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Chapter 9: The Doe review
Title: The Doe Review
‘Do you know what astonished me most in the world? The inability of force to create anything. In the long run the sword is always beaten by the spirit. Soldiers usually win battles and generals get the credit for them... If they want peace, nations should avoid the pin pricks that precede cannon shots.’
Napoleon Bonaparte
Upon independence the Kingdom of Vietnam faced a pressing problem, namely creating a National Army from the VNQDD forces and those who had fought for France. An apt comparison is George Washington fusing a united army from the Continental Army and the Loyalist remnants.
An example of integration at work is illustrated by the four battalions comprising the ‘Tonkinese Rifles’ were renamed the ‘the Rifles’ following independence. The unit remained a light infantry force and retained all of their battle honours with the exception of those earned within Vietnam. In recognition of their previous legacy as a French unit, all soldiers are entitled to wear the fourragere in recognition of their origins and all privates are referred to as a skirmished. The unit has a relationship with the French Troupes de Marine and the British Army regiment ‘the Rifles.’
At a Service Chief level the inaugural heads were: Chief of the Army - General Van Tien Dung, with the Chief of the Air Force - General Trinh whom became the inaugural Chief of the General Staff and Chief of the Navy was a loaned officer Captain Arleigh Burke, USN.
Following independence the Vietnamese government prioritised the rehabilitation of the country over their military capability. Their once impressive military that had spearheaded the August Storm offensive, had atrophied after four years of neglect. The impact of these cuts were keenly felt as Vietnamese soldiers lacking sufficient tanks, anti tank weapons and artillery were deployed to the border to nervously glance over the border at a larger and better equipped Red Chinese force.
With the victory of the Chinese communists in the Chinese civil war in 1949, the Vietnamese military was reorganised to face the looming threat on their borders. The majority of the war fighting element was situated in I Corps (Tonkin), with the remaining two Corps (Annam and Cochinchina) having a smaller force. Recognising the difficulty they would have in stopping the Red Chinese juggernaut American military assistance with reforming their military and with American financial and military support the Army became the backbone of the state.
Major General Jens A Doe, who originally been slated to retire was dispatched to Vietnam, under the auspices of the Military Assistance and Advisory Command, to report on the situation facing the Kingdom and to draft a paper on the ideal structure of the Vietnamese Army. This paper became known as the Doe Review. Although General Doe initially envisioned a force of 150,000 soldiers, upon seeing the tactical situation was persuaded to increase that force to 180,000 soldiers and expand the National Police Field Force to 40,000 to deal with the low level communist insurrection and assorted ethnic tensions.
As a consequence American advisers after completing a six week cultural course were embedded in Vietnamese training establishments, supply depots and staff headquarters units. Vietnamese officers and senior soldiers were sent en masse to training courses conducted in the United States, Okinawa and the Philippines.
Following a chance meeting at the Pentagon, between the head of the Imperial General Staff Field Marshall Sir William Slim and Major General Doe regarding counter insurgency. He recommended that the Army should have a limited counter insurgency role with its main focus on being able to stop a conventional invasion. The National Police Field Force with its special constables would bear the brunt of the counterinsurgency campaign. He justified his stance by stating that
The main personal weapon of the soldier was the M 1 Garand, with the Model 43 submachine or the ‘Duck’ still issued to armoured and airborne units. Due to their ease of manufacture mortars were attached at the company level. A small number of M 4 Shermans were supplied to augment the existing M – 24 Chaffees in service.
As part of the Doe review a two year period of National Service was implemented for all males above the age of 18. The conscript following the successful completion of his basic and employment training would be sent to a unit that held affiliated with their home province. After their initial period of service of two years, they would be liable for continued training each year in their unit. A period of forty five days each year was mandatory and would coincide with the fallow periods of the agricultural calendar. The ‘activated’reservists would join their unit and relieve permanent soldiers that had accrued leave throughout the year.
Those that wished to continue serving in the military were sent on a three month promotion course before promotion to Lance Corporal for a period of two to three years. After promotion to full Corporal they were allowed to marry and this coincided with a posting to a training establishment. The junior non commissioned officer was viewed as the back bone of the Army, their time in rank prior to promotion would vary between 3 – 7 years depending upon their performance and Corps allocation.
Undergraduate Officer training was conducted at the prestigious Royal Military College at Dalat, the college held affiliations with the United States Military Academy at West Point, the Royal Military Academy in Canada and the Royal Military College at Duntroon. Two classmen were sent annually to one of their sister institutes.
Another alternative was the 12 month long Officer Candidate School (OCS) located at Thu Duc for those that held a baccalaureate. Upon receiving their conscription papers if the young man presented himself with an unopened envelope he could elect to serve as an officer. Alternatively if an ordinary conscript was deemed to be of a sufficient standard he was taken aside and offered the opportunity to serve as an officer. As a notable former soldier remarked of the then system:
‘As an officer you have three choices you can go through the front door – that’s Da Lat, you can go through the back door at Thu Duc or you can go through the trap door as a conscript. However it doesn’t matter if you come through the front, back or trap doors – someone from the front door will always be there to greet you.’
‘Do you know what astonished me most in the world? The inability of force to create anything. In the long run the sword is always beaten by the spirit. Soldiers usually win battles and generals get the credit for them... If they want peace, nations should avoid the pin pricks that precede cannon shots.’
Napoleon Bonaparte
Upon independence the Kingdom of Vietnam faced a pressing problem, namely creating a National Army from the VNQDD forces and those who had fought for France. An apt comparison is George Washington fusing a united army from the Continental Army and the Loyalist remnants.
An example of integration at work is illustrated by the four battalions comprising the ‘Tonkinese Rifles’ were renamed the ‘the Rifles’ following independence. The unit remained a light infantry force and retained all of their battle honours with the exception of those earned within Vietnam. In recognition of their previous legacy as a French unit, all soldiers are entitled to wear the fourragere in recognition of their origins and all privates are referred to as a skirmished. The unit has a relationship with the French Troupes de Marine and the British Army regiment ‘the Rifles.’
At a Service Chief level the inaugural heads were: Chief of the Army - General Van Tien Dung, with the Chief of the Air Force - General Trinh whom became the inaugural Chief of the General Staff and Chief of the Navy was a loaned officer Captain Arleigh Burke, USN.
Following independence the Vietnamese government prioritised the rehabilitation of the country over their military capability. Their once impressive military that had spearheaded the August Storm offensive, had atrophied after four years of neglect. The impact of these cuts were keenly felt as Vietnamese soldiers lacking sufficient tanks, anti tank weapons and artillery were deployed to the border to nervously glance over the border at a larger and better equipped Red Chinese force.
With the victory of the Chinese communists in the Chinese civil war in 1949, the Vietnamese military was reorganised to face the looming threat on their borders. The majority of the war fighting element was situated in I Corps (Tonkin), with the remaining two Corps (Annam and Cochinchina) having a smaller force. Recognising the difficulty they would have in stopping the Red Chinese juggernaut American military assistance with reforming their military and with American financial and military support the Army became the backbone of the state.
Major General Jens A Doe, who originally been slated to retire was dispatched to Vietnam, under the auspices of the Military Assistance and Advisory Command, to report on the situation facing the Kingdom and to draft a paper on the ideal structure of the Vietnamese Army. This paper became known as the Doe Review. Although General Doe initially envisioned a force of 150,000 soldiers, upon seeing the tactical situation was persuaded to increase that force to 180,000 soldiers and expand the National Police Field Force to 40,000 to deal with the low level communist insurrection and assorted ethnic tensions.
As a consequence American advisers after completing a six week cultural course were embedded in Vietnamese training establishments, supply depots and staff headquarters units. Vietnamese officers and senior soldiers were sent en masse to training courses conducted in the United States, Okinawa and the Philippines.
Following a chance meeting at the Pentagon, between the head of the Imperial General Staff Field Marshall Sir William Slim and Major General Doe regarding counter insurgency. He recommended that the Army should have a limited counter insurgency role with its main focus on being able to stop a conventional invasion. The National Police Field Force with its special constables would bear the brunt of the counterinsurgency campaign. He justified his stance by stating that
‘A counterinsurgency campaign can hurt, but if the Army can’t stop a torrent of T-34’s flooding across the border – then it has failed itself and the country.’
Noting the inhospitable terrain facing both sides, any equipment that was used by the RVA had to be reliable and easy to carry.
The main personal weapon of the soldier was the M 1 Garand, with the Model 43 submachine or the ‘Duck’ still issued to armoured and airborne units. Due to their ease of manufacture mortars were attached at the company level. A small number of M 4 Shermans were supplied to augment the existing M – 24 Chaffees in service.
As part of the Doe review a two year period of National Service was implemented for all males above the age of 18. The conscript following the successful completion of his basic and employment training would be sent to a unit that held affiliated with their home province. After their initial period of service of two years, they would be liable for continued training each year in their unit. A period of forty five days each year was mandatory and would coincide with the fallow periods of the agricultural calendar. The ‘activated’reservists would join their unit and relieve permanent soldiers that had accrued leave throughout the year.
Those that wished to continue serving in the military were sent on a three month promotion course before promotion to Lance Corporal for a period of two to three years. After promotion to full Corporal they were allowed to marry and this coincided with a posting to a training establishment. The junior non commissioned officer was viewed as the back bone of the Army, their time in rank prior to promotion would vary between 3 – 7 years depending upon their performance and Corps allocation.
Undergraduate Officer training was conducted at the prestigious Royal Military College at Dalat, the college held affiliations with the United States Military Academy at West Point, the Royal Military Academy in Canada and the Royal Military College at Duntroon. Two classmen were sent annually to one of their sister institutes.
Another alternative was the 12 month long Officer Candidate School (OCS) located at Thu Duc for those that held a baccalaureate. Upon receiving their conscription papers if the young man presented himself with an unopened envelope he could elect to serve as an officer. Alternatively if an ordinary conscript was deemed to be of a sufficient standard he was taken aside and offered the opportunity to serve as an officer. As a notable former soldier remarked of the then system:
‘As an officer you have three choices you can go through the front door – that’s Da Lat, you can go through the back door at Thu Duc or you can go through the trap door as a conscript. However it doesn’t matter if you come through the front, back or trap doors – someone from the front door will always be there to greet you.’
- La Rouge Beret
- Word Count: 1.1k