Égalité ou indépendance: a Canadian TL

DREYFUSS: I don’t remember the precise date Johnson confided that he would retire within two years, but it was sometime in October 1970. The campaign had been hard and as a result, he was resolved to avoid controversial issues until Gendron reported and offered a blueprint for language policy. 1970 had seen some younger MNAs of all stripes elected, but more importantly it marked a subtle shift in Cabinet feelings on succession. Johnson’s designated successor was Bertrand, yet Cardinal’s adroit handling of St. Leonard and subsequent negotiations with the teachers’ unions earned him newfound respect within caucus and Cabinet. He worked well with the “O-ring” group of conservative federalists who backed the federal Tories and desired an intraparty realignment along socioeconomic lines, which given caucus demographics had the potential of achieving their mutual goals. However, that fall was mostly about routine government business rather than leadership hypotheticals, which was discussed outside Quebec City only to avoid detection. It was the quietest Assembly session in many years, certainly since 1960, which made for rather banal reporting. With Drapeau set to be acclaimed in Montreal, there was little action on the municipal scene either. One thing which people were buzzing about was the impending property tax reduction in the fall fiscal update, even if it was a fairly minor part of government tax policy.
ROY: In late October the PQ held an electoral post-mortem to determine the way forward. It was decided to shelve plans for a referendum before independence given how deeply the party was divided. Levesque would have won such a battle but at the price of severely straining party unity. Therefore such a motion was tabled for the 1972 policy convention, where a final vote would be held. Levesque decided to attack the government directly rather than the PLQ, since it was his ultimate target. The UN had always answered language questions by saying “let the Gendron Committee finish its work” and pushing the boundaries in external relations. Almost as importantly, Johnson had impeccable nationalist credentials and remained even more popular than his government. Always a pragmatist, Levesque knew his new party lacked the resources for more than concentrated efforts in certain ridings or even a single region. The UN’s financial resources were only surpassed by the federal Liberals and Conservatives, as everyone knew. They had already begun discussing plans for the PQ’s electoral shutout and regain nationalist defectors. Language legislation would be their primary weapon, though in fall 1970 these discussions were in their earliest stages. Meanwhile the Liberals made almost no important political moves during this period beyond even more strident opposition to many government initiatives.



CLÉMENT VINCENT, AGRICULTURE MINISTER: November was a time when we were scouting ridings to target in the federal election, when on Nov. 8 we heard that Trois-Rivieres MP J.A. Mongrain had died. While a nominal independent, Mongrain was in fact a Liberal who had been the city’s mayor during the Duplessis era. He had been the Liberal candidate against Duplessis himself in 1952 before being elected to Parliament later on. For practical and yes, sentimental reasons, it would be one of our targeted ridings for ’72. As a prelude, we decided to make a full commitment to the by-election. Yves Gabias, the local MNA and Dozois’ parliamentary secretary, would take charge of the PC campaign once that by-election was called. Daniel approved the plan during a meeting of the Cabinet Operations Committee 2 weeks later, and Yves said he would have a candidate within the month. In order not to spike excessive public or Liberal interest, Yves’ search was limited to what he called “regular” candidates. Otherwise November was a fairly quiet month. It has been forgotten that despite Daniel’s lack of attachment to the federal Tories, he had been Duplessis’ primary organizer in 1958. Like Duplessis, he did not intervene in a hopeless federal cause, but there was no doubt as to which party he preferred governing in Ottawa.



Vincent in 1971. A member of the federalist "O-ring", he was the only Unionist minister who had served both federally and provincially.



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NEWMAN: On Nov. 27, New Brunswick decisively voted for Dick Hatfield’s Tories, ousting Louis Robichaud’s Liberals after one of the province’s most progressive decades in its history. Hatfield had not been expected to win initially, but benefited from a strong campaign, Robichaud’s reluctance to continue governing and Liberal missteps. It was the decade’s first change in government, a harbinger of things to come. Grits ruled securely in Alex Campbell’s PEI, Gerald Regan’s Nova Scotia and Joey Smallwood’s Rock. Despite the New Brunswick setback, it would soon be clear that anti-incumbent sentiment was hardly limited to Liberals, as a cursory glance westward could attest. In the 1950s BC, Manitoba, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia Liberal governments had all fallen before their federal cousin did in 1957. Yet provincially Trudeau’s strongest foes were in Ontario and Quebec, as usual. Ontario was undergoing a change in Queen’s Park as John Robarts announced his imminent retirement, with a crowded field emerging to replace him. I still thought Quebec was the province to watch long-term, given various political trends and the fascinating party dynamic which was developing on the ground. So long as Quebec remained a Liberal hammerlock, the chance of Tory governments being anything but circumstantial flukes was slim.



MARIO BEAULIEU: Just before we recessed for Christmas, Daniel asked me to prepare a memo on the upcoming policy convention, which would be held sometime in April. This would be mostly an opportunity for grassroots voices to be heard rather than announcing any new policy directions, given his previous instructions to us. At the end of that session he was much less stressed than he had been in a long time, and told me that he would take a long Christmas vacation. The Assembly would not be recalled until the budget was tabled in early February, as usual. In the meantime a Trois-Rivieres candidate had been found, local businesswoman Claire Malraux. She was a first-time candidate but a seasoned political activist at both federal and provincial levels. Yves understood that he would be running this by-election on his own, as a test. If he succeeded then he would enter Cabinet at the next vacancy. Just before he left for his Christmas vacation, Daniel said he was considering an initiative to work with New Brunswick and Manitoba on minority language rights. It would be nothing formal, at least for now, but a step towards interprovincial cooperation on this issue.



WILLIAM TETLEY: In our last caucus meeting before Christmas break, Pierre [Laporte] told us we would be making a strong push on language in the next sitting. The caucus was far from unified on this point, with a sizeable minority supporting Lesage’s more voluntarist approach. Nonetheless he said it was a political imperative, for as long as the government held its nationalist trump card with a decent economy, it would continue its winning streak. Moreover, we needed to stop progressive nationalists from defecting to Levesque, who at that time was equally scornful of both major parties.



CANADIAN GALLUP POLL, DECEMBER 1970

IF A FEDERAL ELECTION WERE HELD TODAY, WHICH PARTY'S CANDIDATE DO YOU THINK YOU WOULD FAVOUR?

LIB: 42.6%
PC: 34.8%
NDP: 15.2%
SC: 5.1%
 
I can't wait for the election. :D

Gotta admit, and I know I've said it before, but I was never much of a fan of Hatfield. Guy caused a decade in the wilderness for the NB PC party, not to mention his rather...sordid personal life.
 
PIERRE-MARC JOHNSON: It was the first week of January when my father started weakening again. Despite the rather sedate political environment, I do not think he fully recovered from his campaign exertions. It had been extremely strenuous for him, and Reg [Daniel Johnson’s cardiologist brother] had told us that he did not have much longer to live back in June 1968. Had he retired immediately at that time, then Reg thought Dad could live another 5-7 years with proper care. Remaining politics considerably shortened that timeframe. I wanted Dad to retire, but he wanted to remain because there was still work to do. Having won the victory he always wanted in 1970, restored financial stability, and other things, he was at peace with his record. We pleaded with Dad to announce his retirement that fall and allow someone else to take over. After much discussion, he seemed to agree with us. Nothing and no one should be prioritized over his own health. There was also some discussion about a new lieutenant-governor: convention dictated 5 years on average, and Hugues Lapointe had been appointed shortly before the 1966 election. Dad wanted Lapointe out and replaced with one of us, specifically Paul Beaulieu, whom he had approached a few months earlier. We were under no illusions about the possibility that Trudeau would simply reappoint Lapointe as a snub to my father, as King had done with Fiset in 1944.

DOZOIS: It was the 23rd when I called Daniel to discuss some final budget touches. Around 10 minutes into the call, I heard him gasp and then a thud. Though I dared not say anything, I knew in my heart what had just happened. About 20 minutes later Jean-Jacques [Bertrand] called me and said he would be convening a Cabinet meeting. It was then we found out that Daniel had suffered another coronary and would probably not survive. I had been in similar meetings 11 years earlier when Paul Sauvé had died and we needed a few days to decide on leadership, picking someone weak who had lost what should have been an easy election. We were all determined to avoid a protracted process while picking the best possible person to be nominated. Many believed that Jean-Jacques should be elected leader as Daniel’s chosen successor and deputy premier. I had gradually come to the view that Jean-Jacques was not that person, and even though I had strong support I would not nominate. This was partially because I felt myself more useful as finance minister, but mostly because I had no intention of contesting another election. I had told Daniel the previous year of my intention to retire from politics within 5 years, which he had accepted. Jean-Guy Cardinal had minority support in the Cabinet but caucus was a closely run thing. Nor did any of us want to involve Lapointe, a stridently partisan Liberal before his appointment, in internal party matters.

MARCEL MASSE, MINISTER OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS: Bertrand was unacceptable to me because while he had been loyal as deputy premier, he had been a disruptive force in opposition, bringing our internal unity to the very limit on at least two occasions. Moreover his adamant opposition to language legislation made him ideologically unacceptable as well. He seemed to forget that nationalism is just as important as conservatism, especially as time went on. Finally he was a weak man who sought to impose his viewpoint on others rather than earning such consensus as Daniel did. All these factors combined, I was able to work well with the conservative federalists such as Dozois, Vincent and Sauvé. While we disagreed somewhat on federalism, we were all on the same page with regards to leadership, language, and two co-equal ideological pillars. In the middle of our long meeting, we received a phone call around 4 PM that Daniel had died, never having regained consciousness. Jean-Jacques called for an adjournment and said as in 1959/60, leadership would be postponed till after Daniel’s funeral. The funeral was held 3 days later in Montreal, and his sons delivered the eulogy. He had been a truly exceptional leader for Quebec and our party. For me and many others, he would be replaced but never succeeded.



Masse in 1969.


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ROY: I have rarely covered such intense caucus meetings as the ones which selected Daniel Johnson’s successor from Jan. 24-25, 1971. While Bertrand initially had plurality support, his support was insufficient to safely recommend his commission to the lieutenant-governor. If it had just been the Cabinet, most likely Bertrand would have been approved by a bare majority and commissioned premier. In caucus, federalist and nationalist conservatives were dominant, which meant that so long as a broadly acceptable anti-Bertrand was found, they would win. With Paul Dozois, who would have easily defeated Bertrand, not running, the alliance turned to Cardinal. Cardinal nominated for the leadership, and by roughly 10:30 PM he had defeated Bertrand in the caucus ballot. While the ballots were quickly destroyed, I reported that the count was 40-29. Cardinal had won on the condition that Bertrand was kept as deputy premier and mandatory biannual leadership reviews be instituted. Bertrand never got over losing the leadership again, especially someone whom he personally despised. One of the ugliest feuds was with Pierre Sauvé, who despised Bertrand and regularly disparaged him to journalists and federal Tories as “le p’tit rouge”, referring to Bertrand’s Liberal past and moderate views. Most of his comments were not printable in a family newspaper. It was all the more galling because Luce Sauvé, Pierre’s mother, had delivered Deux-Montagnes’ delegation to Bertrand at the 1961 convention.





Deputy Premier Jean-Jacques Bertrand in 1971.


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LYSIANE GAGNON, LA PRESSE COLUMNIST: In mid-February 1971, Cardinal gave me an interview to discuss how the government would proceed. There would be little change in policies, but he did give notice that Gendron’s upcoming report would be a template for comprehensive language legislation. Federal relations were dependent on a constitutional deal as proposed by Johnson in 1968, with Fulton-Favreau an acceptable starting point. Ministers could support whom they wanted in their own ridings provided that their support was neither public nor requiring financing beyond their individual Caisse, just as Johnson had previously decreed. Since Yves Gabias had just been appointed Education Minister, he was allowed to continue his Trois-Rivières experiment. Cardinal had an excellent policy mind but since he was very new to elective politics he relied heavily on Cabinet and the party executive for political guidance. Johnson had dealt with Anglophone stakeholders personally, leaving Sauvé to work with the emerging Allophone stakeholders. Under Cardinal, Sauvé would handle Anglophones as well, which he was happy to do for personal and political reasons.



Premier Jean-Guy Cardinal in 1971.


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MULRONEY: The party was totally dedicated to winning Trois-Rivieres in winter ’71. If we couldn’t win a small riding with the total backing of its local Unionist MNA, then our hopes of a Quebec breakthrough were slim indeed. Without a breakthrough, we could never hope to form a lasting government. Claire was a great candidate who focused almost exclusively on local issues, and Yves had worked hard to convince his constituents that voting Creditiste would only allow a Liberal victory. Just before polling day Yves called and said it was too close to call and all would depend on turnout, which was beyond my initial feeling of a competitive race ending in a comfortable Liberal win. We were all on tenterhooks that rainy day in March. The budget debate was what occupied most attention, so we had a quiet night to observe the by-election. For most of the night Claire exchanged tiny leads with the Liberal candidate, and it was nearly 11:30 when a key precinct in the city’s southwest came in. Yves phoned shortly before the result was posted to tell me that Claire would be the new MP for Trois-Rivières. I drove over to her victory party, which had almost as many journalists as supporters. Virtually no one outside our respective parties expected us to win Trois-Rivières, so it was quite the media circus. One journalist who had predicted a Tory win, the ever-perceptive Michel Roy, asked whether we had plans for “20 Trois-Rivières.” I could only say that we would take things one day at a time.

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TURNER: Trudeau was not overly concerned about Trois-Rivières either in itself or as a harbinger for the general election. Marchand was angry for having lost it, for we knew that the UN would not relinquish that seat anymore than they would the provincial seat. So long as the Tories were unable to progress beyond Unionist-led guerrilla warfare in the province, they would never win a majority government. I shared Trudeau’s view on this question, as did just about everyone in Cabinet. Our primary focus at that item was multiculturalism and bilingualism, not party politics. We still had to deal with the Union Nationale, since we all believed that it would govern for the foreseeable future. Multiculturalism and bilingualism were causing us considerable political difficulty in Ontario and the West but Trudeau would have no bar of slowing the schedule despite pleas from Western MPs and Ross Thatcher. It was a fundamental principle for him. In Quebec multiculturalism rather than bilingualism was the bigger controversy, though one ignored by the provincial government which was still developing its later concept of interculturalism. When I ran into Sauvé later that month in Montreal, he quipped “salting the earth, eh” in reference to our Western woes. I could only respond that it was for the greater good, and nothing could be done to save Ross Thatcher’s foundering ship.


NEWMAN: Trudeau could not have cared less what the Western Liberals thought, not only because they were frequent policy dissenters and relatively few in number, but also because he believed nothing could be done or at least nothing could be done without keeping true to his ideological principles. The truth is that even had Turner been PM then instead of Trudeau, Western Liberalism would remain moribund because most of the external – and internal problems were the major reason for their collapse – damage had occurred before Trudeau took office. Trudeau also despised Thatcher and years earlier, Manitoba’s Douglas Campbell, for running conservative governments which in his eyes were indistinguishable from Tories. In Campbell’s case, he had been well to the Tories’ right. More interesting were hints of change from two provinces with hitherto eternal governments: Alberta and Newfoundland and Labrador. Both had weakened in previous years, and in Strom’s case he was a relatively new premier. Smallwood, by contrast, was an institution who had won a massive landslide in his previous election. Yet he had also been weakened by Crosbie’s leadership challenge two years earlier, and Tories were salivating at the possibility of Joey’s defeat. If Smallwood lost, then Liberalism could be challenged anywhere. That was the theory anyways.


PIERRE SAUVÉ: In early May I met Charles Bronfman, Jack McConnell [Montreal Star publisher], and Ross Munro [Montreal Gazette publisher] for informal consultations. I knew McConnell and Munro, but it was my first time meeting Bronfman, who I liked instantly. They were somewhat concerned about Cardinal’s election as leader given his very nationalistic views. My argument was that Jean-Guy’s tone and demeanor sometimes exaggerated the words he was actually speaking, and that he would be as respectful of the Anglophone community as Daniel Johnson had been. They remained unconvinced, even as I reminded them that similar concerns had been voiced about Duplessis before the war. Overall Charles and Jack were more persuadable than Munro, who was quite agitated about language legislation. My response to him was that education could be somewhat flexible, but on the ultimate goal of francization there would be no compromise. Overall the meeting was useful if less productive than I had hoped. One trend which I noticed around this time was that on language, Allophone community leaders were somewhat more persuadable than Anglophone ones. We also discussed federal politics, where we all agreed that while the rose had dropped off Trudeau’s lapel, it remained to be seen whether Stanfield could sell himself as an alternative PM.



VINCENT LEMIEUX, UNIVERSITÉ LAVAL POLITICAL SCIENTIST: Despite the rhetoric from Quebec City and Ottawa, including the apocryphal “c’est la guerre” from Trudeau to Cardinal in a phone conversation during spring 1971, there would be no direct, open confrontation between the federal Liberals and Union Nationale. Neither could persuade Quebecers to vote en masse for their respective allies, which both leaders knew perfectly well. Neither Trudeau nor Cardinal was interested in bargaining over fundamentally irreconcilable policy differences, so the cold war between both governments was set to continue until one or both was defeated. Moreover, Cardinal had no personal interest in federal politics, almost uniquely among Unionist leaders, and only very reluctantly allowed his ministers who did to work with the federal Tories. Clement Vincent once described the process to me as like pulling teeth, except more excruciating. Cardinal’s weakness was not that he delegated too much, rather that he lacked instincts of his own and often seemed like he was following rather than forging political leads. The exceptions to this rule were on language and national issues, as opposed to socioeconomic ones. It was very fortunate for the Union Nationale that Cardinal’s instincts on language proved absolutely correct, for without them the party could have easily been vulnerable to PQ attacks.


TIMMINS: There wasn’t much to say about the NDP’s Saskatchewan victory other than its inevitability. In reality local factors were almost entirely why Blakeney won, not that the opposition parties cared much about such nuance. They were far more interested in Alberta and Newfoundland, given their historic importance. In Alberta a PC victory would mean a centrist government replacing a right-wing dynasty, which is why many right-wing Tories hoped for a Socred victory. In Quebec, Unionists privately voiced similar sentiments, though they were ambivalent on Newfoundland since they had always enjoyed excellent relations with Smallwood. Federally, Caouette was steaming mad after Trois-Rivieres, daring the Unionists to challenge his MPs directly. While many senior Unionists were eager for such a battle, Cardinal was adamantly opposed to an open federal political battle which would consume significant resources if any success would be had. Nonetheless, it would be wrong to interpret the O-ring’s desire to eliminate Socred as affection for the PC Party, an organization they considered ideologically anathema. Sauvé, a lifelong PC supporter, was privately most outspoken on this point. Such disdain was reciprocated by Ontarian Red Tories who disliked the right-wing, openly machinist Union Nationale and its Albertan Socred cousin. The mutual disdain would eventually surface with serious political consequences, but in 1971 it remained subterranean as all focused on the joint goal of planning Trudeau’s dethronement.


MULRONEY: That summer, Levesque was the only leader planning on an active political season. He planned to unveil his party’s social democratic side with policies such as no-fault auto insurance, campaign finance reform, anti-strikebreaking laws and a more progressive tax system and a tuition freeze. His target was progressive nationalists disenchanted with a Liberal Party led by one of their own, Pierre Laporte. While Grit progressiveness was not in doubt, left-wing nationalists were dismayed by Laporte’s refusal to aggressively promote such causes. Levesque believed that not only was Laporte harming the progressive cause but he was inadvertently contributing to the political apathy which helped sustain Unionist momentum. If the Liberals would not pick a policy fight and wage a protracted argument, swing voters would see no reason to disrupt the blue status quo. Privately, Levesque believed his old friend had been coopted by the Liberal establishment that disdained bold progressivism and especially campaign finance reform. The latter was a subject on which the frontbench of both major parties had long agreed not to disturb the essentially wide-open status quo. Nonetheless, that summer saw auto insurance as the main PQ plank, as something easily saleable to voters across the political spectrum.
 
Nice update.

Good mention of Ross Thatcher. As you probably know, his son, Colin went to jail for murdering his ex-wife JoAnn in the 1980s...
 
GAGNON: For once the PLQ decided to be proactive and pre-empt Levesque during the quiet summer of 1971 by pushing hard for a no-fault insurance policy. Laporte decided to overrule the concerns of moderate Liberals, especially small-town lawyers for whom such work was a crucial part of their caseload. It was a policy argument they prepared all summer to make when the National Assembly resumed that fall. On its part, the government was happy to bash the Liberals as anti-rural while exploiting divisions in the Liberal caucus. Their own policy initiative that summer was streamlining the professional credentials system to allow easier access for immigrants. Bertrand believed too many professional associations were guilty of “guild-like” behaviour, which left credentialed immigrants underemployed. In reality, he, Sauvé and the associations preferred a negotiated settlement which would preserve self-regulation in return for accepting an improved retraining scheme. Under threat of legislation, the bar and various medical associations agreed to amend their internal regulations. Another bill being prepared that summer was Bill 211, the Employment Rights Act, which prohibited discrimination on the basis of gender, race, religion and other human rights criteria. It had been promised by both parties in the previous election and was assured of unanimous passage after a brief debate.



LEMIEUX: One question which the ERA didn’t address was the fact that women in provincial politics at that time could be counted on one hand. There were only two female MNAs, both Liberal backbenchers. Claire Kirkland-Casgrain had been the Lesage-era exception, who had now retired. It was more difficult for the Union Nationale because of that party’s notoriously masculine culture, though more women would be elected starting in 1974 as older members began to retire. 1974 was also when the first non-white MNA would be elected, the Unionist Guy Ingres in Saint-Marie. Of course it was more difficult for Unionists to elect non-Francophones because that demographic was mostly Liberal and Anglophones almost monolithically Liberal as rural Anglophone communities shrivelled and died. Running an Anglophone in a Francophone riding could be a delicate situation, as far back as Compton in 1954 when Duplessis had personally appointed an Anglophone Unionist candidate. That was the last time an Anglophone held that majority-Francophone riding. As various community groups began to arise in provincial politics, these questions took on further importance. Best-organized were the Italian and Greek communities, clearly anticipating the impact language legislation might have on their educational institutions. Both enjoyed friendly relations with the Unionists and Liberals even as most of their rank-and-file voted Liberal.


MULRONEY: It was early August when I began impressing upon Bob Stanfield the necessity of successful constitutional talks for both national unity and political purposes. In other words, he would have to bring the Constitution home from London. It would take time and effort, but with Fulton-Favreau as a baseline I felt we had a reasonable chance of success. He was very open to the idea on the condition that talks not begin in a minority parliament given its inherent instability. There were no premiers implacably opposed to Quebec’s demands, and the Liberal Party’s centralist wing as represented by Trudeau would be irrelevant out of power. Trudeau’s likeliest would-be successors disagreed with him on this question, which would provoke an open split within their caucus. Politically, Stanfield had a chance for the history books regardless of whatever else he could accomplish as PM. At the time many English Canadian eyes were focused on Alberta, where history was about to be made. Stanfield and I welcomed a potential PC victory, though we had no personal problems with Strom’s Socreds. It was the right-wing Tories who loathed and feared a PC government. Pierre Sauvé told me “1960 all over again if Lougheed wins”, a narrative which Alberta Tories themselves would implicitly promote.



TIM PAULSON, HISTORIAN, AUTHOR OF SINGING THE BLUES: Lougheed’s Alberta victory was mostly a local affair, but in 1971 there was considerable comment about how Lougheed and Davis were the Tory future. The BC Socreds had little interest in federal politics and though Bennett’s premiership was coming to an end, the dynasty would endure later. It was the Union Nationale which realized the potential of moving their federal ally rightward through personnel changes. With minimal Tory infrastructure and an absolute necessity for Unionist support to elect Tory MPs, in practice Unionist MNAs selected Tory candidates in their own conservative ideological mold. All 6 Tory Quebec MPs were right-wingers, a pattern which deepened over time. In 1971 this was relatively insignificant because of their small number. Nor were senior Tories overly concerned about it, indeed Stanfield welcomed ideological diversity. For his part, when he was first elected, Lougheed was not terribly interested in similar Albertan Tory activities. In later years he would change his mind on that subject, especially in Calgary and Edmonton. Bill Davis would always remain aloof from such matters, saying that if he wanted to manage federal Tory candidacies he would run for the federal leadership. Such tactics dated to the Union Nationale’s founding: Duplessis had run Tories as ALN candidates in 1935, a key factor in the merger’s quick success.



TIMMINS: In his first months as premier, Cardinal had gone from underdog or underhanded, depending on your view, winner to a cool and capable leader. That did not mean his serious weaknesses disappeared, if anything they magnified over time. Yet he had asserted control over the government and party without ruffling too many feathers, despite numerous retirement rumours floating around that fall. While he did not want to purge the party, Cardinal wanted to end the intraparty tension which had been dormant since 1965. His staunchest ally, Paul Dozois, had already given notice that this legislature would be the last of which he was a member. Dozois and Maurice Bellemare would be Cardinal’s chief collaborators in this endeavour. In practice this meant easing out Bertrand and several of his more ardent followers, who by 1971 did not represent nearly as much of the party as they once did. Bertrand’s leadership loss was only the first step towards the retaking of ideological leadership by the right-wing alliance. Cardinal did not share all his allies’ economic convictions, which is why apart from budgetary politics he did little to attack his Liberal predecessors’ economic legacy. At any rate, the government’s long-term policy planning was almost entirely consumed by language and cultural issues. Killing the PQ was their political objective and no stone would be left unturned in the Unionist quest to asphyxiate their upstart rival.



BEAULIEU: Perhaps the only time where Trudeau engaged in extended negotiations with us came in October when Lapointe’s year-long extension as Lieutenant-Governor reached the halfway point. After lengthy negotiations, he agreed to appoint Paul Beaulieu as Lapointe’s replacement effective May 1972. There was little to gain for Trudeau in starting a political hot war over the lieutenant-governorship, an office which he cared little about – as did Cardinal. It was a relief to all of us that Lapointe, whom none of us liked, would be gone soon. We were thrilled to have Paul back with us, if in a more exalted capacity than previously. To the generation which had not served with Duplessis or had a connection to him, it was a mark of continuity with our previous government. More importantly, he had always been widely respected across the political spectrum. One of his conditions for returning was a slightly higher ceremonial role for him, which had been steadily reduced by premiers starting with Duplessis, who had run most minor functions himself. Jean-Guy, privately a republican, acceded only because it was Paul, as he made very clear to anyone who asked. In future, viceregal prominence would continue to fluctuate depending on the premier’s personal preferences rather than convention.
 
TURNER: Trudeau was very ambiguous about the possibility of Smallwood losing, given that while Joey had always been a strong supporter of the PM’s, he also represented an older style of Liberalism which Trudeau disdained. This was somewhat ironic since Smallwood, like Trudeau, had been a socialist in his youth. Unlike Trudeau, he had moved considerably rightward over the years and the Tories were now seen as change agents. On balance he was sad to see Smallwood probably gone, since he had always remained loyal to the federal party and Trudeau personally. His Unionist foes in Quebec were simply immutable, a fact of life which had to be dealt with as required. That fall was one of the quietest in my career, with a daily routine to follow and not much legislation being crafted. Everyone seemed to be marking time, which made me reflect on my career. After a decade in Parliament, I felt now was an ideal time to reassess. If we were simply going to small-ball government for the foreseeable future, then I wanted no part of that. Ultimately I decided to stay, a decision which I have never regretted. The things we were doing, like Opportunities for Youth and enhanced pensions, had little interest for me. One thing which escaped attention at the time was how Mackasey’s employment package would become prohibitively costly if unemployment rose above 5%, a point I futilely argued in Cabinet.


MULRONEY: In late October, just after Frank Moores edged past Joey Smallwood in Newfoundland, there was a secret meeting of the Prairie caucus called by Jack Horner to criticize Stanfield’s leadership. Horner didn’t respect Stanfield, thinking him a wimp and a socialist who didn’t care about Western values. He saw no values in a “Liberal-lite” party that would impress our core voters, especially in domestic policy. There was no revolt as such, but the media coverage hurt us just as voters began to give Bob another look. Stanfield calmed things later by laying down the gauntlet, but he never fully regained the confidence of his Western members. For my part I sympathized largely with Stanfield on both policy and politics, but recommended he include at least one of their domestic policy items in our platform as an olive branch. The party’s basic ideological direction and leadership should be decided at convention, not in caucus meetings. On Oct. 30, I called Maurice Bellemare to ask if he would reconsider the veto imposed on Claude Wagner’s candidacy by Johnson in 1969. He refused, saying that no candidate affiliated with the PLQ – Claude being a provincial Liberal - would get UN support. Stanfield was annoyed but there was nothing we could do: winning government required a beachhead only attainable with Unionist support.


SAUVE: To me the Wagner question was one of basic self-respect. It would be absurd to say that someone who had vocally opposed us provincially was somehow now deserving of our support. Our voters would have laughed us off their doorstep or worse. Wagner was a lifelong provincial Grit who had been one of their star Cabinet ministers. As I joked to Brian, don’t piss on my leg and tell me it’s raining. What I did do was find a capable Tory candidate for my own riding of Argenteuil-Deux-Montagnes: Université de Montreal economist Marie Boivin, whom I had known for many years and was a fellow native of Saint-Eustache. Marie was not only very practical but also politically intuitive, which was rare for first-time PC candidates in Quebec. I promised her whatever support she needed, and like Yves I could not make any public appearances on her behalf for fairly obvious reasons. We knew her Liberal opponent would be Francis Fox, a Montrealer who had no connection to the riding and would thus be fairly easy to portray as a carpetbagger. We were fairly confident she could win so long as Stanfield’s platform was as Quebec-friendly as it had been four years earlier. Localization would be impossible in a general election. Nor was I under any illusions my personal imprimatur might be decisive: my father had publicly endorsed Tory candidates twice and they had lost.



TIMMINS: One plan Cardinal circulated in fall 1971 was to end the party’s newspaper, Montréal-Matin, and fold it into Péladeau’s Journal de Montréal. His reasoning was that contemporary voters would be better swayed by a mass media outlet rather than a party organ with declining circulation. He encountered stiff resistance from many ministers who felt it was too soon for such a decision, though none of them objected on principle. The paper had never lacked financing when the party was in government. Maurice Bellemare spoke for most when he said that the money spent on Montréal- Matin would be better used on outside consultants, a longstanding federal fixture which had not yet fully entered provincial politics. Apart from polling, outside consultancy was still foreign to Quebec politics. Once both parties chose new leaders, then consultancy would flourish almost overnight. Cardinal disliked consultancy partially because it highlighted his excessive dependence on advice for a premier, particularly in the top-heavy Union Nationale. Another reason was because the long-term political situation seemed quite stable, and with a highly experienced team there would be little need for outside advice. At a meeting with the party executive on November 12, Cardinal agreed to shelve indefinitely his plan for Montréal-Matin’s disappearance. That same day, he began preliminary discussions of federal election plans, since the Unionist brain trust mistakenly expected a summer election.


GAGNON: If I could describe 1971 politics in a word, it would be mundane. Nothing of lasting consequence emerged from the UN or PLQ, and both were merely waiting on future events. The government was waiting for Gendron to report, while the Liberals were promoting causes which many voters were only mildly interested in. This was partially their leaders’ natural caution and partially because Cardinal had no interest in pushing policy boundaries outside his cultural comfort zone. Moreover, to build a lasting government, he believed that voters’ passion should only carefully be excited lest they be unsatisfied. I wrote then, and still believe, that such a strategy is cynical, unnecessary and demeaning to the voters’ intellect. Cardinal grew quite flustered when I said that is what happened to the St. Laurent Liberals, ultimately stagnating and losing power as voters craved something new after a long period of staleness. An obsessive focus on security had bred restlessness, a lesson which subsequent governments of both parties would take to heart. Cardinal and some of his ministers were dismissive when their own pollsters put it to them, arrogance which eventually cost them deeply. Maurice Bellemare was one of those who disagreed with Cardinal, as did the entire O-ring along with Masse. Duplessis’ government had been buzzing with political and policy activity, as those who had served in it knew well.
 
BEAULIEU: Around the time we were doing final budget preparations, I met with various industry leaders to discuss the Gendron Commission, which would report in May. Our plan was for a summer of consultations before legislation would be tabled that fall. Many companies based in-province were open to a hearing, if highly skeptical. Outsiders were almost unanimously opposed and I was unable to persuade them to even keep an open mind. If they hoped such pressure would change our mind, they were delusional. At least for me, it reinforced the need for a comprehensive francization regime. Voluntary or a moderately regulated regime would face strict resistance. We were all cognizant of the economic consequences but believed a newer economy would arise to replace what had left. As time passed, younger generations would accept what would simply be political reality as they had always known it. I would be the minister responsible, while Pierre [Sauvé] would be our pitch man to non-Francophones. Such legislation had been first proposed by the PQ in 1970, but we would be the ones to enact a regime and thus obtain credit. The Liberals would be deeply divided along linguistic and nationalist/federalist lines, even if Laporte himself strongly supported francization. During their last years in government, Laporte and his left-wing colleagues had succeeded in pushing Lesage away from his previously voluntarist position. We expected similar Grit fireworks this time.


TIMMINS: Government consultations on Gendron were much more successful with the Allophone than Anglophone communities. No one had forgotten St-Leonard, and the government had learnt the lesson of consultation from that near-fiasco. Sauvé and Beaulieu won Cabinet approval to float alternate models which nonetheless complied with educational provisions, especially in the Greek and Italian communities. Their final form would be discussed until the legislation was drafted, but overall their proposals received a cordial reception. We decided to hold off on more consultations with the Anglophone community, and in the end our consultations were mostly public rather than private. There was no point in knocking when no one was home. I heard from federal Tories that they were worried about it helping Trudeau in English Canada, concerns which were breezily dismissed by my Unionist contacts. Leaving policy aside, the government was on a search-and-destroy mission and would brook no distraction from its mission to eliminate the PQ. Even the even-tempered Maurice Bellemare dismissed Tory concerns as “typical bed wetting.” At an absolute maximum, legislation would be fully enacted within a year – that is winter 1973. Cardinal did not want an excessively protracted debate which would create space for “nitpicking” and undermine what he believed would be his primary legacy as premier.


MULRONEY: Our focus was on Ontario rather than Quebec, since only a sizeable victory there could deliver us government. In February we were polling about 10 points behind the Grits, not ideal but not irreversible either. Stanfield believed that once the writ campaign started, voters would give us a close-up and decide that sobriety was needed after four years of Trudeau. We would also have considerable assistance from Bill Davis, who promised to do everything he could for us. Davis did not select candidates like the Unionists did, but he and his team advised us on how to best match candidate with community. In Quebec we hoped for only 3-4 more MPs due to scarce opportunities. I felt somewhat uncomfortable putting so many eggs in the Ontarian basket, but there was no alternative and it was both familiar and friendly terrain. Our intelligence told us that the Liberals had not made much progress on campaign planning. If anything, they expected their lead to grow once Trudeau turned on the charm and coast to another comfortable majority. It was an atmosphere quite unlike today where the parties are at constant electoral readiness and always preparing for whatever may come next. Later that month I advised Stanfield to leave the language question alone until Cardinal tabled his bill and we could craft talking points for English Canada.



SAUVÉ: English Canada’s ballot question in 1972 was simple: who would be seen by Ontarians as a better economic manager? Language at either level of government was a minor factor outside certain regional pockets, as much as irresponsible journalists liked to portray some sort of regionally based linguistic cold war. Brian, Claude and everyone else in the Quebec wing did a fabulous job in the pre-writ, so much so that Stanfield gave them a measure of autonomy from the national campaign on messaging. Organizationally we were of course still in charge. Mme Boivin’s campaign was run by my people, as was Claire Malraux’s in Trois-Rivières and a couple of others who didn’t have a trusted team in place. What galled me about Ontarians who affected concern about language legislation is that they didn’t say a word about Bill Davis denying full funding to Catholic schools. How would that affect their attempts to woo the Francophone diaspora? Davis helped Stanfield far more than we did, yet I did not hear a peep about his initiative from English-language reporters. Fortunately, none of us fielded linguistic questions from out of province in the lead-up to Gendron’s tabling. Stanfield later told Maurice Bellemare that he understood our concerns and was grateful for the linguistic advice.


GAGNON: 1972’s budget, one of the Cardinal government’s most popular ones, contained tax rebates for home renovations and child fitness and was well-received by economists and suburban voters. They also announced the creation of an environment ministry with moderate as its minister. This was mostly window dressing given how central the resource industry is to Unionism, with their environmental policy focused on conservation. Aboriginals and private sector unions would be assiduously courted as development partners, culminating in the James Bay Accord of 1975. In one backbencher’s words, this budget was a “sugar pill” before Gendron became the predominant, if not only, policy debate. Dozois and most of the Cabinet were adamantly opposed to a Swiss cheese tax code, and made clear they would block any attempt at further credits. From their point of view, it made far more sense to continue their current path and reduce overall rates. Personal income tax rates were reduced slightly, but remained essentially unchanged from the previous year. Payroll taxes would remain untouched for his entire premiership. The positive budget attention translated into a further popularity bump for the government, which was now polling nearly 20% ahead of the Liberals. Laporte had become much more vocal during the budget debate, and thereafter did whatever he could to inject himself into the news.
 
MULRONEY: That April, I asked Bob [Stanfield] to consider meeting our Unionist allies, the so-called O-ring. It would be preceded by a courtesy call on Cardinal. Bob readily agreed to my proposal, and the meeting was set for the 6th. Cardinal was pleasant but distant, telling us that successful constitutional talks were the only policy which could shatter Liberal dominance and ensure a truly competitive playing field. He did, however, praise Deux Nations and Bob’s “respectful, flexible” approach to the province. Our meeting was far more successful. Bellemare and Vincent led off by promising full assistance in their ridings, and urged us to include at least one “big, bold” policy which would be emblematic of a Stanfield government. Pierre [Sauvé] suggested free trade with the US or a substantial defence procurement with the factories located in Quebec. Either one would be a “game-changer” in his words. Bob said both were desirable in principle, but could only be pursued in government. Clement suggested rephrasing it to a defence buildup, and to that Bob agreed. In our subsequent discussion, Bob agreed to Pierre’s request for an immigration and manpower deal which would concede Quebec significant powers in selecting their immigrants. Such a deal was a no-brainer for us from both a provincial rights and cultural standpoint, which is why the request was almost pro forma.


TIMMINS: On April 26, Beaulieu announced that the Gendron Commission would table its report in exactly one month. Once it was deposited, the remaining session would be devoted to debate before summer drafting began. The Liberals were debating supporting the legislation while offering amendments to loosen some anticipated provisions. This was insufficient for their Anglophone and hard federalist members, who wanted to oppose the educational provisions while supporting workplace legislation. Laporte adamantly refused to consider this for both policy reasons - being an ardent cultural nationalist – and political reasons, since it would give the government a slam dunk to tar them as anti-national Ottawa puppets. Intraparty debate grew so intense that at times certain members came nearly to blows. René Lévesque wholeheartedly supported the proposed legislation while criticizing the lengthy process and reminding voters that Johnson had been opposed to comprehensive legislation. Given the PQ’s marginal status, such criticisms were not likely to resonate with voters. As Cardinal told me, the fleur-de-lysé’s adoption had followed a very similar pattern. It had been proposed by [nationalist gadfly] René Chaloult but adopted as their own by the Duplessis government and became the foremost symbol of Unionist nationalism. As a bonus, there would be open war among their opponents, which had not been the case a quarter-century earlier.



GARNEAU: Personally I supported language legislation with possible amendments. No one who had any extensive contact with certain elements in the business community, especially finance, could deny that a regulatory regime was needed. Anything voluntary would be completely useless. That was the point I made in caucus, as did Laporte. It was one of the most intense periods of my career, and there were times when I feared some colleagues might come to blows given the emotional subject. Opposing legislation was politically fatal, and our Anglophone voters would vote for us regardless. That sounds a bit cynical but it is true. Pierre said he would handle Trudeau’s expected vocal opposition and we were to make the case in our ridings. What concerned many Liberals, including Claude Ryan, was how deeply the government might propose to limit freedom of expression. For the Union Nationale, authoritarian governance has always been a feature, not a bug, and they always wrapped themselves in the banner of collective rights. In a Shadow Cabinet shuffle, Pierre appointed me language critic in addition to the finance portfolio I already held; confident I could handle a dual burden. He reassured me that with the budget enacted, I could spend most of my time on language.



GAGNON: The Gendron Report was released on May 26, and immediately became provincial politics’ sole debated policy issue. It recommended a comprehensive francization regime throughout the public sphere, including business, education, municipalities, signage, among others. All parties welcomed its publication, and Gendron himself would be appointed as a permanent advisor to the Minister of Cultural Affairs, Mario Beaulieu. Cardinal announced that legislation would be drafted during the summer for tabling in the fall sitting. It was a collaborative project between many ministries: Education, Culture, Industry and Immigration. Beaulieu’s department would draft while the others helped guide Beaulieu through stakeholder shoals. While Justice played their usual supervisory role, it was done by senior civil servants rather than Bertrand himself, who played little part in the language debate. He did not really agree with what was proposed but like all caucus members, had to vote yes. Moreover his personal relations with two of those ministers [Sauvé and Beaulieu] were abysmal to the point where they could barely stand to be in the same room. Bertrand would play important roles in other policy debates, but his political standing continued its long, slow decline since 1970 during this period. In interviews he was defensive and often petulant, though never losing his temper. I did hear from male colleagues whom he called to regularly complain about a political status which was largely his own creation.



SAUVÉ: My work on the language legislation, which at that time was titled Bill 209, was helping with immigrant integration on the policy side and selling it to skeptical Anglos and Allophones politically. As I suspected, my generation and those younger were easier to sell regardless of mother tongue. I appeared at as many public forums as my personal schedule – at the time my kids were toddlers - would allow in June and July. This was not public consultation in the strictest sense but rather public Q&A to dispel myths which were already circulating. One beat I had to myself was the Anglophone media, especially the Star and CJAD. These discussions were almost unanimously respectful, though often spirited. The closest we got to an endorsement was in the Italian and Greek community press which praised us for working on a mutual accommodation for schooling. French language media, with the notable exception of Claude Ryan, was foursquare in support. Ryan was an implacable opponent but also our leading intellectual adversary, a loyal adversary in the best sense of that term. Cardinal would personally meet Ryan and the Le Devoir editorial board, not even Mario [Beaulieu] could be trusted in that room. Needless to say Ryan remained unconvinced and his criticism would grow even harsher once we tabled our bill that fall. As I joked, some things never changed, like Le Devoir being our harshest media critic.



CANADIAN GALLUP POLL, JUNE 1972


IF A FEDERAL ELECTION WERE HELD TODAY, WHICH PARTY'S CANDIDATE DO YOU THINK YOU WOULD FAVOUR?


LIBERAL: 38.9%
PC: 33.2%
NDP: 16.1%
SOCRED: 4.2%
CREDITISTE: 2.4%
 
If the PCs completely absorbed the Social Credit parties, which probably won't happen, they'd only have 39.8 per cent, and I'm not sure if that's enough to remove Trudeau completely. They need to start eating into either the Liberals or the NDP.

Who knows, maybe the NDP would be open to a coalition or supply & support agreement.
 
PAULSON: July was a quiet month for everyone but the federal parties, who were all preparing for the fall campaign. Trudeau had decided on an October poll with the final date to be decided in August. He did not want any August campaigning, and was utterly confident of another majority government. While there had been poll slippage in recent months he felt it would disappear once voters started paying attention. The Tories had been preparing for months and had the Big Blue Machine at their disposal in Ontario, with Unionist assistance in Quebec. Yet another domino was due to fall, in BC, where Bennett was now seen as a cranky old man from a time warp. The BC Socreds supported their federal counterparts, yet if forced to choose preferred Tories over Grits. Yet both major parties were losing media attention to David Lewis’ NDP, whose criticism of “corporate welfare bums” resonated among working-class voters and urban progressives disappointed in what they saw as Trudeau’s Liberalism-as-usual. For obvious reasons the Tories were gleeful at Lewis’ criticisms of former CCF activist Trudeau, though ironically Stanfield, like Trudeau, was also an ex-socialist. The Creditistes were hunkering down, hoping to retain what they already had and repel any Unionist probes in their direction.

BEAULIEU: I spent my July with my senior officials overseeing the drafting process for what would become known as the French Language Charter. It was an intense process involving 5 ministries and a handful of outside experts. Our instructions were to fully implement the report, and once the legislation was enacted my department would be responsible for administration. A comprehensive regulatory regime was what we were doing rather than piecemeal legislation as had been suggested by several moderates in our caucus. In Cardinal’s words, the time was ripe to rip off the band-aid. All our internal surveys showed overwhelming support for what we were planning, which was confirmed by public polling. Strictest secrecy had to be maintained lest a political firestorm erupt before we were fully prepared to rebut critics. The Liberal caucus was a total train wreck from what I gathered, with 2 or 3 different viewpoints having at least a handful of members in support. Eventually they would be whipped yet the private dissidence leaked into numerous media outlets, especially Le Devoir and the Star, which gleefully attacked them. The PQ was wholly supportive, only asking why we had not acted sooner. We all firmly believed that once we enacted the Charter, most PQ support would come to us. What was left would go to the Liberals led by a progressive nationalist.

TURNER: August was spent on final pre-election preparations, with nearly continuous meetings of the Cabinet’s political committee. After some discussion, Trudeau told us that he had decided on an October 24 poll. That would give us plenty of time to adapt to whatever came our way on the campaign trail. More importantly, Trudeau did not like short writ periods. So Oct. 24 it would be, and we went to work examining the platform which our policy division had spent 4 months crafting. Individually there was much to like, but I thought an overarching theme was lacking. If anything it was infrastructure and unemployment, hardly themes to excite voters. I told Trudeau his proposed “The Land Is Strong” slogan was absurd, given economic realities at the time. We all remembered how voters had punished us 15 years earlier for painting a false economic picture, and I thought it would revive memories best left alone. Trudeau disagreed, as did a majority of Cabinet. All our efforts would be focused in Ontario and BC, leaving the Maritime MPs to run on their record with our Quebec caucus secure. Trudeau did not want to waste resources blasting away at Unionist forces playing defenCe when every penny was needed elsewhere. As for the NDP, Trudeau would handle them personally.

GAGNON: The Tories hoped for 10 ridings, holding their additional 6 plus 4 more. Bellemare angrily retorted that at best, they could hope for 8. Argenteuil-Deux-Montagnes and Chicoutimi would be overseen by their respective MNAs, Pierre Sauvé and Jean-Noel Tremblay. As in Trois-Rivieres, suppression of Socred votes was their key objective. Both men planned campaign pranks to play on the Grit candidates, Francis Fox in Argenteuil –Deux-Montagnes and MP Paul Langlois in Chicoutimi. It would be a high-spirited, classic affair more in provincial than federal traditions. For their part the Socreds were far better prepared than a year earlier and furious at what they saw as betrayal of the cold peace. Cardinal and the Unionist leadership believed Socred was a dying movement which by that point was almost entirely a Caouette personality cult. Once he was gone, they could finish off their erstwhile rival. Cardinal personally paid little attention to the federal election, being monomaniacal on the language charter and letting his team act as they saw fit so long as expense rules were rigorously observed. One reason why so few businessmen chose to apply was because of potential federal retribution against major businesses by pulling contracts. Moreover, the Unionists and Tories both preferred local campaigns on local issues given the policy hurdles Stanfield faced in Quebec.

TIMMINS: Trudeau went to Rideau Hall on Sept. 1 to seek dissolution of Parliament for an Oct. 24 election. Both parties were well-financed, well-organized and confident of victory. Dave Barrett’s landslide victory over the legendary Wacky Bennett in BC boosted NDP hopes in that province, while Trudeau had no provincial ally outside the Atlantic Provinces. Stanfield’s campaign would be all about the economy, especially inflation and unemployment. Trudeau would be painted as arrogant and incompetent economically. Foreign and defence policy were not as high-profile as Tories outside Ontario would have liked, because Stanfield did not want to damage Ontarian chances by aggressively challenging anti-Americanism among certain elements of that electorate. Nonetheless, Stanfield had Bill Davis’ complete support and like Frost before him, he happily shared stages with the federal leader. His defence proposals were pitched at manufacturing ridings which might otherwise be reluctant to consider voting Tory. In Quebec Stanfield‘s top campaign personnel, Claude Dupras and Brian Mulroney, left logistics in the capable hands of their Unionist allies. Early September was essentially that campaign’s phony war, with duelling headlines and not much poll movement. Trudeau had refused Stanfield’s offer to debate, partially because he felt it was unnecessary but also because the previous format had been so distasteful. While neither Stanfield nor Lewis disagreed with Trudeau on format, they both felt it important that the country hear them debate the issues. They wanted a debate without Trudeau, but CTV and Global rebuffed them.


CANADIAN GALLUP POLL, SEPT. 26-28, 1972


IF A FEDERAL ELECTION WERE HELD TODAY,WHICH PARTY’S CANDIDATE DO YOU THINK YOU WOULD FAVOUR?

LIBERAL: 41.1%
PC: 31.4%
NDP: 18.3%
CREDITISTE: 1.7%
SOCIAL CREDIT: 3.8%


Liberal Leader Pierre Trudeau laughs it up in Charlottetown, Sept. 22, 1972.


George_S_Zimbel_Pierre_Eliot_Trudeau_PEI_1972_19721999_3468_41.jpg





PC Leader Robert Stanfield is interviewed on Montreal's CJAD, Sept. 24, 1972.


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NEWMAN: That first week of October was when the Phony War ended, as voters began to pay more attention to opposition criticism of Trudeau’s mismanagement. Moreover the economy was sour as inflation soared and deficits rose. Many of Trudeau’s legislative initiatives, especially on foreign investment and most prominently the White Paper, had failed miserably due to intraparty opposition. Ironically the Liberal platform’s focus on unemployment and infrastructure highlighted their own failings, making Stanfield’s task easier. Lewis quipped that Trudeau was a living proof of Einstein’s definition of insanity. His criticisms of corporate welfare hurt Trudeau in Ontario and BC, while the Big Blue Machine’s legions fell upon unsuspecting Liberal MPs like bees on honey. Tory numbers soared in Ontario and inched upwards in BC throughout those first two weeks. Stanfield now had the momentum going into the final stretch, and both sides expected a very close outcome. Perhaps as close as or closer than 1957’s federal election. Trudeau had adamantly resisted a pre-election spending blitz, but now authorized the spending spree he had resisted weeks earlier. In Quebec Trudeau overrode his advisors and ordered a spending barrage in Tory-held seats which were easily repulsed by a Unionist counterattack. Perhaps the ultimate media insult was when the Star endorsed Stanfield, having been highly impressed by his platform.


SAUVÉ: The final week is always a mixture of serenity at the final stage of GOTV and anxiety about the outcome, especially in those days when internal polling was not as reliable as today. I was confident Marie would win, our attacks on Fox had resonated and he was unaware of the ad buys on his behalf. This is a riding where people want to know their candidate, which they didn’t in Fox’s case. Marie embarrassed him at the debate when he had some difficulty when asked about local issues. I told Marie she should expect to win by 4-6% depending on turnout, barring a last-minute shakeup. Trudeau was clearly defensive and the Socreds had little organization in this riding. Having elected a Tory MP only two cycles previously, there was no problem with the party label as was the case in many parts of the province then. Marie and I both enjoyed the campaign immensely, and I told Brian of my hopes that she would be in either Cabinet or Shadow Cabinet soon enough. In the meantime we had tabled Bill 209, which was undergoing first reading in the campaign’s final week. Brian and I both felt a 1957 elixir in the air, and were fairly confident we could win a minority.



CANADIAN GALLUP POLL, OCT. 18-20, 1972
IF A FEDERAL ELECTION WERE HELD TODAY, WHICH PARTY DO YOU THINK YOU WOULD FAVOUR?


LIBERAL: 36.3%
PC: 36.1%
NDP: 17.2%
CREDITISTE: 1.4%
SOCRED: 2.5%




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PAULSON: As jubilant Tories partied across the country, Pierre Trudeau announced that not only was he conceding defeat but was resigning immediately as both Liberal leader and MP for Mount Royal. He had accepted the voters’ verdict and privately admitted he had underestimated Stanfield. This threw the Liberal Party into a state of immediate confusion, as they named Mitchell Sharp interim leader in preparation for a leadership convention. Stanfield’s minority was stronger than Diefenbaker’s two, and the Socreds would support him as needed despite hard feelings. Caouette had been angry at Tory advances in Quebec, where they had held their current seats and gained both Argenteuil-Deux-Montagnes and Chicoutimi. Yet ideologically he was closer to the Tories and was used to working with them. Moreover Stanfield’s defence plans might find NDP votes for manufacturing votes. Senior Tories believed the Liberal left would resist an attempt by Blue Liberals to retake leadership, given NDP performance and dislike of Turner. Stanfield’s immediate focus was on Cabinet-building in preparation for a November 7 transition. He had a strong lineup to choose from. Erik Nielsen would become Deputy Prime Minister, Marcel Lambert Minister of Finance, Heath Macquarrie Minister of Foreign Affairs, among others. The 21st Canadian Ministry, to use its official title, was sworn in by Governor-General Michener on Nov. 7. Stanfield decided that the 29th Parliament would not convene until January, to give his caucus and Cabinet time to learn or remember the ropes. A few days later, Mitchell Sharp announced that the Liberal leadership convention would be held in May.


21st Canadian Ministry - Stanfield Cabinet


Deputy Prime Minister: Erik Nielsen
Employment: Lincoln Alexander
Fisheries: Lloyd Crouse
Agriculture: Harold Danforth
Public Works: Walter Dinsdale
Justice: Robert Fairweather
Defence: Michael Forrestal
Environment: John Fraser
Secretary of State: Heward Grafftey
Energy: Alvin Hamilton
Transport: Jack Horner
Veterans Affairs: William Knowles
Finance: Marcel Lambert
Immigration: Howard Lundrigan
Indian and Northern Affairs: Erik Nielsen
Solicitor General: Elmer MacKay
Communications: Flora MacDonald
Foreign Affairs: Heath Macquarrie
Health: Paul Yewchuk
Treasury Board: Don Mazankowski
Labour: Jim McGrath
International Trade: Jack Murta
Revenue: William Ritchie


Government House Leader: Ged Baldwin
Chief Government Whip: Tom Bell
Government Senate Leader: Jacques Flynn

GAGNON: During the federal election debate had begun on Bill 209, the French Language Charter. Cardinal’s objective was to pass it by March, an objective he could easily attain with all the procedural tools at his disposal. His ultimate objective vis-a-vis the federal government was to sign a new constitution with special status for the province, among other provisions. In that way Johnson’s dream of equality would be met and the ultimate Unionist constitutional goal accomplished. Cardinal believed Stanfield and the premiers could devise an acceptable consensus without excessive rancour, once the Tories could win their ever-elusive majority. In the 1950s there had been a stalemate between St. Laurent and Duplessis over fundamentals, something Stanfield was determined to avoid. For his part, Cardinal wanted a “return to normalcy”, because he was preparing to phase out the residential school system starting in 1974. This was not known publicly until the following year, for he had instructed his ministers to assemble a plan in strictest secrecy. It would be a banner commitment in the next election manifesto. In late November Cardinal, along with Maurice Bellemare and Pierre Sauvé, met with Paul Bouchard and Paul Gouin, both of whom were ecstatic about Bill 209 and the government generally. It was more than anything symbolic of Unionist continuity, something which the party prized highly.


MULRONEY: After the election result, Bob asked if I’d consider running for Parliament at some point in the not too distant future. Enjoying my business career, I declined his offer, as well as one from Cardinal to run provincially. While I supported the Union Nationale provincially, it was not a party in which I could feel comfortable as an elected MNA or minister. There was not a single Anglophone Unionist MNA, which was unsurprising given demographics and the sensitivity of running Anglophones in a Francophone riding. As if to prove the futility, in 1966 John Lynch-Staunton had run and nearly lost his deposit. Our entire attention span was devoted to preparing for the new Parliament in January. With an experienced Cabinet this would be easier than some initially thought. That election was notable, among many other things, for the election of a precocious young man who was then the youngest-ever MP: Sean O’Sullivan of Hamilton-Wentworth, Dief’s former executive assistant. Bob told me that if Sean performed well enough, he could earn a promotion very quickly. Before Christmas, he intended to fly to London and Washington to meet Heath and Nixon, much as Pearson had done in 1963 to restore ruptured bilateral relations.
 
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Prime Minister Bob Stanfield is the biggest missed opportunity in Canadian political history. So happy you decided to fix that.
 
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