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The Limits of Endurance II
The Limits of Endurance II
What remained of the battered Army Group A in orderly retreat towards Peking. Heavy equipment such as artillery and tanks were left behind as there could be no fuel spared to tow them
Although there were trickles of supplies heading towards the Peking pocket, the situation was still desperate for Army Group A. The problem was not so much the Japanese or Manchurian troops, who had dug in and were making no attacks besides harrassment shelling - but the savage weather. The Peking winter which arrived early in December and continued throughout January would be one of the coldest in memory. The unpredictability of the weather was also a problem, as was the heavy snowfall. Some positions were simply burried underneath tonnes of snow and froze to death.
Compounding Field Marshall Bao Chonxi's problem was the long supply lines of the pocket and disrupted communications due to the snow-storm. In order to decrease his supply lines and prevent any more positions from being snowed under Field Marshall Bao ordered a general retreat towards Peking. From Peking a much shorter line could be defended and this also simplified the logistical problem of trying to feed so many troops spread out over a large area with poor communications and freezing weather.
Peking had the advantage of having shelter, troops could shelter in houses and huddle besides civilians who were trapped in the city with them. In any other weather condition, the effect of cramming so many bodies so close together would have been intolerable, in the bitter winter it was a comfort.
"...Things weren't easy in the pocket. We had to share our house with 4 soldiers and it was so cold that it was hard to get the stove going to cook food sometimes, not that there was enough of that to go around...Lots of animals were killed just so we could stay alive... dogs, cats even rats in the sewer were fair game... we ended up getting so desperate that the army resorted to shooting it's mules and horses just to get enough meat. Things were tough, but we were all in this together. I heard that even Field Marshall Bao Chonxi was billeted with a simple family and ate the same meals as they did and slept in the same bed..."
- Wenwei Xei in "We remember: Civilians in the Second Great War"
Qikou today
The Japanese High Command, although not ordering their troops to move forward in the attrocious weather, decided to find ways to cut the supply chain. They had discovered the fishing village in Qikou and devised a way to cut the supply chain. They would simply land troops there and take it...
Fortunately, Chiang had anticipated such a move and devised a solution - Qikou would be 'leased' as a "naval base" to the Americans for 10 years. Although it was somewhat humiliating in having to give up Chinese soil, it was done willingly and with the reason of protecting supplies to the pocket.
The Japanese leadership were stunned by the audacity of the move. Although they could not and were not willing to risk an all out confrontation with America - they believed they could make the Americans aware of the risks that being involved in this situation would involve. A sort of 'warning shot' was needed by Japan. They couldn't 'accidentally' sink a ship that was too high of a value however, sinking of a Battleship would be too much and couldn't be claimed as 'accidental' - besides there were no battleships in the area. A destroy could be useful to sink - but there were few and it was difficult to claim to have sunk one 'accidentally.' A gunboat? That was the perfect size.
The USS Panay gunboat
It was a cold morning on January 28 when the USS Panay steamed in view of the Qikou fishing village with it's colours prominently displayed. Suddenly, 6 planes flashed out of the sky and raked the gunboat mercilessly with machine-gun fire. Bombs were launched and the stricken ship sunk with nearly all hands on deck. The ships she was escorting looked in horror at the whole scene...
The Japanese response to the attack was schizophrenic. At first Japan denied responsibility and claimed that the planes were NRA ones - indeed they had been painted with the colours of the Nationalist Air Force, but crucially the attacking planes were not ones that the Chinese Air Force made or had had time to capture yet.
When this line of questioning was exposed, Japan finaly relented. It claimed that the attack was a result of 'rogue pilots' and paid indemnities and publically apologized.
The result of the attack was a loss in support of the Japan lobby in the US and a rise of support for the China lobby. President Roosevelt was able to use the attacks as a justification for increasing military spending and ramping up military production. Internationally, Japan lost even more face and her allies in Britain and France despaired of their inability to control their ally. As January drawed to a close it was clear that the American public and the international community had begun reaching their limits of endurance for what seemed to be the rogueness of Japanese attacks... Something had to give.
What remained of the battered Army Group A in orderly retreat towards Peking. Heavy equipment such as artillery and tanks were left behind as there could be no fuel spared to tow them
Although there were trickles of supplies heading towards the Peking pocket, the situation was still desperate for Army Group A. The problem was not so much the Japanese or Manchurian troops, who had dug in and were making no attacks besides harrassment shelling - but the savage weather. The Peking winter which arrived early in December and continued throughout January would be one of the coldest in memory. The unpredictability of the weather was also a problem, as was the heavy snowfall. Some positions were simply burried underneath tonnes of snow and froze to death.
Compounding Field Marshall Bao Chonxi's problem was the long supply lines of the pocket and disrupted communications due to the snow-storm. In order to decrease his supply lines and prevent any more positions from being snowed under Field Marshall Bao ordered a general retreat towards Peking. From Peking a much shorter line could be defended and this also simplified the logistical problem of trying to feed so many troops spread out over a large area with poor communications and freezing weather.
Peking had the advantage of having shelter, troops could shelter in houses and huddle besides civilians who were trapped in the city with them. In any other weather condition, the effect of cramming so many bodies so close together would have been intolerable, in the bitter winter it was a comfort.
"...Things weren't easy in the pocket. We had to share our house with 4 soldiers and it was so cold that it was hard to get the stove going to cook food sometimes, not that there was enough of that to go around...Lots of animals were killed just so we could stay alive... dogs, cats even rats in the sewer were fair game... we ended up getting so desperate that the army resorted to shooting it's mules and horses just to get enough meat. Things were tough, but we were all in this together. I heard that even Field Marshall Bao Chonxi was billeted with a simple family and ate the same meals as they did and slept in the same bed..."
- Wenwei Xei in "We remember: Civilians in the Second Great War"
Qikou today
The Japanese High Command, although not ordering their troops to move forward in the attrocious weather, decided to find ways to cut the supply chain. They had discovered the fishing village in Qikou and devised a way to cut the supply chain. They would simply land troops there and take it...
Fortunately, Chiang had anticipated such a move and devised a solution - Qikou would be 'leased' as a "naval base" to the Americans for 10 years. Although it was somewhat humiliating in having to give up Chinese soil, it was done willingly and with the reason of protecting supplies to the pocket.
The Japanese leadership were stunned by the audacity of the move. Although they could not and were not willing to risk an all out confrontation with America - they believed they could make the Americans aware of the risks that being involved in this situation would involve. A sort of 'warning shot' was needed by Japan. They couldn't 'accidentally' sink a ship that was too high of a value however, sinking of a Battleship would be too much and couldn't be claimed as 'accidental' - besides there were no battleships in the area. A destroy could be useful to sink - but there were few and it was difficult to claim to have sunk one 'accidentally.' A gunboat? That was the perfect size.
The USS Panay gunboat
It was a cold morning on January 28 when the USS Panay steamed in view of the Qikou fishing village with it's colours prominently displayed. Suddenly, 6 planes flashed out of the sky and raked the gunboat mercilessly with machine-gun fire. Bombs were launched and the stricken ship sunk with nearly all hands on deck. The ships she was escorting looked in horror at the whole scene...
The Japanese response to the attack was schizophrenic. At first Japan denied responsibility and claimed that the planes were NRA ones - indeed they had been painted with the colours of the Nationalist Air Force, but crucially the attacking planes were not ones that the Chinese Air Force made or had had time to capture yet.
When this line of questioning was exposed, Japan finaly relented. It claimed that the attack was a result of 'rogue pilots' and paid indemnities and publically apologized.
The result of the attack was a loss in support of the Japan lobby in the US and a rise of support for the China lobby. President Roosevelt was able to use the attacks as a justification for increasing military spending and ramping up military production. Internationally, Japan lost even more face and her allies in Britain and France despaired of their inability to control their ally. As January drawed to a close it was clear that the American public and the international community had begun reaching their limits of endurance for what seemed to be the rogueness of Japanese attacks... Something had to give.
- CCA
- Word Count: 880