Égalité ou indépendance: a Canadian TL

TIMMINS: Despite the buzz about a new federal government as 1973 opened, Quebec’s attention was entirely on provincial politics. The National Assembly would resume sitting in February, whereupon Bill 209 would be given second and third reading. It was also budget time, with little new to announce compared to the previous fiscal year. Cardinal planned to unveil his secret plan to begin phasing out residential schools, which apart from being overdue policy was excellent politics. It was a way to outflank the Liberals from the left, which was the only time I have ever seen such a feat attempted by Unionists. Laporte had not even given that issue much thought. Rene Levesque had given serious thought to aboriginal issues as a minister and in opposition, and informed us of his complete support for such legislation. With regards to federal issues, Stanfield informed Cardinal that he would begin negotiations over an immigration and manpower agreement once the budget was passed. Its basis would be Quebec gaining powers to select its own immigrants, something which provincial governments had been demanding for a decade. To Cardinal, a new federal government was a better negotiating partner than its predecessor, nothing more. In private with his federalist ministers, he referred to Tories as “your people.”


MULRONEY: I attended the opening of Parliament on Jan. 25, a magnificent sight if there ever was one in our politics. Bob’s plan was to pass the Throne Speech and budget while implementing as many platform planks as possible before another election could be held. With the Grits leaderless, it was Lewis who became our main opponent in those first few months. Bob joked that he could get used to that, as could I. The Liberal contest was between Turner and MacEachen, and despite Turner being the heir apparent I thought MacEachen had a good shot. Grit operatives knew that they had lost progressives in BC and Ontario, for which Turner was not a good fit ideologically or personally. Conversely, Turner was well-versed in Quebec issues, spoke fluent French, and had been one of the ministers to try and break the deadlock between both governments. Moreover his ideological and personal distance from Trudeau among swing voters would be assets. Bob was prepared to face both, but preferred MacEachen since he was an easier target and lessened our Quebec workload. The Socreds quietly assured us of support on supply and confidence matters, so our first budget and an infrastructure bill could pass immediately. Another major piece of legislation was our ban on essential services strikes, which would infuriate our Grit and Dipper friends. Bob was always careful to inform Caouette of our plans and be entirely respectful, a contrast with Dief when he was in opposition to Pearson.

BEAULIEU: The winter sitting began Feb. 6, when Paul [Dozois] delivered his budget speech and announced our intention to begin closing the residential school system. In an otherwise unremarkable budget, that announcement went off like a bomb, with both opposition parties supporting us nonetheless. At that time we did not know just how widespread the horrors were, but we knew enough to realize that the inhumane system must be eliminated. Yves Gabias would begin a dialogue with aboriginal leaders about a replacement which would combine localism and accountability, something which was elusive then and to some extent even now. The Church was outraged but they no longer had a vote. As with language, there would be dialogue but no negotiation. Replacing that system would be a long and arduous process, so our announcement was not much more than one of intent. We were more concerned about an increasingly slow economy than medium-term educational policy, needless to say. At that rate we’d be back in the red within 2 fiscal years, perhaps earlier if the downturn continued. Given the divisions on economic policy within Cabinet, we essentially agreed to stay the course. This would be Paul’s penultimate budget before retiring, and we all hoped he would eventually be seen as one of this province’s best finance ministers.

PAULSON: Stanfield’s first budget implemented most of their campaign promises: a 4% reduction in personal income tax, eliminating the 11% tax on building materials, indexing tax and pension brackets, and mandating foreign-owned companies to have a Canadian majority on their board of directors. There was also a ban on essential services strikes. While the platform had called for “increased discipline in government spending” while giving the Auditor General more powers, in practice it was the Auditor General’s powers part of that promise which was fully implemented. Stanfield wanted to reduce and eventually eliminate the deficit but not at all costs. While Lambert and Mazankowski were more open to their right-wing colleagues’ economic ideas, Stanfield and a majority of the Cabinet were not. Unionist green-eyeshade economic policies were anathema to Stanfield, a sentiment which was fully reciprocated in Quebec City. Stanfield also had major procurement plans for the Canadian Forces, plans that he wanted to keep under wraps so long as he was in a minority situation. Cautious by nature, he wanted to prove that Conservatives could form a stable, competent government after the Diefenbaker disaster. The budget went a long way towards establishing that pattern, and contentious issues were always precleared with Caouette, who did not want an early election for his own reasons. With the Liberals in a leadership race, Stanfield had a clear field to set his priorities and slowly convince Canadians he could be trusted with a majority.

SAUVÉ: On March 18, Bill 209 passed on third reading and received royal assent a few days later. Our French Language Charter had established a comprehensive language regime, as we prepared for the inevitable economic dislocations. This was a point I made repeatedly: such dislocations were long inevitable and only their tempo was affected. Combining the Lesage era with the country’s economic centre of gravity moving westward for decades, most of those businesses would have died or moved anyways. One of our central policy goals was accomplished, while another [residential schools] had been initiated. After that, Maurice and I encouraged Jean-Guy to reduce Assembly sittings since we had no major policy proposals to table before the next election. He refused on both timing and principle, which I found absurd but as the most junior minister I had no say in the matter. In my mind the Assembly should not be kept open for its own sake. Jean-Guy, academic that he was, took a rather different view than we did. Our polling showed PQ support down to 6-7%, which would push them down to 1 seat but not quite out of the Assembly. Voters strongly approved of the Charter and we were all confident that with time, Anglophones would eventually come around and fully participate in the new, francized public sphere.
 
TIMMINS: Following the Charter’s enactment, there was a certain amount of speculation about a snap election to capture a newly optimistic mood among voters. Cardinal and the Cabinet’s “P” committee had in fact toyed with that idea before quickly discarding it. 1939 loomed heavily in Unionist consciences and they felt that voters would be angry if taken for granted. Moreover their policy schedule dictated that an election be held in summer 1974, summer elections being another longstanding Unionist traditions. Only 2 ministers and a handful of backbenchers seriously considered it, moreover the Cabinet’s senior figures – Dozois, Bertrand, Bellemare – were unanimously and vocally opposed. As a concession to ministers who wanted a shorter session, Cardinal promised to adjourn by early May instead of early June as was customary. The party’s policy convention was held in the first week of April, which did not include a formal constitutional pledge. That was party convention dating back to Duplessis, and the government saw no reason to commit to what might not be an acceptable initial offer. This quiet period was tougher on Levesque than Laporte, since the PQ had seen one of its central planks enacted into law by its archenemy. The last major legislation passed was authorization of a Montreal lottery to pay for the Olympics, with an “Olympic tax” also being drafted for the fall session.


GAGNON: Drapeau was happy about the lottery but would be infuriated by the Olympic tax, which would be imposed by the province at Moody’s behest to rescue Montreal’s credit rating. Lussier and Dozois simply ignored Drapeau and planned to announce it as a fait accompli, significantly damaging bilateral relations. Nonetheless, on other matters Drapeau preferred Unionism to Liberalism and the Unionists certainly preferred him to the “Commie” MCM and left-wing MAG. Unlike UN-PC relations, there would never be a public break or open confrontation, and Drapeau could claim to have been a victim of Unionist vindictiveness. One project they cooperated happily on was implementing the Charter, which Drapeau had some reservations about but whose goals he entirely supported. In the 1950s Drapeau had petitioned Duplessis to intervene in the Queen Elizabeth Hotel’s naming and been coolly dismissed. Now language politics had come full circle, as Drapeau often remarked in private. Both major parties maintained links with Drapeau, while the PQ’s ally was the MCM. It was entirely fitting that Drapeau’s 1950s enemy Paul Dozois, who had played a key role in toppling Drapeau in 1957, was now the finance minister imposing Montreal’s Olympic tax as part of his political swansong. Both the UN and Drapeau were capable of forgiving, but never forgetting, their old foes.



SAUVÉ: In May we started negotiating what is known today as the Immigration Accord, otherwise known as the Quebec-Canada Accord. There were four major areas: selection, admission, integration and quantity. For me, what was vital was preserving our demographic weight within the country while maintaining our distinct society. That meant the federal government would withdraw from certain areas of reception and integration. The federal government would of course retain exclusive jurisdiction over citizenship while retaining certain multiculturalism programs. It was a process which proceeded surprisingly quickly: we managed to sign the Accord in December, after 7 months of hashing out details. The Liberals were now supportive with MacEachen as leader in place of Trudeau, since he did not share Trudeau’s refusal to deal with us. Negotiating the Accord was one of the proudest moments of my career, and henceforth English Canadian pundits would recognize that we were happy to negotiate provided core principles were respected. When I was in Ottawa, I got to meet Stanfield for the first time. He reminisced about meeting Duplessis and my father when he was premier in the ‘50s, and overall my mostly positive pre-existing impression of him was reinforced. I remember telling him my personal political motto was “always on offense”, which he found funny.


NEWMAN: On May 8, Allan MacEachen had narrowly defeated John Turner to win the Liberal leadership. He would be the Grits’ first Maritime leader, which was a cultural shift for a party long built around the central provinces. His victory could be attributed to Liberals’ desire to continue the progressive path blazed by Trudeau, distrust of Turner, and regaining lost NDP votes. Turner was angry but decided to remain as shadow finance minister. The Tories were happy at MacEachen’s election, for they believed the centre ground was now theirs and a unilingual Nova Scotian would greatly facilitate their attempts to make Quebec inroads. It was the first time that both the prime minister and opposition leader were Maritimers. Stanfield believed MacEachen could be easily painted as a Trudeau clone representing policies Canadians would reject again if given the opportunity. Nonetheless, he was in no rush for another election for similar reasons to the UN’s rejection of their own snap election: voters could punish them harshly for an unnecessarily early poll, and it did not fit their legislative schedule. For their part, the Grits believed Tory unity to be a facade and Stanfield a weak leader with a middling Cabinet. If pushed hard enough that fragile house of cards would erode and eventually crumble, though perhaps not in a single electoral cycle.


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PAULSON: The immigration deal was a minor policy item overall, but the Tories were eager to trumpet it as proof they could successfully negotiate with Quebec. One of Stanfield’s campaign themes, echoing Diefenbaker in 1957/8, had been a “relationship of mutual respect and civility” in federal-provincial relations. In that he easily succeeded, and planning began for a First Ministers Conference in October billed as a dialogue rather than policymaking session. He told his senior staff that he would be there to listen, not dictate as Trudeau and other Liberal prime ministers had done. For their part the UN’s fears of Tory incompetence subsided somewhat, with Cardinal and Sauvé permitting themselves some cautious optimism. With all 8 target ridings now held by Tories, the Unionists considered themselves free of further federal partisan engagement for the foreseeable future. Bill Davis and Peter Lougheed were also pleased by Stanfield’s overtures and had their own wish list for the prime minister. Later that month, Davis persuaded Cardinal and Lougheed to meet him in Toronto for an introductory and strategy session in advance of the fall conference. Cardinal had initially been hesitant, but quickly came around to Masse’s advocacy of an Alberta-Ontario-Quebec axis. His decision would have repercussions which extended well beyond that fall’s meeting.

CANADIAN GALLUP POLL, JUNE 1973
IF A FEDERAL ELECTION WERE HELD TODAY, WHICH PARTY DO YOU THINK YOU WOULD FAVOUR?


PC: 42.1%
LIBERAL: 36.3%
NDP: 15.2%
SOCRED: 2.5%


CROP, JUNE 1973

IF A PROVINCIAL ELECTION WERE HELD TODAY, WHICH PARTY DO YOU THINK YOU WOULD FAVOUR?

UNION NATIONALE: 51.4%
PARTI LIBÉRAL: 38.7%
PARTI QUÉBÉCOIS: 6.2%
 
I gotta say, its kinda ironic that this timeline is being published now, with Canada-Quebec tensions at an all time low. As Marois found out last year separatism isn't anywhere near the top of the list of priorities for modern generation of Quebeckers, even for Francophones. To be blunt Quebec pretty much has gotten everything the Sovereignists wanted short of full independence (Big transfer payments, heavy protection of French, active government sponsored discouragement of English or any other language, provincial control of immigration, ect.). That's not to say that the young people in Quebec are particularly patriotic, they just are pretty satisfied with how Quebec's position in Canada as it is. I live in Montreal, and all the Francophones I know that were in their 20s simply didn't care about separatism, aside from some who feared that it would ruin the economy (however pretty much everyone I knew who was less than thirty absolutely loathed the Charter of Values).

In a way the first generation of Sovereignists (ie Levesque and co.) were successful, achieving protection and privilege for French and an unprecedented devolvement of power from the Federal government to the provinces (I can only imagine the Scottish Parliament wishes it had the kind of control the Quebec government does).
 
I gotta say, its kinda ironic that this timeline is being published now, with Canada-Quebec tensions at an all time low. As Marois found out last year separatism isn't anywhere near the top of the list of priorities for modern generation of Quebeckers, even for Francophones. To be blunt Quebec pretty much has gotten everything the Sovereignists wanted short of full independence (Big transfer payments, heavy protection of French, active government sponsored discouragement of English or any other language, provincial control of immigration, ect.). That's not to say that the young people in Quebec are particularly patriotic, they just are pretty satisfied with how Quebec's position in Canada as it is. I live in Montreal, and all the Francophones I know that were in their 20s simply didn't care about separatism, aside from some who feared that it would ruin the economy (however pretty much everyone I knew who was less than thirty absolutely loathed the Charter of Values).

In a way the first generation of Sovereignists (ie Levesque and co.) were successful, achieving protection and privilege for French and an unprecedented devolvement of power from the Federal government to the provinces (I can only imagine the Scottish Parliament wishes it had the kind of control the Quebec government does).

Thanks, fellow Montréalais!
 
TIMMINS: Summer ’73 was on track to be a quiet one, that is until Bertrand and Dozois announced that they would retire at the next election within days of each other in early July. Despite appearances, this was not a coordinated action. The two men had fallen out since Dozois’ engineering of Cardinal’s leadership victory, and they left for different reasons. Dozois was tired and eager to return to private life after 26 years in politics, while Bertrand was angry and a political leper. He knew only a lonely backbench existence, if that, awaited him in another Cardinal government. Cardinal would miss Dozois but was practically squealing with delight after Bertrand informed him of his decision. Their replacements had already been decided: Industry Minister Jean-Paul Beaudry would take Finance, Pierre Sauvé Justice, and Beaulieu Industry. All three men had proven their competence and loyalty to the premier, who wanted younger men, all in their 30s or 40s, to replace the preceding generation’s retirees. Apart from Bellemare, there would be no Duplessis-era veterans if the UN won the next election. Cardinal, being a newcomer to politics, was less sentimental about it than some of his ministers, who were privately annoyed at his distant approach to party tradition.

GAGNON: That summer was when a political unicorn appeared: Bertrand and Sauvé strongly agreeing on a piece of legislation. Specifically, an amendment to the Elections Act which would lower the voting age to 18 and “universalize the age of majority”, as Sauvé phrased it in Cabinet meetings. As the youngest member of Cabinet at 34, he would be the bill’s cosponsor. There was unanimous agreement within the Cabinet and almost unanimous in all three parties. It would be Bertrand’s policy swansong as he celebrated his silver anniversary as an MLA that summer, a bittersweet one to put it mildly. Cardinal and Dozois wanted all non-budgetary items enacted during the fall session to prepare the ground for a pre-electoral budget that winter which would be loaded with small-business and agricultural incentives targeted at their core constituencies. The voting bill was seen in a rather blasé manner since few frontbenchers in either party believed the youngest voters would force them to seriously recalculate their psephological assumptions. They had seen the Bloc populaire, ALN and RIN, all left-wing nationalist parties with youth appeal, quickly vanish. As Bertrand told me at the time, “what would be their mass motivator?” Only a cataclysmic failure of the major parties, perhaps over constitutional affairs, could seriously threaten the duopoly inaugurated by Maurice Duplessis in 1936.

MULRONEY: Bob was quite pleased with his first few months in office, having accomplished his competency goal and enacted most of the ’72 platform. The fall First Ministers Conference would help us craft our next platform. It was a quiet summer politically, and in provincial politics I believed that Bertrand’s retirement would mark the collapse of his wing of the party. This was a by-product of the leadership race’s ideological realignment, which also saw nascent tension between economic moderates and conservatives. The latter included Beaudry, Pierre [Sauvé] and Gabias, all advocates of a significantly liberalized economy. Cardinal was an economic moderate and absolutely refused open confrontation with the Quiet Revolution’s economic legacy. Pierre told me the subject never came up in Cabinet except during particularly contentious negotiations with certain unions. An example of Cardinal’s distaste for confrontation would come later in July when Cardinal and Bellemare forced Drapeau to accept a settlement with the firefighters’ union with some provincial money to help Montreal pay for part of it. Nonetheless, for loyalty’s sake the dissenters would not attempt to alter the early manifesto drafts. Besides, no one wanted to push Cardinal outside of his ideological comfort zone in a party whose policy and tone has always been very leader-centric.

SAUVÉ: I wouldn’t say there was considerable tension. In a big-tent conservative party, there are always different ideological factions – but the leader has final say on policy. Some of us had our economic viewpoint, others had theirs. My larger point was that without some clear-cut policy victories on non-cultural files, we would court voter apathy and dissatisfaction. Sometimes policy victories are more important than political ones if you can entrench them permanently. There’s no doubt in my mind that if M. Lesage was given the choice between winning’66 and losing key parts of his legacy, he’d choose the former. The federal Liberals suffered a similar fate in the mid-‘50s: idleness breeds apathy, resentment and ultimately voter rebellion. In hockey as in politics, if you can’t get the puck out of your zone then the other team will score. My major priority that summer was negotiating the Accord and working with the Greek and Italian communities on the education deal I had promised a few months earlier, work I thoroughly enjoyed. Insofar as I had any party-related thoughts that summer, they were sadness at Paul’s impending retirement. He was a mentor to me and a bulwark of stability in the party whose contributions, in my mind, made him one of our best-ever finance ministers. Certainly among the best people this party has produced in its history.

PAULSON: The trilateral meeting between Davis, Cardinal and Lougheed was fairly successful. They agreed on a common front for transit funding and agreed to examine dismantling barriers on interprovincial trade. Davis was far more cautious on the barriers than Lougheed and Cardinal, both of whom enthusiastically embraced the prospect. They expected Stanfield to agree with them and help guide the provinces towards an agreement. Both men were also somewhat wary of potential ripple effects, since the right wings of their respective parties were known advocates of ending or privatizing monopolies. The most concrete result of that meeting was the knowledge that they worked well together. That had often been the case historically for Ontario and Quebec, but Alberta had never worked closely with Quebec despite ideological parallels between Duplessis and Manning. Hatfield had held a meeting with Cardinal earlier that year, but only to discuss bilateral issues. The progressive premiers were led by PEI’s Alex Campbell and Saskatchewan’s Allan Blakeney, who enjoyed good personal relations with their conservative counterparts. All five agreed on transit funding and at least in principle, on trade barriers. At his first policy conference as Prime Minister, Stanfield had declared that provincial rights were a core Conservative principle. As a former premier himself, Stanfield hoped that respect for provincial rights could eventually be normalized in both parties, which in his view would do much to improve national unity.
 
MULRONEY: If I had to describe that month’s First Ministers meeting, it would be “cordial.” Trudeau and Pearson-era acrimony was over, and everyone had a good time. Bob readily agreed to consider a trimmed version of the premiers’ request for more transit funding and appointing a Cabinet task force to coordinate on interprovincial trade. It was the first meeting since the 1968 one which had helped seal Trudeau’s leadership victory, and quite the opposite in every respect. It was a modest start, but a start nonetheless. Most importantly, there seemed to be no absolute objections to another constitutional round if agreement could be reached. At least in principle, the premiers agreed on the need to bring our Constitution home from London. They also agreed that such an endeavour should wait until after the next federal election, “whenever it may be”, as Campbell impishly told me. Once they all left, Bob asked us to work on the basis of a summer deadline. He wanted an election in “Q2”, soon after a budget and before the UN became totally distracted by their summer election. With a unilingual Anglophone as leader and in opposition, the Grit chances of retaking their former ridings were slim. Paul Dozois had told me that we would need to invest our own money into the campaign “if you don’t cut your right arm off” in reference to campaign finance reform.

Ontario Premier Bill Davis and Alberta Premier Peter Lougheed at the First Ministers Conference, Oct. 6, 1973.

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PEI Premier Alex Campbell in 1973.

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TIMMINS: The UN’s involvement in federal politics in fall ’73 was minimal. This was mostly because of the upcoming provincial election but also because with most winnable territory conquered, the Tories were playing defence in the province. MacEachen and his Quebec lieutenant Jean Marchand had recruited strong candidates in certain ridings to defeat the Tories before they became entrenched. It was easy for the UN to protect their allies since the ridings in question were all in their own territory, thereby necessitating minimal expense. The provincial election itself was expected to be a sleepy affair, with polls showing a popular government leading the Liberals by high single or low double digits. René Lévesque and Jacques Parizeau had rejected an idea to create a “Year Zero” budget showing a hypothetical post-independence fiscal plan. Instead they opted to run on independence and their proposed progressive reforms. It was an attack on the Liberals for having relinquished the progressive mantle and the UN for softening, at least in practice, their 1966 constitutional stance. For their part the Liberals were eager for battle but under no illusions about the outcome. Their objective was to gain seats at the expense of both parties and wipe out the PQ, which was starting to eat at their left flank.

SAUVÉ: In November ’73 we were wrapping up the Accord and starting to think about the budget. Once the Accord was passed there would be some major planks to be enacted before the election. These were the Institut de police, expansion of the Universite du Quebec, creating an Ombudsman’s office, and enhanced crop insurance. Medicare had been a contentious issue in the ‘60s, but by now the manifesto consensus was to keep Hospital Insurance, which we had started and Lesage had finished in ’61. While Jean-Guy personally favoured full expansion, he did not want to start a rancorous debate on this question given how deeply divided caucus was. Jean-Paul, Paul and I were among those who wanted to keep the status quo. There was also some discussion of campaign finance disclosure requirements, which we agreed should be postponed until after the election. Unlike their federal counterparts, the Liberals were not screaming for financial restrictions – they knew how the game was played, and both our parties had been increasingly successful in broadening our small-donor base. It was the PQ which banged this drum, to little effect. All of us in Cabinet heard far more about such nonsense from the media than actual voters. So-called reformers were quite capable of adapting to the facts of political life, and no one in this arena better exemplified that than Laporte himself.

Industry Minister Jean-Paul Beaudry in 1973. A right-wing nationalist, he was Cardinal's most conservative economic minister.

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GAGNON: Apart from the government’s popularity, Laporte’s major problem was that he had seen many potentially potent ideas legislated. Business-creation incentives for Francophones had been implemented through public-private partnerships rather than crown corporations, crop insurance had been reformed, and education expanded. In Dozois’ final budget, he would eliminate income tax for singles earning less than $2000, which was a rare tax incentive not targeted at families or seniors. Most importantly, the Language Charter had resonated with most nationalist voters and prevented the opposition from painting the UN as promoting conservatism at nationalism’s expense. Finally, with Cardinal having left Lesage’s economic legacy mostly untouched, he did not arouse progressive enthusiasm or leave his flank open to a scare campaign. It was immensely frustrating for many Liberals, and their caucus leaked like a sieve that fall. If the Liberals could not govern themselves, how could they govern the province? That was the question Unionist advertising asked for months on end, weakening Laporte’s already mediocre leadership numbers. Barring an unexpected shakeup, voters seemed content to deliver the government a third term and await better offerings from the Liberals. On Nov. 27, the Liberals had an easy scandal shot when Loubier was forced to resign from Cabinet after a public drunkenness incident which was splashed all over the media.

BORBOKIS: In the entire Accord hubbub, the agreement Yves Gabias and Pierre reached with our community and the Italians on linguistic schooling was seemingly forgotten by the media. That was quite fine by me, considering the negotiations had been mostly covert to avoid a media firestorm until the details were finalized. Just before the Assembly recessed for Christmas, Pierre invited me to join his personal staff after the election. I accepted, since my superiors at HCGM had recently said that once negotiations were done I had to “fish or cut bait.” The language debate was loud but relatively contained: being overwhelmingly popular among Francophones it would be a permanent addition to our policy landscape. Certain Anglophone businesses began to leave, as did Anglophones of all ages – mostly older ones who were unable or unwilling to adapt. Among Allophones, the reaction again varied by age. I agreed with Pierre that in 10 years, language would be legally marginal, confined to challenging elements of the law or lobbying for liberalization but not challenging its basic premises.
 
TIMMINS: Before Parliament resumed on Jan. 10, Stanfield informed his staff that the election would be called almost immediately after the budget speech. The dates tentatively penciled in were Apr. 8 or 15, with a final decision to be made by month’s end. While the supply and confidence agreement with Caouette was stable, Stanfield felt their working majority was too small and needed a majority for his long-term projects. Among those was a deal being negotiated with the Nixon administration to replace Canada’s obsolete F-5 fleet with F-4 Phantoms, which were in the final stages of negotiation but temporarily deadlocked over production in Canada. Stanfield wanted the deal to be a fait accompli and not have to fight a defensive campaign in southern Ontario. Provisionally titled Peace Beaver I, locations for domestic production being considered were in Winnipeg and Montreal. Another political consideration was that the Tories had learned that Caouette was ailing and was likely to resign as leader sometime that year, throwing their alliance into doubt. Roch La Salle, Stanfield’s Quebec lieutenant, doubted that anyone else could hold the Socreds together and the party would likely implode, leaving their seats for the Tories’ taking. Moreover, there was no guarantee a new Socred leader would continue their alliance. Stanfield and Caouette had managed to create a working relationship, but neither man expected their alliance to last long.

TURNER: I had heard the Caouette news too, which to me was a confirmation of the obvious. Socred had always been a personality cult and would likely disappear once their leader was gone. We also believed that some of those seats could be ours once he was gone. The UN was preoccupied by their election, but I fully expected them to jump on Socred seats if the faintest hint of an opening appeared. So would we. All of us expected an election within months, perhaps weeks, and our goal was to hold the Tories to another minority government. An important element of this plan was targeting the freshman Quebec Tories, all new to politics and totally dependent on Unionist protection for survival. Had Stanfield lost some of those seats, Trudeau could have remained in power with NDP support in ’72. Like 1925 it would have been controversial but constitutional and politically legitimate, no matter what the Tories might say. In Ontario we had recovered our footing after being swarmed by Davis’ bees, and were eager to beat them on their own turf. It would be easier to do this in Quebec than Ontario, since the UN was distracted by their provincial election and had only once given their all in a federal election – 1958. Even that had been largely covert, for mutually convenient political reasons.

GAGNON: On Feb. 6, Dozois delivered his final budget, a political document loaded with the planned tax cuts and Police Academy funding. A small surplus was projected for that year, a product of a weakening economy and Cardinal’s desire to avoid deeper cuts just before an election. Once the budget was passed, Cardinal planned an immediate adjournment to focus on final pre-writ preparations. It was a Cabinet meeting 5 days later where Cardinal and the Cabinet’s operations committee decided that the election would be held in early August with a 6-week writ period, with a final date to be determined in May. As in 1970, their theme was “stay the course” while warning about Liberal incompetence and PQ radicalism. Cultural issues would play a much bigger role in 1974 than 1970, with a seemingly inevitable vicious Unionist attack on Liberal devotion to Quebec culture as they had done in Duplessis’ time. Cardinal would not do that himself of course – he was too much the academic for such demagoguery.

PAULSON: Stanfield took the 3-minute ride to Rideau Hall on Feb. 25, with Parliament being dissolved for an Apr. 15 election. It would be a 6-week campaign, 1 week less than the 1972 campaign and a length Stanfield was comfortable with. The campaign would be fought on two themes: economic and leadership, both of which were Tory strong points. Stanfield had been seen as a weaker leader than Trudeau, but his new rival was a consummate insider without Trudeau’s charisma. Ontario, BC and the Atlantic provinces were all targeted for pickups, with Tory HQ aiming for 140-150 seats in a 264-seat House. They would also target Ontarian NDP seats which could be picked up with a populist economic message. He was cautiously optimistic that his party could win its first majority since 1958, given that first-term governments were usually reelected and his government was modestly popular. Diefenbaker’s election had marked a change in the public mood from apathy to ecstasy, and the wildly inflated expectations played a key role in Diefenbaker’s long fall from power. This Tory government was determined to play a “bottom-up expectations game” in Marcel Lambert’s words. With a veteran premier as leader and an experienced Cabinet, Tories were confident that they could demolish the dominant party system which had existed since 1896.

PC Leader Robert Stanfield campaigning in Winnipeg, Mar. 24, 1974.

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MULRONEY: The campaign started off splendidly with a rally in Vancouver, to give our campaign a traditional Western flair. With Barrett loathed and a Socred restoration only a matter of time, we had fantastic turnout for a kickoff rally. We followed a similar pace as ’76, with rallies planned all across the country and a mostly positive campaign. Cautious optimism was the watchword both on our team and among voters our candidates met. Quebec was merely ensuring our MPs had enough money to repel expected Liberal attacks, and we wanted to cannibalize more of the Socred vote as part of that goal. No further gains seemed possible given that most of those Socred MPs had won by 30-40%, and while Caouette was there they were untouchable. The Socreds were wracked by internal divisions and a chunk of their members were PQ supporters, while others supported the Union Nationale if they supported a party at all. We planned to finish with a Toronto rally headlined by Davis and Bob, as in 1972. There were no major retirements planned and therefore Bob had no need to shuffle the Cabinet barring the unlikely scenario of ministerial casualties. My role was to oversee operations as Quebec vice-president and coordinate with the UN. With Paul Dozois retiring, Maurice Bellemare took over as O-ring leader, and we talked twice a week to discuss the ground war.

CANADIAN GALLUP POLL, MAR. 18-20, 1974

IF A FEDERAL ELECTION WAS HELD TODAY, WHICH PARTY’S CANDIDATE DO YOU THINK YOU WOULD FAVOUR?

PC: 40.1%
LIBERAL: 35.7%
NDP: 15.4%
SOCRED: 4.2%
 
Stanfield would only look better by comparison during Watergate. If Canadians paid as much attention to the crisis as OTL, Bob could get a noticeable bump in the polls.
 
PAULSON: The federal campaign’s final 2 weeks saw no dramatic polling change or even a noticeable debate effect. After Trudeau’s refusal in 1972, the three leaders had agreed to institutionalize leaders’ debates at the following election. Both Stanfield and MacEachen had pledged to create a Federal Debates Commission if they won, which would be a Canadian version of the Commission on Presidential Debates. Both parties were making a major play for NDP seats, particularly the Liberals who wanted to recoup lost progressive votes and knock off David Lewis personally in his Toronto riding. The Tories, through unofficial channels, distributed fliers in York South’s immigrant communities, particularly in Italian and Slavic neighbourhoods, about Lewis’ pro-choice abortion position. While Stanfield generally disdained negative campaigning, he was eventually convinced by Erik Nielsen and several senior English Canadian members of the campaign team to authorize it. Ironically, the Liberals had decided on a similar tactic and often their hired messengers would cross paths. Stanfield had agreed on the premise since they were merely engaging in factual messaging rather than personal attacks, it did not break his personal rule. The more hardball members of Cabinet, such as Nielsen, found Stanfield’s reluctance understandable but essentially quaint. Their Unionist allies considered it “kid stuff”, or in Pierre Sauvé’s words, “a wet fart in the forest.”

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BEAULIEU: We were delighted by the federal result but had our own campaign to think about. It was less than 3 months before Jean-Guy planned to see the Lieutenant-Governor, and we wanted to wrap up the budget debate quickly. Stanfield had kept all his seats in Quebec, while splitting 2 Socred seats with the Liberals. Maurice’s plan was to adjourn April 20 and allow 2 months of unhindered pre-writ preparation. We all wanted to wipe out the PQ and have a clear fight with the Liberals, for while the RIN was a crucial assister in 1966 we knew that we were their ultimate target. Same applied to the Bloc in 1944 and the ALN in 1939. All third parties must be asphyxiated immediately before they become termites gnawing through governing parties. We had all read The Strange Death of Liberal England, after all. On April 20, Paul delivered his farewell address to the Assembly, ending his 18-year provincial career and 8 years as one of this province’s best finance ministers. It was a very emotional day for Paul and all of us. Jean-Guy’s heartfelt tribute was one of the most touching moments I’ve seen in politics. He was perhaps the most invaluable member of Cabinet and would be deeply missed by everyone.

SAUVÉ: In politics there are nice guys and there are wimps. Bob Stanfield was undoubtedly one of the former, despite misinformation in the late ‘60s. It was under his leadership that the Tories became a professional fighting force, after a mixture under Diefenbaker earlier. Let’s not forget that within living memory they had been a pathetic excuse of an opposition party, much like the PLQ at the time. I do not think Stanfield gets enough credit for that, partially since his personality was often stereotyped as “Maritime nice” or worse. You can be an overpowering personality but poor leader, best exemplified by Stanfield’s Tory predecessors. Meighen, Bennett, Drew and Diefenbaker all fit that mold. In Drew’s case, it was a fake personality which eventually caught up with him. Like my friend Mr. Chrétien, I’m a fighter by nature, as those who know me can attest. Simply informing Lewis’ constituents of a stand he downplayed publicly is hardly a dirty trick. In May I was on a family vacation in Old Orchard before the writ dropped a few weeks later when I got a call from Paul Gouin saying he wanted to meet once I returned. I knew that he was not in the best of health, but did not get the sense from his voice that it would be a farewell. When I met Paul Bouchard in late April, we had a lot of fun reminiscing and discussing the upcoming campaign.

TIMMINS: Dozois’ and Bertrand’s retirement opened up a path for the ascension of Beaulieu, Beaudry and Sauvé into the innermost Cabinet committees – P and Operations. Beaudry and Sauvé were seen as future leadership material, as was Marcel Masse and maybe Yves Gabias. Along with Bellemare, those men would form the core of another Unionist government if Cardinal won the election. Beaudry and Masse were nationalist while Gabias and Sauvé were federalists, which left the Cabinet’s ideological balance unchanged. All would play leading roles in the upcoming campaign. The Liberal team was the same as four years prior, with Lesage-era veterans filling out their frontbench alongside freshmen or sophomores like Raymond Garneau and Lise Bacon. Those two would be major players in the Liberal future. Pierre Laporte had honed his pitch since 1970, arguing for a more progressive society and further social reforms to broaden Liberal appeal among rural and working-class voters, who were predominantly Unionist even in Lesage’s 1962 landslide. As in 1970, the PQ targeted ridings in and around Montreal which were held by both parties. This time their attacks were almost exclusively on the Liberals for being fake progressives and unable to win battles of public opinion with Cardinal. It was ironic since apart from being colleagues in Lesage’s cabinet, they had been journalistic crusaders against Duplessis in the 1950s.

MULRONEY: When Parliament reconvened in June, Bob took the opportunity to announce that a First Ministers’ Conference on constitutional affairs would be convened in September. He hoped for a ministerial working group which would do daily work while full conferences were reserved for “basic principles.” The opposition parties called foul, since Stanfield had not campaigned on a constitutional round. Yet they did not outright oppose the move since they also supported bringing the Constitution back from London, while MacEachen said he was not opposed in principle. What would prove most contentious were Quebec’s demands, including over spending powers and recognition as a distinct society. All three parties were bound to see internal tension, even as the First Ministers unanimously backed another round. Alex Campbell, the dean of first ministers and only veteran of Pearson’s constitutional round, offered to host the talks in Charlottetown. It was the Charlottetown Conference’s 110th anniversary and part of his pitch was that with both a prime minister and opposition leader from the Maritimes, it would be great symbolism. Moreover, a conference held outside of Ottawa would further Stanfield’s goal of cooperative federalism which Pearson had embodied and Trudeau disdained. Bob ultimately accepted Alex’s offer and scheduled it for Sept. 1-4, just like the original conference.


Prime Minister Lester Pearson and PEI Premier Alex Campbell in June 1967.

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GAGNON: Cardinal had called the election for August 8, a Thursday, which was not coincidentally the 30th anniversary of Maurice Duplessis’ return to power. The Union Nationale has always been fairly absorbed with their history, and this time was no exception. Both parties had new recruits, including Pierre-Marc Johnson and Guy Ingres for the Unionists and Marc-Andre Bedard for the PQ. On July 12, Cardinal, Laporte and Levesque held their only debate of the campaign season. Cardinal was generally judged a narrow victor of that debate, which saw both major party leaders go at each other hammer-and-nail over ethics, culture and a weakening economy. 1970’s economic optimism was rapidly dissipating as the economy slowed and neither Cardinal nor Laporte had any original ideas on how to handle it. Laporte’s attacks were parried by Unionist charges that they had restored economic health after Liberal recklessness under Lesage, sometimes mentioning 1944 to older audiences. It was clear that voters still found Laporte wanting and were generally pleased by the government’s record, so a third majority was never really in doubt. Cardinal, like Stanfield, did not mention constitutional issues in his campaign except to say that he would defend Quebec’s interest as strongly as his predecessors. When I interviewed him 10 days out from Election Day, he much preferred to talk about the Charter and even economy rather than the Constitution.

TIMMINS: As the campaign entered its final week, our bets were on whether there would be a net Liberal seat gain or whether the UN would win an absolute majority of the popular vote. I bet that they would win between 67-71 seats and 48-50% of the popular vote, with the PQ down to 1 or maybe 2 seats. Marc-Andre Bedard had become very popular and would prove difficult to dislodge barring a major Liberal investment which they were unwilling to make. Had they done so, the PQ would have probably been at death’s door and made both parties’ lives easier. It was not a cash problem – the Liberals had plenty of money, if not nearly as much as their opponent – but rather a desire to focus all their fire on the UN. Cardinal had confided to me that he would not reshuffle the Cabinet other than to make previously indicated changes, barring any surprise ministerial defeats. Like Johnson and Duplessis, he believed in constructing “durable” Cabinets where only performance, health or defeat could prompt personnel (as opposed to portfolio) changes. I asked him whether he would appoint female ministers, to which he replied he would appoint Michelle Hivon as Industry Minister when Jean-Paul Beaudry was promoted to Finance. In a Cabinet of 16 ministers, there would be a single woman.


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BEAULIEU: On election night, we were all ecstatic: we had made net gains and hit 50%, while knocking off 2 Pequistes. Laporte delivered an emotional resignation speech, having led the Liberal Party as far as he could take it. The most obvious Liberal heir apparent was [Raymond] Garneau, a young centrist technocrat who had no connection with the Duplessis era opposition and had gotten great media reviews for his presentation and economic knowledge. There would be opposition from Wagner and maybe 1 other candidate, but we all expected Garneau to be our opponent. That would be either just before Christmas or in the New Year, and we were fully focused on Charlottetown and Cabinet formation. I would remain in Cultural Affairs while Paul Shooner took Immigration. Pierre took Justice and Jean-Paul Finance. Most ministers remained in their portfolios, while Pierre and Marcel would be front and centre in our Charlottetown delegation. Immediately after the Cabinet was sworn in, they spent a couple of weeks cloistered with their senior civil servants in preparation. Around this time, Stanfield announced the appointment of George Ignatieff to replace Roland Michener as Governor-General, a choice which proved popular in English Canada. The Cabinet would be sworn in on Aug. 18 and the new Assembly would convene, as usual, in early October. With most of our policy agenda enacted, there would be little distraction from constitutional reform – about which Jean-Guy was still somewhat hesitant.

Cardinal II Cabinet

Deputy Premier: Maurice Bellemare
Finance: Jean-Paul Beaudry
Justice: Pierre Sauvé
Agriculture : Clément Vincent
Labour: Maurice Bellemare
Public Works: Armand Russell
Cultural Affairs: Mario Beaulieu
Health: Jean-Paul Cloutier
Education: Yves Gabias
Environment: Claude-Gilles Gosselin
Natural Resources: Paul-Émile Allard
Transport: Fernand Lizotte
Municipal Affairs: Robert Lussier
Intergovernmental Affairs: Marcel Masse
Industry and Commerce: Michelle Hivon
Immigration: Paul Shooner
Revenue : Raymond Johnston

SAUVÉ: I have rarely been in such a hectically compressed month as August ’74. I was sworn in as justice minister on the 18th – an abbreviated transition, but done quicker for Charlottetown purposes. Fortunately Marcel [Masse] would lead our team while I spent 2 weeks in virtually nonstop briefings with my senior officials, as if I had entered a convent. Having been an Army reservist for a couple of years, I was used to the breakneck pace, but I’m not too sure some of my staffers were. I had a very able senior team at Justice, probably the government’s best outside Finance and possibly IG [Intergovernmental Affairs]. They got me up to speed on the files and were extremely helpful throughout. Marcel and I assembled the delegation by the 28th as we prepared to fly to Charlottetown for the conference. It would be Cardinal’s first lengthy exposure to the English Canadian spotlight, something he knew was inevitable but did not relish. As a staunch nationalist, Jean-Guy was hardly going to win their “premier of the year” award. While fluent in English, he did not like speaking the language unless absolutely necessary. We had spoken to our Ontarian and Albertan counterparts to plan a sideline meeting between our respective premiers, in furtherance of our successful “troika” meeting in Toronto.

Newly appointed Governor-General George Ignatieff in June 1974.



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NEWMAN: The Conference was moderately successful, with the premiers coming to agreement on certain basic principles. Among them was using both Diefenbaker’s Bill of Rights and the BNA Act into a single baseline. This would entrench property rights central to the Tory constitutional vision and including an extremely robust provincial override mechanism that pleased both Quebec and the Western provinces. Quebec’s demands included recognition as a distinct society, financial compensation for opting out of federal programs, and selection of senators and Supreme Court justices from provincial lists. While agreeing to repatriation in principle, the 3 NDP premiers were opposed to the entrenchment of property rights in a new Constitution. Stanfield was not concerned since Barrett was on his way out and the other two provinces did not have sufficient population weight to derail the project. Having obtained their desired Senate reform and opt-out clause, Lougheed and especially Davis were happy to cooperate with Quebec. Both were willing to accept the distinct society and joined Cardinal as staunch advocates for entrenched property rights. As in 1968, Campbell remained the most popular premier in his role as mediator. He and Stanfield were pleased that a baseline and some building blocks had been set immediately, and agreement was reached to adjourn until the New Year.

Saskatchewan Premier Allan Blakeney in 1974.

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I see that the election took place the day before Nixon resigned over Watergate (coincidental).

Cardinal and Stanfield's new campaign slogans: At least we're not Nixon...:D
 
NEWMAN: After Charlottetown, Stanfield’s autumn agenda was relatively bland. He reached a tentative agreement with President Ford on F-4 procurement, a deal which would not be formally announced till November. There was pressure from the provinces on non-constitutional issues, including the transit funding the Prime Minister had promised earlier that year. It was released in the fall fiscal update, while a ministerial working group on provincial trade barriers was struck between Ontario, Quebec and New Brunswick. Hatfield was the fourth conservative premier, mainly working with Cardinal given the relationship between their respective provinces. Cardinal and Hatfield were more eager to bring down barriers than Davis, who hesitated at liberalizing his liquor laws. One senior Ontario civil servant told me that at one meeting Cardinal and Hatfield raised the prospect of a bilateral deal if they failed to reach agreement. Eventually Davis did agree to a limited deal on liquor products, but the amounts were relatively small and not what Quebec and New Brunswick envisioned. For a little while relations between Ontario and its allies cooled notably on daily files. None of them wanted a constitutional failure as had happened for most of the postwar era. Stanfield, for his part, was much more focused on an increasingly shaky economy and pondered imposing wage and price controls. While the Tory right vehemently objected and had one of their own sympathizers as Finance Minister, Stanfield adamantly refused to operate outside the economic consensus of both parties.

Davis and Hatfield at Charlottetown, Sept. 2, 1974.

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GERALD CAPLAN, NDP HISTORIAN: We were undergoing our own leadership race at that time, but we didn’t hesitate to condemn Stanfield’s dishonesty. He had not promised wage and price controls in the campaign. If past history was any precedent, controls on wages would be stricter on wages than prices and hurt average Canadians most to protect their Bay Street friends. We had come to expect some sort of campaign finance reform, which mysteriously disappeared after April 15 amid talks of disclosure legislation without financial limits. It was the Wild West with both parties propped up by their corporate friends. What few Canadians know is that the Liberals, not the Tories, had been responsible for what was until that point the most notorious dark money campaign in Canadian history back in 1945. MacEachen was more uneasy about money in politics than Trudeau or Pearson had been, but like Stanfield, he faced strong pressure from his party’s right to preserve the status quo. Tory pressure came from both within their own caucus and provincial allies, namely Lougheed, Davis and Cardinal. Unionist wealth was a 9-digit number, adjusted for inflation, with the Alberta and Ontario Tories somewhat behind. Only the federal Tories and Liberals had more cash than the Union Nationale. While Davis could be flexible on this subject, Cardinal and Lougheed were quite the opposite.


SAUVÉ: Money is the mother’s milk of politics, period. That is not just a cliché but an eternal truth. All I’ll say positively for campaign finance people is that they are sincere in their idealism and principle. We were not lobbying Stanfield to do anything on campaign finance that year. Insofar as I was worried about any federal issue, it was one that pertained directly to my new portfolio. On that particular subject, we made our views known but beyond that did nothing concrete. It would have been very counterproductive given Stanfield’s personal view and the delicacy of obtaining our desired outcome. At Charlottetown I had some side conversations with my Ontarian counterpart, speaking in pure hypotheticals. He gave me reason for cautious optimism. In early November we got some good news when Stanfield announced a new small arms factory would be located in Quebec, to offset the Phantom contract going to Winnipeg. While we would have preferred to land a Phantom factory, the small arms contract would still create a few hundred jobs where they were needed. Despite it being Michele’s portfolio, she was very gracious to keep me informed on that file. As I joked to Army buddies at the time, it was mutually beneficial for an infantryman to care about the flyboys.


CF-116 Phantom drawing as presented to Air Command, April 1974.


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MULRONEY: In November I was watching the NDP leadership race, which pitted Ed Broadbent against Rosemary Brown to replace the defeated David Lewis. It was obvious Broadbent would win, and he seemed like the better choice if hardly stellar. His longwinded speeches on industrial relations and labour policy were very professorial and hardly conducive to wooing the voters he needed. By contrast, MacEachen was a better speaker but poorer campaigner than Broadbent. They were down but hardly out, and Broadbent’s more modern social democracy would fit bitter than the ancient socialism of David Lewis, which in my opinion had only spiked in ’72 because of Trudeau’s left-wing weaknesses. Between defense and energy contracts in key areas across the country, I was confident we could compete with the NDP in those blue-orange swing ridings. He had knocked off one of Diefenbaker’s best ministers, Mike Starr, in ’68 and I knew Broadbent would make a bigger play for our seats than Lewis was ever capable of. Provincially, what interested me was the severe turbulence buffeting Bill Davis’ government over scandal and a sluggish economy. The invincible Big Blue Machine, English Canada’s most legendary dynasty, showing signs of vulnerability was uncharted territory for someone of my generation. It seemed another time when only months earlier they had clinched our majority.

GAGNON: At the end of 1974 Cardinal was working towards completion of the James Bay Accord, which if successful would create a template for government-aboriginal relations and significantly simplify resource development processes. Unionist governments have always been completely devoted to the resource sector and Cardinal’s was no exception. Since many of his powers could be exercised by decree, [Paul-Émile] Allard was not in the spotlight as often as his colleagues. That was a mistake since his political and policy influence was among the Cabinet’s highest. A conservative federalist like Bellemare and Sauvé, Allard was a personal friend of both men and often joined Sauvé on hunting trips. He managed to successfully negotiate the Accord and in the process formed trusting relationships with Aboriginal leaders, as did Yves Gabias as he worked to shutter the residential school system. When I interviewed Cardinal at year’s end, he was optimistic about beating the new Liberal leader, Raymond Garneau, who had been acclaimed after Wagner dropped out.
 
BEAULIEU: For the new session in January, we had decided to televise proceedings first an experiment and soon permanently. Cardinal was not opposed to the idea but worried about a “three-ring circus” and theatrics replacing serious debate. These objections had merit, as they would later have in the federal Parliament, but as Maurice told us, the Assembly had always been rambunctious. Under Duplessis rambunctiousness had been the norm, with constant government assaults on opposition benches which riled them into displays of nearly incoherent rage. Procedural rulings, particularly in the 1950s, were often devised by Duplessis, Paul Sauvé or Maurice himself and implemented by the Speaker arbitrarily. To party traditionalists like Maurice and Pierre such behaviour was not deplorable but entirely welcome. An easily ridiculed opposition was a prerequisite for the dominant party system both men wanted to restore. In their mind, exceptions could be made for Garneau, with whom they were friendly, and certain other Liberal frontbenchers. Cardinal forbade such behaviour in very explicit terms, but the idea remained in his ministers’ minds nonetheless. TV’s appearance did not noticeably change behaviour except to reinforce the theatrical tendencies of members on both sides, at least initially. Like any new technology, we were mostly curious about its potential.

SAUVÉ: As justice minister, I had three major priorities: streamlining the appeals process, community policing, and access to the judicial system. Improving the SQ had started with our construction of the Police Academy in ’74, which would admit its first class the following year. Judicial access, in my mind, meant those who were chronically under-served: poorer citizens, seniors, veterans and aboriginals. The legal aid bill I asked my department to draft would be specifically targeted at those groups. I planned an introduction after the budget, which still had a tiny surplus despite the economic downturn. All of us expected a return to red in ’76 and the subject wasn’t really discussed even in P committee. I later found out it was discussed in the economic committee, with Cardinal simply restating that his view hadn’t changed. Politically, there were quite a few of us who felt this was heading down the road to Toryland, but we did not want to rehash the previous term’s debates or do anything which would spark rumours of a leadership challenge. So I kept my head down and focused on the legal aid bill, which was modestly popular if strongly criticized among the left and certain journalists for being too narrow. As for Assembly TV, it was something I enjoyed but didn’t give much thought to then or later.

NEWMAN: February’s budget was back in the red after 2 years of surplus, a result of increased defence spending and rising inflation. Stanfield had considered imposing controls but decided to wait until the fall to reevaluate, since he felt it might be seen as panic-driven rather than part of a methodical process. His party’s right was vehemently opposed to such an idea but their Cabinet representation outside Alberta was minimal. One little-known secret was discreet pressure from BC Socred and Quebec Unionist allies - in Quebec’s case, led by Pierre Sauvé, an outspoken supporter of capital punishment - for an end to the death penalty moratorium imposed by Pearson in 1967. Both the prime minister and his justice minister, Gordon Fairweather, were opponents of capital punishment, and reversing it would only take a countermanding order-in-council. As a concession, they promised not to move for further narrowing of capital crimes or formal abolition while holding out the possibility of mandatory minimums. This was the first intraparty clash which was forgiven but not forgotten on both sides. Stanfield resented such pressure from his allies and they resented his refusal to deliver policy rewards they felt owed. Fortunately for all concerned, the Charlottetown process was where most progress was being made, since all shared the same repatriation goal.

MULRONEY: One by-product of the constitutional process was detente between Stanfield and Diefenbaker, as the Chief’s Bill of Rights was among the draft Constitution’s centrepieces. While Dief disagreed with the distinct society clause, he agreed not to publicly oppose it and thus rile his remaining loyalists in caucus. By 1975 his daily influence was almost entirely gone and he privately made clear that the 30th Parliament would be his last, given his advancing age and declining health. Stanfield had been impressed by Dief’s devoutly loyal and talented former EA, Sean O’Sullivan, and promised Dief that Sean would be promoted to parliamentary secretary at the next shuffle. It had been less than a decade since our party had been engaged in civil war, a time which less than a decade later seemed so distant. Bob scheduled the next conference for September and told us that he wanted the process complete before the next election. An excessively protracted process would transform apathy into frustration and eventually open rebellion. That is why Bob decided to guide the process rather than take direct leadership. If the provinces could agree among themselves, then we could avoid getting bogged down in petty squabbles, and accusations of centralism, or a stalemate over core principles. The latter is what happened in the postwar Liberal era, with a standoff over core principles between St. Laurent and his provincial foes – Manning, Frost, and Duplessis.

Former Prime Minister John Diefenbaker and Hamilton MP Sean O'Sullivan, 1975.

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PETER LOUGHEED: My idea of Senate reform was each province submitting a list to the PM from which to pick an appointee. An elected body was never something I considered, nor did any of the other Western premiers. As for the distinct society, I felt it was tolerable as part of the proposed package and merely an interpretive clause. The next conference would be held in June, after my election and before what we all expected would be an early BC election and a Socred romp back to power. Bob asked if I could play host, as a change of scenery from Ontario where these conferences were so often held. Cardinal was not too keen on hosting a constitutional conference on Quebec soil for personal reasons and Bill [Davis] had already hosted our first conference. I ignored the intraparty squabbling over capital punishment, since it was a federal issue and I would modify our laws if the federal government did likewise. The whole debate seemed rather premature to me, since so long as Stanfield remained Prime Minister there was little possibility of a reopening. During Charlottetown, Sauvé had asked, unofficially, whether we would be interested in joining such a pressure group. I gave him the exact answer I gave you, though I understood why he felt that way and respected his strong views on the subject.

Alberta Premier Peter Lougheed in 1975.

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TIMMINS: In April 1975, Cardinal announced the James Bay Accord with aboriginal leaders, which was a mass settlement of Northern aboriginal land claims. It divided traditional lands of signatories into 3 groups: exclusive aboriginal lands, Crown-owned lands with shared jurisdiction over resources and exclusive native hunting and fishing rights, and lands with partial hunting rights for natives. There were also elaborate provisions for economic, environmental and social protections. Finally they also began to assemble a new educational system to replace the residential schools that were to be phased out by 1984. Cardinal was very proud of the Accord, which turned out to be one of his most important political legacies as premier. With conflict resolution mechanisms in place, Cardinal could begin to dream of an alliance between government, aboriginals, corporate Quebec, and private-sector unions against “foreign green men”, as he referred to environmentalist groups. When I interviewed Yves Gabias, who had been a lead government negotiator, on the issue, he agreed with me but promised the party would be “very responsive” to any stakeholder demands. The James Bay Project, delayed for 2 years due to a court-ordered stoppage, would now resume. Once the Accord and budget deliberations were finished, Cardinal planned an early May adjournment in preparation for a resumption of constitutional talks.


GAGNON: Lost in the celebrations of James Bay was noticing an increasingly ailing PQ. They had completely opposed constitutional talks as merely window dressing and even if an accord was reached, it would sell out Quebec’s interests in a mad dash to a deal. Yet by this point Levesque found it difficult to attack either major party, both of which studiously ignored him. Nearly a decade after Johnson’s informal cooperation with Bourgault, whose suburban vote-splitting had been crucial to the Unionist comeback, both parties had become determined to wipe out the PQ. Levesque’s leadership remained unchallenged, and he secured a commitment to a referendum before independence. Looking ahead, a right-wing Union Nationale leader like Gabias or Sauvé combined with Garneau’s centrism could create a progressive vacuum to be occupied. Levesque intended to contest the next election, but clearly indicated to his inner circle that it would be his last election as leader. Marc-Andre Bedard or Jacques-Yvan Morin, I thought, could be his most capable potential successors but were handicapped by a limited public profile outside Montreal. If the PQ lost its last seat, then its death would be merely a matter of time. Yet there was still a void since independence remained a politically mainstream option rejected by both parties, and neither wanted outspoken ultras in their ranks.


PQ MNA Jacques-Yvan Morin in 1975.


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MULRONEY: That spring, Bob decided to finish what Dief had started by granting the territories Senate seats. It was absurd to have the territories represented in only one house, and the legislation was passed by unanimous consent. Around this time, we also decided to terminate all discussions of a new airport for Montreal. While Mirabel had been halted in 1972 by ministerial decree, Bob now decided to destroy the site. It had been a boondoggle from the outset due to a poorly chosen location and cronyism in the bidding process. Instead, we would upgrade Dorval as required, which is what Cardinal and Drapeau also wanted. The Grits had some chutzpah criticizing us for not demolishing the white elephant immediately even though they had created it! In Bob’s view, major infrastructure projects like that should be left almost entirely in expert hands, as he had done in Nova Scotia. There was considerable comment about the delay, but Bob correctly believed the anger would pass in time. Restarting somewhere else, especially given local anger over the original expropriation, was a non-starter. Nonetheless, it was a useful diversion from constant speculation over constitutional talks and Blakeney’s impending reelection in Saskatchewan. I urged Bob to bring Marie Boivin into Cabinet at the next shuffle, as I felt was merited by her superb work on the Finance Committee. He said he would consider it.


CAPLAN: With wage and price controls at least temporarily dismissed by Stanfield, we decided to pressure the government on foreign investment. There had been limited success under Pearson and Trudeau on this issue, and Stanfield had introduced tokens such as board quotas and secondary processing tariffs. I think Stanfield himself had somewhat conflicting views but again, the Tory right was adamantly opposed to defending our economic independence. When MacEachen had met with Stanfield to propose further limits on foreign investment, the PM flatly refused, saying he opposed it on principle. Furthermore in his view it would be a one-way ticket to an economic crisis and forced retreat, or economic calamity if actually implemented. Yet he was quite open to wage and price controls, probably only to give a sense of economic control without violating his principles and enacting his right’s reactionary agenda. Ed told me that if he won, foreign investment would be a centrepiece of our next election platform. The Liberals had almost completely backed off Walter Gordon’s agenda even with a pro-labour man like MacEachen leading and [Bryce] MacKasey one of his chief lieutenants. They did not reembrace their old continentalist agenda either, which left a policy void that we were happy to fill. Despite that, it seemed obvious to me that the Grits were more unified than our Tory foe.


Outgoing NDP leader David Lewis with NDP MPs Ed Broadbent and Stanley Knowles in 1975.
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DON MAZANKOWSKI, PRESIDENT OF THE TREASURY BOARD: Blakeney’s victory reinforced our frustration at the lack of a viable non-socialist alternative in Saskatchewan despite the provincial party getting off its deathbed. Our federal domination made it all the more painful, considering that it was Dief’s home province. Bob wanted us to try and help resurrect the provincial party through the local caucus, but there was no obvious candidate at either level. All we could do was hope, while relying on Blakeney, a comparative moderate by NDP standards, to keep his loony left in check. Despite our constitutional differences, Bob always had deep (and reciprocated) respect for Blakeney. Manitoba was fine, since it looked like Lyon was set to win the next election even if he strongly disagreed with us on distinct society and bilingualism. Indeed Lyon’s impending victory was one reason why Bob wanted to finish constitutional negotiations, because we didn’t want an outspoken Tory opponent of the distinct society. Bennett was more malleable in that respect. Once Parliament adjourned we resumed preparation for the October round, which we hoped would close most of the remaining gaps. If October succeeded, then a final round could be held the following winter.
 
PAULSON: One little-noticed event that summer was when Pierre Sauvé made a rare foray to Parliament Hill to brief Diefenbaker on the constitutional working group. He had done so at the request of Stanfield and Roch La Salle, who knew Dief was fond of Sauvé, having been a friend of his father’s in the 1950s. It was nominally a meeting about the distinct society in particular, but Diefenbaker’s meeting was not the main event. That was a meeting between Sauvé and Sean O’Sullivan, the prodigal young right-winger who led a small conservative group known as the Chateau [Laurier] Cabinet. The two men had been encouraged to meet by mutual caucus friends. They instantly hit it off personally and politically, and decided to remain in contact. A few weeks previously Deux-Montagnes’ Marie Boivin, a respected economist and perhaps the star of Quebec’s delegation after Roch La Salle, had joined the Chateau Cabinet. She had been given a prime Finance Committee slot by Stanfield, earning the admiration of her colleagues despite their strong disagreement with many of her views. Stanfield had promised to consider her for a Cabinet position, but there was no economic slot open that would not provoke intraparty tensions. International Trade was the easiest, but as an outspoken supporter of free trade in general and with the United States in particular, she could not accept that portfolio. Ultimately Stanfield decided to give her Industry at the next shuffle.

SEAN O’SULLIVAN, PC MP FOR HAMILTON-WENTWORTH: It was an introduction which went extremely well, much more social than political conversation. We promised to keep in touch and on the political side; Pierre’s advice was to continue doing what I was doing. “No spooking” was the most explicit thing he said. I laughed when he said that a speech draft of mine was “way too hot” – initially I thought he was talking about me rather than the speech- and advised me to tone it down. Mostly we just swapped personal and political lore. Pierre was interested in learning more about Oliver Mowat and Mitch Hepburn, while he talked to me about Duplessis and Gouin. In Pierre’s view, Lomer Gouin was the better politician than Taschereau and the Liberal dynasty’s architect. Needless to say there was another veteran premier who entered our discussion. It was a thoroughly enjoyable time for both of us when all was said and done, but there was nothing particularly noteworthy about our talk. Politically that year was shaping up to be a good one for us, with predictable opposition behaviour and quiet dissent on all sides. That’s normal for any healthy political party, a diversity of viewpoints. What concerned me was that our party refused to entertain alternate viewpoints. A party founded to echo the Grits did just that on economic and for the most part, social policy.

TIMMINS: Politically, ’75 was a quiet summer with not much to write about except preparations for another Charlottetown round. Broadbent’s win had always been a given, and I thought he could be a formidable leader if he could successfully transition from longwinded professor to polished politician. His initial impression gave little hint he was capable of doing that, with lengthy and complex speeches on labour history which probably went over his audience’s head. The next major economic decision was whether to implement controls, which we strongly opposed, as did major Western outlets. It seemed clear to me that Stanfield would do it, and I confirmed my hunch in an exclusive scoop July 24. With Parliament recessed till September, we might as well have firebombed the political arena. Both MacEachen and Broadbent hammered Stanfield on why the announcement was made to a journalist rather than the public. His process answer was unsatisfactory and only fed beliefs he was ducking a confrontation with his right flank. Stanfield had the numbers to win a straight-up fight at crunch time, but having narrowly escaped lasting damage on bilingualism in 1969; he did not want to split his party. Nor could he afford a nasty intraparty squabble in the midst of constitutional negotiations, which he considered his central goal as Prime Minister.

Transport Minister Jack Horner, an unofficial leader of the Tory right, in 1975.

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GAGNON: It was around 1975 when Bellemare ceded PC-UN daily liaison work to Sauvé, leaving himself general oversight. He didn’t completely give up that role for a few reasons, practicality, seniority, ideology and mutual desire being among them. Both men were very cognizant of the fact that an excessive focus on constitutional issues could cede the spotlight to Garneau, who was talking up affordability issues and the spectre of inflation. Bellemare had begun considering retirement after 31 years in the Legislature, most of them in senior portfolios. He was getting tired physically and had become exasperated with Cardinal’s bland performance, telling me that if a constitutional deal was done “we’d have nothing left to do.” Unlike Stanfield, Cardinal’s economic views were a clear minority in his party, especially the grassroots and backbench. Yet as with their federal ally, such a situation could only be changed by changing leaders, which was out of the question. Cardinal became as frustrated as his critics, but since they never openly challenged him – something he deeply resented to the end of his life- he could not respond in kind. For the time being, the laser-like focus on constitutional talks kept everyone working harmoniously. From my point of view, both parties were teetering on the brink of open intraparty confrontation of the sort which had not been seen since the Pearson era.

SAUVÉ: Complete baloney, to use the word appropriate for family television. I, Yves, Jean-Paul, and everyone else were focused on our daily jobs. We had our differences with Cardinal but it was not a breath-holding contest as journalists like to portray. Indeed he promised to bring down a tougher budget the following fiscal year and introduce baseline budgeting. I was focused on my family vacation that summer, and my major non-constitutional project was community policing, a joint project with Robert [Lussier]. Insofar as I did any political work, it was getting updates from our interdepartmental working group and weekly chats with Robert. As for my introduction to Sean, it was 90% social and 10% light politics. Period.

CANADIAN GALLUP POLL, SEPTEMBER 1975

IF A FEDERAL ELECTION WAS HELD TODAY, WHICH PARTY'S CANDIDATE DO YOU THINK YOU WOULD FAVOUR?

LIBERAL: 41.6%
PC: 31.9%
NDP: 18.2%
SOCIAL CREDIT: 5.4%
 
TIMMINS: October’s constitutional round resumed harmoniously, with further discussions on entrenchment and other related issues. One provision was the ability for Parliament to override it by inserting a notwithstanding clause in the appropriate statute. This pleased Quebec, which made its retention a non-negotiable demand from the outset. For conservatives, what concerned them was “cruel, unusual or degrading form of punishment.” Quebec was worried that the clause was a backdoor root to the Supreme Court’s abolishing capital punishment, but was reassured by Stanfield that his current and future Supreme Court appointments would “not create cause for concern.” Having already appointed 3 justices, if he won the next election then the Court would have a majority of Stanfield appointees. This was the closest Stanfield came to openly debating capital punishment as prime minister, for he was not prepared to risk scuttling the project or waging a battle of attrition with his Western and Quebec allies. Privately he felt Quebec’s fears were overblown and that Sauvé was cloaking his personal policy agenda – one entirely shared and supported by Cardinal - under the guise of provincial rights. Quebec had persuaded Hatfield and Moores that regardless of views on capital punishment, such a decision should be made by Parliament. Despite that retrospectively minor dispute, the conference adjourned in a cordial mood October 9. The final round would be held in Charlottetown that March, which would cover constitutional repatriation.

Newfoundland and Labrador premier Frank Moores with his intergovernmental affairs minister John Crosbie in October 1975.

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PAULSON: As Stanfield prepared for the final constitutional round, he received mixed provincial news: Bill Bennett’s Socreds won a landslide victory in BC while Bill Davis’ Tories were reduced to a minority. Given competition between his Liberal and NDP rivals plus the Liberals positioning themselves to Davis’ right on certain issues, Davis’ minority position was secure. During the campaign Davis had been forced to make policy concessions on rent control and battled back from a double-digit Liberal lead. He saw minority government as a welcome opportunity to improve his government after a scandal-plagued first term, appointing right-wingers to his Cabinet after the election. Alongside the 2 new ministers, wealthy real estate attorney Scott Barton, a close O’Sullivan friend, was elected president of the Young PCs. Stanfield enraged conservatives when he finally chose to introduce controls effective October 31, but they were a caucus and Cabinet minority. Even among the economic ministers, only Finance Minister Marcel Lambert and International Trade Minister Marie Boivin dissented. Both had to watch Cabinet and caucus approve Stanfield’s plan, and Lambert resigned rather than implement it. He was moved to Justice and Gordon Fairweather took over Finance, thus preventing the complete breach of a Cabinet resignation. Stanfield refused to lose the sole Francophone in his Cabinet, which would have severely damaged his Quebec image.

GAGNON: Publicly, the government was all business as usual during the banal fall session, preparing to pass healthcare and education legislation before Christmas break. Privately they were aghast at Lambert’s resignation and contemptuous of Stanfield’s decision. More than one senior minister called the prime minister “the relapsed socialist” and other things unprintable in a family newspaper. Beaudry was inching closer to Lambert’s position, being a right-winger implementing economic policy he fundamentally disagreed with. His position was infinitely stronger, since the caucus and grassroots had a conservative majority which would back him in any open dispute. Since Cardinal did not demand specific interventionist policies, there was no trigger for Beaudry to resign. Additionally, they did not want to provoke a leadership crisis after the difficult opposition years, and the epochal 1960 defeat was caused by a leadership crisis. Those two memories, combined with the adamant refusal of Cardinal’s most obvious rivals to challenge him on politics rather than policy, ensured a calm caucus room. The government’s primary focus was slowly turning to the deteriorating economy as constitutional talks drew to a close. They cheered when Stanfield refused to nationalize Canadair, instead allowing it to enter bankruptcy protection. That was his major concession to his party’s right wing after forcing them to accept wage and price controls.

O’SULLIVAN: In November ’75 I met with Tim Horton to talk about his franchise’s expansion. One of the earliest stores was in Hamilton, and I was a frequent customer. Moreover, I had been a huge fan of his during his playing days. After requisite small talk and business conversations, I asked whether the franchise was considering political expansion. That is, donating to political parties. He was uncomfortable with the question but answered nonetheless, saying “you guys are OK” and mentioning donating to both parties. He also expressed concern about the controls, and I could only answer sympathetically. We agreed to keep in touch, and he was as good as his word. Naturally only my closest friends in caucus knew about this, since Stanfield did not take kindly to junior MPs soliciting corporate donors. It was also around this time that other Quebec MPs began joining the Chateau Club, though not Claire Malraux since I told her it would look coordinated if both she and Boivin were members. She was annoyed with me for a few weeks thereafter. None of us thought Davis would actually touch a right-wing agenda, since like Stanfield it would violate his principles and in Davis’ case, directly contradict his strategy of straddling the Grits and Dippers.

Tim Horton in 1975.

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SAUVÉ: Just before we adjourned for Christmas, Caouette announced his resignation as Socred leader effective January 20. It had been expected since the election, if not before given his obviously declining health. Gilles Fortin was his replacement, winning a bitterly contested election with the separatist wing. Combined with the PQ’s decline, Cardinal contemplated waging open war on the Creditistes but decided to target a handful of their remaining seats instead. By knocking them down to a single digit seat count, they would probably disintegrate within 2 cycles at most, recreating a 2-party system. Cardinal told me I would be one of our team leaders on this project, which we codenamed PING PONG. It was a welcome diversion from constitutional talks, which were mercifully drawing to a close by that point. Jean-Guy asked the civil service to devise project ideas for us over the winter, which was his way of breaking the government’s intellectual impasse. I was skeptical on principle but willing to give it a try if we could regain some momentum. After all, the following year would mark a decade in government and 5 years of Jean-Guy’s leadership.
 
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