The problem is this is basically consequences, not or something that direcrly follows it. If your PoD is Ivan IV having another character, childhood, whatever else it also requires a lot of earlier changes potentially butterflying away Livonian War as a whole if not the whole foreign policy. Moreover you started with showing 1577 map which presumably offers PoD around that year, and I argued that this is far too late for a win of any kind. The best Russia can hope with PoD that late is a draw
I said nothing about Ivan's childhood but for successful implementation of the Livonian War (as in the title) you definitely need a different personality because Ivan of the OTL simply could not fulfill the requirement: "Russia wins over Sweden and Poland-Lithuania, and maintaining its conquest (at least a few years)". The OTL Tsardom would not fit the bill which means that there should be serious changes prior to the Livonian War.
Sorry for the confusion: map of 1577 was used just because it is showing the maximum extent of the Russian expansion. I did not stress any specific date. However, in OTL the Tsardom was still on the offensive in Livonia and Finland (against the Swedes) in 1573 - 1575. "Ivan's campaign reached its height in 1576 when another 30,000 Russian soldiers crossed into Livonia in 1577 and devastated Danish areas in retaliation for the Danish acquisition of Hapsal, Leal and Lode... The conquered territories submitted to Ivan or his vassal, Magnus, declared monarch of the
Kingdom of Livonia in 1570." (
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Livonian_War#Danish_and_Swedish_interventions) Of course, soon enough Magnus defected but this besides the point.
Approximately at that time (at least after 1572) Ivan switched to "a new strategy whereby he relied on tens of thousands of native troops, Cossacks and Tatars instead of a few thousand skilled troops and mercenaries, as was the practice of his adversaries". Which means that reliance upon the existing modern troops (and their further development) was abandoned in a favor of the old Asiatic-style warfare.
I have no idea what amounts to a "draw" for you so please be more specific.
Not really, no. After he conducted his reforms Swedish army no longer suffered catastrophic defeats like it did prior to them. Battle of Mittau in 1622 was a draw, battle of Wallhof in 1626 a Swedish victory, a battle of Gniew in 1626 - a draw again.
So what? Khmelnitsky was routinely defeating the Poles without any military reforms and without being a military genius. At Gniew combination of the field fortifications and steady infantry and artillery played an important role in stopping the Poles.
Regular infantry with the firearms had been created early in Ivan's reign and it routinely used the prefabricated movable field fortifications and had strong artillery. The problem was in inadequate training of both. Practically anybody with the ideas less bizarre than Ivan's (who started stressing the Tatar troops) would continue in this direction, especially taking into an account that there already was plenty of experience and expertise all around starting from the Janissary and all the way to the Western warfare.
BTW, GA's reforms were not a pure inspiration of a genius: the successful model was already functional and he learned a lot from the Dutch, specifically
Maurice of Nassau. As for the "genius" part, he was over-advertised by the Protestant writers but, while Montgomery put him on a list of the great commanders he considered Wallenstein to be a greater strategist.
OTOH, closer to the time in question, in 1612 Chodkiewicz (unquestionably a great general) failed to break through to relieve the Polish troops besieged in Moscow: after a battle that lasted over 14 hours he was forced to retreat. The opponent were not Swedes but Russian "opolchenie" with the infantry consisting of the streltsy and dismounted cavalry. Cavalry - mostly the Cossacks and feudal militia. Neither was he spectacularly successful during Wladislav's Moscow campaign: using system of the field fortifications Russian troops (with the arriving reinforcements, up to 16,000 including strong German infantry) had been holding position near Mozaisk for more than a month against a bigger Polish force (18,000) and safely retreated (Mozaisk itself was not taken by the Poles who besieged it for an extra month). Neither was he successful in an attempt to take Moscow in 1618 even after the Polish army had been reinforced by the Zaporozian Cossacks (Russian troops: 11,500 including 5,500 irregulars; Poles - 8,000, Cossacks - up to 18,000). As you can see, even with what was available after the Time of Troubles and without any military genius on their side (just few adequate commanders), Russians managed to avoid the catastrophic results by sticking to their strong points: defense of the long-term and field fortifications. Of course, this did not always work (see "Smolensk War").
Now, as far as pre-Gustavian Swedes are involved, during the Time of Troubles Skopin-Shuisky had under his command 12,000 of the Swedish soldiers and managed to capture
Oreshek,
Tver and
Torzhok and cleared the north of the country from the enemies after which defeated Hetman
Piotrus Sapieha at
Kalyazin (assessments: Poles between 10 and 20,000, Russian troops: between 11 and 18,000 including 1,000 Swedes). The same winning pattern: defense of the field fortifications followed by a successful counter-attack.
in a battle of Torzok in June 1609 the Polish-Cossack army of 6,000 (including at least 1,000 hussars) had been defeated by the Russian-Swedish army of 5,000: while being initially successful against opponent's cavalry Polish armored cavalry was repulsed by the Swedish pikemen and then successfully counter-attacked by Russian-Swedish cavalry.
I would not make too much of the over-advertised Battle of Klushino because enthusiasts of the winged hussars tend to forget the background. After very popular and successful Skopin-Shuisky had been poisoned (presumably by the order of Tsar Vasili) and replaced by the talentless and very unpopular Dmitry Shuisky (who was suspected in doing the poisoning) the troops did not want to fight for Vasili (it is Time of Troubles with "loyalty to the regime" being something of a joke and Vasili never was popular to start with) and started fleeing at the 1st opportunity. After which
De la Gardie found his troops isolated and made a deal with Żółkiewski. The only really interesting thing in the whole affair was that Russian infantry already had pikemen besides soldiers with the firearms.
I am assuming the dates you mean are 1558 and 1559.
Again please allow me to contradict you.
Treaty of Pozvol which put Livonian Confederation under protection by Sigismund Augustus was signed in September 1557. In fact it was casus belli that Russia used to start Livonian War
Thanks for the correction. However, "protection" did not mean "ownership". As for the chronology, Ivan invaded in 1558. Denmark signed a protection treaty with Johann von Münchhausen, Bishop of
Ösel–Wiek, in 1559 (
Duke Magnus of Holstein took possession of the bishopric in 1560). Swedes arrived and formed Duchy of Estonia in 1561 (conflict with the Danes over "Danish Estonia" and with Sigismund over Riga - 1562). Russo-Lithuanian truce expired in 1562, Ivan IV rejected Sigismund's offer of an extension, attacked Lithuania and took Polotsk (Belorussia, not Livonia) in 1563. The first Lithuanian victories at the
Battle of Ula in 1564
[40] and at
Czasniki (Chashniki) in 1567 happened in the Vitebsk region (again, Belorussia). Union of Grodno (1566) tied Livonia to Lithuania. In the same year Lithuania offered alliance against Sweden with a proposal to split Livonia which was rejected by Ivan and only Union of Lublin (1569) put the Duchy of Livonia under the joint Polish-Lithuania protection. In other words, Ivan did not have to reconquer Livonia from Lithuania when he invaded.
However when I spoke about PLC challenging hypothetical Russian domination over Livonia I meant the scenario where Russia takes most Livonia ( or at least all Livonia on right bank of Daugava )while PLC is busy fighting Civil War.
Tsardom of Mosow took possession of a big part of Livonia in OTL before the PLC was created. The problem was with
holding these lands. As I said, if scenario assumes an prolonged possession of a territory it can't heavily rely on something like the civil war in the PLC: when it is over, Ivan is in the deep s--t if everything else is the same as in OTL.
I argued that had Russia been able to take more than it did IOTL in 1577 (or alternatively for longer) it would not end up great for Russia in pretty much the same way as fighting in Livonia in 1600-1611 didn’t end up great for Sweden. Sweden IOTL was defeated and lost Pernau, Russia, even it manages to hold Livonia for longer time than it did IOTL, would be defeated and would lose conquests in Livonia as soon as PLC has time to divert attention to the east.
Well, in OTL Muscovite state (which was not called "Russia") had been defeated and soon afterwards passed through a prolonged period of internal turmoil known as Time of Troubles so there is no need to keep stating the obvious (no offense). The question is how could it retain the area without the ASBs. As far as I can tell, your idea is that the PLC of that period was an unstoppable Juggernaut capable to run over each and every of its neighbors just by a virtue of having the wonderful heavy cavalry. I happen to disagree with an assumption that no realistic (aka, not involving the ASBs, Ivan being replaced with a technologically savvy time traveller from the XXI century, etc.) developments of the Muscovite military system could change this situation. Polish military system had its limitations, it regularly suffered from the shortage of funds and its weak points could be used (and had been used) by a reasonably competent opponent to his advantage.
Moreover the Russian situation would be much more severe than Swedish IOTL because the whole forces PLC would be willing to spend on the eastern affairs would be spent on Russia. Also Russian army is definitely not superior to Swedish even before Gustavus Adolphus.
We are going in the circles. I listed quite realistic things which could change the situation (and specific cases when they were successful). As for the "whole forces PLC" being "willing" to do pretty much anything that would take a prolonged effort, this was hardly the case. Even the outstanding leaders like Bathory and Sobiessky suffered from the shortage of funds when the war was lasted for more than a short while.
If Russia tries to hold for any part of Daugava’s banks lower than Drysa confluences with Daugava (as is the case with OTL 1577 year situation you have provided) Lithuanian export becomes endangered and every Lithuanian magnate would be willing to contribute resources to remedy this situation. Russia would not be able to hold conquests in such a situation
Here we go again: I explicitly stated in the 1st post that Riga is out.
As for the conclusion, it simply does not hold a water: look at the history of the Swedish-Polish Wars. In 1621 GA marched to Riga with 14,700 infantry, 3,150 cavalry and 375 cannons. Riga was defended by a garrison of 300 soldiers, plus 3,700 armed residents. Lithuanian Field
Hetman Krzysztof Radziwiłł had only 1,500 soldiers at his disposal. After Riga Swedes captured Dunamunde and entered the Duchy of Courland and in 1622 took
Valmiera. Size of Radziwiłł's army grew up to ... 3,000 with no artillery. In 1726 GA landed again with 20,000 and proceeded with capturing Livonian cities and ending with controlling the line of the Daugava. Lithuanian armies (no Poles) of
Krzysztof Radziwiłł and
Lew Sapieha did not unite due to the personal conflicts and after the battle at Gniew limited their activities to attacks on Swedish patrols.
The main premise that the loss of Riga and other ports would endanger the Lithuanian grain export is plain wrong: it continued during the following conflicts; it is just that the Swedes were getting the custom dues.
While one can find Ivan’s fault in many areas I don’t think not trying to develop regular infantry and artillery is one of such areas. It was precisely during his reign when Russia got decent artillery train and organized infantry that resembled proper pike and shot one: streltsy.
I said this how many times? The fault was (I'll repeat it again) in switching from this direction back to the old Asiatic methods of a warfare. Streltsy were not progressing noticeably from the initial status in the numbers and tactics. The same with artillery: its development was chaotic without an attempt to regulate the calibers, train the crews and incorporate it into the field armies.
BTW, streltsy were not "pike and shot" infantry. They were strictly "shot": their equipment consisted of the matchlock, battleaxe serving as a support for the gun and a sabre. But they already used pre-packaged "cartridges", which was quite progressive. Absence of the pike formations made them vulnerable to the cavalry attacks and in the field they tended to fight from behind the pre-fabricated wooden field fortifications. Adding a pike would not require a military genius: plenty of experience was available everywhere. Should not take a military genius to figure this out.
But the thing was that gunpowder based army was a lot more expansive than feudal militia. So while Ivan spent a quite a bit money on modern gunpowder troops, he also used feudal militia, Tatars and whatever else was at his disposal for cheap money.
This was, of course, a consideration but not something unique for the Muscovite army (you can start with the Italian Wars) and the feudal militia was not coming free of charge either. Besides a need to provide its members with a land, government had to pay them during the war time. As far as streltsy were involved, part of their compensation was a right of tax-free trade in a peace time. And, unlike the PLC, Ivan had been in charge of squeezing money from the subjects. It is just that thanks to his ...er... "specifics" he was consistently busy with destroying his country's economy and exterminating its population (population loss was something on the scale of 20 - 25% with agriculture in such a terrible shape that the English ambassador at Ivan's court predicted an inevitable catastrophe). A systematic extermination of the capable military cadres contributed to the general picture: if after a defeat the general had to either defect or expect execution (with all family), not too many experienced commanders would be around.
I think attributing to Ivan's inherent cruelty or psychological problems the usage of cheap feudal troops, that already were organized by Ivan’s predecessors and didn’t cost Ivan a significant amount of real money, is going way, way too far
I think that you did not quite get what I'm saying. It was not a matter of an immediate switch from one system to another and, anyway, feudal militia was a cavalry and so were the Tatars; none of them was an adequate substitute for an infantry.
The 1st Romanovs started developing the modern western-style infantry and cavalry without abandoning the old system but rather with gradually limiting it. As a part of the combined army these irregulars (especially the nomadic troops and the Cossacks) had been quite useful even during the GNW: they constituted a noticeable part of Sheremetiev's post-Narva army operating in the Baltic area. As for Ivan's personality as a factor, the switch presumably started with the Novgorodian "expedition" (which was clearly linked to his personality and in which the Tatars were heavily involved). The rest can be interpreted either as his personality (he seemingly liked the genocidal activities in Livonia) or as his general competence and sanity. AFAIK, there is a little doubt that by the 2nd part of his reign he was not completely sane.
