Égalité ou indépendance: a Canadian TL

Looking forward to 1976, and hoping Montreal doesn't have a massive debt for the Olympics, like it did OTL...
 
Looking forward to 1976, and hoping Montreal doesn't have a massive debt for the Olympics, like it did OTL...
They will, no doubt about that. The question is whether or not the UN will bail them out. Ironically, despite Montreal being a PLQ stronghold, Bourassa didn't forgive their debts IOTL...
 
NEWMAN: As 1976 opened, the Liberals were undergoing a fierce internal debate over property rights, which the left saw as a potential barrier to their economic policies, a concern shared by the NDP. They had been angered by Stanfield’s decision to let Canadair enter bankruptcy and had tried to use that as a cudgel against Tory defence policies, saying they would not put their money where their mouth was. In one particularly tortured analogy, a backbench Grit compared it to Dief’s cancellation of the Avro Arrow 17 years earlier. Turner and his fellow rightists were appalled at their colleagues’ proposal to campaign against property rights in the Constitution, which was adamant opposed by their provincial colleagues. Alex Campbell and Gerald Regan wrote to MacEachen on January 11, saying that any such Liberal campaign would endanger party and national unity. Ontario’s Bob Nixon and Quebec’s Raymond Garneau shared similar concerns, warning MacEachen that they would have to publicly oppose him lest they be tarred as “wreckers” and swamped by their conservative rivals. MacEachen was noncommittal, torn between his desire for party unity and his personal views. Ultimately he decided not to filibuster when the bill was tabled. However internal deliberations were leaked and like the Tory squabble over controls, inflicted a short-term popularity hit on the Liberal Party.

Nova Scotia Premier Gerald Regan at a press conference, Jan. 8, 1976.

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JEAN-PAUL BEAUDRY, QUEBEC FINANCE MINISTER: We had been monitoring Drapeau’s Olympic boondoggling closely, and the previous fall the last straw came when Drapeau began complaining about his share of the debt. Robert [Lussier] proposed that we set up a Control Board which would have absolute authority over construction, and the enabling legislation had been passed just before Christmas. In order to pay for it, we instituted a cigarette tax and made the lottery permanent. When we resumed sitting on the 21st, I got a letter from Moody’s informing me that Montreal faced a credit downgrade because of those debts. The Cabinet then decided to impose an Olympic tax, which would be explicitly identified as such on tax forms. It was an easy decision to make, and we seriously considered mounting a publicity campaign targeting Drapeau as the culprit. We did repeat ad nauseum inside and outside the Assembly that if Moody’s downgraded Montreal, it would be Drapeau’s fault. The publicity campaign was discarded almost immediately because it would only be a boon to his far-left opponents. Nonetheless, our sentiment remained, and Drapeau became even more cantankerous than usual. On most issues he was a useful ally and was far too entrenched to find an acceptable opponent without causing a far-left victory. Whenever he chose to retire, we hoped to find an outsider who would be, shall I say, far more flexible when necessary.

Jean Drapeau holds a press conference in response to the provincial budget , Feb. 21, 1976.

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MULRONEY: If March was to be Constitution Month, February was Budget Month as usual. There was little different from the previous year’s budget except for a slightly smaller deficit due to increased spending cuts. That was Stanfield’s concession to the right, and that type of baby step would be his sole concession of note. He did not like the Blues, as they were coming to be known, either ideologically or for the most part personally. Bob knew their strength was growing at the grassroots in Ontario while already dominant on the Prairies, as exemplified by Manitoba’s Sterling Lyon, and had always been dominant in Unionist Quebec. Since they remained a caucus minority and had no obvious leader, Bob let them be, even staying for their speeches at the policy conventions as a mark of respect. In Ontario, Blues were part of Sean [O’Sullivan]’s Chateau network which now included Quebec and Western MPs. Marie Boivin was invaluable to them, since as an economist she could help them devise alternative policies far more detailed than their previously thematic proposals. This was before the think-tank era, so outsourcing was not yet possible. Personally, I was friendly with Sean and felt Bob should pay more attention to Chateau ideas. Among them was one which he could personally endorse: free trade with the US.

GAGNON: In the midst of budget deliberations, Caouette announced he was resigning effective immediately in order to seek medical treatment. Shortly thereafter Stanfield would announce a by-election would be held in April. The Union Nationale began considering whether to contest it on behalf of their Tory allies, since a victory over Caouette’s son would be devastating to Socred’s ability to continue. If the UN lost, then it would be a notable if ultimately insignificant embarrassment. Ultimately they decided not to contest Temiscamingue, instead letting the Liberals make a play for it. Publicly they said constitutional negotiations were their reason, privately I was told that they wanted MacEachen to be rebuked and furthermore, a 2-party system above all was their goal. So long as Socred seats were no longer held by Socreds, they considered it a victory. I considered that a cop-out and wrote a column on the by-election February 14, which annoyed Cardinal, who did not take kindly to accusations of cowardice from journalists or anyone else. His excessive sensitivity to criticism was rarely more apparent than it was then, and I believe only my gender spared me from a profane rant of the sort he often inflicted on male colleagues who he felt questioned his personal honour. The men who ran actually ran Unionist federal operations noted their disagreement and left it there.

TIMMINS: Charlottetown’s final round was held in March, with a veto and amending formula finally agreed upon by all provinces. On March 11, unanimous consent was reached for patriation and the Canada Act 1976 was introduced in the House of Commons. Within a week it had been passed by both houses with unanimous consent, reaching the UK Parliament just as Harold Wilson announced his resignation as prime minister. We did not have to wait for the Labour leadership contest to end as London quickly passed the Canada Act by month’s end. The Queen would visit in early April to proclaim the new Constitution on Canadian soil, completing the 18-month process and ending the decades-old constitutional debate. There would be scattered dissent in the Liberal and New Democratic parties, but not enough to cause serious concern. A festive mood swept the country after patriation, and partisan politics were suspended for most of the year as we celebrated complete independence. 40 years of constitutional debate would now pass into the history books. In Quebec, a similar political Indian summer took hold as the UN prepared to celebrate a decade in office on June 16.

CROP: MAR. 27-29, 1976

IF A PROVINCIAL ELECTION WERE HELD TODAY, WHICH PARTY’S CANDIDATE DO YOU THINK YOU WOULD FAVOUR?

UN: 53.3%
LIBERAL: 38.9%
PQ: 5.2%
 
TIMMINS: Apart from the Queen’s visit, Stanfield had authorized drilling in the Beaufort Sea for a handful of companies. He wanted a limited exploration before removing most restrictions on offshore drilling in Beaufort, but it was a significant gesture which pleased the Blue wing. Even the opposition parties did not object too strongly to Stanfield’s gesture, given his reputation for environmental stewardship in Nova Scotia as premier. Unlike his Western and Quebec allies, Stanfield kept his distance from the resource companies both politically and personally. Like them, the resource sector was a major source of financial support. However such mundane concerns were far from Stanfield’s mind during the royal visit in mid-April. On April 14, Her Majesty signed the Constitution into law at a Parliament Hill ceremony, a beautiful, unseasonably warm day that spring. Years later, Stanfield told me that it was the best day of his premiership and talked at length about the high hopes he had for national unity. I felt vaguely surreal at decades of acrimonious debate now vanishing into a warm April day, as if by magic. Stanfield insisted that Diefenbaker and Davie Fulton be prominent at the ceremony given their roles in the previous constitutional round, a touching symbol of Tory reconciliation. Having covered those battles myself, they seemed distant history rather than less than a decade behind us.

Queen Elizabeth II tours the RCMP Training Depot in Regina during the 1976 Royal Visit, Apr. 18, 1976.
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GAGNON: With passage of the mandatory seatbelts law, Cardinal adjourned the Assembly April 28, the earliest date since Duplessis had been premier. The government was in a celebratory mood and set aside consideration of civil service-conceived projects they had requested merely months earlier. Legislative strategy took a back seat to self-congratulation in their lead-up to the 10th anniversary celebration on June 16. It was even stranger because no such markers had been held in the Duplessis era, only marking their leaders’ longevity. Olympic festivities were also on their minds as last-minute preparations were made before opening day, which was scheduled for July 17th. Despite their successful Games preparation, Cardinal and Drapeau’s relationship did not improve with time. Drapeau was resentful of the tax and Unionist threats to attack him on the airwaves, which he considered beyond the pale for an ally. Since Garneau’s major themes were good government and affordability, he could scarcely side with Drapeau without undermining his own credibility. Privately he made sympathetic noises to the mayor and said it was another Unionist bullying campaign as had occurred under Duplessis in 1957. Like the UN, Drapeau was not averse to working with “flexible” or ideally pliable Liberals if it suited his purposes. Both sides would test the other’s patience in coming years.

SUSAN PURCELL, DRAPEAU BIOGRAPHER: Tension between the Mayor and provincial government was exaggerated then and later. He had good relations with Garneau, as did most senior Unionists, but never let temporary disagreements obstruct long-term interests. Cardinal and Lussier were better for Montreal than Garneau, a Quebecer who rarely spent time in the city, would be. Moreover Victor Goldbloom, Garneau’s municipal affairs critic, had been a harsh critic of the Olympic preparations and Drapeau’s personal role in them. Goldbloom more than Garneau was a good government advocate who instinctively disliked Drapeau’s machine politics, which Drapeau found amusing at best. In early May, the long-expected split between radicals and moderates in the municipal opposition occurred. Nick Auf Der Maur and Bob Holden led a breakaway party named the Municipal Action Group (MAG), leaving the Marxist MCM [Montreal Citizens Movement] on its own. It was close to Drapeau’s dream scenario short of a council sweep as had happened in 1970. Neither Auf der Maur nor Holden would give up their seats to get crushed by him, and opposition divisions would facilitate a Civic Party council counteroffensive. As a conciliatory gesture, Lussier invited Drapeau to the upcoming anniversary dinner, which he declined in favour of a dinner with Cardinal, Lussier and their wives. One important guest at the gala would be Paul Gouin, now 77 and walking with a cane but still intellectually sharp.

Paul Gouin in 1976.

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MULRONEY: Bob was happy that Marcel Lambert, Marie Boivin and I had decided to attend the Unionist dinner, my first as the new vice president of Iron Ore. Marie and I were with Pierre and Yvonne Sauvé, Marcel with Maurice Bellemare. It promised to be a lovely dinner, and I was eager to meet Paul Gouin, the last prominent founding Unionist still alive. Gouin had reconciled with Duplessis postwar and held appointed positions through the 1950s, and now fully embraced his party even though he had long stopped appearing in public. I had a long talk with Pierre about Témiscamingue a couple of weeks before the dinner, amid mounting evidence that Gilles Caouette was in for a tight race with the Liberal candidate. Pierre believed Caouette could lose the by-election despite sympathy for his father, an assessment shared by our local organizers. I was a bit more cautious; thinking at least in a by-election there would be enough family sympathy for a narrow win. We made a $50 bet on the outcome and expected a victory for either candidate within 5%. Looking ahead, we expected to split the remaining Socred seats with the Grits if disintegration happened quickly. Even if Caouette won, he would likely lead the party to a loss of official party status and slightly delayed vaporization.

SAUVÉ: The dinner was hardly a grand gala or some such nonsense, but rather an informal celebration of our decade in government. Black tie events outside fundraisers have always been exceedingly rare in this party because it violates our populist credo. M. Duplessis never let us acquire a designated social club, for instance, instead patronizing different ones in Montreal or Quebec City as needed. The Grits have Reform [Club in Quebec City] and St. James [Club in Montreal]. By contrast, in 1938 when there had been a fire at the Reform Club Duplessis got out of his car, went inside and extinguished the fire by pissing on it. He then left without a word. That’s the sort of party we’ve always been. We all had a fantastic time, Brian and I got to catch up with Pierre Sévigny, who by then was back in business in Montreal. He was upbeat about our chances and about politics generally, which was quite a change from when I had last seen him in ’68. Our final bit of good news before the summer was the Grit pickup of Témiscamingue. Before collecting my winnings from Brian, I called Jean Chrétien to congratulate him on his party’s win.
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GAGNON: The Olympics were a great success for Montreal culturally and politically if not athletically, given our mediocre medal count. Stanfield, Cardinal and Drapeau all attended the opening ceremony, with Drapeau raising the flag in a symbolic triumph. That flush of national pride, coming off patriation, was almost a rerun of Expo despite the deteriorating economy. Politically, all 3 leaders that day looked like winners, none more than Drapeau. Unlike his counterparts with restive parties, he was in absolute control of the city. Even Camillien Houde had held limited executive power due to a weak mayoralty system embedded in the city charter. Drapeau had erased those limits in all but name, and had submitted a request for those limits to be formally removed. Cardinal and Lussier agreed to study the issue in due time, even though both men were wary about giving such powers to future mayors. They decided to delay that decision for another year, figuring there would be plenty of time before the next election. Moreover it was something of a moot point, since the nature of municipal politics meant there was unlikely to be divided government. What worried Cardinal was Drapeau’s lack of an obvious successor or even an outsider who could be counted on to continue his policies.

Opening ceremony of the Montreal Olympics, July 17, 1976.

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TURNER: Almost immediately after we won Temiscamingue, you saw the Socreds start to fracture. I figured it was only a matter of time before they began trickling to either of our parties, more likely the Tories where they could try and apply for Unionist protection. We had wanted them to stay alive as a foil for Tory gains in rural Quebec, but they were too far gone and our voters would not tolerate us propping up a right-wing party. Allan authorized Jean Chrétien to begin planning for an offensive against the dozen remaining Socreds, who were now rudderless and depending on a young, untested leader to keep them together. The Olympics had propelled Stanfield and Cardinal to sugar highs, numbers we felt were artificially inflated and would come down once economic realities started biting. It seemed obvious that both parties were stuck in an intellectual cul-de-sac created by their respective leaders, and we needed some newer policies ourselves for a sharper contrast. One idea which both parties were debating at the time was a guaranteed minimum income, and we had been consulting with outside experts to prepare for the policy convention. Around this time, Jean Marchand informed Allan that he would be retiring at the next election due to exhaustion and recovering from alcoholism. Effective immediately, Jean Chrétien would replace him as Quebec lieutenant.

Jean Chrétien speaks in Chicoutimi, Aug. 4, 1976.

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PAULSON: Stanfield decided on a Cabinet shuffle to replace ministers who would not run again for August, when few people were paying attention to politics. The highest-profile retiree was Gordon Fairweather, who was replaced by John Crosbie as finance minister. Like Cardinal, Stanfield did not shuffle for its own sake, but only in case of retirement, scandal or incompetence. With some notable younger ministers developing their own political personae, like Flora MacDonald at Communications and Paul Yewchuk at Health, the need for renewal was deferred. He decided to study the issue of a guaranteed minimum income as a potential policy plank, which was also being discussed among Liberals at that time. One idea which was being discussed among Chateau Cabinet members was privatizing Air Canada while retaining oversight requirements such as bilingualism and maintaining their head office in Canada. Crosbie and the other economic ministers favoured the idea on practical or ideological grounds, yet Stanfield himself was uneasy. Boivin and Mazankowski tried to sell Stanfield on the idea, but he was extremely reluctant. They believed that Stanfield was hostile to privatization as a concept, or “denationalization” as it was known at that time. One idea which Stanfield flatly refused to consider was abolishing supply management for dairy. Stanfield had halted expansion plans when he was elected 4 years earlier, but he would go no further than that.

GAGNON: As successful as the Olympics had been, their cost had been exorbitant, nearly triple what Drapeau had originally promised. There were calls for a commission of inquiry, which both Drapeau and the government were wary of because they were likely to be blamed for such an endeavour. At a political level, Drapeau believed the masses wanted monuments and were willing to bear their financial burden, as had been the case with Expo. Only the PQ and municipal opposition parties called for an inquiry. The Union Nationale had always deeply resented the Salvas commission into Duplessis-era corruption, believing it a partisan witch-hunt against timeless governing practices. Any inquiry was bound to focus on how both levels of government were essentially “in it together” for lack of a better term. Privately, most senior Unionists blamed Drapeau and if they had any regrets, it was not setting up the Control Board earlier. Lussier and Sauvé believed Drapeau’s biggest error was hiring Taillibert and ignoring all outside advice until forced to by the province. For his part, Drapeau had no regrets, believing that Olympic prestige would ultimately outweigh all other concerns. Lussier and Sauvé, though much more receptive to advice than Drapeau, shared his authoritarian approach to governance.

TIMMINS: The week after Labour Day, there was a massive national strike to protest Stanfield’s imposition of controls that labour felt was far more about wages than prices. It was only a single day but a vivid reminder of union power. As he had done in Nova Scotia, Stanfield favoured a conciliatory approach to labour and periodically met with union leaders to discuss controls implementation. Labour relations were essentially a non-partisan issue at that time, an approach loathed by the Tory right and their provincial allies. To them, public service unions should be the major target while a divide and conquer approach taken towards private sector unions. From BC to Quebec, provincial governments closely allied with construction unions on resource projects such as mining, forestry and oil exploration. Such cooperation did not preclude plots against union power but rather a much more gradualist approach rather than open war. In Quebec, Duplessis had created a de facto right to work labour market while conciliating the rather docile Catholic unions. That was the genesis for his successor’s public/private approach. Cardinal ignored his two most influential right-wingers, Beaudry and Sauvé, when they pressed for a more hawkish approach. He distrusted both men, knowing they both coveted his job and did not much care who knew it.
 
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NEWMAN: While Ottawa’s weather might have been chilly in October 1976, its political temperature was returning to room temperature. The Olympic and patriation glows were starting to fade, for despite strong economic growth inflation continued rising. Stanfield knew his Anti-Inflation Board was essentially useless and did not dispute this, at least economically, when I interviewed him that fall. He saw it as a political tool to show he was acting on that issue without grappling with his far right’s preferred policies. Needless to say he left the latter unsaid, even as his feelings were crystal clear. Today the picture of Stanfield in popular imagination is a calm, even placid man whose first instinct was conciliation. He was even-tempered but capable of toughness when necessary, as had been proven numerous times during his 4 years in office. His attitude towards the right-wingers was respectful and encouraging of intellectual debate within the party, which had been ignored by Diefenbaker in his later years. Stanfield knew about the Chateau Cabinet and its membership, though its internal political (as opposed to policy) deliberations were a closely held secret. On foreign, defense and trade policy they mostly agreed even if Stanfield was hesitant to pursue free trade as his economic ministers fervently desired. It was on socioeconomics where the gap was a chasm.

SAUVÉ: Fall ’76 was a quiet sitting, an ideal time to craft our Freedom of Information Act. FOIA was an idea we’d been kicking around for about a year, with draft legislation ready to go when the Assembly resumed in early October. Our intention was to make provincial government more accessible and accountable to the public, an imperative heightened by the Olympic fiascos. The Liberals happily supported my initiative and promised to give us unanimous consent for all 3 readings, a rare moment of bipartisanship during that term. Contrary to Liberal mythology, we did not hate investigative journalism, nor did we obstruct them. What I objected to was irresponsible, reckless smearing without proper documentation. In my father’s era it had been the so-called natural gas “scandal” and more recently explorations into government contracting which contained far more innuendo than fact. I have always tried to be friendly with journalists whom I considered responsible and fair. If we got on really well, then I might ask them to join my staff. One media lesson I learnt from my father was to cultivate the local papers rather than major dailies, since they always asked substantive questions and ignored the Gallery-created circuses. I was always happier talking to those outlets than the metro dailies who know less about rural life than I do about quantum physics.

MULRONEY: I urged Bob that fall to emulate the Quebec and Ontario Freedom of Information Acts, both on their merits and as a way to further our good-government bona fides. He had considered such legislation when he was premier but never got around to it. There would be all-party support for such a bill, since we all supported clean government and transparency. Another item on our agenda was televising Parliament, which had been initially floated 3 years earlier and delayed due to the need for more study. Bob agreed with Flora [MacDonald] and I that the time had come, and Flora issued a ministerial directive enabling the CBC to set up what later became their PTN {Parliamentary TV Network]. That would be a medium-term trial, and if ratings were high enough we hoped the private broadcasters would form their own dedicated channel. Politically, we had high hopes for Bill Davis taking advantage of favourable public opinion to call a snap election in the new year. He had used the minority government effectively to marginalize his opponents while addressing Ontarians’ concerns about an aging dynasty. In many ways it was a blessing in disguise, since a decaying government had been given a fresh lease on life that would last for years to come.

GAGNON: One story I decided to sit on was Cardinal’s musings about retirement just before the Assembly adjourned for Christmas. He was getting tired and I knew his health, while not endangered, was not 100%. He had never been physically robust and 9 years at the highest levels of government were punishing on him and his family. Beneath the gruff exterior he was a sensitive man with an artistic side who painted as a hobby. I think at bottom, he was a lonely man who was ill suited to high politics even after nearly 6 years as premier. He lacked the killer instinct and love for the game you saw in his predecessors, or in ministers such as Beaulieu and Sauvé. Beaulieu he liked and trusted, whereas he respected Sauvé’s ability but disliked his transparent ambition and certain elements of his personality. The two men had a respectful relationship but no more than that. Sauvé saw Cardinal as a well-meaning intellectual, Cardinal saw Sauvé as a talented but glib, obscenely ambitious and excessively casual (Sauvé loved to be photographed in casual settings) young man. A couple of days before adjournment, Maurice Bellemare confirmed to Cardinal that he would run in the next election, but it would be his last. Being a much more robust man than the premier, he was not exhausted but simply wanted to retire.


Prime Minister Robert Stanfield at the PMO Christmas party, Dec. 7, 1976.

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TIMMINS: ’76 ended on what I thought was an Indian summer note, with a vaguely positive aura still permeating the political atmosphere from the Olympics and patriation. Despite inflation and mounting red ink, economic growth was strong and wages were slightly rising. All 3 levels of government looked secure for their respective incumbents, though both Cardinal and Stanfield faced formidable opponents. My own sense was that this might be too good to last. What had been temporarily forgotten was that an economic reckoning was a long time coming. I had criticized both parties in 1970 for what I saw as economic happy talk rather than making the necessary difficult decisions. Johnson and Cardinal had temporarily returned to surplus but mostly ignored structural reforms. In Cardinal and Stanfield’s cases, that was because they were philosophically opposed to such radical chances. I personally supported the right wing of both parties and besides that, believed that accepting your opponents’ intellectual premises was the biggest political victory you could give them. Conservatively administering the Liberal state should have never been on the Unionist agenda. By contrast, that was not only a PC agenda but their very core.
 
TIMMINS: As a new year began, Stanfield was wrestling with his longstanding musings about free trade with the US. There was no indication of opposition from the now-Democratic White House, and his MPs were mostly supportive of the idea. Westerners would enthusiastically support the move, as would Quebec and most likely Stanfield’s own Atlantic region. It was Ontario which worried Stanfield politically. Unlike King, he was not wary of a deal but rather seeing one through and having it repudiated like Laurier in 1911. There was a meeting of the Cabinet’s economic “E” committee followed by Priorities and Planning just before Parliament resumed. He decided to announce a royal commission on the subject which would report within 3 or 4 years. That would give Stanfield breathing room from both sides, and it would be composed solely of economists rather than a political chairman as was often the case. The announcement was not a bombshell but it abruptly ended the 6-month political truce, as the NDP denounced Stanfield’s foray and Liberals were critical but not noncommittal. Behind closed doors, there was another intense debate between both wings. Leftists cited economic and cultural nationalism, the right their party’s historic support of free trade and continentalism. Ultimately they decided to restate support for free trade in principle while awaiting the specifics of a proposed deal.

Opposition Leader Allan MacEachen speaks to the Toronto Economic Club, Jan. 24, 1977.

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MARIE BOIVIN, INTERNATIONAL TRADE MINISTER: I was one of the ministers who advocated starting the process almost immediately. Politically it would be easier with a Democrat in the White House, even though Ford had been a great friend to this country and the prime minister personally. A royal commission, to me, was a cop-out because there was a substantial Cabinet and caucus majority in support. Bob’s own feelings were hardly a secret. At heart you are either a free trader or a protectionist, and Bob was a free trader. There were obvious lines of attack in how Liberal protectionism had nearly sparked a trade war, and the party’s long devotion to free trade. All our premiers would support us, possibly excepting Bill Davis, who was worried about its manufacturing effects in southern Ontario. He was nonetheless supportive of free trade provided we included “robust” cultural protections and support for a manufacturing transition. He did not want us making any formal plans until after the election which he planned to call once his budget debate was finished. Bob readily agreed to that request, and promised wholehearted support for Davis as usual. In Quebec, both parties enthusiastically supported free trade with the US. Cardinal had proposed a unanimous motion along those lines but dropped the idea after being persuaded that Davis’ opposition would try a similar gambit.

GAGNON: With the Olympics over, competition had returned to provincial politics with the budget debate taking up most of the winter sitting. It was a rather banal budget, marked only by rising debt and deficits due to sluggish growth. Internally, Finance believed a recession was likely in the short-medium term. What struck me was how instead of the usual public apathy, a bubbling frustration could be felt among ordinary voters. They had expected economic action or at least some fresh policies from the government, which were not forthcoming. Those who had been there longest, such as Cardinal himself and Maurice Bellemare, had long been privately worried about a severe contraction. It was because the governing party had reached an intellectual impasse, with Cardinal and his stalwarts opposed by Sauvé and Beaudry’s conservatives. Neither side would do anything to break that impasse, which had resulted in the civil service request to break that logjam at Christmas. Almost all the major items agreed upon by both sides were already enacted into law. At a tense Cabinet meeting shortly before budget day, ministers agreed to focus on aboriginal educational institutions that would replace the disappearing residential schools. It was not an obvious vote-getter, but both sides sincerely believed in their mission, particularly Yves Gabias. The political theory was that swing voters would like seeing a more “humanist” side to the party, as one pollster told me.

YVES GABIAS, QUEBEC EDUCATION MINISTER: There was no political theory behind closing residential schools; it was simply the right thing to do. We had to replace residential schools with something humane and capable of striking a balance between preserving their culture and preparing them for the outside world. It could only be done by extensive cooperation with aboriginal leadership, as Trudeau’s failed White Paper conclusively proved a few years earlier. Education has always been a core priority for us, and aboriginal education was a new road taken on a never-ending journey. There was a limit to how much we could do given that aboriginal issues were within federal jurisdiction, but we did our part in education and health, which were provincial responsibilities. The only provinces doing as much as we did were Alberta, Saskatchewan and to a certain extent Ontario. As for leadership politics, that was the furthest thing from our minds. We all supported Jean-Guy and focused on our own ministerial responsibilities. Any policy debates could be had at the convention scheduled for June, where we would mold a platform for the next election. Jean-Guy was convinced, as was I, that education and culture should be its centrepieces. There was no discussion of leadership politics then or later, period.

MULRONEY: There was no substantial opposition to free trade within caucus, except among an older, protectionist Ontarian cohort who were a distinct minority. Sean and his Chateau denizens were happy that Bob had finally taken up one of their most cherished ideas, even if they refused to celebrate until a deal had been enacted. Free trade was one of Bob’s masterstrokes, creating disarray among our opponents and closing intraparty ranks which had fissured for over a year. He also agreed to begin negotiations with aboriginal leaders about an education accord similar to Quebec’s James Bay Accord. Instead of putting all our eggs in an omnibus basket and risking collapse over 1 or 2 issues, better to negotiate smaller deals which could be later assembled if necessary. Bob rarely took policy inspiration from provincial governments, yet he felt this was a worthy exception to the rule. He told Flora and other Ontarian ministers to prepare for Davis’ impending election call, being expected to stump for our cousins. Bill remained very popular personally and his party had rediscovered its humility following its minority humbling in ’75. He would later say it was one of the best things that ever happened to him as premier.

CANADIAN GALLUP POLL, MAR. 29-31, 1977

IF A FEDERAL ELECTION WERE HELD TODAY, WHICH PARTY'S CANDIDATE DO YOU THINK YOU WOULD FAVOUR?

PC: 38.3%
LIBERAL: 37.9%
NDP: 17.1%
SOCIAL CREDIT: 3.2%
 
SAUVÉ: One of the more interesting political diversions that spring was the rumour that Paul Martin Jr. wanted to enter politics, which I had heard from our mutual friend Paul Desmarais and others. Brian [Mulroney] and I batted the idea around and thought Martin would be a good asset for the Grits, who needed a businessman with political pedigree. Trudeau’s few Bay Street recruits had been defeated in previous elections and Turner was internally isolated. I met Martin at a party hosted by Paul Desmarais April 5th, and politics were among other subjects we discussed in a long conversation. He said he didn’t feel now was the time to make that leap for business and family reasons. We talked about the isolation of Liberal rightists, which he was fairly dismissive of, seeing Turner himself as the bigger issue. My response was that if he made the jump, he would have to choose a faction, find allies and decide what rank he aspired to. Fence sitters will feel the pain soon enough. We moved onto other subjects, but his insistence that there was no necessity to choose factions stuck with me. In that rat’s maze known as the Liberal Party of Canada, you find a faction or it finds you. If you remain outside, then you can be everyone’s friend, which is more Paul’s nature.

O’SULLIVAN: Like the other Ontarian MPs, I was stumping for Team Davis during the provincial election. Only 1 of the 4 Hamilton ridings was considered competitive for us, the others being NDP-Liberal battles. My own was not among them, but I joined with our other Hamilton MPs in trying to keep Hamilton Mountain for our party. If we could win that riding, we could deal a symbolic blow to Grit leader Stuart Smith in his hometown. Such a riding could be held only by engendering personal loyalty among your constituents in traditionally hostile territory. That had been my own approach federally, as well as [incumbent PC MPP] John Smith’s provincially. One of the more interesting battles was a dynastic matchup between Dipper MPP Mike Davison and Grit Sheila Copps in my own riding of Hamilton Centre, which promised plenty of local entertainment. I knew them both casually and had no particular preference for a winner, both being left-wingers in their respective parties. That said, Sheila had a much better sense of humour than Mike. More relevant for me was Scott [Barton] running in his home riding of York North, where our incumbent had retired. I visited his riding a couple of times to catch up, but spent most of my time in Hamilton Mountain, one of our top NDP targets.

TIMMINS: May 1977 was a quietly triumphant time for the federal Tories, having overcome free trade controversy and seeing their provincial cousins on a seemingly unstoppable majority march. Some particularly excited backbenchers even thought of a snap election to bottle the mood. Such thoughts, as they were, were almost nonexistent. Almost the entire caucus, and certainly the entire Cabinet, believed in governing for a full term in majority government. There was no galvanizing issue and their poll recovery was quite soft, a product of slightly improving economic news and opposition parties bickering among themselves. Stanfield worked diligently to maintain his government’s image as frugal and straightforward. He had seen his Liberal predecessors and Diefenbaker undermined by arrogance and ultimately punished by voters for what, after corruption, is probably the cardinal sin in Canadian politics. Provincially, the Union Nationale continued their aboriginal education initiatives and ignored almost everything else in an attempt to revitalize their flagging agenda. The policy convention would be guided by ordinary members more than almost ever before, save for the 1963 and 1965 conventions which led them back to power. Cardinal, making a virtue of necessity, trumpeted this as a populist triumph as opposed to elitist Grit methods. When I asked Bellemare about that in an interview, he shook his head and said “it is what it is.”

MULRONEY: The Ontario election was our best-case result. Bill Davis won a comfortable majority while his opponents were still fighting each other to be a clear alternative. The Grits regained official opposition by a single seat and both opposition leaders announced their impending departure. With his opposition in complete chaos, Davis had free rein for several months, perhaps up to a year. Sean’s close friend Scott Barton cruised to victory in York North, among other notable Tory victories. On the opposition side, Sheila Copps narrowly defeated a NDP incumbent in one of their very few bright spots that night. It was almost as if the previous 2 years had been erased from memory and Big Blue Machine supremacy had never been interrupted. All of us were ecstatic at Davis’ victory and awaiting an expected landslide in Manitoba sometime that fall, with only 2 Atlantic provinces controlled by Liberals. Both of whom, I might add, were friendly with Bob. Immediately after Ontario, we were preparing for Her Majesty’s Silver Jubilee tour, and all of us were caught up in the festive mood. Political serenity gripped the country again, much closer to Expo than patriation in its intensity in English Canada. As a goodwill gesture, the opposition gave their consent to an early adjournment so we could prepare.


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GAGNON: The Silver Jubilee attracted little attention in Quebec in itself, but did contribute to a warm haze which kept voter minds off politics during an unseasonably warm summer. As promised, the Unionist policy convention was largely in grassroots hands. Unsurprisingly, few resolutions passed by its right-wing majority were incorporated into the election platform. Voters had already turned out for the summer, so public opinion polling did not register this inertia. Embarrassingly for Cardinal, Beaudry and especially Sauvé had received much louder applause than he, even though neither man said anything remotely controversial or openly contradictory to their leader’s agenda. The Liberal convention would be held in September and by all indications intended to be an almost entirely economic discussion. Garneau believed that with patriation, the government’s nationalist trump card was weakened alongside its economic one. If his party could devise a forward-looking, consumerist agenda appealing to middle-class anxieties, he would have a real shot at power. In an interview with me just before St. Jean Baptiste, he called the government “intellectually bankrupt” and said he thought Cardinal would not survive another term as leader.

Ontario Premier Bill Davis in a jovial mood on adjournment day, June 20, 1977.

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TIMMINS: That summer was a deceptively quiet time, with only the Liberal policy convention in early July to cover. Garneau decided to fight the next election on affordability and inflation, arguing that the government had proven helpless on both those fronts and was ignoring middle-class concerns. He believed that with patriation complete, the Unionists lost their nationalist trump card that only they could be trusted to speak for Quebec on constitutional issues. Privately he called their aboriginal education initiatives “chasing rainbows” and a political ploy to distract swing voters. Garneau and his chief strategist Paul Desrochers added a third leg to complete their triangle: leadership. Focus groups showed voters knew little about Garneau but saw him as an honest, fiscally responsible technocrat and a strong leader. Cardinal held that advantage in 1974 over Laporte and had gradually relinquished it due to inherent weaknesses and holding steadfast against his party’s policy wishes. Combined, “Paul D” believed he had a winning combination for his leader. The government, like most Quebecers, steadfastly ignored politics that scorching summer. Cardinal himself was exhausted and husbanding his strength for the coming election, which he decided should be fought simply on his party’s record. Quebecers had endorsed his “no surprises” governance in deteriorating economic conditions once and why not again?

MULRONEY: Our vacation was interrupted by news of Jean-Jacques Bertrand’s death on July 20th, and we flew back from Sarajevo for the funeral. Jean-Jacques’ death was not a surprise to me; he had not been well for some time and had visibly deteriorated in recent months. His bitterness had ebbed since leaving politics 3 years earlier, but not all wounds had healed. What he saw as betrayal by Paul Dozois and treachery by Pierre [Sauvé] still rankled with him. I had not spoken with him much since then, but was invited to the funeral nonetheless. Shortly after the funeral I spoke with Aurea Cloutier, who was 81 but lost none of her vitality. She was giving interviews to Ben Timmins, whom she wanted to write the party’s authorized history. The project had been authorized by Daniel Johnson shortly before he died, and Cardinal allowed it to continue despite his dislike of the author. Mlle Cloutier told me the government’s survival chances were 50-50 “for now.” She was dismissive of Cardinal, whom she saw as a desiccated academic disconnected from the party. Yet his critics knew what they were getting when they elected him, so they were not entirely blameless either. More positively, she believed Stanfield would be re-elected as a “sober statesman emblematic of Canada’s best traditions.”

Jean-Jacques Bertrand in 1976.

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ROY: Stanfield had begun tentative preparations for the upcoming election, which he felt should be held in spring rather than autumn as in 1974. His platform would be essentially “stay the course” with mortgage relief, continued defence buildup and trade agreements with smaller European countries that would showcase his party’s commitment to free trade. As with the Quebec Liberals, leadership would be a key component of Stanfield’s appeal to voters. The Tory brain trust believed that Stanfield had grown as a leader between his 1968 defeat and 1972 victory with an appealing platform. By contrast, his Liberal opponents were internally divided and had not done much policy development during the 30th Parliament. Ed Broadbent had spent 3 years honing his pitch in Ontario and BC to traditional voters who had abandoned them in 1974 and disaffected progressive Liberals disenchanted with their party’s ideological ambiguity. The Créditistes were rapidly disintegrating, with only the threat of losing official party status and desperate efforts by Gosselin to keep them together preventing more than 2 MPs leaving. With 10 MPs they lost official party status, which was extended to them by the Speaker on Stanfield’s orders. He did not want to knife them unless they dropped below 10 and stretching that rule was no longer feasible.

PAULSON: In late August, Stanfield’s vacation was interrupted by the news that Heath MacQuarrie would not run again. After 20 years in Parliament, he was ready to move on. Stanfield offered MacQuarrie his choice of a Senate seat or the lieutenant-governorship when incumbent Gordon Bennett’s term expired in 1979. MacQuarrie chose the latter, wanting to return home and enjoy a much more leisurely life. Another benefit would be overseeing his rival Alex Campbell’s government, which appealed to his sense of mischief. They decided that MacQuarrie would remain minister until the election while Stanfield thought of a replacement. He considered Marie Boivin, who had emerged as a star in International Trade, but needed her for upcoming trade negotiations. He decided to replace MacQuarrie with Pat Nowlan, then chairman of the Commons foreign affairs committee. That way he would have a “clean” shuffle instead of a complete overhaul which Stanfield considered unnecessary barring mass casualties. Another retirement was Heward Grafftey, who simply wanted a quiet retirement after 20 years of service. In reality the Unionists had taken over Grafftey’s riding association in anger at his support of the provincial Liberals. 3 years earlier, Stanfield had persuaded Maurice Bellemare that it was in neither party’s interest to defeat Grafftey. Now those pleas fell on deaf ears, and Grafftey was forced to retire rather than risk a humiliating defeat.

SAUVÉ: It was my idea to take out Grafftey, and I persuaded Maurice to make the call. Jean-Guy did not interfere in our decisions, placing complete faith in Maurice’s judgment. Norm Atkins got total loyalty from the Ontario caucus for Bill Davis, and we expected total loyalty to us from the Quebec caucus. Had it not been for us none of them would have been elected dogcatcher for a federal seat. Bill Hamilton was bad enough in my father’s day, and we resolved after his defeat never to allow a PC MP who supported the PLQ into Parliament. Since Grafftey left we have kept that promise. By ’77 the Tories had developed a decent organization of their own led by Claude [Dupras] after Brian returned to Iron Ore. Their independence of us, due to the disparity of forces, was mostly theoretical. Had Norm Atkins been faced with a similar situation he would have done the same thing, as he told me at the time. It only took a few phone calls from Maurice and me before we went on a hunting trip to Gaspe. Besides, Secretary of State was an obsolete ministry anyways.


Brian Mulroney in 1977.


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GAGNON: On October 11, the Assembly fall sitting’s 2nd day, Cardinal held a Planning & Priorities meeting to discuss campaign strategy. Their first topic was election timing: some ministers wanted the usual summer campaign; others wanted to delay till the fall. Cardinal believed he needed a bit more time than usual, since private polling showed a dead heat which was deteriorating rapidly. Other ministers felt a delay would smack of panic, for even in 1960 the election had not been delayed. He snapped and said the lack of delay had been a mistake, not giving them time to recover from a nasty leadership race. Instead they had lost what should have been a slam-dunk election and ushered in “Gritmageddon”, as Cabinet conservatives called the Quiet Revolution. After an hour of debate, Cardinal decided on a September date and August dissolution. This would be outside the June-August window but still during summer. Cardinal also believed Garneau’s policies would not be sufficiently distinct to convince voters that he would offer relief from economic malaise. Most of that meeting was devoted to mundane logistical and tactical issues such as fundraising and advertising, with a final date decision deferred till spring. Cardinal told me in an off-the-record interview that he was cautiously optimistic about the election.

MULRONEY: We had also been discussing campaign strategy around this time, an ideal time with only metric conversion on our parliamentary agenda. Bob would fight strong Liberal push in Ontario while mounting a Quebec offensive to finish off the dying Creditistes. With Davis’ support he was confident of a strong Ontario score. BC would also be targeted for further gains, while Western and Maritime support was solid. He was sad to see Heath MacQuarrie leave, a fellow Nova Scotian who had become one of his closest Cabinet colleagues. One of his objectives was to recruit more talent from BC and Ontario, two places where he felt a need for fresh young talent to replace Diefenbaker-era veterans. Provincially, we were about to have a new ally in Sterling Lyon, though he was averse to federal politics and a staunch Blue ideologically. We were thankful that patriation had been accomplished while Schreyer was in office, for Lyon’s hardline opposition to the distinct society would have been a significant hurdle. On the Hill, Bob found the new reality of televised proceedings a “fascinating experiment” but worried about degraded discourse and showmanship in place of reasoned debate. He instructed the Speaker to ensure that decorum was preserved and Members’ Statements reserved for constituency affairs, not “cheap shots from the peanut gallery.”

PAULSON: Sterling Lyon’s landslide Manitoba victory was pleasing to Stanfield only in terms of Tory solidarity. He liked Schreyer and thought the cantankerous Lyon would be a difficult partner. Lyon, a staunch advocate of decentralization and provincial rights, joined Bill Bennett as the second Blue premier. Like Bill Davis, he would exercise firm but discreet ideological influence on his party’s federal caucus. Lyon enthusiastically supported free trade with the US and often remarked that he wished Stanfield’s domestic policy was “1% as good as his foreign and defence policies.” Bennett, a Socred, remained completely aloof from federal politics so long as his province’s interests were protected. While a more easygoing personality than Lyon, Saskatchewan Tory leader Grant Devine was another Blue provincial leader assured of becoming premier. Bill Davis had given his Blues considerable latitude on non-economic files and was personally close to some of them, such as Hamilton MP Sean O’Sullivan and freshman MPP Scott Barton. Stanfield decided to meet with Davis after Remembrance Day to discuss a joint strategy for the upcoming election campaign, their first since the provincial election a few months earlier. He also planned a tribute to Diefenbaker in the House to follow the rousing valedictory applause the Chief had received at September’s policy convention, with Dief’s former EA Sean O’Sullivan in charge of preparations.

Manitoba Premier Sterling Lyon at his first press conference as premier, Nov. 26, 1977.

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TIMMINS: I did not have any contact with Cardinal that fall, for he was in a funk and held not a single press conference during the session. We soon learned that barring unforeseen events, there would be no more press conferences in the Salon Bleu. He would instead give select interviews to local media outlets rather than the metro dailies, which he felt were prejudicial and focused on Cabinet politics instead of issues “normal people” cared about. All his predecessors had addressed both dailies and local papers that were not implacably hostile – Duplessis had spoken to almost everyone except Le Devoir. Paul Sauvé had even been interviewed by a panel of his party’s harshest critics in what was a premier’s first TV interview, and effortlessly charmed his inquisitors. After a very difficult time in opposition, Daniel Johnson enjoyed good relations with journalists as premier. Being a naturally shy and private man, Cardinal did not enjoy this task at all. He was out of policies and lacked the personality to compensate, so he lashed out at us for reporting uncomfortable realities. If I wanted to know something I would call Bellemare, who was as important to his government’s stability as Dozois had been for Johnson. There was no one whose conversation was more stimulating or informative in that government – though Pierre [Sauvé] was close behind - which made our talks especially enjoyable.

O’SULLIVAN: We were all very optimistic about the election, but took nothing for granted. Both our opponents would make strong pushes in BC and Ontario, while we looked to Quebec for cushioning inevitable losses in those other 2 provinces. Stanfield was looking to make history by winning another majority, since no Tory PM had won consecutive majorities since Borden – or Macdonald if you count 1917 as a coalition victory. MacEachen would run against inflation and affordability sure, but he had no solutions. Stanfield had already imposed controls and bigger mountains of red ink would do nothing for the cost of living, actually far worse than nothing. Our polling showed voters did not blame us for the economic difficulties, which were attributed to external forces, and liked the stability we offered. I have always believed that a major problem for previous Tory governments had been competence and a lack of quiet time – Depression, war, Quebec. Now we were governing in stable, prosperous times and Canadians were convinced we were a viable alternative to a 1-party state. That in my opinion is Stanfield’s greatest political legacy as PM.

CROP PROVINCIAL, DEC. 6-8, 1977

IF A PROVINCIAL ELECTION WERE HELD TODAY, WHICH PARTY'S CANDIDATE WOULD YOU FAVOUR?

LIBERAL: 48.1%
UN: 46.4%
PQ: 4.2%
 
MULRONEY: While preparing the budget, Bob called me and asked me to hold some fundraisers later that month. He had decided over Christmas to call a June election after the budget speech so we could have campaign on it without having to keep Parliament in session during the summer. Then we would quickly pass third reading. It would be a short campaign, since we wanted to bottle the remaining economic optimism. Plus our intelligence told us that the Grits were expecting a long campaign, and it would be amusing to wrong-foot them. The budget itself would contain tax incentives for community groups, small businesses and a hiring freeze across the public service. Bob refused Marie [Boivin]’s request to privatize Air Canada, which was supported by the other economic ministers and a substantial minority of the Cabinet. He then quietly but firmly said no crown corporation would be privatized so long as he was prime minister. Bob saw Air Canada as a crown jewel which should remain public administered, and that was that. His record in Nova Scotia had been public-private partnerships, with public side being done by crown corporations. One area where all the ministers agreed was not to extend mortgage relief, simply because the fiscal situation was too dire for such an expensive commitment. It might be considered in the next mandate if there was significant economic improvement.

Prime Minister Robert Stanfield holds a press conference, Jan. 22, 1978.

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TIMMINS: Stanfield’s major non-budgetary initiatives were granting responsible government to the Yukon and amending the Immigration Act to repeal the prohibition on gay immigration. Neither was a vote-catcher on its own but added to Stanfield’s progressive image. Like Cardinal, he would decide his election date sometime in March and was deep in preparation for the upcoming campaign. Both were unusually quiet that winter, only talking to the media when they felt it absolutely necessary. Stanfield was optimistic about his own province finally returning to Tory rule if John Buchanan won the upcoming election, which would leave only PEI and Saskatchewan in opposition hands. He mulled a First Ministers Conference sometime that fall, simply for an exchange of views and concerns. It would be in the autumn to avoid elections in Saskatchewan, Quebec, Nova Scotia and PEI that could result in changes of government. Saskatchewan was likely to see another NDP victory, Quebec was shrouded in uncertainty, while Nova Scotia would certainly turn blue. Finally, PEI seemed likely to break tradition and give Campbell an unprecedented fourth term. In his 6 years in office, Stanfield had not made enemies of a single premier he had dealt with, though his relations with Cardinal and Regan were civil but cool. He told his staff that regardless of outcomes, he hoped that record would continue.

ROY: The provincial budget was noteworthy for what it did not include: any hint that the government was changing its course as the red ink continued to mount. As usual, this was a result of impasse and the cabinet’s focus on stability rather than experimentation. Lesage had been pushed and prodded by different factions in his second term and ultimately created a chaotic image where he publicly argued with his own ministers. This was often evoked to me by both moderate and conservative ministers when I asked why they did not challenge Cardinal more forcefully. They knew we would report internal dissension regardless, so if forced to choose they would rather we discuss abstract philosophical differences than put x name to y disagreement. Moreover, the likeliest leadership contestants in case of a defeat – Sauvé and Masse – were determined to avoid the slightest whiff of disloyalty, as had often clung to Bertrand in opposition. They were only 2 among many ministers who flatly acknowledged and bemoaned the intellectual impasse, albeit under cover of an embargo. The only new announcement made was of 3 more provincial parks that would be inaugurated that summer. Negotiations with aboriginal leadership over education expansion had slowed almost to a crawl, and at several points a walkout was a real possibility.


PAULSON: Bellemare and Sauvé could spare only limited organizational resources for their federal allies with a provincial election on the horizon, which was devoted to a handful of Socred ridings ripe for the taking. Both men would take a far more hands-off approach than previous elections, only making birds-eye decisions and leaving the rest to their staff. As senior ministers they were expected to crisscross the province on pre-writ tours, and Bellemare had to help mediate a handful of strikes that spring. They were confident that Socred would be wiped out, restoring 2-party federal politics for the first time since 1958. Not only were they confident of destroying Socred, they were also confident of removing Chicoutimi from the PQ column and restoring the 2-party system dented in 1966. Bellemare had become impatient with the premier for refusing to seriously consider a course change, not so much for ideological reasons as because he disliked a leader ignoring the party’s collective will. That was the major reason he had supported Cardinal in 1971, and now Cardinal was indulging in a passive-aggressive version of Bertrand’s behaviour. For his part, Sauvé was quietly confident that the leadership was his whenever the post was vacated, given his grassroots support and public popularity. “Good things come to those who wait” was his catchphrase for well-wishers.

NEWMAN: MacEachen and his team believed they could reduce Stanfield to a minority if not outright defeat him. One option contemplated was a supply and confidence agreement with Broadbent to provide stable government for at least a couple of years. The Tories had set a precedent with Socred during their minority, so in their view, what was good for the goose was good for the gander. Ontario was the eternal battleground, while Quebec offered Socred cannibalization on a silver platter for both parties. Davis would fully support Stanfield as usual, while the Unionists were distracted by their own election. Both opposition parties were eager for battle but lacked a single target for their arrows. Economically, MacEachen’s approach was essentially similar to Stanfield’s, while the defence buildup had proved popular on its own and due to the manufacturing jobs it brought to contracted provinces. Foreign policy offered less than it might have with a Democrat in the White House. Ultimately MacEachen decided on the same plank as his Quebec counterpart: affordability.
 
NEWMAN: Early April was an incredibly hectic month on the Hill as final pre-writ preparations were made by all parties before Stanfield would ask Governor-General Ignatieff to dissolve the 30th Parliament. I learned that the election date would be June 14 and published my scoop shortly thereafter, which got me a bunch of angry callers from PMO. All 3 parties were confident, though the fact that MacEachen hoped for a minority said all I needed to know about private expectations. I thought Stanfield would win all along, since there was no single focus of discontent and he ran a competent, respected government. More interesting were the regional battles across the country, and I decided to embed in BC, where I suspected there would be more action than many of my colleagues believed. As usual, there would be a Tory-Dipper battle with Bill Bennett’s Socreds tacitly supporting Stanfield. Since they were a coalition, Bennett could not openly campaign for the Tories like Davis or other conservative premiers, but his wishes were well known. Many Socred volunteers took leave to work for Stanfield, as did their NDP counterparts. Stanfield’s BC lieutenant, Frank Oberle, told me he was confident of Tory gains in his province, and I was accompanied on my tours by his parliamentary secretary Tom Siddon on more than a few occasions.

GAGNON: On April 27, I learned that the Cabinet had decided on a Sept. 12 election, with provisional agreement for a 6-week writ period. It was the result of a compromise between those who wanted a summer and fall election, with enough time to exploit the Unionist financial advantage. That financial advantage would be smaller than usual due to Garneau’s business-friendly centrism and the business community’s diminished confidence in Cardinal’s ability to govern. He adjourned the Assembly the following day, with only the budget and a handful of minor bills having been enacted during that spring session. I wrote that if Cardinal did not put some new policies in the window, he would lose. In 1974 he had the Language Charter, a balanced budget and mortgage relief to sell. With a rapidly deteriorating fiscal situation, there were no more goodies for voters. In my conversations with voters, I saw what had been apathy turn to anger at a bad economy and Cardinal’s poor leadership. They were hurting and all Cardinal offered was more of the same. Garneau’s calm reassurance provided a stark contrast with the premier’s restrained, formal tone of a sort which had probably not been heard since Taschereau. By contrast, Robert Stanfield’s opponents had failed to provide a coherent alternative vision, so they could not capitalize on this anger federally.

PAULSON: Stanfield loved campaigning, especially in springtime with ideal weather and a public which if not happy, was at least satisfied with his government. Public and private polls showed that while voters were upset at a poor economy, they were not convinced MacEachen’s Liberals would be an improvement. The impression from constitutional debates was of bickering Grits and united Tories. while they had resolved their differences, Turner was still uneasy about being finance minister in a MacEachen government. Stanfield had devised a modus Vivendi where he would give his Blues enough to be satisfied but not happy, which kept ideological peace. Moreover, Tories were fully united in foreign and defence policy unlike their Grit counterparts. Stanfield was competent and liked despite a poor economic situation. Substitute the economy for scandal and a similar situation existed for Pearson in 1965. If he won another term, then his party’s Diefenbaker-era reputation for terminal incompetence would be banished. Amid the federal campaign, Alex Campbell cruised to a fourth term in PEI, giving the Grits a much-needed morale boost. In Nova Scotia, Stanfield was set to receive a morale boost of his own with John Buchanan’s impending victory. Both major parties were most concerned about Quebec, where Unionist rule looked increasingly imperilled. A Liberal victory there, MacEachen said privately, would be “the sweetest provincial victory of all.”

TIMMINS: Stanfield and MacEachen’s hopes for a 2-party Quebec were well on their way to being realized during the second half, as Gosselin floundered in a polarized environment. Most of his voters went to the Tories in hopes of blocking a Liberal government, and internal tracking polls predicted a Socred shutout. As Quebec lurched towards a predictable finish, all eyes were on the English Canadian battlegrounds. This suited the provincial parties just fine, for both wanted to exclusively focus on their upcoming battle. I met Cardinal 2 weeks before Election Day and he said a Tory victory would be best for Quebec based on their track record and support for the province’s industries. For once, he allowed musings on federal politics to be published. Garneau supported his federal leader, Allan MacEachen, but believed it would be better for Quebec if John Turner was leader. Ideology aside, Turner was bilingual and knew the province well from his time practicing law in Montreal. He had mediated between Trudeau and Johnson in the 1960s and was on good terms with the leadership of both provincial parties. Chretien, MacEachen’s Quebec lieutenant, had a good relationship with Cardinal’s liaison ministers, Pierre Sauvé and Maurice Bellemare. Both their networks would be equally useful if MacEachen lost.

Conservative Leader Robert Stanfield is interviewed on Vancouver radio, June 1, 1978.

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O’SULLIVAN: Our victory was narrower than public polls predicted, with a smaller majority than we had in the previous Parliament with a 283-seat Commons after redistribution. This occurred due to economic concerns among BC and Ontario voters, especially in the Lower Mainland and Southwestern Ontario. We did not lose a single seat in Quebec, but picked up fewer seats than expected. This was probably due to Unionist unpopularity rubbing off on us and their inability to commit significant resources. There were 2 or 3 seats we could have won but lost because of superior Liberal organization. Regardless, our majority was secure and Bob the first Tory PM to win consecutive majorities since Borden. His place in history would be assured. Dief wrote to Bob after the Cabinet was sworn in warmly congratulating him on his achievement, joking about his newfound life as retiree after an entire lifetime in politics. Dief also wrote me congratulating me on my appointment as Marie Boivin’s parliamentary secretary, saying he hoped I would enjoy the economics lessons. In truth, that’s a major reason why I was thrilled Marie asked me to be her PS. Having been elected as a student, I had little time to formulate a specialty as such, instead opting to be a generalist.



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Stanfield III Cabinet

Deputy Prime Minister: Erik Nielsen
Finance: John Crosbie
Justice: Marcel Lambert
Foreign Affairs: Pat Nowlan
Defence: Michael Forrestal
Agriculture: Harold Danforth
Public Works: Walter Dinsdale
Environment: Frank Oberle
Energy: Alvin Hamilton
Transport: Jack Horner
Veterans Affairs: William Knowles
Immigration: Roch La Salle
Indian and Northern Affairs: Erik Nielsen
Solicitor General: Elmer MacKay
Heritage: Flora MacDonald
Health: Paul Yewchuk
Treasury Board: Don Mazankowski
Labour: Jim McGrath
International Trade: Marie Boivin
Revenue: William Ritchie
Government House Leader: Ged Baldwin
Chief Government Whip: Tom Bell
Government Senate Leader: Jacques Flynn
 
John and Geills Turner at a Toronto fundraiser, c. 1978.

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JULIA ABRAMS, HISTORIAN, UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA: Immediately after Stanfield’s reshuffled Cabinet was sworn in, Allan MacEachen formally resigned as Liberal leader. The calls for his resignation had not been unanimous, given Liberal gains, but MacEachen felt he had two shots and missed both. Herb Gray was elected interim leader by caucus in preparation for a leadership vote sometime that winter. Liberal hierarchy believed a longer leadership contest was necessary, given 3 consecutive defeats and a polarized caucus. The rules would be announced in September and mark the campaign’s formal kickoff. John Turner and Jean Chrétien were the obvious candidates, representing the Liberal right and centre respectively. Both men had loyal followings in the West and Quebec respectively. While Turner had represented Ottawa since 1968, his roots in the province were shallow. Themselves thrown into a leadership contest, the Ontario Liberal Party had no particular preference given a divided membership. Chrétien had the advantage of being a bilingual Francophone in a party devoted to alternation and less polarizing than Turner, who had endured bruising battles with his left-wing rivals. Outside Parliament Hill, there was a sizeable number of grassroots Liberals who felt Turner was too internally polarizing and Chrétien too unknown in English Canada. This group, which later became known as the “gingers”, wanted an outsider. After all, had not the party’s most successful leaders come from outside, either to leadership or politics?

GAGNON: When the campaign began, Cardinal declared the issue was proven Unionist stability against radical Liberal change. They had been a financial wrecking ball in government before and would be again. He downplayed leadership, which was exceedingly rare for a Unionist leader given the party’s culture. Both were a mistake on his part because Garneau was seen by voters as a competent, bland technocrat who had solutions to their economic woes. His frontbench had many new recruits elected since 1970 rather than Lesage-era veterans, which mirrored the cabinet. Emphasizing leadership would have drawn attention to much stronger personalities than his own, such as Gabias, Sauvé and Bellemare. There would be 2 debates, as in 1970 and 1974. Unlike Johnson, Cardinal declined to press for an English debate since he was less fluent in the language than Garneau and did not like speaking it unless absolutely necessary. Both parties slowly released their platforms, which were mostly repackaged from their respective policy conventions. Given the paucity of Unionist ideas, they were forced to run on past achievements rather than address economic woes. Almost all swing voters I spoke to cited the economy as a reason to vote Liberal, saying that at least Garneau would try something new. They were tired of being told there was no alternative to their economic woes.

ROY: It was obvious that the Unionist premise of stability was not only useless but actively harmful to their campaign. Inflation and red ink made a joke of their claims to economic stewardship, the same red ink which they had successfully eliminated under Johnson. By the time of their first debate, the Liberals led by roughly 6-8 points in public polls, a gap which was higher in internal polling. Garneau led on almost all policy questions except culture, which was not an issue in 1978 with the PQ collapsing and the constitutional issue resolved. Voters under 30 had dim or no memory of the Lesage era, and they wanted a better economic future than their government was promising. Moreover, Cardinal’s stiff and wooden public persona made him an aloof figure, if in a different way than the imperious; Napoleonic Lesage had been a dozen years earlier. I was a panelist in their first debate, and Garneau’s victory was immediately apparent to all those not paid to say otherwise. Their exchange did not move many votes, since Cardinal had nothing new to say and looked disengaged. I concluded he did not really want another term even had the voters been inclined to give him one. In those days, you did not write about a politician’s health even if you had the facts.

SAUVÉ: I had felt since Christmas we would probably lose. You don’t lose in a downturn automatically; you only lose if voters believe you’re hopeless at fixing what went wrong and if your opponent is credible. We had a credible opponent and voters believed we were hopeless. There were many people in my riding who said they were voting for me personally, not the government or even the party. I was one of the lucky ones, since many of our freshmen had shallow roots and would go in or out with the tide. Another lucky one was Guy Ingres, who had been a community education activist before being elected in Mercier and one of the most naturally talented organizers I’ve ever known in politics. Jean-Guy’s own riding of Saint-Hyacinthe was in doubt because despite being premier he had no roots there and it was a swingy riding. Localism was not as strong as it had been when I was a teenager, but in many smaller ridings it was preferable to have local roots. I had used this myself to defeat Francis Fox in ’72, and Jean-Guy’s opponent was a well-known small businesswoman. The PQ was a non-factor, as progressive nationalists wanted to ensure our defeat rather than risk another victory through vote-splitting as in 1966.


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MULRONEY: Stanfield was not surprised at the Liberal victory, since he could read the polls like everyone else and I had been updating him from the ground. Garneau’s win was hugely consequential for us in Quebec, since we were now entirely on our own. Sure, Pierre was now virtually guaranteed the leadership, but there was only so much he could do in opposition while rebuilding his own party. Bob’s dismay at the Quebec result was tempered by our big win in Nova Scotia and rise from the dead in Saskatchewan. He had no comment on Quebec other than to wish Garneau well and say he looked forward to working with the new government. We had our own economic issues to worry about, and our political diversion that summer was watching the nascent race to lead the Grits. I felt Chrétien would be a tougher foe than Turner given his populist credentials and acceptance by all wings of the Liberal Party, though Turner would have a fundraising advantage.

Garneau Cabinet


Deputy Premier: Gérard D. Lévesque
Finance : Guy Saint-Pierre
Justice : Gérard D. Lévesque
Education : Jérôme Choquette
Health : Lise Bacon
Agriculture : Normand Toupin
Labour : Jean Cournoyer
Public Works : Maurice Tessier
Cultural Affairs : Fernand Lalonde
Immigration : Jean Bienvenue
Environment : Claude Simard
Natural Resources : Paul Phaneuf
Transport: Georges Vaillancourt
Municipal Affairs: Victor Goldbloom
Industry and Commerce: Paul Berthiaume
President of the Treasury Board: Robert Quenneville
Revenue: Gérald Harvey
 
TIMMINS: The Liberal leadership officially started in October, seemingly a 2-way battle between Chrétien and Turner with an unpredictable result. As had been the case since June, a certain part of the Liberal establishment felt they needed an experienced outsider with proven economic credibility. Maritimers, disappointed by MacEachen’s failure, also wanted one of their own. Between these two elements, there was enough room for a third candidate. His name was Alex Campbell. Campbell had resisted entreaties to run federally in 1972 from Pierre Trudeau, preferring to continue his work in PEI. 6 more years in Charlottetown had gradually changed his view, for after a hard-fought 4th majority it was clear that his work was done. Despite previous disavowals of interest, Campbell was not totally disinterested in federal policies: his widely praised constitutional role had garnered him a profile in English Canada. In the early 1960s he had narrowly lost a federal nomination before becoming provincial leader. While unilingual, Campbell was determined to learn French like his friend Bob Stanfield. He knew that Quebec would be largely Chretien territory, so better to concentrate on Ontario where both leading candidates had shallow roots. Chrétien believed he had the edge given how internally polarizing Turner was. As for the moneymen, both financial centres were entirely comfortable with all 3 candidates.

Liberal leadership candidates Jean Chrétien and John Turner at a Vancouver fundraiser, Oct. 9, 1978.


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GAGNON: After its defeat, the Union Nationale decided a quick leadership contest was best. It would be misleading to call that race a contest, since Pierre Sauvé had a hammerlock on both grassroots and donors. Marcel Masse entered the race to present the outgoing nationalist-moderate viewpoint against Sauvé’s federalist conservatism, and that was the extent of their competition. Both men pledged a review of the party’s defeat and a new platform to be devised at the upcoming policy convention. Their ideological contrast was clear for all to see, and the Union Nationale would return to unabashed economic liberalism. Masse was to Cardinal’s right and willing to embrace some right-wing policies, but that was as far as he went. Neither man cared about the executive’s decision for a race lasting less than 3 months, ending Dec. 10. I asked both would they would pick as their deputy, both answered that Maurice Bellemare would be their choice. Of course Bellemare would not be running in the next election, but neither man was willing to name an alternate. Both men said Cardinal’s legacy would be cultural with the Language Charter and James Bay Accord as its centrepieces. In Masse’s words, “Jean-Guy did for culture what Daniel did for the economy.”

PAULSON: Stanfield’s first legislative priority was to slowly phase in deductibility for municipal property taxes while conducting a review for mortgage interest payments. He had decided on the partial reversal of his private vow after extensive consultation with Finance, Revenue and outside experts. All agreed that the mortgage plan should be delayed indefinitely given the state of federal finances, which were unlikely to reverse in the short to medium term. With the Liberals leaderless and the NDP supportive, there was little controversy around Stanfield’s proposal. Many proposed bills would be vetoed for lack of funds, and the Cabinet decided to put their eggs in their trade and defence baskets. It was a quiet fall, almost too quiet for some Tories’ liking. That calm was interrupted on Nov. 12 with the death of John Diefenbaker at 83, who had never recovered from his wife Olive’s death the previous year. His state funeral held a few days was held in his native Saskatoon, with Mulroney, O’Sullivan and Stanfield as honorary pallbearers. Not since the 1890s had 3 prime ministers – in this case, St. Laurent, Pearson and Diefenbaker – died consecutively. When he returned to Ottawa, Stanfield began the process of searching for a new-Governor General when George Ignatieff’s term expired the following summer.

MULRONEY: We did not have a preference for Liberal leader – all 3 candidates’ qualities essentially evened out in the end. Turner appealed to Westerners and soft Tory voters but was weak with progressives, who might turn to the NDP as had happened twice before. Chretien was internally unifying and could appeal to both progressives and moderates, but his Quebec base left little room for expansion. Campbell was an experienced outsider, who despite wide admiration among English Canadian elites had the smallest regional base, was unilingual and faced declining popularity in his own province. At a personal level, Chretien and Campbell were charismatic populists who could connect with ordinary Canadians. Perhaps the only parallel between that race and the Unionist one was that the candidates agreed their party’s economic centre of gravity needed a noticeable rightward shift, if for different reasons. When I asked Pierre what role he would give Masse in his shadow cabinet, he said Environment, where a “soft touch” was needed. After patriation, Intergovernmental Affairs was now a shadow of its former self and he wanted Masse to have a senior non-economic portfolio. Yves Gabias would become finance critic. One of his first meetings as leader would be with Jean Drapeau to patch up frayed relations, which had always been personally friendly. Moreover, with Drapeau’s foe Victor Goldbloom at Municipal Affairs, City Hall already had a grievance with Quebec City.


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SAUVÉ: I was taking over a party which was down but hardly out. Our coffers were reasonably full, though there would be an inevitable dropoff in opposition as had been the case under Daniel. I wanted to finish the job of remolding our donor base to be more grassroots-friendly. Having spoken to Raymond, I knew that he would not try to kill our respective golden geese by limiting corporate contributions, as his party’s left occasionally grumbled about. Big donors were tapped out after 3 consecutive elections for all levels of government, so it was an ideal time for small-donor fundraising. I said our policy statements would be reserved for the June convention. To me, if we wanted to move the Overton window rightward, we would need to strike at the heart of liberal power. That is to say the public sector unions and their associated groups who had formed a key part of our “New Class” since 1960. Lesage had done a similar thing with the Church’s temporal power. If we did not have labour reform, we could not have the economic reform this province so desperately needed. As for social policy, I wanted to see what the delegates would introduce, since my own ideas were rather vague at the time and it was important to give them the role they deserved.

Pierre Sauvé poses before a portrait of his grandfather, former Conservative leader Arthur Sauvé, c. 1958.

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TIMMINS: Stanfield’s desire for freer trade took a while to find a partner, which was made more difficult by his own refusal to significantly liberalize the economy. Ultimately he decided to scale back his commitment and seek a Foreign Investment Protection Agreement (FIPA) with Australia, after discussions with Fraser shortly before Christmas. Preliminary negotiations began in January 1979, a couple of months before Stanfield was due to make an official visit to Australia. The Liberal opposition supported Stanfield’s initiative while the NDP remained opposed to trade liberalization. It was one of the few pieces of good news for the Tories as economic prospects continued to deteriorate and inflation soared. Politically, Stanfield would have a clear field only until the Liberal leadership contest ended in March. The Tory right was satisfied with his Australian initiative, if somewhat skeptical of its success. Marie Boivin did not share her colleagues’ view: like Stanfield, she believed an agreement could be concluded. Privately she believed that the chance of failure on either side was roughly equivalent. Meanwhile the Liberal leadership race continued. In Quebec, Raymond Garneau had signalled his preference for Jean Chretien as Liberal leader, while Ontario Liberal leader David Peterson endorsed John Turner. The only certainty seemed that given the antipathy towards Turner, a first-ballot victory would be required to avoid an ABT movement.

GAGNON: Garneau’s first major initiative was to freeze civil service hiring and a tougher budget than his predecessors had delivered since 1973. Other than that, his initiatives were mostly around localization of services, mild education reforms and friendlier labour relations. It was a technocratic approach to governance suffused with a liberal spirit, quite unlike the last Liberal government, much less their Unionist rivals. On the opposition bench, Sauvé conducted a spirited but essentially generic critique of the Liberal government, having decided to wait out the Liberal honeymoon and focus on party reorganization. It was a quiet time in provincial politics, perhaps the quietest since Laporte’s lackadaisical 1973 session which had cemented the conditions for Cardinal’s 1974 victory. Quiet suited both men just fine for different reasons despite complaints from their most ardent supporters that they were “shadowboxing” rather than truly engaging with each other. In the federal Liberal contest, Garneau personally supported Jean Chretien, but many of his provincial colleagues preferred John Turner, who though not a Quebecer was more of a localist than Chretien. Later that month the two leaders secretly negotiated on the construction of a premier’s residence, which would be built on the grounds of the former lieutenant-gubernatorial Bois de Coulonge. Garneau wanted to ensure bipartisan support before beginning construction given the cost and inevitable controversy which would result.

SAUVÉ: My goal in early ’79 was to regroup and revitalize, period. We had just lost nearly half our caucus, with a few ministers among them. The government was going to have a honeymoon that could last up to a year or more depending on how external factors played. We had been in government for 12 years; voters were not going to listen if we did a brisk 180 and repudiated that with no explanation. So we decided to release policy gradually and wait for opportunities. That was a pattern for us: prepare in the early term, and then pounce during pre-writ, both in wartime and when Daniel was in opposition. I had every intention of following that pattern. It gave me an opportunity to modernize the organization, which was not as sharp as it once had been. Hire outside consultants, sharpen our polling and ad team, banal but essential logistical items. One of them was removing the county patronage moratorium imposed by Daniel when he was leader, given its essentialness to our ground operations. As for the premier’s residence, it would never have been built as a partisan issue. Both Raymond and I had young kids at the time, which had not been the case for any premier since my father.

MULRONEY: The Liberal leadership race was too close to call in its final weeks, with Campbell gaining momentum at the expense of both his rivals in Ontario. I thought if he could emerge ahead of Chretien he would be elected to block Turner given how much the Liberal left loathed John. Chretien’s Quebec base was not as solid as it seemed, with Turner making inroads in the Montreal era. Campbell had the Maritimes to himself, and the West was largely Turner’s. I thought Chretien would be our toughest foe given his populist appeal and Quebec base. Campbell was an outsider but unilingual and a Maritime progressive seeking to succeed another Maritime progressive. We were focused on the budget and implementing the tax promise which would be our key economic policy at this point in the term. The Australian agreement was not something which would move many votes if implemented, or even a free trade agreement for that matter. Otherwise the winter looked promising, with landslides for Bennett in BC and Lougheed in Alberta just over the horizon. Around this time, Bob asked if I would reconsider the presidency of our Quebec wing, and I refused, wanting to continue at Iron Ore. I would always be available for fundraising and strategy, but business is where I wanted to stay.

PAULSON: Campbell’s narrow victory over Turner was an exceedingly close, only because Turner made stronger inroads in Quebec than had been expected. To win, Campbell needed Chretien to come in third because the Liberal right would prefer Chretien to Campbell, a pragmatic progressive who had instituted restrictions on foreign land ownership as premier. Nonetheless, Campbell offered both Chretien and Turner Shadow Cabinet portfolios of their choice. Both men elected to keep their current positions at Justice and Finance respectively, even as public and private doubts swirled as to whether Turner would stay there. It was not a question of personal antagonism or policy disagreement rather that after 3 defeats for leader, Turner would never fulfill his ultimate ambition of becoming Prime Minister. In the interim, Herb Gray would remain parliamentary leader until a safe seat could be found for Campbell. His only requirement was that it be in an Atlantic province. In the next election, he would run in his home riding of Egmont. Ultimately Allan MacEachen chose to retire, opening up his Cape Breton riding for Campbell. MacEachen resigned on March 28, and Stanfield would call the by-election for May 18.




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LISE PAYETTE: I was surprised as anyone when Sauvé offered me one of his first sit-down interviews as party leader. He had been a frequent guest as a minister, a good one too. Yet even though he enjoyed sparring with me there was no love lost between us then or later, to put it mildly. He explained that I was one of his favourite interviewers because he considered me fair and tough, and that it would be “politically criminal” to neglect my audience. I asked if this had anything to do with the gender gap, and he replied with a nonchalant joke. His interest was in suburban moderate women, whose defection was a major demographic cause of his party’s defeat the previous year. To them he projected the “everyday dad” image juxtaposed with his polished legal persona. To male interviewers, you saw more of the freewheeling Army macho he used with men in his orbit, embodying his party’s longstanding culture. He liked to say that people are like diamonds, with different sides being illuminated depending on your perspective. For my part, I found that slickness off-putting and told him so. Thereafter, our interviews took on a much more aggressive tone. I was not the last interviewer of either gender to have this experience.

NEWMAN: Campbell’s election had buoyed Grit spirits, eager to fight for their new leader as they had not been for MacEachen. He was an enigma to many Ottawa Grits, not because he was secretive or ambiguous, indeed quite the contrary, but simply as an outsider. I wrote in 1968 that he was an impressive young statesmen who deserved to be a founder of our new Confederation, which I believe was fully vindicated by his role at Charlottetown. When we met for an interview a month or so after he became leader, he told me his platform would be the pragmatic progressivism he had pursued as premier. I asked him about the Australian negotiations, which he said he supported in principle and would support free trade. The Liberal Party always favoured free trade, as did he. That said, there had to be appropriate cultural protections if and when we negotiated agreements with allied countries. I did not ask about a potential US agreement explicitly, though his comments about cultural protection signalled a tacit approval. Even more than words, keeping Turner and other economic shadow ministers on showed he was serious about re-establishing Grit economic credibility. He and Turner somehow managed to forge a cordial working relationship, even as the new leader personally preferred Chretien.

MULRONEY: In early May Bob informed Cabinet of his choice for Governor-General: Denise Proulx, an eminent constitutional law professor at McGill who was a pioneer in her field and universally respected across the political spectrum. Bob wanted a constitutional expert as GG, and she fit the bill perfectly. It was also important to him that governors-general be strictly nonpartisan, despite Roland Michener’s eminence as one of our greatest GGs. The news was interrupted by Margaret Thatcher’s astounding victory in Britain, and Bob was anxious to meet her at the upcoming G7 and CHOGM summits. He had met her when she was in opposition 2 years earlier and been extremely impressed, though I’m not sure that was entirely reciprocal. Foreign affairs were a top priority of Bob’s as PM and he quickly came to like it despite initial reservations. On defence, he had quietly commissioned a study as to whether unification could be undone but DOD said it would akin to unscrambling eggs. Instead, he decided to restore their traditional ranks and service names. We decided to delay the announcement till fall while Defence prepared. It was a quiet session, calm which would not last when Parliament resumed in the autumn. There was an important domestic policy announcement Bob had up his sleeve, and we were uncertain of how it would play.

GAGNON: Sauvé performed well in his first sitting as Unionist leader, deploying the same cheerful irony Daniel Johnson perfected against Lesage nearly 20 years earlier. To him, few image points were as important as optimism for conservatives. It was not just about a parliamentary image but also his party’s strategic positioning. He had seen his father and Duplessis deploy humour to effortlessly deflate a self-righteous, sanctimonious and often enraged Liberal opposition as a teenager and wanted to resurrect his party’s optimistic streak. Sanctimony and self-righteousness were anathema to him and part of the personality screening test he administered to prospective candidates or personal staffers. All this was not yet known, as all eyes were on the policy convention held at the end of May. Among resolutions passed was privatization of the natural resource crown corporations established by Lesage, which was Sauvé’s first major controversy as leader. He shrugged it off, as he did most policy controversies. When I interviewed him, he said there was this strange notion that local control was synonymous with state control, a premise he did not accept. After all, he was keeping Liberal powers to block takeover bids if deemed detrimental to provincial interests. That was the fine print ignored by his most ardent supporters and detractors.

PAULSON: Alex Campbell’s first few weeks as opposition leader were low-key but a wakeup call for the government, faced with a charismatic, youthful opponent far more in tune with popular opinion than MacEachen had been. Campbell had not spent much time in opposition, but he had a razor-sharp instinct for it nonetheless. MacEachen was a better forensic debater but Campbell was light years ahead in popularizing them, which as Stanfield noted was different from both Diefenbaker and Trudeau. Yet the collegial atmosphere remained intact, in the Maritime tradition. All 3 leaders got on well personally and would sometimes confer just to talk. It was a sharp contrast from the “hot war” under Pearson when the Tories were isolated from all other parties, to say nothing of the Pearson-Diefenbaker mutual contempt. When Parliament adjourned for the summer on June 20th, all parties left in an optimistic mood, believing they had accomplished their respective goals. Stanfield on economic reassurance, Campbell in transitioning to the federal arena, and Broadbent jockeying to Campbell’s left. After Dominion Day celebrations in Ottawa, all leaders decamped to the summer BBQ circuit. This was especially important for Campbell, who had just arrived in Ottawa and still unknown outside Atlantic Canada.

Liberal Leader Alex Campbell at a Burlington, Ont. fundraiser.

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