…Debs had hoped to defer all questions about what form the postwar government would take until after the war, fearing that to make that choice now would lead to schism – or, worse, that the pressures of the war would lead to the creation of an authoritarian regime. The GDC had been established as a temporary body, after all. But by October, Debs had to confront the reality that he was the head of a body now responsible for governing most of the United States. Some questions had to be answered now…
…At the top of the list was the issue of wartime industry. As his Army of Manhattan had overran much of the East Coast, General Bronstein had placed much of its industry under military control and ordered production retooled to support the war effort. This had been generally accepted at first, but a pushback had begun, particularly as Bronstein’s demands increased and the supply of consumer goods became an issue. Several factories (now under worker control) had outright refused his orders, and he was demanding the GDC do something about it…
…After a rather tense discussion between Debs and Bronstein, the commissariat system was proposed (the name suggested by Bronstein). These were pitched to the GDC as a wartime expedient to be replaced by a postwar civilian government. The first two commissariats established on October 17 were the Commissariat for Industry and the Commissariat for War. The Commissariat for Industry would handle all industrial production, ensuring that neither the populace nor the military were denied vital resources, while the Commissariat for War would oversee the military effort…
…Heading up the Commissariat for Industry would be none other than Daniel DeLeon. Despite his immense influence on the ideology of the IWW, SLP, and eventually the ASU, DeLeon’s influence had waned, in part due to a period of poor health between 1914 and 1916[1]. He was still editor of the Daily Worker, but he had had to take a leave of absence from more intense duties with the SLP. Now recovered, he would take on the herculean task of organizing Red American industry. Fortunately, he had spent decades developing his particular syndicalist ideology, and would now be able to put it into practice…
…William Z. Foster, the first Commissar for War, had a similar task. He had barely assumed his duties when the Navy Mutiny happened. This greatly magnified his responsibilities, but it helped him deal with his single biggest problem: General Leon Bronstein. Bronstein had objected to not being given the position of Commissar for War while simultaneously being in command of the Red Army (and remaining at the Army of Manhattan’s HQ in Philadelphia rather than move to Chicago). What made him particularly hard to deal with was that he had proven to be an excellent general and Foster found it difficult to turn down his suggestions. The formalization of the Red Navy under Admiral Strauss put another voice in the room (so to speak – Strauss maintained his own headquarters in New York), and one of a career officer to boot. Strauss firmly rejected any notion that the Red Navy should be subordinate to the Red Army, even proposing that a separate Red Air Force be created (as would ultimately happen after the war). Strauss helped Foster keep Bronstein under control, backing the suggestions that had obvious merit and quashing those that were more about Bronstein’s ego…
…The commissariat system proved an effective one. Before long, new commissariats were established. George C. Porter, a congressman from Nebraska before the war, became Commissar for Agriculture. Benjamin Hanford became Commissar for Foreign Affairs, although he would have little to do for a while beyond negotiating with Canada to allow goods and people to cross the border once more. Far from being a temporary measure, the commissariats would become a permanent feature of American government…
- From A New Union: A Political History of the American Socialist Union by Hillary Rodham
[1] As mentioned before, DeLeon died in 1914 IOTL.