The Great War at Sea
Miscellaneous Addendum and Erata
Here’s something I pulled out of my butt a while back … for your perusal.
This is in no way complete, but it’s the beginnings of another project and may prove to be of some interest to some of you.
Comparative gunnery results at the Battle of Jutland
1st, 2nd & 4th BS
Shells fired = 1539
Hits obtained = 57
Percerntage = 3.70%
5th BS
Shells fired = 1099
Hit obtained = 29
Percentage = 2.63%
1st & 2nd BCS
Shells fired = 1469
Hits obtained = 21
Percentage = 1.42%
3rd BCS
Shells fired = 373
Hits obtained =16
Percentage = 4.28%
Heavy Shells fired by RN = 4480
Hits obtained by RN = 123
High Seas Fleet
Battleships
Shells fired = 1927
Hits obtained = 57
Percentage = 2.9%
1st SG
Shells fired = 1670
Hits obtained = 65
Percentage = 3.8%
Heavy shells expended by HSF = 3591
Hits obtained = 122
While just 3 of the hits included in the HSF BC total are on the British CA’s, 31 of the hits recorded by the HSF BB’s were in fact hits on British CA’s
So when looking at comparative hit totals on a basis of BB/BC vs. BB//BC the HSF obtained 88 hits compared to the RN’s 123.
This sets out a few interesting ideas.
Comparing the averages of the various groups of warships involved we see that with the exception of Beatty’s battle cruisers, there is not a lot to choose from in difference.
Another interesting note is that over half of the hits obtained by the German battleships (31 out of 57) were in fact recorded on 3 British Armoured cruisers at a reasonably close range.
What is possibly of more interest is that HMS Black Prince absorbed 12 heavy hits before succumbing while HMS Warrior was struck 15 times. The other 7 hits were on HMS Defence. While HMS Defence and HMS Black Prince both were destroyed by magazine detonations (which more than anything is best explained by their lack of armour considering the calibre of shells hitting them), HMS Warrior managed to take in 15 heavy calibre hits and still limp away from the fight to sink a few hours later. It raises some questions as to the perceived frailty of armoured cruisers in general and those of the RN in particular.
The two largest contributing factors relating to the catastrophic loss of the British vessels at Jutland were both based in the powder charges used by the RN. The first was simply its volatility and related speed of burn which caused massive over pressure which in turn allowed for flash burning. Without the ability to vent to the outside atmosphere this flash phenomena would follow the path of least resistance which sadly usually meant other areas of the gun mounting including the magazines.
The other factor was how the charges were stored and handled, which was for the most part poor. This was particularly so in the British battle cruisers, where some of the established safety features were actually removed to increase the rate of fire. The primary reason for this not simply for increasing the rate of fire for that alone. Rather it was to make allowance for the lack of gunnery training available to the Battle cruisers when they were based at Rothsay.
Another oft overlooked reason for the overall poor gunnery for the British was visibility constraints in both the ‘Run to the south’ and the ‘Run to the north’. In both instances the High Seas Fleet had the weather gauge advantage, allowing them much more accurate shooting. In instances of clear visibility the gunnery accuracy of the RN ships increased markedly as was proved by HMS Iron Duke delivering 7 hits out of 43 shots fired on SMS Konig during a period of clear visibility.
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**A note on the Invincible and Indefatigable class battle cruisers **
The two groups of ‘I’ class battle cruisers were only protected to a level of armoured cruisers. In fact, when the original Invincible class joined the fleet they were classed as armoured cruisers. It wasn’t until after that they were re-classified as battle cruisers.
Previous until that time armoured cruisers filled the role of heavy scouting and the fast wing in the worlds fleets, as well as providing a source of ‘expedient ships of the line’ in certain situations. The general success of the armoured cruisers in the Russo-Japanese War seemed to prove this out.
The ‘I’ classes were an evolutionary step up to an ‘Big Gun’ philosophy example of the previous generation of armoured cruisers. The one action where they were used in a more traditional armoured cruiser role (the Falklands battle) they did yeoman service.
At Jutland however, these ships, along with the armoured cruisers, were in a position they were never designed to face. While having close to comparable offensive potential in the case of the ‘I’ classes, their defensive protection was in no way comparable.
While the collective catastrophic loss of these ships was shocking at the time, and caused great debate ever since, what always has amazed me is that more didn’t meet the same fate given the circumstances. The combination of the armour (which was only proof against mid calibre weaponry),the volatility of the British cordite, the removal of safety systems and poor ammunition storage and handling essentially made them floating bombs.
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The Splendid Cats
The newer British battle cruisers were substantially better armoured than the previous ‘I’ classes, and while one of them, HMS Queen Mary, was lost to a magazine detonation, probably through a combination of the cordite, removal of safety systems and ammo storage, the survivors took a substantial beating and still survived.
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Hits on British surviving British battle cruisers and battle cruisers
HMS Lion
13 - 12”
HMS Princess Royal
8 -12”
1 - 11”
HMS Tiger
14-11”
HMS New Zealand
1 - 11”
Barham
5 -12”
1 -11”
Malaya
7 - 12”
Warspite
13-12”
2 - 11”
Colossus
2 - 11”
From looking at the results of the hits on the British ships if I was a cynical person, I’d say the battle results were all down to luck. If I was a person with a bias for the High Seas Fleet, I’d be saying it was poor luck that there wasn’t more British ships blowing up. If I was leaning more to the British I’d be saying that it had been unlucky that the German shells had found our magazines.
The fact remains that the High Seas Fleet managed to sink 3 BC’s and 3 CA’s. But out of the ships sunk 5 of them had the poorest protection in the Grand fleet, whose armour was in no way comparable to the standards of even second rate battle ships, they were essentially armoured cruisers if one was to look at their protection.
In the case of the Queen Mary the Germans did account for a much better protected British ship, and she did explode with terminal result. But none of the other British Battle cruisers or battleships hit faced the same fate. In the survivors the British system of protection, as troubled as it was, did work.