alternatehistory.com
The Split Arrow: The National Revolutionary Air Force in The Early Second Great War
The Split Arrow: The National Revolutionary Air Force in The Early Second Great War
...The early days of the Second Great War saw the NRAF outclassed, outfought and outthought. The NRAF's planes were technically inferior to that of the Japanese air forces, their tactical doctrine - focussed mostly on ground support was obsolete in an era of indepdendent air forces and strategically in a bad positions...
Cutting edge when introduced, the Feng Ru V was showing it's age by 1938 despite upgrades
One of the primary problems of the NRAF was in their obsolete air craft, although the NRAF boasted one of the largest air forces in the world with nearly 5000 models of aircraft in different makes the main fighter the Feng Ru V was beginning to show it's age. The FR V had originally been based on the Junkers D.I aircraft and despite many upgrades on it's engines it was beginning to show it's age. The main problem was that the chassis was far too small to fit a bigger engine and that it had reached it's potential for further development. This was a problem as 4/5ths of the NRAF was that of FR Vs. There needed to be a new fighter design that could fulfill the multi-role nature of the FR V.
FR VI refuelling
The FR VI, like it's predecessor the FR V and the FR IV would also be derived from a German design - that of the Bf 109. Early prototype production began as early as late 1937 with an initial 10 being completed by the time of the Amoy attack. The obvious inferiority of the FR V in combat against the new Japanese figher planes - especially against the "Zero" which could outclimb, outspeed and outmanoeuvre the FR V meant that the Japanese gained effective air superiority over China. Indeed, in the early days of the Japanese invasion the kill ration for an average Japanese pilot was 5:1. The FR VI would be a much bigger plane that could fit a bigger engine - however, it was not due to enter mass production until 1939 where it would begin replacing the FR V, Chiang personally approved fast-tracking the mass production process to early 1938 instead.
Japanese bombing of Chinese cities prompted a major revision of Chinese
The tactical weakness of the NRAF was the result of it's role as a support air force. Indeed - there were no independent air squadrons with the doctrine suggesting that there would be one air squadron to one National Revolutionary Army division. The major flaw of this doctrine was it's inflexibility - it could not vary it's strenght whereas the enemy could. There were two main factors in the revision of this doctrine - the first was the Peking Pocket, rather than risk destruction at the pocket, many squadron leaders flew out of the pocket. This left the squadrons as 'indepdendent' ones and were used to good effect in protecting the air supply convoys of the pocket. The second was the bombing campaigns that the Japanese waged against Chinese cities. The garrison divisions protecting cities such as Shanghai usually contained only 30 planes which were greatly inadequate for protecting large cities - this prompted an ad-hoc approach where the area commands shifted planes to the divisions that needed them. But the two factors meant that there was little sense in continuing an obsolte doctrine.
As a response to the changing situation and obvious flaws in the current doctrine a revolution occured in NRAF organization. The NRAF was reorganized into a completely independent air force - as opposed to merely a theoretical one. The attachment of air squadrons to divisions was discontinued and there was - finally a centralized air force command. Although Air General Feng Ru had allowed Chiang to micromanage the air force - in return for lots of resources invested in it, Chiang was now too busy with the general war effort to micromanage everything. The air force was organized into a unified command structure with three major "commands" or missions the first command was the air support one - which would oversee the pursuit of air superiority in the battlefield and support ground troops. The squadrons dedicated to the "Air support" role were attached to Army HQ - not the divisional HQ as was the previous practise. The second command was that of "air defence" this was the attempt to pursue air superiority in China and defend Chinese cities - an early warning system was devised and implemented quickly. The final command was of "sea defence" which was the Chinese air force working with the Chinese navy to pin-point and sink Japanese vessels - as the NRAF lacked the means to pursue this at this point, most of the resources were directed to the crucial task of "air defence." With a reorganized command structure, a new tactical doctrine and a formiddable new fighter entering production the National Revolutionary Air Force was finally beginning to get ready to fight the Japanese on even terms. But first there needed to be the cathartic impact of a "Revengre Raid" for all that the Japanese had done so far.
...The early days of the Second Great War saw the NRAF outclassed, outfought and outthought. The NRAF's planes were technically inferior to that of the Japanese air forces, their tactical doctrine - focussed mostly on ground support was obsolete in an era of indepdendent air forces and strategically in a bad positions...
Cutting edge when introduced, the Feng Ru V was showing it's age by 1938 despite upgrades
One of the primary problems of the NRAF was in their obsolete air craft, although the NRAF boasted one of the largest air forces in the world with nearly 5000 models of aircraft in different makes the main fighter the Feng Ru V was beginning to show it's age. The FR V had originally been based on the Junkers D.I aircraft and despite many upgrades on it's engines it was beginning to show it's age. The main problem was that the chassis was far too small to fit a bigger engine and that it had reached it's potential for further development. This was a problem as 4/5ths of the NRAF was that of FR Vs. There needed to be a new fighter design that could fulfill the multi-role nature of the FR V.
FR VI refuelling
The FR VI, like it's predecessor the FR V and the FR IV would also be derived from a German design - that of the Bf 109. Early prototype production began as early as late 1937 with an initial 10 being completed by the time of the Amoy attack. The obvious inferiority of the FR V in combat against the new Japanese figher planes - especially against the "Zero" which could outclimb, outspeed and outmanoeuvre the FR V meant that the Japanese gained effective air superiority over China. Indeed, in the early days of the Japanese invasion the kill ration for an average Japanese pilot was 5:1. The FR VI would be a much bigger plane that could fit a bigger engine - however, it was not due to enter mass production until 1939 where it would begin replacing the FR V, Chiang personally approved fast-tracking the mass production process to early 1938 instead.
Japanese bombing of Chinese cities prompted a major revision of Chinese
The tactical weakness of the NRAF was the result of it's role as a support air force. Indeed - there were no independent air squadrons with the doctrine suggesting that there would be one air squadron to one National Revolutionary Army division. The major flaw of this doctrine was it's inflexibility - it could not vary it's strenght whereas the enemy could. There were two main factors in the revision of this doctrine - the first was the Peking Pocket, rather than risk destruction at the pocket, many squadron leaders flew out of the pocket. This left the squadrons as 'indepdendent' ones and were used to good effect in protecting the air supply convoys of the pocket. The second was the bombing campaigns that the Japanese waged against Chinese cities. The garrison divisions protecting cities such as Shanghai usually contained only 30 planes which were greatly inadequate for protecting large cities - this prompted an ad-hoc approach where the area commands shifted planes to the divisions that needed them. But the two factors meant that there was little sense in continuing an obsolte doctrine.
As a response to the changing situation and obvious flaws in the current doctrine a revolution occured in NRAF organization. The NRAF was reorganized into a completely independent air force - as opposed to merely a theoretical one. The attachment of air squadrons to divisions was discontinued and there was - finally a centralized air force command. Although Air General Feng Ru had allowed Chiang to micromanage the air force - in return for lots of resources invested in it, Chiang was now too busy with the general war effort to micromanage everything. The air force was organized into a unified command structure with three major "commands" or missions the first command was the air support one - which would oversee the pursuit of air superiority in the battlefield and support ground troops. The squadrons dedicated to the "Air support" role were attached to Army HQ - not the divisional HQ as was the previous practise. The second command was that of "air defence" this was the attempt to pursue air superiority in China and defend Chinese cities - an early warning system was devised and implemented quickly. The final command was of "sea defence" which was the Chinese air force working with the Chinese navy to pin-point and sink Japanese vessels - as the NRAF lacked the means to pursue this at this point, most of the resources were directed to the crucial task of "air defence." With a reorganized command structure, a new tactical doctrine and a formiddable new fighter entering production the National Revolutionary Air Force was finally beginning to get ready to fight the Japanese on even terms. But first there needed to be the cathartic impact of a "Revengre Raid" for all that the Japanese had done so far.
- CCA
- Word Count: 850