NEWMAN: Before embarking on a barbeque-filled summer tour, Campbell had lengthy meetings with both his former rivals to determine whether they were fully committed. With Turner, the meeting was cordial but cool: Turner was not prepared to commit to running in the next election, but promised a decision within a year. He bluntly told Campbell he did not know whether he could remain finance critic if a sizeable element of the parliamentary party maintained its hostility towards him. Campbell said Turner could take as much time as he wanted, but that he wanted “100% commitment from every member of this team.” Both men emerged wary from that meeting for fairly similar reasons. With Chretien the meeting was upbeat and humorous: he was definitely running again and would serve in any capacity the leader wanted. Campbell decided not to shuffle the Shadow Cabinet until the new year. In the interim he enrolled for French lessons, much as Stanfield had done a dozen years earlier after becoming PC leader. He told me he rather enjoyed the intellectual challenge of learning a new language in middle age. I asked whether both his rivals would stay on his team and his only response was that everyone must make their decision in their own time.
TURNER: There was no tension between Alex and I, either at that meeting or later on. We got on perfectly well and he understood my concerns about the parliamentary party. He simply encouraged me to make a decision on my own time and get back to him. There were similar meetings with other members of the shadow cabinet, including Jean [Chretien]. He was sympathetic to my concerns about caucus tensions lingering from the constitutional fight and promised he would address them when the caucus strategy session was held in August. Indeed he promised me considerable policy autonomy, along with our other economic shadows, in preparing for the following year’s policy convention. He would not have done that had he wanted to push me out the door. It was far more than Allan had ever offered me, and I was made a member of his inner circle. What he wanted was advice on the West, territory he was unfamiliar with and he was unwilling to totally rely on Lloyd [Axworthy] for a primer. I agreed to accompany him and Lloyd on a Western tour in August, before we returned to Ottawa for the strategy session on the 20th. I wanted to spend July on vacation, having gone through 2 national campaigns in less than a year.
SAUVÉ: Despite all the noise over our policy convention, the controversy passed quickly once everyone went home for the summer. My family and I were vacationing in Morocco, well away from any domestic political controversy. Staffers were told not to disturb me unless there was a truly urgent matter, and the message was passed to reporters as well. The government was still in their honeymoon period and anything I said would be lost, as caucus understood perfectly well. In politics you always have to take the long view: not how does this look now but how things will be judged closer to crunch time. There would undoubtedly be moderate voters turned off by our policies, but more attracted to a principled, populist conservative party which would address everyday concerns. If we wanted to have a lasting government rather than a tentative one then we had to set the agenda and force our opponents onto our intellectual terrain, not vice-versa. We lost policy discipline in our third term and therefore government since our opponents had a plan while we held our collective breath. This time there would be a detailed plan which left nothing to ambiguity or subtlety, given the depth of our planned reforms. My model was quite consciously Mackenzie King’s Green Book.
MULRONEY: Bob told me shortly before the pre-session caucus strategy session that he would announce the commissioning of more CANDU reactors as part of an effort to diversify our power sources. He thought nuclear expansion would enhance our environmental bona fides, alongside an expansion of hydro. Before making the announcement we extensively consulted with our provincial allies, all of whom favoured expansion. The most enthusiastic were BC’s Bennett and Pierre in Quebec, both of whom included nuclear expansion in their party platforms. Even our opponents hesitated to oppose our initiative outright. Bob wanted one of his legacies to be environmental stewardship, as it had been in Nova Scotia. There was great enthusiasm in caucus for it, especially given the energy crisis which was being hammered home to Canadians every day. Bob also would end the Anti-Inflation Board, which had proved a dismal failure and become scandalous due to outrageous expense abuse by certain employees. That was the first major scandal on Bob’s watch, and we got hammered by the media and opposition for months about it. For Bob, it was painful to have scandal blemish what to that point had been an exemplary career. Meanwhile Marie Boivin was having increasing difficulty concluding the Australian FIPA, mainly due to reluctance on their end rather than ours.
Prime Minister Robert Stanfield, c. 1979.
PAULSON: Stanfield’s scrapping of the Anti-Inflation Board, though spurred by scandal, was long overdue. Even before the scandal broke in July Stanfield had concluded that AIB had been a dismal failure. The Chateau group was emboldened by Stanfield’s decision even as they worried about FIPA’s impending failure. Marie Boivin told her confidants that the deal was being held back by both principals, and on the Australian side the “wet” Coalition caucus majority opposed to liberalization. Fortunately for all concerned, her musings were not publicized. She was loyal to Stanfield while remaining focused on her long-term agenda, like O’Sullivan and other Chateau members. Chateau followers looked to Bill Bennett’s Socreds, Sterling Lyon’s Tories and Pierre Sauvé’s Unionists for policy inspiration. All 3 leaders did not want their followers making unnecessary waves at the October policy convention in Vancouver and directed them towards foreign and defence policy instead. This was less about Stanfield and far more about not jeopardizing their long-term goals, as was recognized on both sides. Even in 1979 the signs were obvious that the federal PC Party was quietly simmering, unlike their humming Ontarian counterpart where intraparty harmony reigned.
TURNER: There was no tension between Alex and I, either at that meeting or later on. We got on perfectly well and he understood my concerns about the parliamentary party. He simply encouraged me to make a decision on my own time and get back to him. There were similar meetings with other members of the shadow cabinet, including Jean [Chretien]. He was sympathetic to my concerns about caucus tensions lingering from the constitutional fight and promised he would address them when the caucus strategy session was held in August. Indeed he promised me considerable policy autonomy, along with our other economic shadows, in preparing for the following year’s policy convention. He would not have done that had he wanted to push me out the door. It was far more than Allan had ever offered me, and I was made a member of his inner circle. What he wanted was advice on the West, territory he was unfamiliar with and he was unwilling to totally rely on Lloyd [Axworthy] for a primer. I agreed to accompany him and Lloyd on a Western tour in August, before we returned to Ottawa for the strategy session on the 20th. I wanted to spend July on vacation, having gone through 2 national campaigns in less than a year.
SAUVÉ: Despite all the noise over our policy convention, the controversy passed quickly once everyone went home for the summer. My family and I were vacationing in Morocco, well away from any domestic political controversy. Staffers were told not to disturb me unless there was a truly urgent matter, and the message was passed to reporters as well. The government was still in their honeymoon period and anything I said would be lost, as caucus understood perfectly well. In politics you always have to take the long view: not how does this look now but how things will be judged closer to crunch time. There would undoubtedly be moderate voters turned off by our policies, but more attracted to a principled, populist conservative party which would address everyday concerns. If we wanted to have a lasting government rather than a tentative one then we had to set the agenda and force our opponents onto our intellectual terrain, not vice-versa. We lost policy discipline in our third term and therefore government since our opponents had a plan while we held our collective breath. This time there would be a detailed plan which left nothing to ambiguity or subtlety, given the depth of our planned reforms. My model was quite consciously Mackenzie King’s Green Book.
MULRONEY: Bob told me shortly before the pre-session caucus strategy session that he would announce the commissioning of more CANDU reactors as part of an effort to diversify our power sources. He thought nuclear expansion would enhance our environmental bona fides, alongside an expansion of hydro. Before making the announcement we extensively consulted with our provincial allies, all of whom favoured expansion. The most enthusiastic were BC’s Bennett and Pierre in Quebec, both of whom included nuclear expansion in their party platforms. Even our opponents hesitated to oppose our initiative outright. Bob wanted one of his legacies to be environmental stewardship, as it had been in Nova Scotia. There was great enthusiasm in caucus for it, especially given the energy crisis which was being hammered home to Canadians every day. Bob also would end the Anti-Inflation Board, which had proved a dismal failure and become scandalous due to outrageous expense abuse by certain employees. That was the first major scandal on Bob’s watch, and we got hammered by the media and opposition for months about it. For Bob, it was painful to have scandal blemish what to that point had been an exemplary career. Meanwhile Marie Boivin was having increasing difficulty concluding the Australian FIPA, mainly due to reluctance on their end rather than ours.
Prime Minister Robert Stanfield, c. 1979.
PAULSON: Stanfield’s scrapping of the Anti-Inflation Board, though spurred by scandal, was long overdue. Even before the scandal broke in July Stanfield had concluded that AIB had been a dismal failure. The Chateau group was emboldened by Stanfield’s decision even as they worried about FIPA’s impending failure. Marie Boivin told her confidants that the deal was being held back by both principals, and on the Australian side the “wet” Coalition caucus majority opposed to liberalization. Fortunately for all concerned, her musings were not publicized. She was loyal to Stanfield while remaining focused on her long-term agenda, like O’Sullivan and other Chateau members. Chateau followers looked to Bill Bennett’s Socreds, Sterling Lyon’s Tories and Pierre Sauvé’s Unionists for policy inspiration. All 3 leaders did not want their followers making unnecessary waves at the October policy convention in Vancouver and directed them towards foreign and defence policy instead. This was less about Stanfield and far more about not jeopardizing their long-term goals, as was recognized on both sides. Even in 1979 the signs were obvious that the federal PC Party was quietly simmering, unlike their humming Ontarian counterpart where intraparty harmony reigned.