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Cabinet papers - Police Auxiliary
(This Document is the Property of His Britannic majesty's Government) SECRET Memorandum
From : Home Secretary To : Prime Minister July 2, 1912 Subject: Creation of National Police Auxiliary Force I was asked to prepare a note on the possible creation of a National Police Auxiliary Force to be organised on military lines capable of being deployed to assist local police forces facing conditions of riot or unrest and so relieve pressures on the Army, whether Regular or Territorial.
I have had such a paper prepared and a copy is attached. While I do not disagree with the analysis of the current situation contained in that paper I would like to add the following observations. The creation of such a force would be a significant step away from the norms of policing in this country to date. I am referring here to the long standing philosophy generally known as Peel’s 9 Principles of Policing, although there is no evidence of any link to Robert Peel. These principles were most likely devised by the first Commissioners of Police of the Metropolis (Charles Rowan and Richard Mayne). They were set out in the ‘General Instructions’ issued to every new police officer from 1829 and I list them below:
To prevent crime and disorder, as an alternative to their repression by military force and severity of legal punishment.
To recognise always that the power of the police to fulfil their functions and duties is dependent on public approval of their existence, actions and behaviour and on their ability to secure and maintain public respect.
To recognise always that to secure and maintain the respect and approval of the public means also the securing of the willing co-operation of the public in the task of securing observance of laws.
To recognise always that the extent to which the co-operation of the public can be secured diminishes proportionately the necessity of the use of physical force and compulsion for achieving police objectives.
To seek and preserve public favour, not by pandering to public opinion; but by constantly demonstrating absolutely impartial service to law, in complete independence of policy, and without regard to the justice or injustice of the substance of individual laws, by ready offering of individual service and friendship to all members of the public without regard to their wealth or social standing, by ready exercise of courtesy and friendly good humour; and by ready offering of individual sacrifice in protecting and preserving life.
To use physical force only when the exercise of persuasion, advice and warning is found to be insufficient to obtain public co-operation to an extent necessary to secure observance of law or to restore order, and to use only the minimum degree of physical force which is necessary on any particular occasion for achieving a police objective.
To maintain at all times a relationship with the public that gives reality to the historic tradition that the police are the public and that the public are the police, the police being only members of the public who are paid to give full time attention to duties which are incumbent on every citizen in the interests of community welfare and existence.
To recognise always the need for strict adherence to police-executive functions, and to refrain from even seeming to usurp the powers of the judiciary of avenging individuals or the State, and of authoritatively judging guilt and punishing the guilty.
To recognise always that the test of police efficiency is the absence of crime and disorder, and not the visible evidence of police action in dealing with them.
This philosophy derives not from fear but almost exclusively from public co-operation with the police, induced by behaviour on their part which secures and maintains for them the approval, respect and affection of the public. It is unique in history and throughout the world.
Examples from other countries demonstrate that the mere existence of gendarmerie such as this can often be a provocation rather than a deterrent. They have in times of political upheaval become a focus for malcontents and for action against the interests of the state rather than in its support. They may be seen as 'private armies' having personal allegiance to an individual rather than the Office of State they hold. All of these suggest that the creation of such a forces should not be undertaken lightly but only when faced with the most extreme provocations. I do not believe we are yet in that state. [Handwritten note in Asquith's hand: defer consideration]