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The Chinese National Revolutionary Air Force Part 2 (Mid-War)
I just realized that for some reason, the latter half didn't post.
The NRAF and Ground Support
One should not mistake the reorganization of the NRAF into an air defence focussed air force into abandonment of Ground Support. The FRV was seen to be a suitable close air support plane and used in the same capacity pre-reform, as a decent dive bomber and ground attack plane. The surplus NRAF FRVs also meant that China never really developed medium or heavy bombers. There was no production capacity to spare and anyway, Airships were intended to fulfill that function.
The NRAF and Strategic Bombing
Postwar analysts would deride NRAF's obsession with Airships as a 'costly white elephant,' at a time when many Air forces had abandoned the formal use of Airships, China continued to invest and build more of them to use as bombers against Japan. The main advantage of Airships was that they could attain altitude that made it difficult for Japanese to engage in, more often than not, they could get away, release bombs and get away. However, on analysis - the NRAFs Airship bombing campaign was not strategically significant. There is no evidence that they damaged Japanese production in any meaningful way - there were too few of them. The failure to realize this and the continuation of investment in them was probably one of China's big mistakes in the Second Great War. It is true however that building airships did not really come at the expense of other type of production, the materials that Chinese airships used - reinforced wood, silk, helium - was not really used for any other aircraft. The propaganda value to them was also immense - while Chinese men, women and children were huddling and squatting in makeshift dugouts, they though they could take cold comfort in the fact that the Japanese were also doing the same thing.
The NRAF and anti-ship interdiction
Faced with the destruction of much of China's surface navy, the NRAF was also tasked with the unpleasant and difficult task of trying to prevent an invasion by sea and stop Franco-British-Japanese navies from mercilessly shelling Chinese coastal cities. This was not a task that the NRAF could do easily. It was already stretched to capacity trying to protect Chinese cities and Chinese armies from air attack and the impossible naval superiority of Entente forces meant that FRVs running bombing sorties had to go through a wall of flak and anti-aircraft fire. Air Marshall Feng Ru's assessment of the strategic situation was frank: "...The National Revolutionary Air Force will be unable to meaningfully interdict, repel or guard against any amphibious invasion..." The NRAF could probably make any amphibious invasion costly and expensive, but if the NRAF went all-out against an attempted invasion it would be "destroyed as a fighting force..."
The MS. 406 was the main fighter encounted by FR Vs and VIs. Against the Vs, they dominated, but they struggled against the faster and more heavily armed VI variants.
China vs France
France treated the China front predominantly with disinterest. She was disinterested because her mortal foe and existential threat to her existence - Germany was only a stone's throw away compared to the more remote China. And France had only reluctantly declared war on China anyway, so she didn't have much in the fight. Although French forces made initial attacks in 1939, the front quickly settled into a stalemate after indecisive fighting. In fact, by the end of 1940 - there were more Japanese troops in Indochina than French, a fact greeted with alarm by some.
The air war was an extended reflection of this, with the Chinese front getting the dregs of French equipment. Old MS.406 fighters which were hacked out o the sky with ease in Germany were a staple here and they cut through old FR Vs with ease. However, when the upgraded FR VIs made their way to the frontlines, they would hack through MS.406s like hot knife through butter.
Britain vs China:
Boston Defiants were one of the motley range of aircraft that Britain bought to bear against China in the opening stages of the Second Great War.
At the onset of the Second Great War, the China front was not seen by Britain as a 'priority' area. Colonialist attitudes lingered and it was seen very much as a 'colonial' conflict. So second-rate aircraft were stationed in the China front - aircraft such as the Gladiator, Boston Defiant, Fairey Battle, decent enough aircraft for their times - but 'obsolete' in Europe. It was a sign of how overstreched and obsolete the NRAF had become that these aircraft were able to compete at a competitive level - at least at the beginning.
As 1940 wore-on and more and more squadrons converted to the FR VI-a2, it became more necessary to prioritize modern aircraft to the China front. Hurricanes and Spitfires became common foes of the FR VI-a2s. The FR VI was an even match for the Hurricane, it was slightly faster, had guns and could climb faster - but the Hurricane could turn better, had a tougher airframe and more ammo. The Spitfire, on the other hand had the slight edge on the FR VI, being able to turn better, go faster and climb faster with the tradeoff being a light airframe (which the FR VIs cannons could demolish with ease)
The lack of opposition from the NRAF and conversely, the stiff German resistance to the RAF's strategic bombing campaign led to a discussion about bringing RAF's campaign from Germany to China. The conditions were right for it: close airfields, close proximity of Chinese industry and more importantly a growing sense of desperation and determination to end the stalemate by knocking out what Churchill saw as the Axis' 'weak link.' By the end of 1940, Churchill commissioned two studies: (1) If it was possible to destroy Chinese industry using Britain's Air Power. (2) A feasibility study on the use of an amphibious invasion to outflank Chinese forces...
The NRAF and Ground Support
One should not mistake the reorganization of the NRAF into an air defence focussed air force into abandonment of Ground Support. The FRV was seen to be a suitable close air support plane and used in the same capacity pre-reform, as a decent dive bomber and ground attack plane. The surplus NRAF FRVs also meant that China never really developed medium or heavy bombers. There was no production capacity to spare and anyway, Airships were intended to fulfill that function.
The NRAF and Strategic Bombing
Postwar analysts would deride NRAF's obsession with Airships as a 'costly white elephant,' at a time when many Air forces had abandoned the formal use of Airships, China continued to invest and build more of them to use as bombers against Japan. The main advantage of Airships was that they could attain altitude that made it difficult for Japanese to engage in, more often than not, they could get away, release bombs and get away. However, on analysis - the NRAFs Airship bombing campaign was not strategically significant. There is no evidence that they damaged Japanese production in any meaningful way - there were too few of them. The failure to realize this and the continuation of investment in them was probably one of China's big mistakes in the Second Great War. It is true however that building airships did not really come at the expense of other type of production, the materials that Chinese airships used - reinforced wood, silk, helium - was not really used for any other aircraft. The propaganda value to them was also immense - while Chinese men, women and children were huddling and squatting in makeshift dugouts, they though they could take cold comfort in the fact that the Japanese were also doing the same thing.
The NRAF and anti-ship interdiction
Faced with the destruction of much of China's surface navy, the NRAF was also tasked with the unpleasant and difficult task of trying to prevent an invasion by sea and stop Franco-British-Japanese navies from mercilessly shelling Chinese coastal cities. This was not a task that the NRAF could do easily. It was already stretched to capacity trying to protect Chinese cities and Chinese armies from air attack and the impossible naval superiority of Entente forces meant that FRVs running bombing sorties had to go through a wall of flak and anti-aircraft fire. Air Marshall Feng Ru's assessment of the strategic situation was frank: "...The National Revolutionary Air Force will be unable to meaningfully interdict, repel or guard against any amphibious invasion..." The NRAF could probably make any amphibious invasion costly and expensive, but if the NRAF went all-out against an attempted invasion it would be "destroyed as a fighting force..."
The MS. 406 was the main fighter encounted by FR Vs and VIs. Against the Vs, they dominated, but they struggled against the faster and more heavily armed VI variants.
China vs France
France treated the China front predominantly with disinterest. She was disinterested because her mortal foe and existential threat to her existence - Germany was only a stone's throw away compared to the more remote China. And France had only reluctantly declared war on China anyway, so she didn't have much in the fight. Although French forces made initial attacks in 1939, the front quickly settled into a stalemate after indecisive fighting. In fact, by the end of 1940 - there were more Japanese troops in Indochina than French, a fact greeted with alarm by some.
The air war was an extended reflection of this, with the Chinese front getting the dregs of French equipment. Old MS.406 fighters which were hacked out o the sky with ease in Germany were a staple here and they cut through old FR Vs with ease. However, when the upgraded FR VIs made their way to the frontlines, they would hack through MS.406s like hot knife through butter.
Britain vs China:
Boston Defiants were one of the motley range of aircraft that Britain bought to bear against China in the opening stages of the Second Great War.
At the onset of the Second Great War, the China front was not seen by Britain as a 'priority' area. Colonialist attitudes lingered and it was seen very much as a 'colonial' conflict. So second-rate aircraft were stationed in the China front - aircraft such as the Gladiator, Boston Defiant, Fairey Battle, decent enough aircraft for their times - but 'obsolete' in Europe. It was a sign of how overstreched and obsolete the NRAF had become that these aircraft were able to compete at a competitive level - at least at the beginning.
As 1940 wore-on and more and more squadrons converted to the FR VI-a2, it became more necessary to prioritize modern aircraft to the China front. Hurricanes and Spitfires became common foes of the FR VI-a2s. The FR VI was an even match for the Hurricane, it was slightly faster, had guns and could climb faster - but the Hurricane could turn better, had a tougher airframe and more ammo. The Spitfire, on the other hand had the slight edge on the FR VI, being able to turn better, go faster and climb faster with the tradeoff being a light airframe (which the FR VIs cannons could demolish with ease)
The lack of opposition from the NRAF and conversely, the stiff German resistance to the RAF's strategic bombing campaign led to a discussion about bringing RAF's campaign from Germany to China. The conditions were right for it: close airfields, close proximity of Chinese industry and more importantly a growing sense of desperation and determination to end the stalemate by knocking out what Churchill saw as the Axis' 'weak link.' By the end of 1940, Churchill commissioned two studies: (1) If it was possible to destroy Chinese industry using Britain's Air Power. (2) A feasibility study on the use of an amphibious invasion to outflank Chinese forces...
- CCA
- Word Count: 1k