-3 years for a successful conclusion, leaving us enough time till the next election. If we had to run out the parliamentary clock for a deal, then as Bob said, so be it. The cultural protection issue was not one I considered a deal-breaker, nor did Bob for matter. We felt that way for different reasons: its economic ineffectiveness for me, the importance of a deal for Bob.

Municipal Affairs Minister Victor Goldbloom in 1980. A reform Liberal, Goldbloom was a bitter enemy of Drapeau's.

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TIMMINS: Quebec City had another quiet spring sitting close in mid-May, a more productive one than the previous autumn, with public housing expanded and a major curriculum update implemented. Both party leaders alternated between fundraising and a light speaking circuit before summer vacation. Neither was in a talkative mood, feeling there was not much to discuss that had not been covered in interviews during the session. They were both optimistic about free trade’s prospects and in their own arena, relieved that the Bois-de-Coulonge controversy was over. Neither of them wanted to discuss a slumping economy for different reasons: Garneau because that would undermine his narrative that things were slowly turning around, Sauvé because he was saving his biggest policy announcements. Even while they wanted to keep provincial politics out of their mind, both monitored the Ottawa rumour mill closely for a possible midterm shuffle. Towards the end of the month, both leaders met separately with Drapeau to discuss municipal issues in theory, but in reality to sooth ruffled feathers over the succession flap. The mayor was irritated but not annoyed, for he considered both men friends and allies. One thing which would not change was the mutual disdain between Drapeau and Goldbloom, and Drapeau made many pro forma requests for Goldbloom’s replacement.

GAGNON: When Parliament recessed in mid-June, Stanfield began considering his midterm Cabinet shuffle once again. He had done his previous shuffles in August, but now he considered doing it in July to give his ministers more time with their new portfolios. There were two major retirements to work with: Alvin Hamilton, Walter Dinsdale and Marcel Lambert. Their replacements would, as per standard practice, be from the same province or region and wing if possible to maintain the Cabinet’s finely crafted balance. That is why despite excellent reviews for Elmer MacKay as Solicitor General, Stanfield could not appoint him Lambert’s replacement. The prime minister believed he needed more Ontario and Quebec voices to counteract notions of an Atlantic-Western coalition which neglected Central Canada. Most of the other ministers were happy with their current portfolios, could not be moved for balancing reasons, or usually both. Stanfield decided to spend time with Ged Baldwin, Erik Nielsen and Tom Bell to create a list of potential rookies for promotion, a meeting which would take place shortly after Canada Day. The Chateau group, enthused by free trade, made no Cabinet request of Stanfield. After all, the entire economic team was either allied or cordial.
 
TIMMINS: Stanfield decided only to replace his retiring ministers rather than revamp the entire Cabinet, seeing as he saw no reason to change most portfolios. Jake Epp would take over Public Works from fellow Manitoban Walter Dinsdale, making Epp the first Mormon cabinet minister in Canadian history. Alvin Hamilton’s replacement would be Ray Hnatyshyn at Energy, and Marcel Lambert’s would be Robert Laviolette from Beauce. The shuffle took place July 8, and then Stanfield departed on a much-needed vacation where he would consider his own future. He used the shuffle to encourage speculation he would seek a fourth term, when in reality he had no intention of leading his party into another election. Low-intensity rumours had been circulating for a couple of weeks, which Stanfield deflected by saying he would serve as long as the party wanted him to. It was a clever ruse because that line is normally used by leaders who have no intention of leaving for the foreseeable future. I was not fooled, having excellent PMO sources who told me that an announcement would be made “sometime this year” about Stanfield’s future. Any Tory leadership race was bound to be fractured and messy, with no single candidate standing out above the fray. There would be one important candidate who passed on running.

JANIS JOHNSON, PC PARTY PRESIDENT: Bob told me at the end of July to prepare for an announcement at the caucus strategy session. He wanted a longer leadership race to allow for a wide range of candidates and issue debates, having led the party longer than anyone since Borden. Bob was adamant that the winner must not be from a Maritime province, and while he wanted regional representation, it would be only for that purpose. He informed his inner circle individually via phone, including Erik [Nielsen] and Ged [Baldwin].Nielsen wanted to run for leader but he had a serious issue in his private life which prevented him from running. He had told me in strictest secrecy about that some years earlier and said that was the reason he would never run for leader. Erik was neither surprised nor upset about Bob’s decision, feeling that his work was done and it was time for someone else to lead the party. While they were never close personally, they trusted each other completely and Nielsen wanted to continue as deputy regardless of who ran the leadership race. If the likely frontrunners were who I thought they would be, then Erik was virtually guaranteed to keep his job. I set an executive meeting for Aug. 23; the day after Bob was due to announce his decision to caucus.

MARJORY LEBRETON, PMO APPOINTMENTS DIRECTOR: Bob had several reasons for retiring, foremost among them a desire to retire with his family after spending almost his entire adult life. People forget now, but he had been leading a party continuously for 31 years by that point, 19 years in Nova Scotia and 12 federally. He was 66 and would be nearly 70 by the next election, and his doctors wanted him to take it easy. Bob agreed, having seen King and St. Laurent become increasingly disengaged in all but the most important decisions and in St. Laurent’s case, become visibly frail. Under no circumstances would Bob put himself in such a position. Finally he had accomplished almost everything he wanted to do except free trade, which he had initiated after years of preparation. Combine all these factors and there was no reason for him to stay. Bob always thought very little of leaders who stayed for what he saw as pure egotism rather than accomplishing things for ordinary people. He looked forward to retirement and supporting whoever our next leader would be. Bob told me that he would resign his seat immediately and return to private life once his successor was sworn in, since Halifax deserved a full-time MP. Nor would there be any public political involvement: he would offer advice if asked but do no fundraisers or any other partisan events.

SAUVÉ: We were vacationing with friends in Marseilles when I was notified of Bob’s announcement, which was both expected and sad. I never thought he would run again, even before the free trade announcement. Bob had been an excellent prime minister and party leader who would receive his due from history, even as I felt it was time for a leadership change by that point. I encouraged Roch La Salle to run, believing the time was ripe for a fellow right-winger to be elected leader. Electing one of us would go some way to proving that our party had no language barrier for any position, including leader. I told Roch I would personally support him if he ran, but first to sound out any fellow conservatives who were running. I knew that Maz [Don Mazankowski] might be interested, as was Michael Forrestal, Flora, [MacDonald] and Paul Yewchuk. Maz and Paul were not precisely of our wing, but they were allies and willing to move significantly rightward than Bob or any of his likeliest Red successors would. What was important was sticking together, and Roch needed no encouragement on my part or anyone else’s to run. Within a week he had already made up his mind and told me so about a week later.


Prime Minister Robert Stanfield announces his impending retirement at the National Press Club, Aug. 24, 1980.

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PAULSON: Stanfield’s announcement spawned a notable but not crowded field. Defence Minister Michael Forrestal, Treasury Board President Don Mazankowski, Immigration Minister Roch La Salle, Heritage Minister Flora MacDonald and businessman Peter Pocklington would round out the field of major candidates. Deputy Prime Minister Erik Nielsen and finance minister John Crosbie decided not to run, as did premiers Peter Lougheed of Alberta and Bill Davis of Ontario. Stanfield joked that “we’ve had enough premiers for a while” after Bracken, Drew and himself, while Campbell was another 4-term Maritime premier. Lougheed was unilingual while Davis only wanted to govern Ontario. Neither man would publicly support a candidate, believing that they could work with whoever had a realistic chance of winning. The convention date was set for March 6-8, giving the winner more than 2 years of a mandate before having to face voters in summer 1983. Stanfield’s political position was mildly positive and shaky, so he wanted to give his successor all the time they needed to establish themselves.
 
O’SULLIVAN: The executive’s decision to hold a March convention was ill-advised considering there was a strong possibility that Bill Davis might call a spring election and we would be useful in our ridings. He was not upset, telling me not to worry when I told him, but both of us found it amusing that his wishes were not considered on this issue. Bill said while theoretically he might be tempted by a federal race, he much preferred leading his province than “herding cats” federally. There would be no leadership endorsement from him since there were no candidates whose agendas would be detrimental to Ontarian interests. Pocklington’s candidacy amused him, an accomplished if naive businessman trying for the leadership as his first political move. For my part I had not yet decided on a candidate, having narrowed my choices to Roch La Salle or Maz. Both were excellent candidates who would be worthy successors to Bob at 24 Sussex. The Ontarian caucus was deeply divided, with progressives supporting Flora or Forrestal while we decided between Roch and Maz. Later that month I resolved to endorse before Christmas, ideally in the last month before recess. I was very close to endorsing by Halloween after meeting both candidates, when one’s superiority became obvious to me.

SAUVÉ: The Pocklington vanity run was mildly amusing entertainment for me, since there are few things more amusing in politics than donors trying to become candidates. He would support Maz or Roch depending on who came out on top in that battle, while Mike Forrestal seemed likely to overtake Flora among Reds because he could build a broader coalition. Marie persuaded Sean and a handful of other Ontario MPs to support Roch over Maz, which while not a breakthrough per se signalled Ontarian donors that it was OK to donate. I shook some of our usual donors for Roch when he held a Montreal fundraiser just before Halloween, encouraging them to support the man who could well be the party’s first Francophone leader. When in Toronto for pleasure, I ran into Allister Grossart, who told me “it’s time” for a Blue leader, and he was remaining neutral so all candidates could seek his advice. A meeting with him had not been on my schedule, but we found time to have dinner and discuss the race in great depth. Eventually we came to slightly different conclusions about how the race would end despite agreeing on many specifics. As with the Liberal race a year earlier, the lack of an Ontarian frontrunner made the race much more interesting than it would otherwise have been.


PC leadership candidate and Edmonton Oilers owner Peter Pocklington in Vancouver, December 1980.

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PAULSON: November was when Dalton Camp announced his endorsement of Mike Forrestal, in contrast to his neutral colleague Grossart. Camp’s influence had gradually waned during the Stanfield era but he was still a name for journalists to cover. Peter Lougheed endorsed Don Mazankowski while John Buchanan and Brian Peckford endorsed Forrestal. Sterling Lyon endorsed Mazankowski, and Bill Davis and Pierre Sauvé remained neutral. Davis’ neutrality was real; Sauvé backed La Salle but did not say so publicly except to compliment La Salle when his name was mentioned. Nielsen preferred Mazankowski while Stanfield himself had no strong preference for a successor. Stanfield’s ambivalence was reflected among the Tory donor class, which had no strong preference other than avoiding another Atlantic candidate. Bay Street knew Blue grassroots power was waxing despite their minority status in Ontario and the Maritimes, and made to sure to fund Mazankowski and La Salle quite handsomely. Diefenbaker’s gang was completely Balkanized: Camp with Forrestal, O’Sullivan to La Salle, Grossart neutral and Hamilton for Mazankowski. Never before or since has the Tory establishment and donor class been so splintered in a leadership race, which reflected conflicting election and demographic impulses more than anything else. Some felt it was a Quebecer’s turn, others that Mazankowski represented the best bridge between both wings, and a smaller group that was pro-Forrestal.

TIMMINS: While the Tory leadership race made for excellent political copy, I was also focused on something a little closer to home: the Gazette’s demise. After a few years of losing the circulation wars to us and heavy losses, their journalists went on strike that fall. The strike was dragging to an end by November, but even before a settlement had been reached it was clear they would not survive. We would now have the English market to ourselves, as the Chronicle-Telegraph was our sole major competitor elsewhere in the province. They too had bled circulation, teetering on the financial edge between daily and weekly. Pierre was happy we won the war but told me that both parties had received job applications for their former journalists, which he was disinclined to accept seeing as he already had enough English communications staffers and moreover, had been displeased with Gazette coverage of his party. We discussed the Tory leadership, where he was backing La Salle, and free trade negotiations which would be much easier with Reagan’s election. Both of us were lifelong US political junkies and had followed the election with great interest. My other country of interest was Britain, Pierre’s France. Both of us agreed that too little attention was paid to foreign policy in federal political discourse.

GAGNON: 1980 went to Garneau by a narrow margin, with Liberal social policies popular even as the economy continued to deteriorate. Garneau and his economic team continued to believe the economy would improve and voters would see their moderate approach as best for Quebec in an increasingly uncertain time. Neither leader underestimated the other, nor did they waver in their respective approaches. For his part, Sauvé believed either voters would tire of the status quo or a crisis would remind swing voters why they preferred Unionist rule. Polls showed a dead heat or small Liberal lead throughout that fall, reflecting the electorate’s ambivalence. A deteriorating economy and mild yet perceptible optimism were the two political strands worth watching as 1981 came into view. If the former became dominant, Sauvé would gain the advantage, if the latter then Garneau would have a springboard to urge a continuation. The true tests for both men were still to come, with their nature being quite obvious even then.

CROP PROVINCIAL POLL, DECEMBER 1980

IF A PROVINCIAL ELECTION WERE HELD TODAY, WHICH PARTY'S CANDIDATE WOULD YOU SUPPORT?

LIBERAL: 49%
UN: 47%
PQ: 4%
 
TIMMINS: Winter 1981 was an exciting time to be a Tory: leadership race, budget and impending Ontario election all in 3 short months. Crosbie was planning for a transitional budget, essentially an update of the previous one given the highly uncertain leadership outcome. By January the field had essentially solidified between Forrestal and La Salle, who had consolidated their respective wings of the party. Forrestal was handicapped by being another Nova Scotian after Stanfield, a sort of Maritime fatigue which afflicted Ontarian donors. By 1981 being Blue was no longer a detriment in the PC Party, indeed it was hovering between neutral and net positive. The Tory activists were moving right, however in Ontario Red Tories still controlled the Big Blue Machine and a majority of the federal caucus. Ontarian Blues’ leading provincial representative was Treasurer Frank Miller, who remained publicly neutral and privately backed La Salle. Their federal leader was Hamilton MP Sean O’Sullivan, the party’s young prodigy and a tireless organizer. Davis preferred Forrestal on issues and probably personally voted for him, but true to form he did not make a public endorsement or pressure his divided organization one way or another. He felt both leading candidates would be good for Ontario, and that was ultimately mattered to him.

GAGNON: Pierre Sauvé, for obvious reasons, would make no public interventions in the PC leadership race. Even his private interventions were limited, since the party’s grassroots and caucus were overwhelmingly ideologically conservative by the early 1980s. His defenestration of Heward Grafftey 4 years earlier had been a rare and unforgettable exception to that rule, one not forgotten in 1981. While moderate federalists and nationalists were represented in PC delegate selection meetings, they were a small minority, probably no more than 25% between them. Between ideological connections and a viable favourite son for the first time in modern Tory history, the delegation would vote almost en bloc for La Salle, an advantage matched by Mazankowski in Alberta and Forrestal in the Maritimes. Mostly he was focused on his budget reply and policy convention that spring, which would be his biggest test yet as leader. He promised that this would be where he unveiled the “big bang” cryptically mentioned to me shortly after his leadership victory. The government was planning a budget similar to the previous years, loaded with localization measures for social services and moderate spending cuts. As usual, the economy would remain front and centre as signs grew that a mild recovery might not materialize after all. That is without mentioning the impending Common Front negotiations.

O’SULLIVAN: It would be utterly false to say that the rural/urban cleavage in our delegation was ideological. After all, Frost and Bill were rural, as were Frank [Miller] and Scott [Barton]. I’m an urban conservative. One of our greatest strengths has always been ideological diversity at both the provincial and federal levels, a key to our dynastic longevity at Queen’s Park. In February I took a short break from organizing to focus on our input for the budget speech, which was a transitory budget given leadership uncertainty. I knew John Crosbie would continue at Finance whether Mike or Roch moved into 24 Sussex, which boded well for us. Indeed, apart from the winners I doubted whether any significant shuffling would take place. Bob’s practice of only absolutely mandatory shuffling would endure with both Mike and Roch. Bob told me that he planned for a very active but quiet retirement. No speeches, no fundraisers or any partisan activity except in matters of “grave national interest.” This would be similar to his immediate predecessors, all of whom had largely, Trudeau being the exception, withdrawn from public life after leaving Parliament. Leslie Frost had done the same provincially, only doing a couple of interviews before his death. Bob believed very strongly that once you leave the stage, you leave for good.

PAULSON: Bill Davis called the Ontario election for April 13th on February 28th, immediately after his budget speech. With a shaky economy, he appealed as always to stability and his government’s proven economic track record. His personal popularity remained stratospheric, in the 70% range, and the Tories expected to potentially pick up a handful of seats from both opposition parties. Since 1977 David Peterson had revitalized his party and regained the Liberal position as principal opponent to the Davis government, since NDP leader Michael Cassidy was a lacklustre anti-establishmentarian who had little appeal outside his party’s core electorate. Like Davis, Peterson believed in a big-tent party led by moderates such as himself despite the prominence of certain left-wingers like Hamiltonian Sheila Copps. Copps was already a controversial and polarizing figure within the OLP by 1981, a progressive if pragmatic firebrand who believed the Grits needed to consolidate the left first. Ontario MPs devoted as much time as possible to pitching in for their respective parties, while the Tories were diverted by leadership politics as they prepared to convene in Toronto to elect Bob Stanfield’s successor. For his part, Davis could watch his opponents tear each other apart to become the clear alternative as in 1977. Polling between 15-18% ahead of the Grits, only his majority’s size remained in question.

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MULRONEY: March was an excellent month: Roch was elected party leader at a very harmonious convention, continuing our momentum from a well-received February budget. I was in the gallery just before the convention to watch the tributes to Bob as he prepared to leave for a well-deserved retirement. Roch was sworn in as Prime Minister on March 20 and Bob resigned his seat the following day, with a by-election shortly to be scheduled for June. Roch told me he was considering proroguing Parliament and opening a new session in the fall with a Throne Speech reflecting the change in leadership. I was wary, since a sharp rightward turn needed time for adjustment – you couldn’t just swing on a dime without a mandate from voters. Roch said he would consider both a Throne Speech and my suggestion of a fall economic update, which would suit his policy goals just as well. One thing which we readily agreed on was that Parliament would not enter its fifth year, since we believed that in peacetime there was no real reason for it. If you had to do that, then you’re heading to a landslide loss anyways.
 
MARK ROSS, GLOBE AND MAIL, AUTHOR OF “BIG BLUE MACHINE:” Election night ended almost as quickly as it began, with another Tory majority projected at poll closing. What took a little longer to sort out was who would be official opposition, and around 10 the networks projected a Liberal opposition. The decapitation strategy pursued by both Tories and Grits against the NDP worked handsomely: they would only have 18 seats in the 125-seat Legislature, arrayed against 31 Grits and 76 Tories. Among NDP casualties were Michael Cassidy himself and two of his likeliest successors, all on the party’s left wing. Bill Davis had nearly equalled his 1971 score of 78 seats while Peterson had emerged as his clear challenger. Both men could take immense satisfaction in this victory for both external and internal reasons, and Davis could expect another four years of clear sailing. Peterson was strengthened in his argument against the left, for he had gained NDP seats while running on a moderate platform. Prime Minister La Salle and all the provincial conservative leaders phoned with congratulations, as Davis settled down to another 4 years in the Pink Palace. Meanwhile the NDP was stuck with a handful of left-wingers to contest the battle for Cassidy’s succession, which gave Peterson no small measure of satisfaction.


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MULRONEY: After Ontario there would be Manitoba, where Sterling Lyon called a June election just days after Bill Davis and his new Cabinet were sworn in. If we could keep our momentum going then that would bode well for us in a pre-election year. Roch’s focus remained the free trade agreement, which was the last major policy initiative he wanted done before the election. He had accepted my argument for a fall economic update rather than a Throne Speech reflecting changing economic conditions as signs multiplied that our hoped-for spring recovery was not materializing. Our polling showed the winter lead turning to a dead heat despite a successful convention and generally positive media coverage since Bob had announced his retirement months earlier. Before the convention there had been some thought of a snap election after the new leader was installed, like Trudeau in 1968, to head off the gathering economic clouds. Now all thoughts of a snap election, which Roch never entertained for a second, were banished. Alex Campbell was a formidable opponent, who had revitalized a sleepy Liberal Party and had succeeded as both plucky underdog and rock-star incumbent in PEI. We needed a message beyond stability, having seen how disastrous that could be with poor fundamentals in the previous Quebec election.


GAGNON: While the spring sitting slowly wound down, the Union Nationale prepared for the June policy convention which would largely determine their election platform. In 1979 Sauvé had simply uploaded his leadership manifesto into the party’s platform, while saving the most controversial elements for later. Preparations were closely held to a handful of senior policy aides who were held to strict secrecy: Sauvé did not want plans leaking before counterattacks had been devised. He had toured the province for roughly a year, meeting voters and various sectoral leaders to seek policy input. His major promises would be economic: privatization, tax and spending cuts, labour reform. The latter was what promised to be extremely controversial given his proposed solution. When I asked whether he was considered about a backlash and alienating moderate voters, he said voters would understand “when the time came.” For their part, the Liberals were still focusing on education and healthcare reform. On education, the Union Nationale favoured a greater private role while their Liberal counterparts preferred public systems, but otherwise both were generally pro-reform. Healthcare was a predictable dividing line, with the hospital insurance system created in 1961 mixed with federal Medicare. Opposition from the Unionist right under Cardinal and Liberal concern about mounting costs had prevented implementation of a full provincial Medicare system.



PAULSON: Roch La Salle’s ascension to the Tory helm was historic in two ways: he was a Quebecer and a right-winger, in a party which had been overtly hostile to the former and ambivalent at best towards the latter. La Salle had neither the mandate nor the skill to impose a right-wing agenda on his party, indeed in many ways the intraparty tension under Stanfield merely changed directions. He and his advisors wanted to reassure moderate voters that there would be no major shifts before La Salle won a mandate of his own. Like their Ontarian cousins, any ideological reorientation would be gradualist and narrowly focused. Bill Davis had personally encouraged La Salle to adopt that approach, as had Peckford and Buchanan. There would be a more restrictive fall update and budget planned, while beyond that La Salle made minimal changes to the policy playbook inherited from Stanfield. A full debate on the party’s ideological future would wait until after the election. In the meantime, their attention would be wholly devoted to signing what was known internally as CUSFTA before the election. La Salle was cautious and essentially small-c conservative personally, much like Stanfield had been, even if his populist nationalism sometimes gave a contrary impression to the unfamiliar.



ROY: Ultimately Sauvé decided to simply propose repeal of the Labour Code requirement mandating Rand formula usage under certain conditions rather than a formal right-to-work law on American lines. It was a shrewd decision, since his policy goal could be enshrined into law without creating an excessive backlash among moderates. He could simply say that employers now had the choice, and if they liked the Rand formula they could keep it. The other big policy resolution was privatizing liquor, as had recently been done in Alberta. Outside the policy arena, Sauvé had enacted a constitutional amendment changing the leadership election mechanism from a delegated convention to one-member-one-vote, a first for any major Canadian party. Besides the leader and his caucus’ deep commitment to party democracy, a new voting system would enhance the party’s populist ethos and nurture its volunteer base. This was in certain ways finishing what Johnson and Cardinal had started when they had gradually built a small-donor base. In Sauvé’s view, while delegated conventions were undoubtedly more fun for delegates, they led to insularity and an excessively narrow representation of rank-and-file views. “How many younger couples or farmers have the time to go through multiple rounds?” was a question he repeatedly asked megadonor skeptics.
 
ROY: An unambiguously right-wing platform emerging from that policy convention reflected not only Sauvé’s personal beliefs but also his view that the party evolved in phases ideologically. It was a paraphrase of his father’s policy speeches nearly a quarter-century earlier when explaining how he was simultaneously continuing and diverging from Duplessis-era policies. He praised Johnson while being somewhat critical of Cardinal, who at that time was ailing and not expected to survive the year. Having covered their sharp disagreements in government, nothing he said was particularly new. “Intellectual paralysis” was his more polite term for what he felt bedevilled that government, whereas under Johnson there was a plan and sense of purpose which disappeared slowly after his death and disappeared by 1975. After the interview was published I did not get a phone call from Cardinal or any of his former aides, but I heard that they were even more infuriated than usual. Sauvé, as usual, could not care less: he had told me nothing for public consumption which he had not told Cardinal and other colleagues, often in less decorous language. Fortunately for him, his comments were overshadowed by the Liberal policy convention 2 weeks later. At that convention, Garneau made little news of his own, with resolutions passed essentially urging the government to stay on course.

TIMMINS: I called that summer “observation circle” because everyone was observing their rivals and the economy, while essentially confirming their spring conclusions. A deteriorating economy further convinced La Salle that he had been right not to call a snap election in April or May, Garneau that his moderation would win his next election, and Bill Davis that his timing had been just right. Signs abounded that we were about to enter a recession, which would not be confirmed for a couple of months. As for policy, Tories were on the verge of the intellectual paralysis which had plagued the Unionists only a few years earlier. La Salle decided to bring in a more restrictive economic update and budget than Stanfield had planned, yet beyond that his options were limited because of his razor-thin mandate and a caucus which was wary of sharp rightward turns either on principle for Reds or timing for Blues. It was even quieter than usual until Cardinal died on July 27th. In many ways the funeral and reactions were similar to Jean-Jacques Bertrand’s funeral a few years earlier. Despite being premier for nearly 8 years, his shallow roots in the party portended a minimal political, as opposed to policy, legacy. This had been foreshadowed by Paul Bouchard in a 1976 Le Devoir article marking Cardinal’s 5th anniversary as premier.

ALEX CAMPBELL: My view then and now is that the Tories were exactly where they wanted to be on policy. They were running on a centre-right platform and if they won, Reds could claim vindication. If they lost, Blues could claim vindication for “pale pink pastels” as Reagan had memorably jibed a few years earlier. Otherwise it seemed like La Salle was just sleepwalking into a recession, given his lackadaisical response to the crisis. When I was crisscrossing the country, few people were talking about the trade negotiations or foreign policy – they were worried about losing their job. It was around this time when I said that a recession is when your neighbour loses their job, a depression when you lose yours and recovery when Roch La Salle loses his. We had lost in the ‘70s because we were not seen as credible on the economy and too detached from everyday concerns. Now our roles were reversed: we had the manifesto and they had a bunch of collected bullet points scribbled down before an election. Before the policy convention, I met with Paul Martin and confirmed that he would run in Montreal for us at the next election. He was quite sensitive about not being seen as a “rich man’s Liberal” and decided to run in Lasalle-Émard.

GAGNON: In August the conservative premiers met in Vancouver to discuss a common political strategy in advance of the federal election, a summit where Bennett spoke for the Blues and Davis for the Reds. Bennett, though personally sympathetic to the federal Tories, could not endorse given his party’s nature as a Conservative-Liberal coalition. Davis felt La Salle needed to pay more attention to Ontario and while free trade would undoubtedly cost them manufacturing votes; it was a price worth paying. Short-term pain for long-term gain is how Davis phrased it. Sterling Lyon and Bill Bennett wanted a commitment to privatizing Air Canada and CN, which La Salle was inclined to make in Air Canada’s case. CN was a bridge too far for La Salle to sell his Red caucus members on, and it would be deferred until the next policy convention. Despite their ideological differences, all the premiers had cordial if not necessarily friendly personal relations. La Salle did not listen to the premiers as much as Stanfield or Campbell, their former colleagues. That was partially out of pride and partially because he felt their influence was too strong within the PC Party. He preferred Peter Lougheed’s “non-interference, non-indifference” to the interventionism of Davis and Lyon.

Prime Minister Roch La Salle speaking in St. Hyacinthe, Quebec, Aug. 14, 1981.

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Ontario Premier Bill Davis holds a press conference, September 1981.

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PAULSON: La Salle’s announcement that a re-elected Tory government would privatize Air Canada fell flat for several reasons; foremost among them that privatization was hardly atop anyone’s minds in those economic conditions. Secondly, that La Salle was more focused on his own wish list than the electorate’s, which was craving some form of economic relief. Finally, there was notable tension among Tory MPs who were not so much worried about Air Canada itself as what was next. While La Salle certainly believed in Air Canada privatization, it was mostly a distraction, as the government’s signature policy of free trade had been defused as a wedge by Campbell’s tacit support. The other proposed policy of mortgage relief was seen as fiscally irresponsible with mounting deficits, just as it had been when Stanfield floated the idea 4 years earlier. Nonetheless, La Salle and his senior ministers believed they had a fighting chance to win the next election by attacking Campbell’s economic credibility. That is, his deep interest in land planning as premier and musings about environmentalism and economic development.
 
FLORA MACDONALD: I chose to remain in Cabinet because I knew arguing for my beliefs would be much easier inside than outside, even if La Salle did not make it easy. Unlike Bob, he was rarely interested in widespread consultation and instead preferred to make decisions in committee with some backbench input. Backbenchers would be invited in individually and their riding’s concerns taken into account if La Salle felt generous. CN privatization and free trade I could swallow for the party’s sake, even if I personally disapproved of both. If we won, I had no illusions about remaining at Heritage or even in Cabinet. La Salle did not like me and would want an ideological soulmate to implement the FTA’s cultural provisions. We also had the recession to deal with, which La Salle essentially left to the Bank [of Canada] while preaching the need for stability. I felt we were lacking a signature policy which could rally Ontario behind us and that La Salle lacked personal definition. He had been Prime Minister for a few months yet few outside Quebec really knew him or what he stood for. Despite our difficulties, Cabinet was still a mostly content team, with Albertans the most content of all. Marie [Boivin] and I remained friends throughout the government’s life, for instance.


Heritage Minister Flora MacDonald scrums outside the Commons foyer, c. 1981.

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GAGNON: October was when the recession was officially confirmed, just as another Common Front negotiation was beginning. Polls were now reflecting economic anxiety as the biggest issue, with a small but consistent Unionist lead replacing the tie which had been standard for over a year. These negotiations would end by March 1982, and hard times predisposed Garneau to take a harder line than he might otherwise have considered. He wanted to be fair without a “total giveaway”, a compromise of the sort hammered out by his Unionist predecessors. For his part, Sauvé saw the Common Front as his biggest strategic foe and an inadvertent tactical ally if negotiations went sour. He kept mostly silent except when absolutely necessary, believing that little good could come from being outspoken on this file. Having unveiled his alternative in June, he was content to sit back and take pleasure from Garneau’s angst on an issue which both leaders intuitively knew would be electorally decisive. The time when both leaders had briefly aimed for a more relaxed, almost bipartisan atmosphere had long since ended. Their respective supporters wanted a return to the more adversarial climate of a decade earlier, and both leaders gave them exactly what they wanted. In truth, that is also what they wanted for strategic and personal reasons.

TIMMINS: Campbell and his closest advisors decided to formally announce their FTA support as soon as it was unveiled, which was expected to be sometime in spring 1982. Ratification would take place before the election and by neutralizing the issue; Campbell could focus solely on the Tory economic record. He strongly supported the deal so long as he was reassured about cultural protections, being a free trader by conviction and rereading Laurier’s speeches on the issue to his caucus on occasion. Broadbent would lead the anti-FTA forces, while Campbell calculated that soft progressives would support him rather than risk another Tory government. CN privatization was not something which he personally favoured, but nor it would not be an election issue. Nothing would distract Liberals from selling their platform and for the first time since 1968, their leader. By contrast the Tory pre-writ positioning was bland and essentially a pitch for 4 more years of the same, combined with attacks on Campbell’s PEI record as quasi-NDP in nature. Broadbent’s plan was to attract progressive voters on free trade and attacking Campbell as having acquiesced to his party’s right. It was an opinion shared by among others, Pierre Trudeau, who had tried to recruit Campbell in 1972 and still paid attention to party affairs nearly a decade after leaving office.

CAMPBELL: I told caucus from our first very meeting that the Tory record and our ideas would be the issues, not any squirrels which our opponents or the media tried to throw in our path .I favoured public CN ownership, but it was not an issue which Canadians cared about amid one of our deepest recessions since the Depression. Free trade has always been a defining element of Liberalism, and a lifelong belief of mine. There were probably more protectionists in their caucus than in mine, as befits the parties’ historic beliefs on trade. Not until Stanfield became leader did the Tories become friendlier to free trade, a process which La Salle wanted to complete. I had sympathy for cultural concerns, as did Bill Davis and many other Ontario Tories. We would address those if we won, but not at the cost of an historic deal and our international reputation. I took the same stance on free trade as I did on the Constitution, and caucus proved quite receptive – even some who would have preferred I be more progressive than pragmatic. In late November, I met with Jack Pickersgill at his request to discuss policy development and the possibility of chairing our transition team if we won. He was very happy about the direction I had taken and readily accepted my offer.

PAULSON: La Salle had a cool relationship with the Tory premiers, being grateful for their help but also resentful of their influence. His gripes were not ideological like his moderate colleagues but at the press portrayal of him as a proxy for Blue provincial leaders like Bennett, Lyon and Sauvé. They mostly ignored him and were dismissive rather than resentful. Davis privately told his aides that part of the problem was Ontarian underrepresentation in the Cabinet, which was heavily Western and Maritime. La Salle did not have the same ear for Ontario as Stanfield, a concern echoed by Ontarian MPs Red and Blue throughout 1981. Flora MacDonald and Sean O’Sullivan, who were otherwise barely on speaking terms, heartily agreed on that point. In Quebec, Sauvé was of a mind with Bill Davis: he would help his allies as best he could without associating himself with party headquarters or La Salle personally. Similarly to 1978 5 Tories would be shielded from Liberal attack, while all other seats would be left alone. La Salle, Boivin and Malraux were entrenched, locally popular MPs by 1981 and would not require outside support barring a complete meltdown.

CANADIAN GALLUP POLL, DEC. 7-10, 1981

IF A FEDERAL ELECTION WERE HELD TODAY, WHICH PARTY`S CANDIDATE WOULD YOU SUPPORT?

LIBERAL: 45.1%
PC: 33.8%
NDP: 16.9%
 
You know what? Lets make Premier Davis leader. Might cause some problems in the West, but he's by far the best candidate to be leader after the next election.
 
GAGNON: 1982 opened with Common Front negotiations dominating headlines and abundant speculation that there would be another strike, longer and more far-reaching than 1979. In 1971 there had been a compromise which was seen then as a narrow government victory, while 1979 had been seen as a wash. Both sides’ positions were hardened by the economic crisis, as Garneau decided to roll back contracts he had agreed to four years earlier, enraging the Front. A short transit strike in Montreal just before Christmas had reawakened public fears of a general strike amidst a bitterly cold winter. At 1982’s first Cabinet meeting on January 10, the Planning and Priorities’ Committee’s rollback proposal was formally approved. If negotiations were not concluded by March 1, then collective agreements would be imposed across almost the entire public sector. Garneau and his economic team decided that shared sacrifice would be their watchword, even as progressive Liberals were dismayed or enraged. In their view, this proposal was awfully close to Duplessis-era tactics. To the premier and his supporters, such a comparison was outrageous: their proposed legislation was merely a temporary measure, and they had always tried to work with the unions. Their union allies were of no use now, despite a membership which was sometimes more tepid than their leaders. Garneau decided to try and isolate the teachers.

TIMMINS: When Parliament returned in late January, the Tory mood could best be described as sullen. Free trade would be historic but Campbell’s support and a worsening recession killed whatever boost they might have gotten. Erik Nielsen privately told La Salle that his support was weakening among backbenchers and in Cabinet, and he was not really certain where the prime minister wanted to go. La Salle listened and promised to make major changes after the election, while essentially ignoring Nielsen’s advice. Nielsen was quietly furious and raged to supporters about that “pathetic f*****” at 24 Sussex who would “kill us” at the election. To Quebec MPs, this atmosphere was eerily reminiscent of 1976-7 when Cardinal had been in a similar situation. No one wanted to lead a coup for two reasons: an almost guaranteed election loss, and memories of the 1960s civil war. It would have been flatly opposed by provincial leaders. Nonetheless, they moved on as John Crosbie prepared to table his second budget in a couple of weeks. As promised, his budget would be significantly tougher than the previous year’s, when leadership politics had dictated status quo. CN privatization was not included because Crosbie had persuaded La Salle to delay implementation for a year, until a plan could be developed.

Deputy Prime Minister Erik Nielsen addresses the House of Commons, Feb. 7, 1982.

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ROY: Just before the provincial budget came down, I was phoned by a CSN source who gave me the latest on negotiations: despite the massive demonstration in Quebec City that included roughly 20000 protestors, they had reached an accord with the government. Progress was being made with other professions, with nurses and teachers as the holdouts. Those were the crucial unions and the most militant. If they refused the government’s offer, they would be legislated back to work with draconian penalties. Said penalties included loss of seniority and benefits and unilateral firings without appeal. Garneau and his senior ministers felt relieved, as if a great burden had been lifted from them. Privately, Jean Lesage reluctantly supported his former aide “out of necessity” while Pierre Laporte adamantly opposed the legislation. An otherwise mundane budget was completely overshadowed by the labour dispute. The Union Nationale strongly supported Garneau’s legislation while keeping a lower profile than usual during the debate. Bellemare quoted Napoleon: “never interfere with your enemy when he is destroying himself.” Sauvé remained content to criticize the government while privately reminding donors and potential supporters that labour unrest required a “new government, new policies and a firm hand.” Progressives felt betrayed by a man who while never a soulmate, was seen as at least sympathetic to their concerns. For older Liberals like Pierre Laporte, Garneau had accepted the enemy’s intellectual framework.

PAULSON: Campbell and Chretien had gagged their Quebec caucus while the strikes were ongoing, in keeping with the dictum that they would not entangle themselves in provincial issues. Privately both men supported Garneau’s tactics, a view which was hardly unanimous within the Quebec caucus. Campbell’s concern was the budget debate, and there was plenty for the opposition parties to pick it. The Tories could only keep their heads down, pass the budget and hope that a trade deal was reached within weeks. They got lucky on March 12 when the lead negotiators announced that a deal had been reached 2 weeks before deadline. Almost as soon as the ink was dry, La Salle and Reagan issued a joint statement celebrating what they called “a bridge to a 21st century economy.” Both leaders gave notice that they would submit the deal for ratification immediately to their respective legislatures. Marie Boivin would table the treaty within a week while Ged Baldwin and Tom Bell met with their Liberal counterparts to negotiate an expedited debate. In Quebec the strikes had ended when Garneau enacted the back-to-work law Bill 201, to the great relief of federal Liberals and Tory joy. The legislation passed on a Wednesday. On Friday, Sauvé called Boivin and greeted her with 2 words: “c’est fini.”

LISE BACON, QUEBEC HEALTH MINISTER: We did what we had to do once the teachers decided they would rather go to war than conclude an honourable settlement, as we did with almost all the other unions. It was the ugliest time in my political career. Whenever I passed by a school in my riding, teachers would glare and hiss at me. Their behaviour only strengthened my resolve that we were doing the right thing, and I hoped we would eventually reconcile with the unions. My voters felt a mixture of anger and sadness after the strike was over. Indeed, our legislation had been hardest on our union supporters, who remained silent throughout this ordeal. I did not apologize, but through many conversations over the ensuing months I believe we came to understand how the other had arrived at our respective positions. Raymond had little patience for those who had second thoughts, so I did not openly confess my doubts even if he probably knew my true feelings. The budget debate was anticlimactic by comparison, and Raymond planned an early May adjournment to regroup.
 
CAPLAN: Spring was a great time for us, and not just because of the weather. The Tories and Grits once again decided to arrange things among themselves on free trade and try to strangle our voice. La Salle and Campbell agreed to limit debate and impose time allocation and cloture by mutual consent. This was not a procedural necessity, just a political convenience. Like his predecessors, Campbell started on the left and moved right as time progressed. In his case he started even before he won the leadership and thereby broke the record. If he was not going to stand up for the manufacturing industry, than we would be happy to. His Quebec members’ silence on an anti-labour bill which could have been written by Maurice Duplessis or his latter-day heir Pierre Sauvé spoke volumes. Indeed the provincial Liberals had tacitly supported Duplessis during Asbestos, so for the historically minded this was déjà vu all over again. Ed would spend most of his time in Ontario, where we had hopes of picking off several Grits and Tories in manufacturing regions. Campbell had no provincial allies in English Canada, and he already held most of the 75 seats in Quebec. We did not either after Devine’s landslide victory in early April.

GEOFFREY STEVENS, GLOBE AND MAIL: In late April, as 2nd reading of the FTA was underway in the House, a little-known meeting took place between Pierre Sauvé, Brian Mulroney, Erik Nielsen and Marie Boivin. It had been scheduled beforehand to discuss certain fundraising coordination issues, but that was not the subject of interest. After a brief fundraising discussion, their conversation turned to leadership politics. Nielsen was a Red Tory friendly to Blues, much like Don Mazankowski and John Crosbie. Sauvé mused that while none of La Salle’s issues were unexpected, he had no regrets about backing him. Mazankowski would have been “wasted in a futile endeavour”, and it was time for a Quebecer to lead the party. All agreed that internal tension was due to the fragile ideological balance, something that could only be resolved in opposition. There Nielsen parted company from his colleagues, though the discussion remained cordial. When all was said and done, no course of action was agreed upon. None of the participants had any regrets then or later, having learned the lessons from Diefenbaker’s tragedy. La Salle had known of the meeting beforehand but not of the leadership discussions, which only replicated other talks inside and outside caucus. Yet he was livid, having a shouting match with Nielsen in his office and icily lecturing a full Cabinet meeting on April 27th.

Deputy Prime Minister Erik Nielsen in 1982.

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SAUVE: After that meeting I never had another conversation with La Salle, not that we had been talking much beforehand. We were just catching up, and nothing concrete with regards to leadership was discussed. Fundraising logistics would bore the tears out of most reporters, so they spun what was mostly a bull session like a yarn. Bill [Davis], Peter [Lougheed] and Sterling [Lyon] sent word to their respective caucuses that no hocus-pocus would be tolerated, and I shared that view entirely. We had to make the best of a poor leadership choice in ’81, particularly when we were heavy underdogs. I didn’t support Maz in ’81 because I didn’t want a general election loss on his record, nor did many people who would have supported him in better political times. Sometimes in politics you have to take a short-term loss for long-term gain. King and Duplessis are great examples of that. The party was in an intellectual stalemate which could not be resolved until one side gained a decisive advantage, and for that we needed to go into opposition. Obviously my fellow provincial leaders had different visions for what Toryism should be, but all of us agreed that the federal party was not up to our professional standards.

PAYETTE: In my view, when Garneau agreed to impose the most drastic anti-labour legislation since Duplessis, he turned a competitive election into a guaranteed Unionist landslide. He had conceded the intellectual premise to Pierre Sauvé: progressive attitudes to economic and labour policy should be discarded and the question was of degree only. Garneau was not a conservative, but a moderate with some progressive tendencies which were ignored. He refused to enact campaign finance reform or finish the job on Medicare. Medicare would have forced the UN into an uncomfortable position: force their leader to lie through gritted teeth about his barely concealed views on that subject and stoke tension within his caucus. Garneau did not do that, claiming cost in a recession would be too high. Perhaps he was afraid of being blamed for “bankrupting the province”, as Lesage had been 16 years earlier. Regardless, the Liberal leader finally agreed with his progressive colleagues and promised that if re-elected, he would fully expand the mixed system into provincial Medicare like other provinces had done. Progressive nationalists like me had two choices: fight for our beliefs within the PLQ or stay at home. Sauvé is just as federalist as his father, despite his proud involvement in the Language Charter.

PAULSON: CUSFTA was ratified in early June after a long and relatively subdued debate, followed by an immediate adjournment of Parliament. An exasperated if combative La Salle did not want to call the election immediately and had doubts about a summer election, wanting to use those precious months to shore up PC support. His Cabinet, mostly resigned to their fate, also preferred an early fall election. La Salle decided that the election would be held in October in a Cabinet meeting held on June 11. Everyone dispersed to their ridings for barbeques and canvassing while the leaders remained in Ottawa for a few days to plot strategy. La Salle would focus on Quebec, Ontario and BC while leaving the Atlantic provinces to John Crosbie. The lack of a strong Ontarian minister left Ontario outsourced to the Big Blue Machine, which like its Quebec counterpart would operate only on half-speed in 1982. Both Davis and Sauvé would support their party but privately preferred Alex Campbell, whom they liked and trusted, as Prime Minister. Sterling Lyon, who was more sympathetic to La Salle than his 2 counterparts, would do his utmost for his Manitoba cousins.
 
SAUVÉ: I did not abandon anyone, indeed I spent almost as much on 5 ridings in ’82 as I did in ’78 in both financial and human terms. If I was guilty of believing that victors cannot win every battle, then I will happily plead guilty to that charge. In the summer I was either on vacation or spending time with constituents and had no time for federal politics. The Union Nationale has always worked with prime ministers of both parties if they served Quebec’s interests, and the province’s interests did not always coincide with my partisan leanings. I told our organizers to protect the MPs in question, period. I did not think Raymond would call an election that year because between the economy and polling, there was no reason for him to do so. He wanted to use the fifth year to see if the economy improved along with his party’s fortunes. I would have done the same thing in his place. We were on lowered alert throughout that summer as an extra precaution, but not once did an occasion ever arise where we believed our guess was wrong. The only consequential decision I took that summer was to decide on Mario Beaulieu as my deputy if we formed government.

CAMPBELL: Most voters I talked to that summer had only one thing on their mind: economic relief from one of our worst recessions since the Depression. All they were being offered by the Tories was more of the same. I wanted to run an optimistic campaign focused on economic recovery and job creation. So we promised coordinated infrastructure investment, youth job training, small business support and other related things. There was also childcare to consider, but given the economic situation and jurisdictional disputes I was somewhat hesitant about a national program. Our data showed that voters gave us a strong lead on economic management, specifically in Ontario, which had been hit especially hard by the recession. Ed Broadbent was going to target us on trade, an argument I was happy to have. Moreover while our teams were seen as roughly equivalent in strength, ours was harmonious, cordial and efficient in contrast to the cobweb of feuds on their side. We would be helped in Ontario by Davis’ indifference towards La Salle’s fate, if not the fate of his federal allies. Ontario and BC were our big targets, and I left Quebec mostly to Jean [Chrétien] in his role as lieutenant. I promised that if elected, Ontario would get the representation it deserved after a decade of Tory neglect.


TIMMINS: In early August La Salle did not change his mind completely, but decided to dissolve Parliament at month’s end rather than after Labour Day. Some improvement in his BC and Toronto numbers were the primary reason for this, alongside ministerial pressure. National campaigning was not something which made for the best contrast between La Salle and Campbell. While a fiery speaker, La Salle was no match for the telegenic Liberal leader’s suave charisma and likeability. The Tories wanted an economic contrast warning that Liberal policies would worsen the economy. 1982 brought a newer form of attack ad into Canada: personal negative. Campbell, who was interested in campaign technology, authorized ads with voters explaining how Tory policies had worsened their lives. 4 were produced as an experiment and Liberal focus groups showed they were more powerful than traditional attack ads. Around this time, both Quebec parties and the Ontario Tories were experimenting with similar ads. Otherwise there was little technological change from 4 years previously. Campbell had wanted more debates, but La Salle refused, insisting on only one in each language. The Liberals tried approaching Broadbent to hold a debate between their respective leaders, but Broadbent refused. He was angry at the Liberals over free trade and wanted no part of their scheme.


MULRONEY: I had returned to the campaign as an honorary co-chair and there was little good news even in Quebec. Roch was running an adequate if unexceptional campaign, but media coverage was dominated by Campbell and his platform, despite its lack of originality. There was nothing interesting about infrastructure spending, youth job training and small business tax cuts, which were their main economic planks. Part of it was Campbell: as with Trudeau in 1968, he got extremely favourable coverage from the English Canadian media. Another part was our failure to communicate our vision for another term, much less a platform that would capture voters’ imagination. Had we done that, then there could have been an exchange of ideas that would have benefited Roch. Without our vision, journalists filled the gap with bad economic news. I also felt we should have done more debates in order to provide the best possible contrast with the Grits and Dippers. There’s no better opportunity to reach millions of Canadians, as I told Roch many times. All this said, we had a good ground game across the country, especially in BC and Ontario. Atlantic Canadians would vote for one of their own, as they had done for Bob when he was leader.

Liberal Leader Alex Campbell is interviewed on Halifax radio, Sept. 10, 1982.

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GAGNON: On style, the debates were a split decision due to Campbell’s only adequate French. In substance, he clearly won even if you did not agree with his ideas. It was not that both parties were far apart on the issues, but the Liberals promised action while the Tories could not shake the impression of “4 more years.” La Salle’s attempt to use Campbell’s land planning to paint him as a socialist backfired, since his defence of it as an environmental and ownership issue rang true even in Ontario. Maritime voters reacted strongly and Tory MPs in the region had to dissociate themselves from that attack, particularly in PEI. By the end of September, the only thing left in doubt was how big Campbell’s majority would be. Through a lengthy pre-writ campaign, he had managed to soften BC up enough to raid turf his rivals had jealously guarded and hoped for some extra Western seats. There was no room to expand in Quebec, with only a handful of Tory MPs being guarded by Unionist forces. Likewise, the Tories would never win a big majority without a major breakthrough in this province.

Conservative Leader Roch La Salle addresses the Tory faithful in Quebec City, Sept. 30, 1982.

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CROP PROVINCIAL, SEPT. 23-25, 1982

IF A PROVINCIAL ELECTION WERE HELD TODAY, WHICH PARTY WOULD YOU SUPPORT?


UN: 57%
LIBERAL: 40%
PQ: 3%


GALLUP CANADA, SEPT. 27-29, 1982

IF A FEDERAL ELECTION WERE HELD TOMORROW, WHICH PARTY WOULD YOU VOTE FOR?

LIB: 46.2%
PC: 34.4%
NDP: 18.3%
SOCRED: 1.2%
 
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