NEWMAN: Early April was an incredibly hectic month on the Hill as final pre-writ preparations were made by all parties before Stanfield would ask Governor-General Ignatieff to dissolve the 30th Parliament. I learned that the election date would be June 14 and published my scoop shortly thereafter, which got me a bunch of angry callers from PMO. All 3 parties were confident, though the fact that MacEachen hoped for a minority said all I needed to know about private expectations. I thought Stanfield would win all along, since there was no single focus of discontent and he ran a competent, respected government. More interesting were the regional battles across the country, and I decided to embed in BC, where I suspected there would be more action than many of my colleagues believed. As usual, there would be a Tory-Dipper battle with Bill Bennett’s Socreds tacitly supporting Stanfield. Since they were a coalition, Bennett could not openly campaign for the Tories like Davis or other conservative premiers, but his wishes were well known. Many Socred volunteers took leave to work for Stanfield, as did their NDP counterparts. Stanfield’s BC lieutenant, Frank Oberle, told me he was confident of Tory gains in his province, and I was accompanied on my tours by his parliamentary secretary Tom Siddon on more than a few occasions.
GAGNON: On April 27, I learned that the Cabinet had decided on a Sept. 12 election, with provisional agreement for a 6-week writ period. It was the result of a compromise between those who wanted a summer and fall election, with enough time to exploit the Unionist financial advantage. That financial advantage would be smaller than usual due to Garneau’s business-friendly centrism and the business community’s diminished confidence in Cardinal’s ability to govern. He adjourned the Assembly the following day, with only the budget and a handful of minor bills having been enacted during that spring session. I wrote that if Cardinal did not put some new policies in the window, he would lose. In 1974 he had the Language Charter, a balanced budget and mortgage relief to sell. With a rapidly deteriorating fiscal situation, there were no more goodies for voters. In my conversations with voters, I saw what had been apathy turn to anger at a bad economy and Cardinal’s poor leadership. They were hurting and all Cardinal offered was more of the same. Garneau’s calm reassurance provided a stark contrast with the premier’s restrained, formal tone of a sort which had probably not been heard since Taschereau. By contrast, Robert Stanfield’s opponents had failed to provide a coherent alternative vision, so they could not capitalize on this anger federally.
PAULSON: Stanfield loved campaigning, especially in springtime with ideal weather and a public which if not happy, was at least satisfied with his government. Public and private polls showed that while voters were upset at a poor economy, they were not convinced MacEachen’s Liberals would be an improvement. The impression from constitutional debates was of bickering Grits and united Tories. while they had resolved their differences, Turner was still uneasy about being finance minister in a MacEachen government. Stanfield had devised a modus Vivendi where he would give his Blues enough to be satisfied but not happy, which kept ideological peace. Moreover, Tories were fully united in foreign and defence policy unlike their Grit counterparts. Stanfield was competent and liked despite a poor economic situation. Substitute the economy for scandal and a similar situation existed for Pearson in 1965. If he won another term, then his party’s Diefenbaker-era reputation for terminal incompetence would be banished. Amid the federal campaign, Alex Campbell cruised to a fourth term in PEI, giving the Grits a much-needed morale boost. In Nova Scotia, Stanfield was set to receive a morale boost of his own with John Buchanan’s impending victory. Both major parties were most concerned about Quebec, where Unionist rule looked increasingly imperilled. A Liberal victory there, MacEachen said privately, would be “the sweetest provincial victory of all.”
TIMMINS: Stanfield and MacEachen’s hopes for a 2-party Quebec were well on their way to being realized during the second half, as Gosselin floundered in a polarized environment. Most of his voters went to the Tories in hopes of blocking a Liberal government, and internal tracking polls predicted a Socred shutout. As Quebec lurched towards a predictable finish, all eyes were on the English Canadian battlegrounds. This suited the provincial parties just fine, for both wanted to exclusively focus on their upcoming battle. I met Cardinal 2 weeks before Election Day and he said a Tory victory would be best for Quebec based on their track record and support for the province’s industries. For once, he allowed musings on federal politics to be published. Garneau supported his federal leader, Allan MacEachen, but believed it would be better for Quebec if John Turner was leader. Ideology aside, Turner was bilingual and knew the province well from his time practicing law in Montreal. He had mediated between Trudeau and Johnson in the 1960s and was on good terms with the leadership of both provincial parties. Chretien, MacEachen’s Quebec lieutenant, had a good relationship with Cardinal’s liaison ministers, Pierre Sauvé and Maurice Bellemare. Both their networks would be equally useful if MacEachen lost.
Conservative Leader Robert Stanfield is interviewed on Vancouver radio, June 1, 1978.
O’SULLIVAN: Our victory was narrower than public polls predicted, with a smaller majority than we had in the previous Parliament with a 283-seat Commons after redistribution. This occurred due to economic concerns among BC and Ontario voters, especially in the Lower Mainland and Southwestern Ontario. We did not lose a single seat in Quebec, but picked up fewer seats than expected. This was probably due to Unionist unpopularity rubbing off on us and their inability to commit significant resources. There were 2 or 3 seats we could have won but lost because of superior Liberal organization. Regardless, our majority was secure and Bob the first Tory PM to win consecutive majorities since Borden. His place in history would be assured. Dief wrote to Bob after the Cabinet was sworn in warmly congratulating him on his achievement, joking about his newfound life as retiree after an entire lifetime in politics. Dief also wrote me congratulating me on my appointment as Marie Boivin’s parliamentary secretary, saying he hoped I would enjoy the economics lessons. In truth, that’s a major reason why I was thrilled Marie asked me to be her PS. Having been elected as a student, I had little time to formulate a specialty as such, instead opting to be a generalist.
Stanfield III Cabinet
Deputy Prime Minister: Erik Nielsen
Finance: John Crosbie
Justice: Marcel Lambert
Foreign Affairs: Pat Nowlan
Defence: Michael Forrestal
Agriculture: Harold Danforth
Public Works: Walter Dinsdale
Environment: Frank Oberle
Energy: Alvin Hamilton
Transport: Jack Horner
Veterans Affairs: William Knowles
Immigration: Roch La Salle
Indian and Northern Affairs: Erik Nielsen
Solicitor General: Elmer MacKay
Heritage: Flora MacDonald
Health: Paul Yewchuk
Treasury Board: Don Mazankowski
Labour: Jim McGrath
International Trade: Marie Boivin
Revenue: William Ritchie
Government House Leader: Ged Baldwin
Chief Government Whip: Tom Bell
Government Senate Leader: Jacques Flynn