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The Allies halted their transportation campaign in March and April due to victory being imminent. Even so the damage done was so extensive that it knocked the armaments index back to pre-1941 levels, without the means to supply forces in the field with what actually was produced. At Seelow 9th...

The Germans would still lack the transportation network to support its forces in the field, including arming and feeding them. At Seelow the Germans held up the Soviets for some time before being defeated not only by numbers and firepower but also a lack of fuel, weapons and ammunition. Plus the...

Indeed, logistics would be the main obstacle. But there wouldn't be any kind of military recovery to coincide with logistics problems as in fall 1944.

Without ground operations distracting from the air offensive you're likely to have railway bombing starting anywhere from summer-fall 1944 and continuing nonstop from there. By March/April the German economy would be reduced to its 1941 or 42 armaments index, quickly dropping exponentially...

Not engaging Britain only hurts Germany due to the British blockade of the continent. By cutting off coal, foodstuffs, etc the British can undermines the economic system that Germany occupies, and without any pressure from U-Boats or bombing there's no significant reason to back out of the war...

As I've argued in other threads, the USAAF and Bomber Command would inevitably achieve air superiority in 1944 regardless of the USSR's status due to crushing material and doctrinal superiority. Once that happened trial and error would, as IOTL, eventually make it clear that targeting the...

Wouldn't happen, an intervention would have required months of laying the groundwork. The administration had to explain and justify it gradually rather than spring it on people in August otherwise popular opposition, a knee jerk reaction to Iraq, would inevitably make it political suicide.

Germany policy in Ukraine had no coherency - in fact there never was a point by point policy - which made it's management ineffective. You would have villages that cooperated for years suddenly be looted, raped, murdered, and burned simply because another group of Germans took over the are...

Oh another thing is that the Allies consistently utilized deception in their raids to avoid major German concentrations, so even if the Germans tried I doubt they would be able to deploy significant numbers.

Such an operation, even if it wins some tactical successes, would be a strategic disaster for the Luftwaffe. It would be a battle of attrition against the USAAF, a terrible move considering that in all engagements in 1944-45 the US generally came out ahead on the balance sheet for air combat...

Except Germany had behaved as the aggressor power up until that point. Not evil, especially in relation to Nazi Germany, but certainly at the time its behavior in Europe was blatantly aggressive and violent; invading and occupying neutral nations, committing brutal war crimes against them...

I indirectly referenced them when I referred to the Entente's reasons for wanting to limit Germany, to prevent it from ever being able to wage war on the scale it had previously. The severity of those restrictions was a natural result of the severity of the damage done to France. I was too...

Germany lost land that was populated by other ethnic groups (With the exception of Eupen, and a couple other areas like Danzig and the Sudetenland which were necessary to make Czechoslovakia and Poland more defensible and economically viable) or seized from other states, and had to pay...

Yet somehow was able to compromise and not have that happen, instead accepting the far more reasonable treaty of OTL. The Germans on the other hand refused to do anything but obstinately resist the treaty.

Erm, just the opposite, the Germans unreasonably refused to accept any treaty that was given to them because they believed that they hadn't lost and had been "stabbed in the back" by Jews and communists. The French and Britidh, contrary to popular belief, were entirely willing to moderate their...

There's no chance isolationism will take back hold in the US, it was dead by 1939-40. What you're far more likely to see is ramped up military aid to Britain to recover post-Dunkirk and once the Soviet Union is invaded ramped up aid there. The US public was adamantly opposed to a Europe...

Indeed, the implementation of lend lease had far more to do with the political climate of the time; people wanted Germany to be defeated, but initially with only minimal US commitment. During 1940-41 the US public gradually became more accepting of greater US aid to any combatant fighting...

Or even better, attempted to seriously negotiate with Stalin in good faith to avoid the M-R Pact.

His behavior fits entirely with the Nazi perception of the Czechs as for the most part Germanizable, as well as their economic management of the region which was similar to that of France and Western Europe. None of his behavior, political or economic, did anything more "rational" or "pragmatic"...

His management of the Czech Republic was no different than how other Nazis dealt with it, or other valuable occupied regions for that matter. The Czechs were higher on the Nazi racial ladder and they were economically valuable enough that the seizure of production yielded better results than the...