Égalité ou indépendance: a Canadian TL

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September 14, 1968
Quebec City, QC
5:32 PM
Legislative Assembly, Premier’s Office

Daniel Johnson was exhausted after the morning’s caucus meeting, feeling older than his 53 years. The Premier had been heavily pressured to compromise on a burning policy question which threatened Quebec’s fragile political environment. His concern was not really a Liberal Party which had never regained its footing since he defeated them in 1966, but a nationalist flank whose enthusiasms were reaching a fever pitch. Language was not a file Johnson felt the time was right to tackle, but the public felt quite differently. For months he had followed 100 North Montreal students become a province-wide flashpoint, a situation he deplored. Nonetheless, the premier’s advisors almost to a man believed that without his intervention, the party would be in grave political peril. Johnson himself remembered how in 1947 Maurice Duplessis had felt obliged to retract a right-to-work law due to ecclesiastical objections. He had been a 32-year-old freshman MLA and had never forgotten how his mentor had been forced into one of his career’s very few public concessions. It was this episode which the premier had in mind while conferring with his inner Cabinet that fateful day.

Jean Lesage, René Lévesque and Daniel Johnson in conversation, 1968.

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“At bottom, this is not a really grave problem because there are no more than 100 Italian students who must change from English to French schools.” Education Minister Jean-Guy Cardinal had been in Cabinet since his 1967 appointment to the Legislative Council, a body which was set to pass into history at year’s end. The 43-year-old academic was a newcomer to politics, a staunch nationalist who fervently believed in cultural integration. To him a compromise was not only good politics but good policy. The premier’s planned immigration reform was something Cardinal strongly supported. “It is not a question of numbers, but of rights” Johnson snapped, irritated that Cardinal had not taken the hint at caucus. Deputy Premier Jean-Jacques Bertrand was even more annoyed: “Fundamental rights are not to be toyed with”, he snarled. The justice minister’s opinion was that all Quebecers had absolute freedom of educational choice; something he wished Johnson would legislate and thus end this noxious debate. Finance Minister Paul Dozois’ view was closer to Cardinal’s even if he sympathized with Bertrand, his fellow federalist. “We need to compromise on St-Leo, the public’s too far gone for keeping English as their language of instruction. French as the language of instruction, increased dose of English as a second language, we try this as a district experiment. Would this require more than a ministerial decree, Jean-Jacques?” “I’ll have to confirm that with my department, but I do not think more would be required. “ While the 3 ministers debated, Johnson slipped into his conference room for a quick huddle with Maurice Bellemare. The veteran House leader confirmed that while members outside Montreal were uninterested in language, they overwhelmingly desired a speedy resolution. Johnson’s final decision would be announced at the next Cabinet meeting.

Education Minister Jean-Guy Cardinal holds a press conference, October 6, 1968.

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MARIO BEAULIEU, CHIEF OF STAFF TO DANIEL JOHNSON: That decision is one he never really forgave himself for making. Daniel had been as adamant in caucus or Cabinet as he had been with me, but ultimately he was persuaded when I said if we were doing this on immigration, it must be done on language. I never managed to persuade Daniel of the need for a comprehensive language law. One language debate was more than enough for him, and I don’t think his health – fragile as it always was in those days – would have held through such an intense debate. Ultimately the decision he made was correct, which even his antagonists on both sides will now admit.

PIERRE LAPORTE, CHIEF OPPOSITION WHIP: When we heard Johnson make that announcement, I believe it was October 5 [7], we were frankly astonished. Lesage was briefed extensively but refused to support the government. On other language matters like second language instruction we were in firm agreement. There were many Liberals, myself among them, who felt that the time of absolute choice was ending. Perhaps we were foolish to believe that this question could be dealt with in an environment of our choice – had St. Leonard not erupted there would have been another district. I have always felt sorry for the kids who became a political football through no fault of their own.
After Cardinal issued his decree October 6, St. Leonard’s crisis finally began to wane as the “100 Italians” reluctantly entered their high school, now a French-language institution. Tensions between Italian and French district parents would remain high for the rest of the 1968-9 school year as the language debate simmered at a lower level. Submerged by St. Leonard that fateful month was a political event which would have important repercussions for both the Union Nationale and Liberal parties, one which had been building for a year.

Language demonstration in St. Léonard, QC. (Sept. 26, 1968)

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“My only problem with the government’s proposal is its lack of universality.” René Lévesque's opinion of Cardinal‘s Decree 11051 was one shared by many nationalists of all political stripes. The former Liberal minister was deeply committed to Anglophone educational rights, so much so that he had enshrined it as a founding principle of his newly founded Parti Québécois. Nor had he been surprised at Liberal hedging on this question – he knew how divided his former caucus mates were. Lesage had opposed the government’s decision but said he would welcome an upcoming royal commission on language. For his part, Levesque believed Lesage’s stance was politically helpful for his infant party. Leftist nationalists had gotten Lesage’s 1967 message loud and clear, and now the Liberal leader would reap the whirlwind.

November 26
Quebec City
110 Grande Allee
Union Nationale HQ

“Exactly what I want to see, great work by all of you.” Johnson was relieved to see how well the party had been faring financially ever since he had tasked them with reorganization back in September. “$9.2 million and change, maybe we hit 1-0 by New Year’s.” Andre Lagarde, the UN’s chief organizer, was immensely proud of that haul. For the first time since 1960’s trauma they were approaching Duplessis-era fundraising levels with all the doors such sums opened. While a small donor base was a work very much in progress, Lagarde was confident such a base would be available by election time. “How has recruitment been going since our last talk?” “As well as expected. Jean and I are working on a couple of candidates for Liberal ridings – I have not gotten them quite to the interview stage for you yet but it’ll be done in January.” “Excellent, excellent. When they’re ready, let me know immediately. In the meantime I want that constituency report as Christmas reading, understand?” “Yes sir.”

MARIO CARDINAL: The end of 1968 was when the Legislative Council passed into history and the Legislative Assembly became the National Assembly. Both parties had committed to abolition at the previous election, but we had to give them quite undeserved compensation for that. All these mostly elderly gentlemen left public life. Our dilemma was finding a seat for M. Cardinal, who would now need to be in the Assembly. In exchange for guaranteeing its incumbent a future seat, I managed to place M. Cardinal in St. Hyacinthe – the by-election would be held in early March. For the interim he left Cabinet until his election. At that time we were all focusing on the budget and ensuring the CEGEPs were functioning properly in this first phase. The fiscal objective was making deeper cuts so we could reduce the suffocating Liberal tax burden – Daniel told Paul that he wanted room for tax cuts by election year. That we accomplished without much of a problem, especially after higher than expected resource revenues.

PIERRE-MARC JOHNSON: At the end of 1968 my father was more relaxed than he had been that entire year, as relaxed as he could be given his physical condition. He decided not to resume sitting until early February, officially because Paul [Dozois] needed more time on the budget but unofficially because he needed more rest. It had been a banner year for us politically even if my father still regretted his decision on St. Leonard. He worried he would be seen as unprincipled. He planned to visit Paris in the spring once budgeting had been dealt with. Over Christmas he told me the next project was broad-based tax cuts rather than boutique ones as some people in Finance had wanted. At the time our main focus was Levesque, since we did not know who would lead the Liberals in 1970 but mostly because they were hardly in fighting shape. The left wing had simmered down over that year but it was clear they wanted someone more sympathetic as Lesage’s successor – an error which would haunt them later.


Shout out to Brainbin, CT, Dan and Plumber for their help and encouragement.
 
January 10, 1969
Montreal
Windsor Hotel

Finance Minister Paul Dozois was very happy with his budget draft. Not only had he squeezed out a higher than expected surplus – roughly $150 million – but he had also found more resource revenue. Anti-inflation measures implemented over the previous year had gone well and the economy was performing strongly. This year, he hoped, would be one of consolidation rather than fiscal emergencies which had bedeviled the government for its first 2 years in office. “Here’s what we have so far. I managed to find room for most requests from the usual suspects.” At that Johnson smiled knowingly- some of his junior ministers were among the porkiest. “Great job as usual Popol. Maybe a flowery tweak, like our friend used to do?” “Sure, and you’ll find out what it when everyone else does. When we get the Gendron report...” “We’ll appropriate as required. At any rate I have no intention of touching it before the election, no matter when he reports. You know why. Better for you, gives you some more time for finishing touches.” “Indeed it does. On another subject, I honestly think we should stop competing among island Anglos. Lynch-Staunton nearly losing his damn deposit...” “I told André already. That said, we did find a promising candidate for Brome – you’ll like him a lot.”

Finance Minister Paul Dozois.

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January 22
Quebec City
National Assembly
Premier’s Office

“Premier, Mr. Sauvé is here to see you.””Let him in.” Pierre Sauvé walked into the office he knew so well, warmly shaking Johnson’s hand before sitting down to business. The 30-year-old lawyer had more than pleasantries to share with the Premier. “I wanted to let you know that my decision has been made. The answer is no. I will not sit on the sidelines any longer.” Johnson laughed knowingly. Even the smile, he thought. “Whenever you decide to open nominations, I’m ready. I do know that Binnette is almost certainly retiring – I found that out just before Christmas. Mousy loser if I ever saw one.” “Great to have you on the team – you made the right choice. Andre tells me you’ll probably have some competition for that nomination.” “No one overly concerning, if we’ve heard the same names, but I’m not taking any chances. The only thing than losing big is losing small. That said, I have faith in our network.”The premier listened as Sauvé described his canvassing efforts before he decided to wrap up – he had a business delegation to meet next. “Pierre, whatever you do, don’t let the press see you.” “I’m leaving the same way I came.”

Pierre Sauvé in 1958.

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February 6; 1311
Cabinet Room
National Assembly

“To summarize, we’re even better off fiscally than I thought in November. Inflation still needs watching, but I can inform you that we will have a $151M surplus for this fiscal year.” With that the Cabinet cheered as Dozois passed around executive summaries of his budget. “Paul, can we consider it your Valentine?” asked one minister as the finance minister laughed. “More seriously, I have been briefed on a FLQ threat to the Stock Exchange – bomb.” Bertrand and SQ Director Maurice St. Pierre had already informed Johnson and a handful of senior ministers, now they would tell the full Cabinet. “The threat is being neutralized as we speak.” At that the table went silent – until this point bombs had been mailboxes, without any sizeable civilian casualties. “We are also increasing security at high-risk targets for the foreseeable future. Everyone will need to exercise the utmost caution.” Johnson silently listened throughout the security briefing, mentally reviewing his own briefing before moving to the upcoming Dorion by-election. “Our tracking poll has us on target for a big win – 20% or more. Those of you tasked there know what must be done.” With that Johnson adjourned the meeting, leaving him and Dozois alone to discuss the following day’s budget lockup.

February 24
1841
St. Eustache

“So you’re a gambling man.” “We both are.” Brian Mulroney and Pierre Sauvé laughed uproariously over their drinks. While only acquainted for a few weeks, the two young bleu lawyers had instantly hit it off. Both were gregarious, deeply ambitious and political to their fingertips. With his deep connections between the Unionists and federal Tories, Mulroney was unofficial liaison between the parties. Now he had received his reward in the form of a Loto-Quebec franchise granted by Dozois a few weeks earlier. “Brian, do you think Stanfield will be able to keep that caucus together on bilingualism?” “Very doubtful given whom we’re talking about. Bob knows the consequences here but it seems at best we can get some abstentions instead.” “Bastards are fucking us 3 years before a single goddamn vote is cast”, Sauvé hissed. “As for Stanfield, if he can’t run the caucus, how can he govern the country?” “Bob’s tougher than you give him credit for.” “I certainly hope so. We can’t afford 8 years of Trudeau, that’s for sure.” With that both men downed another Scotch, looking ahead to the Dorion by-election. “Pierre, you reckon Lesage will be gone by September?” “June, if not earlier. Good source confirms what’s been an open secret for months - he’s ready to move on, no intention of leading into the next election. We know who’ll run, question is who wins.” “We do.”

Brian Mulroney in 1969.

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RAYMOND GARNEAU, EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT TO JEAN LESAGE: “The Dorion by-election was a body blow, and while we expected a loss the magnitude was somewhat surprising. All our data told us that Dorion voters strongly approved of Johnson’s performance, with local issues being a secondary factor. Lesage’s own performance at this time was not quite up to his usual standard – he was tired and there were many people inside and outside caucus who felt he should move on. He agreed with them but wanted to set his own schedule and keep Marchand, who was being strongly urged by Trudeau, out of the contest.

PETER NEWMAN, TORONTO STAR: Trudeau felt Lesage had overstayed his welcome, especially for a man who had no intention of fighting another election. Jean Marchand would have been a very bad fit for the provincial Liberals, who had been pilloried successfully by Duplessis for decades as federal puppets. He ultimately decided to stay in Ottawa and had no regrets about doing so. Trudeau never explained his preference for Marchand to me or anyone else. It was one of the most bizarre personnel suggestions I ever heard Trudeau make.

PAUL GÉRIN-LAJOIE, EDUCATION CRITIC: I had thought about running for leader, but ultimately my heart was no longer in electoral politics. Lesage had no new ideas about where he or a successor would take the party. His view that we progressives had been too aggressive, too outspoken, had not changed since “illusions of others” in ’66. While our personal relations were always good, I was in politics to implement my ideas. He no longer wanted my ideas and therefore I had no reason to remain in politics. Eric Kierans had left months earlier for similar reasons. So I eventually told Laporte and Lesage that I would resign my seat once the session was over and return to academia. Had he resigned after the election or sometime in the previous 2 years we could have had the renewal our party desperately needed.

MARCH 30
Quebec City
National Assembly
Cabinet Room

“Gentlemen, I must say the results were absolutely splendid. André, Paul and the team were all fantastic.” Johnson had convened a session of the political Cabinet to plan the spring sitting, which promised to be a relatively sedate affair. Lagarde began his briefing: “Dorion voted on our performance, with local issues a secondary factor. Disaffected nationalist Liberals were a key element of our victory, and also our get-out-the-vote efforts. Turnout was about half of 1966, as is typical for by-elections. If we can perform at this level in a general election the majority will be quite comfortable. As for Jean-Guy in St. Hyacinthe, those were similar dynamics to Dorion.” Maurice Bellemare turned to his colleagues: “As for the session, our priorities are unchanged – economy above all. There are no major new bills under consideration, though private members bills which are economic in nature are always welcome.” “How about opening the parks early? No law required.” Johnson rolled his eyes. Every time he wanted to give his tourism minister a chance, he almost unfailingly regretted it. Voyons donc, nono. Cardinal turned to his colleagues: “I expect Gendron to report sometime this fall, given his progress to date and recent information which has come to my attention.” “Which we will discuss another time. Good afternoon everyone.” The premier abruptly stood and left, leaving his ministers to pack up...
 
Quebec City
Premier’s Office
National Assembly
April 4

“The only path to victory is 1957’s, riding by riding. As then you don’t need many faces, probably no more than 10 if everything falls into place.” Daniel Johnson had no particular affection for Bob Stanfield or the party he led, a feeling which was quite reciprocal. But they did have more than enough common goals to unite them. “Do you have any particular advice for preparation – policy, candidates?” “Constitutional policy is fine, everything else I don’t need to remind you. Keep an open mind and a low profile; we’ll do the rest when that time comes. Brian is doing a fantastic job.” “Do you think Léon –““Could come back? No. He’s dead to us. He’d be laughed out of the riding even if I let him re-rat, which I won’t. Anyone who has worked against us is unacceptable.” “I have a couple of names in mind; I’ll get back to you when I make that choice.” “Keep one thing in mind about Trudeau, Bob. He has not changed as much as English Canada would like to believe. Brian knows exactly what I’m talking about.” At that Mulroney laughed nervously – he knew some details, but not all. After a few minutes, Stanfield and Mulroney left, still pondering what the premier had told them.

RAYMOND GARNEAU: I remember the moment M. Lesage told me he was retiring. He simply said “c’est fini pour moi.” While the official announcement would not come for a few weeks, I was immensely relieved that he had finally admitted the obvious. Paul [Desrochers] and I had begun to plan for the leadership vote, which we tentatively scheduled for December 1-3. That way a new leader would have enough time to become a familiar figure before the election, which per UN tradition would almost certainly be a summer one. While that part of our calculation proved accurate, we also knew a new leader would have little time to make a policy imprint given the short time involved. I can also say that there was no appetite for a revolt against M. Lesage, nor was there any mechanism at that time to replace a leader who would not voluntarily leave. We saw what the UN had gone through in opposition and the federal Tories were to an extent still experiencing in Ottawa. I expected Laporte and Wagner to run, if hoping for more contestants. Such a debate would have buried the media narrative that we were still a divided party, which was not the case then – at least not to the extent portrayed. In particular I had hoped Paul and Eric would have been contestants.

BRIAN MULRONEY: If I had to describe the PLQ that spring it would be “burned out.” Unlike Mr. Johnson when he was in opposition, they did not take the opportunity for policy renewal and reconnecting with ordinary Quebecers – the major reason why they lost power in ’66. Through this state of semi-paralysis they essentially drifted through an entire term, which is exactly what we wanted them to do. Their likeliest leadership contenders had no clear plan for rejuvenating the party either, other than providing more clarity and stridency on existing Liberal ideas. I thought Wagner would provide an interesting contrast: he was young, widely respected across the spectrum as a law-and-order man and kept his distance from the Liberal machine. Laporte’s contrast would be much more ideological – he was not a flaming left-winger by any imagination, but he would move them further left than Lesage had and play for nationalist votes. Rene Levesque was a far greater threat than Bourgault had been, a threat which we were intent on eliminating. Johnson told us often that 1966 was a repeat of 1944 and 1970 would be a repeat of 1948. The next step was a middle class tax cut which would be announced in his pre-election budget. With a forward-looking manifesto in production, all our pre-writ elements were in place even before Lesage made his announcement.

DON MAZANKOWSKI, ALBERTA PC MP: I decided to vote against the Official Languages Act given my constituents’ vehement opposition to that bill, a vote I came to regret rather quickly. Fortunately for all of us Mr. Diefenbaker was not in the House during that vote, otherwise he may have asked for a recorded vote – which would of course have severely harmed us in Quebec and further marginalized us nationally. It had, after all, been less than a decade since Ernest Manning vetoed Real Caouette as Socred’s federal leader because, as he was quoted – “the West will never accept a French Catholic as leader.” That sort of attitude was rarely stated so bluntly in our party but milder variations of it were certainly present. Once Lougheed was elected collaboration between Alberta and Quebec became much easier, though that would have to wait a couple more years. We were confident that voters would tire of Trudeau fairly quickly, considering how little he was doing to meet the stratospheric expectations reposed in him during the campaign. At that point, I thought, Bob would get his second chance. Johnson had been through a similar experience in opposition and encouraged us to remain optimistic, as did John Robarts in Ontario.

May 13
Windsor Hotel, Montreal

“Jacques Parizeau’s joining the PQ. The announcement should be next week, if my source is correct.” “You expect any more big names beyond what we’ve already heard?” “No one who’d be recognized in a Chicoutimi bar.” “None of us would be either.” Robert Burns was not a widely recognized name either, but he was where it mattered, in the city’s labour and intellectual milieus. A labour lawyer and staunch socialist, he had not taken long to rally to René Lévesque’s banner and already was the PQ nominee in Maisonneuve. Mulroney he knew already from their past dealings, but Sauvé he had just met. “Frankly I think Trudeau will bring back Davey for ’72. For one thing PET knows jack shit about political operations, nor is he particularly qualified or interested in doing so. When that shit hits the fan, their professionals will be back. Forget Hellyer, they’d have been better off with Judy [LaMarsh]. Even if in some ways she’d be Dief in a skirt.” Mulroney and Burns nearly choked on their drinks from laughing. “Christ Pierre, not when we’re eating!” “I know, I know. Anyways, good news is that I got confirmation today no one new will be entering my nomination race. Plus Binette made retirement official this afternoon. Realized what most of us knew, he’s not cut out for politics.”

Robert Burns in 1969.
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June 22
Quebec City
Green Room, National Assembly

Jean Lesage meets the press to announce his resignation as Liberal leader, June 22, 1969.
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“I will resign the Liberal Party leadership effective on my successor’s election and have instructed the executive to set a leadership convention for late fall.” With that sentence Jean Lesage announced what had been an open secret for over a year, his decision to retire from politics after a 24-year career. “This choice was not a difficult one for me to make, nor was it recent. Quite simply I am very tired and have fulfilled my duty. It is time for a new generation to lead the party, and I believe there will be an excellent field of candidates who can win government?” “Mr. Lesage, do you have any comment on M. Gérin-Lajoie’s resignation?” “As I told him privately, I wish Paul the best in his future endeavours. His contribution to public life has been truly exceptional.” “Do you believe you may have handicapped your successor by staying so long?” “I believe my successor will have all the time he needs.” “Will you be endorsing a candidate?” “Absolutely not, publicly or otherwise. Before anyone asks, I will retire from the Assembly at the election. My constituents deserve representation and doing otherwise would be a betrayal.” After a few more questions Lesage walked out of the press room, leaving them to disperse. Despite its predictability, the event was still a bit jarring to many Liberals. Could the men seeking Lesage’s job measure up?

PETER NEWMAN: Mr. Lesage could be content with his place in the history books, even if he had hurt his party by refusing to step down once he lost government. Pierre Trudeau was far from displeased to see Lesage go, with his essential attitude being “good riddance.” It was a remarkably shabby treatment of a Liberal leader who in addition to running Quebec’s most progressive government before or since, had fundamentally restructured his province in a way which federally, could only be compared to King over a much longer period. All the more remarkable about Liberal feuding was that on socioeconomics, their substantive differences were far from unbridgeable.

CANADIAN GALLUP POLL, JULY 1969

IF A PROVINCIAL ELECTION WERE HELD TODAY, WHICH PARTY'S CANDIDATE DO YOU THINK YOU WOULD FAVOUR?

UN: 46.2%
LIBERAL: 35.5%
PQ: 15.1%
 
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GABRIEL LOUBIER, TOURISM MINISTER: Summer of 1969 was among the quietest periods of my political career. There simply wasn’t much going on except nominations once Daniel opened them up that July. We were all back in our ridings after a very successful spring sitting, having been instructed not to disturb Daniel unless it was of the utmost urgency. Our family, as was our habit, spent most of our time hiking and swimming. The Liberal leadership race got off to a rather slow start, and to no one’s surprise there were only 2 candidates: Laporte and Wagner. I think Bourassa wanted to run but was dissuaded by M. Desrochers. We had reached the $17M mark that quarter, putting us ever closer to our record. The Liberals were much further behind than they had been earlier that cycle, though hardly cash poor. At that time our major target of interest was the PQ, which regularly polled double digits both privately and publicly, taking more voters from the Liberals than us. Later that year their numbers would start declining as we went on air, but there was mild concern about their potential in north Montreal and the South Shore for sure. The latter’s seats would be crucial if we hoped to obtain a comfortable majority.

Tourism Minister Gabriel Loubier in 1969. The most junior member of Johnson's Cabinet, he was generally seen as a lightweight if competent in his role.


WILLIAM TETLEY, REVENUE CRITIC: I spent that summer deciding who I would support in the leadership race. Both Laporte and Wagner were excellent candidates capable of fully uniting the party and offering an experienced, progressive alternative to Johnson’s government. Claude had never been involved with those intraparty squabbles which had so dominated newspaper headlines, and I felt he would be a better fit for swing voters. I decided to endorse him in the fall, while rounding up Anglophone support in the meantime. My constituents certainly did not feel our problem was being an insufficiently progressive government – by any measure we were the most progressive government Quebec had ever known. After a decade of upheaval Johnson now presided over a calm political environment, though of course both parties were quite curious about the PQ. This sort of environment is exactly what the Union Nationale has always liked, since they could run as its guarantors and paint us as wild-eyed radicals. This time was somewhat different: now they were painting the PQ as such, a party which contained their former RIN allies of convenience from ’66. Mostly the government was promoting its own record since they did not want to give the PQ any free media by attacking it. Claude promised me that if he won he wanted me to continue in my role as roving spokesman for the Anglophone community, as did Pierre in a separate conversation.

July 18
St. Eustache

Pierre Sauvé waited impatiently for the notice he had been on tenterhooks for all day. After 8 months of elbow grease, he was confident of the outcome in making the case for his nomination to his friends and neighbours. As he sometimes did while awaiting the outcome of a trial, he lit a Marlboro and thumbed through a novel while waiting alongside his fellow candidates. “Gentlemen, follow me please.” Backstage in that small theatre all 3 candidates stood face to face with the riding executive president and his colleagues as they announced the result. “M. Sauvé, congratulations on your nomination as the Union Nationale candidate for Deux-Montagnes.” Grinning, Pierre shook their hands and those of his rivals before bounding onstage, waving and blowing kisses to his family and those he recognized. “Bon soir, good evening. It is a great honour to be chosen by my fellow Unionists as our candidate, and I will do my utmost to earn the trust of our entire community in the upcoming months. This is a moment in history that must be seized, for great opportunity lies ahead...” Once finished, he jumped off the stage into a mass of flashbulbs and microphones all pointed squarely in his face. “Was it something I did?” Sauvé joked, alternating rapidly between French and English as the journalists shouted questions in the dimly lit auditorium...

Mayor Jean Drapeau and Executive Committee Chairman Lucien Saulnier in 1967.
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LUCIEN SAULNIER, MONTREAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN: In August 1969 my main priority was reviewing the police contract which would come up later that year. Until quite recently the police union had been one with a concept of civic duty, accept setbacks which other unions would never have in that era. Starting in about 1964 this began to change as social upheaval and labour radicalization took its toll. I did my utmost to resolve many of the union’s minor and moderate grievances and mostly succeeded. The major question was pay, since the union demanded parity with Toronto at roughly $9200 per year. Jean was being urged by Bertrand, his former law school debating partner, to compromise while the government worked on what they promised would be a permanent solution. He did not want to do this, so we appointed an arbitration board and closely monitored the situation throughout the summer. Given the threats they had been making, I took absolutely nothing for granted. [Municipal Affairs Minister Robert] Lussier told me the MUC would be launched in January 1971 and confirmed that I would be chairman for as long as I wanted. By this time I felt I had accomplished as much as I could at the Executive Committee, given Jean’s rapidly depleting patience for voices contradicting his own.

BRIAN MULRONEY: Federally, there was as little happening as there was provincially. With Trudeau’s neutrality plans shelved and the Official Languages Act now law there was precious little worth discussing for the remainder of that year. Whether or not such calm seemed temporary, it proved a welcome respite for all of us. We were eager for a by-election to test our growing Quebec organization, an opportunity which eluded us a while yet. Paul Gérin-Lajoie’s seat was not even contested by the Liberals, enabling the Unionists to win overwhelmingly against a PQ candidate. This meant a National Assembly with 59 Unionists and 49 Liberals, a net gain of 2 since the 1966 election. As August ended it seemed clear to me that Laporte was the Liberal frontrunner to replace Lesage, an assessment which Johnson shared. He never underestimated an adversary but did not think the Liberals posed a serious threat to his re-election regardless of who led them. Privately, many Liberals shared that assessment – if not mine that it would have happened even had Lesage not led them in Opposition. Johnson told his team to go up on TV with negative ads against both Liberals, a new media age tactic which had its desired effects on both voters and critics. We were swimming in cash, nearly $100M adjusted for inflation today.

JACQUES PARIZEAU: 1969 was a year of optimistic growth for our party. We had been steadily growing in numbers and René was optimistic we would enter the Assembly. Maissoneuve seemed like a sure gain for Robert Burns and my own polls showed us with a slight lead in L’Assomption. It had been decided early to fight in a handful of ridings to maximize potential gains, rather than wasting our precious few resources on a province-wide fight. René thought he could win in Laurier despite his new party affiliation, personal loyalties outweighing partisan ones. Privately I was less optimistic but did not tell him so. The government was seen very positively and M. Johnson himself was very popular, which combined with an improving economy made any opposition party’s job extremely difficult. We had successfully kept Bourgault off the executive, as René wished. He was extremely keen on image, for the government was undoubtedly going to latch onto any hint of immoderation. After all, as René often reminded me, the Union Nationale had successfully eliminated nationalist rivals in the past, albeit ones far less methodically constructed than ours. My view of the Liberals and UN was similar in one respect: often they had the right idea on certain issues - on social policy or constitutional policy, yet never took them to their logical conclusion.

RAYMOND GARNEAU: It was just after Labour Day when I sensed the leadership tide beginning to shift towards Pierre Laporte. Almost instantly we saw those negative ads hit the airwaves, a first in Quebec politics and before any federal party did something similar. Before we knew what the outcome would be they already decided, depending on how many layers you saw in their strategy, either who their opponent should or should not be. Then and now I think they did not have a real preference, for we had made a grave error in 1961 by believing Johnson would be easier to beat than Bertrand. It posed a dilemma: we could not retaliate because Lesage was still leader, and defending both would cost far too much money.
 
BEAULIEU: It was roughly 6 AM on October 3 when I got the arbitration board’s report, which recommended the pay increase demanded by the police union. Even then I knew the demands would keep escalating, which is why we resolved to solve this problem once and for all. Daniel requested that Maurice [Bellemare] draft amendments to the Labour Code prohibiting strikes by public safety officers, something Maurice readily assented to do. Jean-Jacques was concerned that it would grow into a Taft-Hartley equivalent or something closer, a prospect which he opposed for ideological reasons. Daniel told me such a law would not be on the agenda so long as he was Premier, though most of the caucus and certainly rank and file members were. It was October 10 when we extended the Gendron Commission’s mandate for another year, primarily to focus on educational issues, at his request. Frankly we did not want to deal with this issue before the election, which Daniel had decided would be in June or July with a final date set sometime in March. Drapeau was happy with us and quietly promised his support for that and other reasons. We spent most of that fall on the economic update and budget, given the centrality Daniel wanted his tax cut to play in the upcoming campaign.

JOHN TURNER: We had no particular interest in the Quebec Liberal leadership race; because we knew we would still be dealing with Johnson regardless of who won. The Quebec caucus was divided along predictable lines, with nationalists favouring Laporte and federalists Wagner. I personally felt Wagner would be a better choice, and if he didn’t win we could entice him to run federally. With him at the helm we could have a successor to Marchand as Quebec leader, not that it mattered given Trudeau’s total lack of interest in organizational matters. Discussing these matters with him was a very short conversation, so I didn’t bother. We had our pressing concerns, particularly in foreign affairs. There were high-level discussions about another constitutional round, a perennial Trudeau interest but not one I felt would be very productive. My standing with Trudeau didn’t improve when Johnson said publicly that he would consider further discussion “if someone reasonable such as Mr. Turner or Mr. Hellyer” was Prime Minister. Johnson had carefully planned this statement, and later I discovered the press question had been planted for him. When we next spoke he was quite nonchalant about it, as was his habit for almost any controversy. I spoke to Paul Desrochers and told him we would happily work with whomever the convention chose, and we agreed to meet the following month.

October 30, Quebec City
Premier’s Office, National Assembly

“Looks like the tax cut will be smaller than anticipated, given revenues.” “Paul, is it revenue fluctuation again?” “Indeed it is Daniel. If you want me to cut deeper I can do so, but we’ll have to ditch some social commitments unless you want to go back into deficit.” “No, no. I can’t physically handle another fiscal crisis, nor would anyone sane want one.” Johnson was aghast at the numbers Dozois was showing him – it had been surprising if not a shock. These numbers meant a campaign focused on stability and cultural issues, especially the new immigration legislation being drafted by its infant ministry. “So we’ll do culture then.” “Indeed we will, and I managed to find some money.” On cue, Dozois pulled a quarter out of his pocket. “As for the MUC...” “All’s going according to plan there.” “I heard Ottawa is taking an interest again – you heard that?” “Indeed, Paul I have. Turner complained about my comment – as if Trudeau cares what I think about his ministers.” “No Liberal is as good as Stanfield. With him we get everything we want voluntarily. Maurice would be very happy with our federal game right now, negotiating has never been easier. Now, I have a request in mind for you... something I know you’ll enjoy very much...”

MULRONEY: The Liberal campaign was coming to an end by mid-November, with Laporte having a strong lead among committed delegates. Johnson had long operated on the assumption Laporte would be his opponent and structured his campaign accordingly. Laporte was to be portrayed not only as an irresponsible left-winger but also as a chameleon, a onetime reformer who became a machinist par excellence. This would ideally have the effect of repelling both swing voters and left-wing nationalists to both the UN and PQ, given the seats Johnson was targeting. Unlike in 1966 where Johnson’s personal unpopularity had required him to keep a low profile, this time he would be front and centre. For reasons of taste and health some of the most prominent ministers would play an important role, such as Dozois, Bertrand, Cardinal and Paul. We had dispatched observers to both Quebec City and Queen’s Park who would embed themselves with our respective allies and learn the latest organizational techniques, an area where we had been deficient since Grosart left. As Pierre [Sauvé] liked to remind me, only a few years earlier the federal PC Party had a single secretary to cover the province’s 27 eastern ridings. While we had made great improvements, infrastructure would be largely a Unionist preserve for some years yet.

NEWMAN: The Unionist immigration program could be summarized as Francization, their ultimate goal in social policy. If a friendly federal government granted them increased power to select their immigrants, Quebec’s demographics could be transformed in a way which would have the added effect of entrenching their power. As much as they disliked Trudeau’s version of multiculturalism, they saw potential for cementing immigrant loyalties to a party which historically had never been friendly to immigrants. Johnson scoffed when I mentioned it to him, as did other senior Unionists. Their actions proved otherwise then and later. I decided to pay more attention to Quebec, since Johnson was clearly the man to watch among premiers besides Smallwood and Campbell. The Liberal leadership campaign was just about over and it proved to be rather anticlimactic, so I used my time to reconnect with old contacts. It was a rather optimistic time despite a slowing economy and a curious sense of fragility, as if this year-long calm could suddenly fray at any moment. After all there were submerged tensions inside both major parties, and I felt that there was too little attention paid to potential Unionist flashpoints. Nonetheless, I made plans to embed with Johnson on the upcoming campaign with a handful of colleagues.

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BEN TIMMINS, MONTREAL STAR POLITICAL EDITOR: Pierre Laporte’s election as Liberal leader gave the party back some spunk which they’d lost in opposition, given the weird limbo which Lesage had subjected them to for 3 years. Now the pace would quicken as both parties spent all their time preparing for the upcoming campaign. In his acceptance speech the new leader clearly positioned himself as a progressive, nationalist alternative to Johnson’s government, which he portrayed as cynical and manipulative, while the PQ was simply not mentioned at all. Laporte did promise a grassroots campaign, a fully universal Medicare system, increased housing assistance and a progressive sales tax, among other things. It was, I thought, an excellent address which touched on concerns held by progressives and swing voters alike. Clearly Laporte decided to provide a sharp contrast as the Liberals had done in 1962, fending off PQ enemies on their left. Not since 1944, when I was a teenager, had I seen so much private attention devoted to a third party. Of course in 1944 there was no difference between public and private attention paid to the third party. When I asked Laporte what he thought of his former colleague Lévesque, it was nothing I could print in a family newspaper.

Newly-elected Liberal Leader Pierre Laporte addresses the Liberal convention (Dec. 5, 1969).
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December 14
Chateau Frontenac, Quebec City

“As I was saying, heads we win, tails they lose.” Johnson was quite happy to have Laporte as his general election opponent. Already his rival, he felt, had made a major error by positioning himself as a bold progressive. After bankrupting the province the last 2 times they were in government, they want to do it again? The premier had already ordered his admen to devise a slogan about Unionist governments cleaning up Liberal messes. “Indeed. Ideally we’d lead them down a rabbit hole like the Polish eggs. Hopefully André is working on that.” Pierre Sauvé always grinned whenever he remembered 1956 and the “Communist egg” trap Duplessis had laid for the Grits, a trick whose hilarity had not diminished with time. His father had then told him it was a comedic highlight of his political career, and Sauvé hoped for an encore in his own career.
 
January 2, 1970
St. Eustache

Pierre and Yvonne Sauvé placed flowers on the grave, their heads bowed deep in prayer. Has it really been 10 years? Seems like we were having fun together on the hunt or in the pool only yesterday, Pierre thought as he looked out towards the snowy horizon. He knows I’m happy with my life, and he’d have loved to meet Yvonne. Especially being a grandfather. For a moment his memory rapidly cycled back, to the happy, carefree days of his adolescence. Lost deep in thought, he did not feel his wife tapping his shoulder. Pierre, Pierre. “Pierre, c’est moi.” He turned around to see a familiar face. Auréa Cloutier was now 72, long retired and spending her days keeping a low profile in Trois-Rivieres except for very rare interviews granted to a handful of her employers’ biographers. She had been Maurice Duplessis’ secretary for 36 years before becoming Paul Sauvé’s when he was premier. Mlle Cloutier, as she was universally known, did not know the younger Sauvé well, nevertheless her memories of him were entirely fond ones. “I know your father would be very proud of the choices you have made so far. I was not surprised at your most recent choice either. Pierre, if I can give you one piece of advice it would be this: always take the long view. What seems like a curse today could be a blessing next week. You will go far, mark my words.” “Mlle Cloutier, a pleasant surprise. I can only say thank you for your very kind words.” “We shall meet again. Good luck.” The Sauvés looked at each other, vaguely astonished, as Cloutier disappeared beyond the gate...

Auréa Cloutier in 1970.
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January 10, Quebec City
Premier’s Office, National Assembly

“I don’t see any particular reason to target them as a group. As with any other group target those who may be receptive to our message. Jo’s bloc concept is for a previous generation, not ours.” The premier was irritated at discussions about his party actively targeting youth voters for the first time since Lesage had lowered the voting age to 18 in 1963. If anything we need more going to the PQ, as last time with Bourgault Johnson thought. Bertrand cut in: “It isn’t like the Liberals have anything specifically on offer for youth voters either. Statistics always say the same story: they are just as apathetic, if not more so, than under-30s already are. Laporte’s preaching an almost social democratic message while Levesque has the real deal with candidates who embody his message.” “Yeah, when I think PLQ I don’t think youthful idealism. Though he does have a reputation for integrity-““Peter, you’re showing your age again. If you knew Laporte as I do, you might rethink that statement.” Peter White was Johnson’s former executive assistant: only 26, he had risen quickly and been nominated as candidate for Brome. Attending his first campaign strategy session, he was eager for more. “Please explain?” “In due time. For now, let’s have lunch.”

Economist Jacques Parizeau in 1969. A former senior civil servant, Parizeau was one of René Lévesque's star 1970 recruits.
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JACQUES PARIZEAU: February was spent choosing ridings. I myself had chosen Ahuntsic, Robert Burns Maissoneuve, and Bernard Landry in Joliette. Our aim at that election was gaining official party status as a first step, given our scarce resources. We had hope that a handful of strong candidates in well-chosen ridings would achieve this rather modest goal. René attacked the UN as much as he did his former Liberal colleagues. Not just because they were the government but because Rene knew that the UN wanted to kill us before we took our first proverbial breath. They would stop at nothing to defend their nationalist flank, which the Liberals were never really interested in doing at the best of times. We all thought the media was delusional to believe that Laporte’s leadership solved Liberal problems – if anything, it showed how their left had been made rather benign. For all Laporte’s talk of social policy, he had never done anything about it when he was in government. René confirmed to me that many other Liberal proposals were also developed quickly. Not quite as bad as their federal cousins taking 50 years to enact universal healthcare. Liberal leaders, possibly excepting Pearson, seem to become more conservative as their incumbency lengthens. At least the Union Nationale had never pretended to be anything than what it was.

MULRONEY: February 1970 was a budgetary month, in retrospect a sign that maybe this calmness was as fragile as critics claimed. Paul Dozois was able to deliver the middle class tax cut he had wanted, however it was a smaller one than Johnson had desired. Nonetheless the Liberals and PQ wanted more, without very convincing costing arguments for either their budget wish list or platform. Bob had told me to embed at UN HQ rather than travel, given our mutual if unspoken policy of avoiding open public embraces between the parties. Word came down that the election would be in June, with a final date to be set in a few weeks time. Federally there was only an impending voting age decrease and the official start-up of the Official Languages machinery, with Keith Spicer as Commissioner. By now both parties were on air – the PQ was far too cash poor for TV advertising, not that their strategy really required it. Johnson, despite his humiliation in 1962, was eager to debate Laporte and also institutionalize leaders’ debates. It would be a simplified version of 1962, with a single moderator asking questions and a more free-flowing portion. As then, he would insist on an English segment. I do not recall him being especially concerned about whether that might be a deal breaker.

BEAULIEU: Early March was when we were about to run through our final pre-writ checklist. All the elements were in place: positioning, fundraising, organization, candidates, and platform. Thankfully I had precious few retirements to deal with, and those were long expected. Paul [Dozois] told me medically and emotionally, despite earlier concerns, he was ready and willing to stay for as long as he wanted. I myself had left a few months previously to win in Vaudreuil-Soulanges. Daniel felt I had accomplished everything he wanted as chief of staff and now could accomplish more from within Cabinet. We took nothing for granted, despite all indicators pointing towards the accomplishment of our primary and secondary electoral objectives. In certain ways the final part of pre-writ is the most frustrating given the eagerness to go, but Daniel would hear nothing of moving up the date. Summer was our tradition and so long as he was leader, elections would be held in June or July. On the 3rd I met with our top fundraisers to discuss the game plan in very general terms, with precious few questions asked. Those were generally about individual ridings, with some on the tax cut.

GARNEAU: I was running for the first time in my solidly rouge riding of Jean-Talon, but it had really been an 18-month campaign when combined with the nomination fight. It promised to be an equally spirited affair as 1966, with a bonus being the Creditiste collapse. Right-wing nationalists were almost entirely in Johnson’s corner, and he had easily squashed them over this term. I urged Pierre to participate in the proposed debate, but he hesitated because of Johnson’s request for an English segment. He did not really speak the language and was furious at what he saw as a transparent attempt to humiliate him. Ultimately Johnson did not insist, and little did we know this would not be a one-off occurrence or personal whim of Johnson’s. Fundraising had changed little since the convention – we had enough for a good campaign, but about 30% less than the government probably had. I had been with Pierre when he had met Turner a few weeks earlier, which was a friendly if ultimately meaningless encounter. As always, Ottawa left us to our own devices and I suspect at bottom did not really care what happened to us. At this point I had little contact with headquarters but kept in touch with my fellow Quebec City area candidates as needs dictated.

Quebec City, March 27
Premier’s Office, National Assembly

“I’ve decided the date will be June 10 or 17, you’ll know the final answer within 10 days. What I have decided is we will have a short writ campaign – 28 days is plenty of time to get our message out.” The premier was eager to hit the hustings, confident that his accomplishments of the past 4 years would gain his long-desired “comfortable” majority. “Sounds fine by me.”“Same here.” No complaints on my end.” The inner circle was unanimous in their assent to Johnson’s choice, as they were in a June campaign. Campaigning in July was not for the faint of heart, as Duplessis-era veterans well remembered...
 
ARTHUR BLAKELY, GAZETTE POLITICAL COLUMNIST: Spring 1970 was dominated by a mixture of economic and nationalist issues on the part of all parties. The government aggressively promoted their new immigration plan and a strong economy, while the Liberal line was mostly about social progressivism. Laporte was careful not to make it sound like he was asking Quebecers to finish what they begun, with its intimations of Liberal arrogance. After all, Johnson had found a Unionist way to continued down Lesage’s reformist path, and the government’s platform was replete with certain social initiatives – not that they emphasized those that much. The PQ stuck to their core message and core support, given their purely local strategy for this election. As had happened 4 years previously, young progressive nationalists in and around Montreal formed an emerging core of separatist support. While there was no English debate planned for this election, I would be participating in editorial board meetings with both major party leaders. Given how badly Johnson had performed in ’62, I was somewhat surprised at his eagerness to debate rather than let his ads speak for themselves. His explanation about institutionalization struck me as disingenuous then and now. At any rate, my true concern was how both parties sidestepped an obviously softening economy, in their eagerness to preserve the illusion of tranquillity.

April 27, Quebec City
Premier’s Office, National Assembly

“June 17 is E-Day, dissolution May 19. You all know what your jobs are.” “Indeed.” André Lagarde had been preparing the campaign for a year, and was more eager than anyone for it to finally begin. With the government’s session priorities enacted quicker than expected, Johnson had adjourned the Assembly the previous day. “Prosperity and Security” – that’s our theme this time. As an expression of the government’s mood, the slogan was perfect. “Andre, those TV ads are excellent – I want more featuring regular people, not politicians.” “Are you still doing that” “Yes, Guy tells me it is almost ready. Do the citizen ads first, and then get back to me.” “Anyone we want in the ads?” “No one votes for a team, regardless of what Grit propaganda says otherwise. You think anyone voted for Maurice because of who was on his team? They didn’t.” “Our first editorial board meeting should be La Presse, then the Journal and some regional papers. Anglo papers later.” “How many...” “We should get the Journal for sure, La Presse maybe, at least 1 Anglo paper.” “I’ll hold you to that André.” As Lagarde turned to leave, he suddenly remembered he’d forgotten something. I’ll tell him later, not important right now.

ROBERT LOUBIER, MUNICIPAL AFFAIRS MINISTER: When the Assembly was dissolved we had all been instructed to interweave local themes as much as possible, similarly to 1966. Being in a swing riding myself, I had always been acutely aware of the need for balance. The PQ was making a strong play here but was hampered by their lack of funds. Parizeau’s late decision to change ridings left them without a strong local face here, where personal contact is of the utmost import. Given my portfolio I had plenty of accomplishments for various community groups and they were very satisfied with my performance. Many voters came up to me and said that while having no regrets about voting Liberal in ’66, I had earned their vote even if our views on certain issues diverged. Apart from a handful of graduate students, I heard precious little about the Gendron delay which had been latched onto by the media. What I did hear was that parents wanted linguistic protections in education and ensuring they could be served in French at their local store. While not my jurisdiction, I suggested to Daniel that we look at Eaton’s bilingualism training for their employees as a voluntary compliance example. He promised he would consider that in the fall, since he forbade any such language talk during the campaign.

TURNER: I observed the Quebec campaign from afar, with my only question being the size of Johnson’s victory. Paul’s predictions were almost exactly in line with the final result, but he was far from pessimistic looking ahead. He believed that eventually old divisions would resurface and with a worsening economy, we would have an excellent time to strike. I spoke to Trudeau often that spring, trying to convince him to hold another constitutional round the following year to see if we could further narrow the gaps. He was not interested in further talks since neither he nor Johnson was prepared to concede anything which would break the deadlock. Though Trudeau never said as much, I believe such a situation suited both governments for political reasons. It was rather ironic considering how Trudeau had catapulted from obscurity to political stardom on that same issue less than 2 years earlier, but that’s politics for you. What I did tell Paul is that if Wagner ever expressed any interest in going federal, to sound out Keith [Davey] about the idea. 1970 was a very quiet campaign, as people on both sides would undoubtedly now admit. The debate was probably its only interesting element.

PIERRE SAUVÉ: The campaign was great fun, as they always are. There’s nothing more rewarding in politics than earning the trust of your friends and neighbours, especially in a close-knit community like this one. The debates were vigorous but fairly collegial, as they had been in my father’s time. Despite certain journalists hopes, the issues were those which have always been important here – education, economy, agriculture, noise pollution from the airport, you name it. While my family had a long history in this riding, it was an almost entirely journalistic issue – English Canadian journalistic issue. I talked about my own work in the community when this subject was raised at the debate. Economic and agricultural concerns were what I heard most at the doorstep, so we had some TV ads done explaining how our policies benefitted the riding. It wasn’t cheap but was worth every cent, even if I still preferred canvassing. Nothing beats looking a voter in the eye and promising to earn the trust. Or being told you’re a slick trust baby, depending on who you meet. The journalists I wanted to meet were almost entirely local, except Tim, whom I knew by reputation to be entirely trustworthy.

June 12, Quebec City
110 Grande Allée

Daniel Johnson waited confidently for the polls to close, confident that he had successfully rallied his fellow Quebecers to give him another 4 years in office. All indications were that he would win big, the question was how big. 4 years of a precarious majority required tight oversight, tighter oversight than he was now capable of. As the clock struck 9, he hushed his aides and family. Within 5 minutes the first results trickled in: UN 13, PLQ 8. Early trends are rarely reversed. Within another 5, Radio-Canada had projected a Unionist majority government. At roughly 9:30 Laporte called to concede, promising to conduct a “vigorous and loyal opposition.” Levesque called a few minutes later, just as the networks projected that the PQ would enter the National Assembly. Shortly after 10, the Premier drove out for his victory speech. While in the limousine he had began to think of his new Cabinet, having already informed the newcomers before Election Day. Once the Cabinet was oriented he planned a typically quiet summer within his riding, conserving his strength for the autumn battles ahead. Language in particular loomed large on the government’s agenda, despite his wariness about the topic. At least I can better control the flow now, Johnson thought as he headed onstage...

Premier Daniel Johnson delivers his victory speech (June 12, 1970).

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June 14, Quebec City
Chateau Frontenac

“Immigration? I’m flabbergasted you want someone with no experience...” “Pierre, you‘ll acquire the experience, and you have the personal skills and contacts for this job. I have every confidence you’ll learn the rulebook quickly. It didn’t hurt Levesque or Jean-Guy did it? Besides, I’ve already sent your name to the Lieutenant-Governor. Maurice will be more than happy to help you.” “Honoured to be on your team.” With that Sauvé shook the premier’s hand and departed, briefing binder in hand...

Johnson II Cabinet
Deputy Premier: Jean-Jacques Bertrand
Finance: Paul Dozois
Justice : Jean-Jacques Bertrand
Agriculture : Clément Vincent
Labour: Maurice Bellemare
Public Works: Armand Russell
Cultural Affairs: Mario Beaulieu
Health: Jean-Paul Cloutier
Education: Jean-Guy Cardinal
Lands and Forests: Claude-Gilles Gosselin
Tourism, Hunting and Fishing: Gabriel Loubier
Natural Resources: Paul-Émile Allard
Transport: Fernand Lizotte
Municipal Affairs: Robert Lussier
Intergovernmental Affairs: Marcel Masse
Industry and Commerce: Rémi Paul
Immigration: Pierre Sauvé
Revenue : Raymond Johnston
 
Sorry for the long absence everyone.

MICHEL ROY, LE DEVOIR EDITORIALIST: July 1970 was a very quiet political month, perhaps the quietest that year. Nonetheless there were important issues being debated behind closed doors. Both the Union Nationale and Liberals were regrouping for a fall session with an economic focus while the Gendron Commission continued their work. Immigration was where political action could be found that summer. Since the department’s powers were limited to integrating immigrants until a friendlier government arrived in Ottawa, Sauvé busied himself devising plans for infrastructure such as second-language schools, community centres and skills training. In this he worked closely with his ally Robert Lussier at Municipal Affairs and the Drapeau administration. Politically Sauvé had two other tasks: liaising with the cultural communities, especially Anglophones, and recruiting them to the cause. This was something his father had always done for Duplessis and it was a mantle he eagerly accepted from the outset. Since 1966 Drapeau had reconciled with his old Unionist foes, including his 1950s nemesis Paul Dozois. Both administrations were natural political allies, though for their own reasons political cooperation was strictly non-electoral. In public the mayor’s refrain that he would work with whoever held office in Quebec City remained constant. Yet privately he was drawing closer to the Unionists, who were ideologically and temperamentally closer to him than an increasingly progressive Liberal Party.



ALEX BORBOKIS, HELLENIC COMMUNITY OF GREATER MONTREAL: I met Pierre [Sauvé] when he had represented us in a school board dispute a few years earlier. It was July 24 when he called me and asked if I was interested in joining a ministerial working group on second language training. I asked whether this was about policy or politics. He said “the former.” We met a couple of days later to discuss the details, including fellow members, and he signed the enabling decree after that week’s Cabinet meeting. I was later informed that he only got approval on condition of including Education staffers on the panel. Such was the price of having the newest and smallest turf on the range. Off the record we also talked political outreach, and I agreed that localism was best. A small core of activists could expand to a larger network and eventually the riding association. Nonetheless, we agreed to shelve such plans until after the working group, which would last 2 years, was finished. What concerned me was Gendron’s potential effect on education, a subject often discussed amongst our group privately. When we met with Premier Johnson at month’s end he gave us further reassurances about consultations before any legislation was enacted, but warned that if deadlock ensued he would decide the outcome.



ROY: August 6 was when the FLQ attacked the British consulate. There were 4 killed and 10 wounded, though the consul and his senior staff were unharmed. Until that day the FLQ had been bombing mailboxes, with their Stock Exchange plot the previous year foiled. 08/06, as the day became known, ended what little mainstream sympathy the FLQ possessed. Within a year the organization would disappear entirely. Once the shock subsided, politics became all about stability at both provincial and municipal levels of government. Municipally, FRAP [Drapeau’s hard-left council opponents)’s support of the FLQ manifesto was their death wish. Beforehand Drapeau had been set for a sweep, now he was guaranteed one. Provincially, the Unionists had always embodied their self-image as enforcers of stability. As much as Johnson and Trudeau hated each other, both men used similar tactics to discredit their principal opponents, if in different styles on different issues. A hostile silence between federal and provincial government continued, given that neither Johnson nor Trudeau had any interest in compromising their respective constitutional positions. Nor was Trudeau at all willing to give Quebec distinct immigration powers as demanded by Johnson, Masse, and Sauvé. At the provincial-municipal level, the new Saulnier-led Urban Community (MUC) provided an outlet for further provincial-municipal cooperation. Johnson was immensely pleased with MUC, Drapeau somewhat less given how much power his friend-cum-rival rapidly accumulated.


TURNER: Trudeau’s refusal to grant Quebec immigration concessions, even though it is constitutionally a concurrent jurisdiction, was about principle but also personality. He had known Johnson since the 1940s and their relationship had always been poisonous. Trudeau thought Masse a crypto-separatist and though he had never met Sauvé, instinctively disliked him as a “CEO’s pet junior executive” and unapologetic right-wing conservative. Politically, the principals had been on opposite sides of Duplessis-era barricades and never really relinquished that mentality. Throughout his premiership Trudeau adamantly refused to budge on immigration even as the provincial government successfully exploited our stance for their own partisan benefit. I believed then and now, as subsequent history has shown, that Quebec’s immigration demands and those of other provinces were perfectly reasonable. Overall, Quebec was not as important as a couple of years earlier given the foreign and socioeconomic files we dealt with in ’70-’71. Despite our stratospheric poll numbers, Trudeau’s glow had faded: he was a politically mortal prime minister rather than the 1968 icon, which we all knew wouldn’t last. Every time I looked across the aisle at Diefenbaker, I remembered well how that process played out. Trudeau needed to post real economic gains if he wanted an easy ride in 1972, which at that time looked eminently achievable.



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MULRONEY: That September we were busy plotting election strategy with our “O-ring”, the ministers interested in helping us federally. That group included Paul Dozois, Clement Vincent, Maurice Bellemare and Pierre Sauvé. While we all wanted to wipe out Social Credit, their entrenched support meant that could not be done without a massive and direct intervention similar to 1958. Johnson refused to even consider such an option, since he did not want to help us that much and attendant local problems with it would be too risky. At least until the PQ was destroyed provincially, since Johnson saw them as his sleeper foe. So we decided to aim for a 1957 strategy focused on a handful of winnable ridings which were provincially blue and federally red. They were mostly in small towns rather than suburbia or rural areas, susceptible to a strong ground game. While Johnson had refused to wipe out Social Credit, we did need to suppress their vote in winnable ridings if we were to win. That was a primary task of our Unionist friends. In 1968 several had slipped away thanks to Trudeau’s wave and Socred vote-splitting. I could agree with the Gang’s assessment that part of the problem was that in our [PC] attempt to urbanize the party, we had neglected rural voters. Clement Vincent told us “rural voters won’t vote for you if don’t vote for them”, and without certain policy adjustments we had little chance of winning those ridings. Bob Stanfield needed little encouragement on this front, and I recommended that we make further adjustments to our rural policies.
 
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